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Abstract 
This study investigates the household and community effects that arise from tobacco farmers’ participation and 
performance under tobacco contract farming arrangements in Mazowe District. The provision of land to A1 Fast 
Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) beneficiaries, attracted the re-entry of capitalist agriculture system and 
revitalised of smallholder tobacco production. Access to land was central to farmers’ participation, performance 
and outcomes from tobacco production. The study used the access theory framework, to track mechanisms and 
processes farmers followed when negotiating the use of productive resources to participate and generate income 
from contract farming. The study further tracks how this income was used and with what effect to the household 
and community. A case study using a mixed method approach was used with the qualitative aspect assessing and 
explaining the contextual, historical and contemporary phenomena surrounding farmer participation, performance 
and the use of the contract farming proceeds, all this with the aim of establishing causal links of contract farming 
to community effects. A quantitative analysis, based on a survey questionnaire and a sample of 150 farmers, 
measured the production and income outcomes of the farmers. Regression models and descriptive statistics using 
SPSS were used to analyse data from a survey questionnaire. The study found that contract farming benefited the 
household and had positive spillover effects within the community of Mazowe. Contract farming arrangements 
had a positive effect on employment, service provision and food security. Provision of staple food inputs, helped 
increase food production which was exchanged for labour.Increased income resulted in contract farmers 
diversifying cash crop production and investment into nonfarm activities which generated employment and service 
spillovers within the community. The paradox, however, is that most farmers struggled under contract farming, 
were indebted and dependent on the contractor, in a captive relationship, for continued tobacco production. Those 
who struggled had difficulty accessing cash advances for labour and assets needed to produce a quality crop. Logit 
results showed that resourced-farmers were more likely to participate, stay and perform well in contract farming 
arrangements while the poor exited. Initial resource endowments of farmers were an important determinant of the 
participation, production and income outcomes of participating farmers and that this was a source of social 
differentiation in Mazowe. FTLRP beneficiaries outperformed their communal counterparts in welfare measures 
tested, indicating the importance of land in rural livelihoods. After the FTLRP there was a tenfold increase in 
smallholder farmers producing over 84 percent of the tobacco under contract. The shift in land ownership from 
large scale farmers to peasants forced agribusinesses to negotiate resource providing contracts with small scale 
farmers. The contracts provided partial resources with the farmer needing to provide supplementary inputs and 
services. Prices were determined by market forces and were deemed unfair by farmers.  Farmers responded to 
these challenges through social relationships.  Access to land by deficient households, labour, production resources 
and better prices were negotiated through networks and social ties. Again, A1 FTLRP beneficiaries wielded more 
power in navigating the social relationships to their benefit, which could be attributed to their large land holdings. 
This study contributes to the literature by showing that contract farming benefits both the household and 
community.Tobacco production was revitalised by the re-entry of capital into smallholder sector, and small scale 
farmers mitigated the exploitative forms of capital through social relationships. For contract farming to contribute 
to rural livelihoods, there is a need for research to address resource endowment, power imbalance gaps and 
institutional arrangements that help build the poor’s asset holdings.  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.0 Introduction and Problem Statement 
The effect of contract farming (CF) on farmers’ participation in agricultural markets, income and 
production at the household level has been widely studied, though results are mixed, inconclusive and 
contested. Research has focused on factors that affect farmers’ participation in contract farming and 
effects on income, yet the question of land reform and its effects on livelihoods1 have remained on the 
periphery. This is despite the recognition that post-colonial land reform, accompanied by 
commercialising agriculture through contract farming, has positive expenditure and employment 
spillover effects on rural communities (Hall, Scoones, and Tsikata 2017). Furthermore, redistributive 
land reforms such as the Fast Track Land Reform Programme2 (FTLRP) changed agricultural 
production relations, market operations and peasants’ livelihoods (Moyo 2011a; Scoones et al. 2011). 
Central to debates on the poor performance of agriculture is peasant farmers’ lack of access to 
productive resources, land and markets, which constrain their participation in high value cash crop 
production. Though access to land is important for farmers’ productivity and the diversification of 
livelihoods (Chitonge and Ntsebeza 2012), scholars have skirted debates linking land, asset 
endowments and contract farming. Yet the need to industrialise African agriculture through improved 
technology and modern input use is a necessary condition to increase production for farmers with access 
to land (Mafeje 2003). As a result, contract farming is proffered as a solution without a clear 
understanding of the linkages between contract farming, land, livelihoods and the effects of ex-ante/ex-
post resource endowments. This study has investigated the household and community3 effects of 
contract farming using rural livelihoods indicators in the context of the FTLRP, which resulted in a 
surge in the number of tobacco producers with an increasing number of farmers producing under 
contract with varied outcomes. Further, this was accompanied by competition for contracts and 
resources among farmers (Moyo 2011a). The study has looked at mechanisms farmers use and 
processes they go through to access productive resources and markets to generate income, and how all 
these affect farmer participation in contract farming in Mazowe. This was done using a mixed method 
approach to explore context-specific farmer and contract farming dynamics within the Mazowe case. 
An access theory analytical framework was used to gain an understanding of the flow of benefits within 
the community (Ribot and Peluso 2003). 
The study found that contract farming positively affects household livelihoods in Mazowe, that is, some 
farmers earned large cash lumpsums, expanded and diversified their agricultural and non-farm 
activities, hired labour and provided business services that benefited the community. A paradox to this 
2 
finding is that most farmers were dependent and struggled under contract, were just breaking-even and 
debt-ridden. This study shows that initial asset/resource endowments provided incentives for farmers 
to participate and/or determined the outcomes of participation in contract farming arrangements. It was 
observed that farmers who accessed land through FTLRP and acquired assets had better participation 
outcomes in contract farming and generated more benefits for the community. Further, FTLRP gave 
rise to a large pool of small scale producers who transformed labour markets in Mazowe. Land 
ownership structure shifted towards black indigenous farmers. This deprived tobacco oligopsony buyers 
of  supplies from Large Scale Commercial Farmers (LSCF) who were the traditional suppliers to the 
tobacco auction floors. LSCFs tobacco operations were financed by commercial banks, who could not 
fund the FTLRP beneficiaries due to lack of colletaral. The oligopsony was then forced to re-enter 
agricultrure finance as contractors through their agribusiness wings.  Agribusinesses supply partial 
resources4 and farmers complement these by negotiating access with actors who control land and 
resources in the agricultural industry, which turned-out to be the main source of differentiation among 
farmers. Farmers responded to the exploitative re-entry of capitalist systems in agriculture, after the 
FTLRP, through innovative social relationships which enabled them to supplement the partial resources 
and  minimise the exploitative pricing tendencies of capital. 
1.1 Background  
 Agriculture is the backbone of rural livelihoods in most developing countries, however, poor access to 
agricultural resources such as land, credit, markets and labour affect smallholder (peasants) productivity 
and growth within this sector (Díaz-Bonilla 2015). In southern Africa, colonial governments forcibly 
settled indigenous people on marginal-poor-infertile land. This was followed by policies that penalised 
peasant agriculture, particularly urban bias in the distribution of infrastructure and other public goods 
such as education and skewed and uneven access to technology and exchange opportunities. As a result, 
access to land and agricultural resources became a contested arena.  Berry (1993) details how historical 
colonial events and dynamism within African communities affect the negotiation and access to 
productive resources needed for livelihood sustenance. In Zimbabwe, peasants were excluded from 
participation in such markets by colonial governments through discriminatory land reforms and 
legislation, which confined peasants to marginal land and markets (Moyo 1995).  
The government at independence sought to reverse land and market imbalances through the 1980s’ 
willing-buyer-willing-seller land reform coupled with input-output institutions that supplied modern 
farming inputs, services and incentivised markets to smallholder farm-gates (Eicher 1995; Mabeza-
Chimedza 1998). After 2000, FTLRP provided land to majority peasants who responded by producing 
for the market (Moyo 2011a; Scoones et al. 2011). However, despite accessing land, peasants still faced 
challenges in accessing capital, which was under the control of neoliberal international and local finance 
capital. This was worsened by the unprecedented nature of the radical FTLRP, which Moyo and 
Chambati (2013) claim to be one of its only kind in recent times. The FTLRP in Zimbabwe brought 
3 
with it new dimensions of land tenure insecurity risks and uncertainty in agriculture for both farmers 
and firms. The uncertainty and risks disrupted livelihood patterns in most rural areas, leading Dekker 
and Kinsey (2011) to argue for more detailed studies on the role contract farming could play to improve 
rural livelihoods. Simmons (2002) believes that contract farming could be of mutual benefit to 
agribusinesses and farmers, as they seek to tackle risks, uncertainty and build on the successes of the 
1980s. 
The government’s (1980-90) institutional support to communal and resettled farmers led to phenomenal 
growth in agricultural production, particularly staple crops and the welfare of the smallholder farmers 
in what is now referred to as Zimbabwe’s agricultural revolution (Eicher 1995). However, this was 
short-lived as policy reversals in response to Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP), deteriorating 
economy and FTLRP all combined to worsen the peasant farmer’s access to agricultural productive 
resources and, with it, a decline in rural economic activities and livelihood options (Potts and 
Mutambirwa 1998; Anseeuw, Kapuya, and Saruchera 2012). Following the 1990s’ market-oriented 
SAP and the 2000s’ land reform in Zimbabwe, agricultural institutions, such as extension services, 
farmer organisations, credit, input and output markets, were left dysfunctional. Rukuni et al. (2006) 
argued that these key agricultural institutions were systematically undermined since the start of the 
FTLRP leading to an unprecedented fall in productivity in all sectors.  Further, both international and 
local capital were hostile to FTLRP, thus limiting sources of finance available to beneficiaries of the 
programme. This led to an uneven access to farming resources, services and markets for smallholder 
farmers. Consequently, there was a reversal of the 1980-90 boom in smallholder agricultural 
productivity and living standards, as farmers with little resources could not sustain agricultural 
production. The problem was compounded by the worsening, hyperinflationary (89.7 sextellion per cent 
by 2008) economic environment (Hanke and Kwok 2009). 
Faced with deteriorating agricultural production, unprecedented inflation and the collapse of the 
economy, Zimbabwe adopted contract farming as a financing model to boost agriculture production 
through government-sponsored initiatives spearheaded by the central bank, and then the private contract 
farming initiative in 2004 for the tobacco crop (Anseeuw, Kapuyaa, and Saruchera 2012). Even though 
government reverted to a free market in 2009, access to finance did not improve with the dollarization 
of the economy due to unsustainable government budget deficit and uncertainty about land ownership 
as collateral (Anseeuw, Kapuya, and Saruchera 2012). This necessitated the continued promotion of 
contract farming as an agricultural financing model to reduce fiscal burden (Setboonsarng 2008). 
Contract farming was introduced to farmers with diverse and changing livelihoods due to differential 
effects of FTLRP (Scoones 2015; Scoones et al. 2011) with different outcomes. Contracting 
arrangements were henceforth negotiated between FTLRP beneficiaries and powerful, hostile and 
suspicious (of FTLRP) representatives of finance capital (some were white farmers who lost their land). 
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In 2016, government extended contracting arrangements, collaborating with the private sector in its 
command agriculture programme to improve resource access by farmers. 
Access to productive agricultural resources have a proven history of success in Asia and Latin 
America’s Green Revolution where governments providing public goods partnered with the private 
sector in providing services to the poor, which led to phenomenal increases in yields. It is within this 
framework that Africa through NEPAD adopted contract farming, which was heralded as a panacea to 
problems facing sub-Saharan African agriculture (NEPAD. 2013). In many ways, contract farming was 
seen as a launch-pad to Africa’s own green revolution, which would reduce rural poverty and promote 
economic growth, and partnering with private agribusiness, which is believed to facilitate access to 
resources to smallholders, thus boosting agriculture. In all this, the Food and Agricultural Organisation 
(FAO) has called for responsible investment in agriculture, that is, investment that supports food 
security of communities, among other positive community effects (Committee on World Food Security 
(CFS) 2015). In Zimbabwe, contract farming was adopted to correct deficiencies in the supply of 
agricultural inputs and services, which arose from the backlash to Zimbabwe’s chaotic FTLRP and 
marketing of output, so that smallholder farmers could improve their livelihood options.  
Early contract farming interventions involved state-business partnership in Zimbabwe (Jackson and 
Cheater 1994; Sachikonye 1989, 1991) and, after the FTLRP, agribusiness contracting arrangements 
with little government involvement have dominated cash-crop production (Moyo 2011a; Sachikonye 
2016), until 2016, when government partnered with the private sector for staple crop contracting. In 
Zimbabwe, tobacco contracting arrangements deviate from standard contracts described for other crops 
in that prices are determined by the auction market. Little and Watts (1994:9) define contract farming 
as 
…forms of vertical coordination between growers and buyer-processors that directly shape 
production decisions through contractually specifying market obligations (by volume, value, 
quality, and, at times, advanced price determination); provide specific inputs; and exercise 
some control at the point of production (i.e. a division of management functions between 
contractor and contractee). 
This thesis applies this definition because of its focus on the intervening effects in the contract farming 
arrangements. Further, the definition views contract farming as an institutional arrangement, providing 
conditional credit in the form of cash, inputs and services (for example markets, extension; technology 
and transport), where all these activities are coordinated and controlled by the agribusiness, in exchange 
for agricultural commodities produced by peasants selected on a criterion set by the agribusiness. 
Contract farming supports agricultural activities and production, a source of rural livelihoods, by 
providing farming resources and services through private and/or government institutions to smallholder 
farmers. Examples of these institutions include input-output markets, research and extension services, 
5 
and farmer groups that are involved in farming and yet benefit the broader community who can gain 
access to other livelihood activities emanating from contract farming activities. Social ties and 
cognitive5 effects create externalities in rural communities through information sharing. Despite the 
possibility of these spillover effects, scholars have focused on participating farmers and neglected the 
broader community, including contracted farmer-labour relations and the income effect that arises. This 
study extends the analysis of contract farming effects beyond the household to community. 
1.2  Objectives of the Study 
The objective of this study is to investigate the household and community effects that arise from 
farmers’ participation in contract farming arrangements. The supplementary objectives are: 
• Farmers’ production and income outcomes and how this can be explained by  
• Factors that influence contractors and farmers’ decision to participate in contract farming 
arrangements  
1.3  Research Questions 
The main research question is: What are the household and community effects of contract farming 
arrangements in Mazowe?  
The following are the sub-questions: 
a. What are the effects of contract farming on tobacco farmers’ production and income outcomes?  
b. How does the expenditure and investment of tobacco income affect household and community 
economic activities in Mazowe? 
c. How do factors that determine farmers’ selection and participation in contract farming 
arrangements affect the household and the community’s economic activities?  
1.4 Significance of the Study 
The access theory approach detailed in chapter 2 and findings of this study will redound (greatly 
contribute) to the understanding of processes and mechanisms that generate community benefits in a 
contract farming arrangement. The study argues that participation in contract farming, results in positive 
spillover effects to the community as farmers diversify their farm and non-farm activities. These 
spillover effects generate jobs and services that benefit the community. A data analysis based on Ribot 
and Peluso’s (2003)s access theory showed how processes and mechanisms farmers undertook to access 
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contract farming generated jobs and investments in farm and non-farm activities that benefited the 
community. Further, this analytic approach revealed that contractors preferred resourced-farmers (with 
initial asset endowments), most of which were generated from access to land from the FTLRP, power, 
social relations and identities held by successful farmers. These issues are often neglected in contract 
farming studies, yet there are a necessary condition and complementary assets to the partial inputs 
provided by contractors for farmers to participate in capital intensive crops like tobacco. The study 
compared A1 and communal farmers (see pages 8-9 for justification) who share similar production 
relations, from the same ecological zone, a departure from most contract farming studies that lumped 
A1 and A2 FTLRP beneficiaries thus clouding land reform and contracting benefits accruing to 
smallholder farmers. 
The study found that contract farming benefited the Mazowe community by providing employment, 
assured food security, new markets and services. Most farmers were dependent on the contractor and 
struggling under the exploitative contracting terms offered by the contractor. Those who struggled had 
limited access to cash advances for labour and had fewer assets. Again, access theory allowed the 
research to reveal that by expending resources to participate in contract farming both successful and 
struggling farmers generated employment and the successful ones’ used their lumpsum payments to 
invest in farm and non-farm activities that benefited the community. Contract farming provided 
additional resources/credit that enabled successful farmers to diversify their economic activities for the 
benefit of both the household and community. 
Access theory provides a critical perspective from which to analyse benefit streams from contract 
farming in a community and recognises the role of power and social relations in accessing resources. 
Complementary resources or initial asset endowments affect peasant selection, participation and 
performance in contract farming. A clear definition of enhancers/barriers to participation provides room 
for assessing who benefits or loses, how they invest or earn a living after participating in contract 
farming and how this affects the community. By so doing, the study expands the horizon of studying 
contract farming from the current approach, where most studies focus on the household, to a community 
level with its complex social relations. Insights into these processes contribute and expand scholarly 
literature on how benefits of contract farming are generated and distributed in a community.  
While showing the importance of the FTLRP in building assets, accessing contract farming and 
livelihood dynamics thereof, the study opens debate on how farmers can raise initial assets that improve 
their contract farming participation outcomes. This is important if the insertion of capital is to benefit 
both the rural elites and the poor. For researchers, this calls for further study on dynamics of initial 
endowments and contract farming participation, particularly post-FTLRP. This calls for research to 
inform policy makers on all the strands through which complementary resources can be provided in a 
contract farming arrangement.  
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1.5  Research Methodology 
This study investigated and explained two broad propositions about the effects of contract farming on 
rural livelihoods, namely: 
 Participation in contract farming is affected by contracting terms and initial resource 
endowments of farmers. 
 Contract farming leads to increased income, assets and capital holdings that benefit the 
community.  
The researcher tested these propositions within the limits of access theory framework developed in 
Chapter 2. Access theory is “the ability to derive benefits from things,” (Ribot and Peluso 2003:153). 
To benefit from ‘things’ one needs to expend resources to gain and maintain access which involves 
negotiations with those who own/control the resources. In doing so, this affects livelihoods, as parties 
get to expend and receive benefits and these processes deplete/enhance welfare of the parties. The 
theory argues that all this depends on the bundles of powers held by the contracting parties and often 
negotiations are multifaceted. A realist methodological approach was used to track the ‘processes and 
mechanisms’ envisioned in figure 2.1 to ascertain how there could generate community effects (Emmel 
2013; Maxwell 2004b; Patton 2015). 
The literature review shows that contract farming research is dominated by micro studies that focus on 
effects on the contracted farmer and the case study is the main approach used. Studies that 
comprehensively analyse the cases studied to include mechanism and processes involved before and 
after accessing contract farming are scarce. For instance, community effects arising from negotiating 
for resources and use of income are often neglected. Though Scoones et al. (2018) describe livelihood 
effects in Mvurwi using statistics and qualitative methods, they do not delve into processes involved in 
negotiating access and distribution of the resultant value. Further, the cases generally apply either 
qualitative or quantitative analysis. This study applies a case study approach where a mixed method 
embedded in a realist approach6 (Patton 2015; Emmel 2013) is used to gain a better understanding of 
the effects of contract farming than one single method can provide (Creswell and Clark 2007). This 
helps understand the effects of contract farming on processes of agrarian transformation and social 
change (Oya 2004:315) and rural livelihoods (Scoones 2009). The rest of the section describes the 
research design, case study area and the methods used to collect and analyse data.  
1.5.1 Research Design  
Creswell (2018: 4) defines mixed methods as 
...an approach to inquiry involving collecting both qualitative and quantitative data, integrating 
the two forms of data, and using distinct designs that may involve philosophical assumptions 
and theoretical frameworks. 
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In a mixed method approach, qualitative and quantitative approaches complement each other and allow 
for ‘multiple view points’, an issue that is important when trying to infer causality in a study (Jick 1979). 
A mixed method approach provides better understanding of the phenomenon under study where breadth 
and depth are provided by quantitative and qualitative methods, respectively (Palinkas et al. 2015). 
According to Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004), mixed methods help deepen a researcher’s 
understanding of a phenomenon under study. Jick (1979:603) observed: “…it can also capture a more 
complete, holistic, and contextual portrayal of the unit(s) under study’’. This was done through within-
method or between-method triangulation that strengthened reliability and validity, respectively. The 
impact of interventions in a community can have various causal paths that might not be explained by 
figures or qualitative data alone; quantitative data helped measure and quantify trends and the status 
quo, while the study benefited from insights from beneficiaries through interviews. In this study, the 
beneficiaries are the ones who identified the real perceived source of their benefit or lack thereof, how 
they responded to FTLRP disruptions, and who ascertain the value added to their livelihoods (Scoones 
2009). Therefore, integrating the two increased validity and acceptability of the findings for policy 
purposes. This was achieved through a detailed analysis of the Mazowe case study, where the researcher 
sought to understand the changes that occurred in tobacco production outcomes and livelihood 
strategies due to the integration of farmers into contract farming. A convergent mixed method approach 
was used for this study, and data collected, analysed and interpreted as described by Creswell (2018).   
Applying a mixed method approach is important in capturing the ‘heterogeneous’ nature of rural 
communities (Oya 2004), their differential response to technology and market integration. Further, 
qualitative data could be used to infer causality (Prowse and Camfield 2009; Maxwell 20004b) to 
remedy quantitative analytic deficiencies arising from selection bias. Most of the studies are concerned 
with the welfare of contracted farmers or comparisons with non-contract farmers, while this study set 
out to explain the effects of contract farming on both household and community livelihoods; issues that 
can be explained using a mixed methods approach. In this study, contextual and contemporary issues 
were understood from the ‘voice’ of the participants, while there was need to measure production and 
income using quantitative data. Furthermore, the study was conceptualised within an access to resources 
lens and Creswell and Clark (2007:12) argue that in such scenarios a mixed method approach is more 
appropriate and further observe that it “provides a bridge across the sometimes-adversarial divide 
between quantitative and qualitative researchers”. As discussed in the data collection sections, the 
researcher noticed that mixed methods require communication skills and time in dealing with a varied 
social group.  
1.5.2  Case Study Area 
A case study approach was used to unpack the above propositions. Mazowe district, which is discussed 
in detail in Chapter 7, was selected as the case study area to capture the A1-communal structural dualism 
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that exists within the area among peasants within the same environment. The objective of the study is 
to test the effects of contract farming at the household and community level after FTLRP, and hence 
selection of households that shared similar living conditions before the FTLRP. As discussed in chapter 
7, page 110 these communities are managed by similar traditional authority structures.Thus a 
comparison of A1 and communal presents a natural experiment. Further, no resource requirements were 
needed to join A1 scheme. This makes them similar to communal areas where most A1 farmers 
originated and hence the two communities are comparable. A2 farmers required a minimum set of 
resources, skills or income before joining the scheme, and hence are not comparable to the two 
communities. Further this allows the researcher to isolate the effect of land on accruing benefits.  
Tobacco production among peasants is on the upward trajectory having been the preserve of large-scale 
commercial farmers (LSCF) prior to land reform in 2000 (Scoones et al. 2018), which provides an 
interesting case of how peasants integrated into capitalist markets after accessing land under FTLRP. 
Mazowe is an interesting case given the historical responsiveness of the people to the moral economy 
7documented by Bessant and Muringai (1993). Further, tobacco was first produced on a large scale by 
smallholders after the land reform, which provided an opportunity to test how farmers responded to the 
disruptive tendencies of the FTLRP. In most areas of Mazowe, communal areas exist side-by-side with 
former commercial farms which were allocated to A1 farmers who are largely peasant. There is a 
historic symbiotic relationship between A1 farms and communal areas as far as livelihoods are 
mediated, negotiated and dependent on access and control of land.  Further, the influx of people from 
other regions into Mazowe A1 farms created complex cultural and social structures, which resulted in 
fluid and changing livelihood strategies. The introduction of capital through contract farming 
arrangements provides fertile ground to test the effects of contract farming within the access theoretical 
framework. A case study undertaken using a mixed method approach is therefore more appropriate in 
analysing the complex contemporary issues unfolding in Mazowe, (see a detailed discussion in chapter 
7), which could also have widespread application to other regions given the diversity of people in the 
area.  
Scholarship in case study analysis (Yin 2013; Simons 2009) has argued that the choice of research 
methods depends on three things, namely: the research question posed, the researcher's degree of control 
of behavioural events, and the extent that the research question focuses on a ‘contemporary phenomenon 
in a real-life context’ or historical events. While all five-research methods (experiment, survey, archival 
analysis, history and case studies) can answer the questions 'how' and 'why' demanded by the research 
question in this thesis, only experiments meet all these standards. However, the expense and feasibility 
of carrying out an experiment to address a social phenomenon eliminated it in this study, while history 
and archival analysis fall short on their focus on contemporary issues. Though a historical analysis 
would utilise the same techniques as a case study, the latter is superior as it utilises direct observation 
and interviews of actors involved in the case (Yin 2009). Simons (2009:123) adds they are “…useful 
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for exploring and understanding the process and dynamics of change”, which this case seeks to 
investigate. Therefore, this study uses an explanatory case study with an embedded survey used as a 
data collection tool to investigate the contemporary phenomenon described by (Yin 2009:18).  
1.5.3 Data Collection  
Quantitative and qualitative data collection was done concurrently according to the dictates of the mixed 
methods approach adopted for this study (Creswell 2018; Creswell and Clark 2007). Furthermore, 
triangulation (use of several techniques) within methods was used; for instance, in qualitative data 
observations, life history, interviews and document analysis were used, while for quantitative data, the 
survey questionnaire was complemented with secondary data from TIMB and Zimbabwe Statistical 
Agency (ZIMSTAT). Prowse and Camfield (2009) found life history to be strong complements to 
survey data in explaining causal relationships. A concurrent triangulation method, that is, simultaneous 
collection of data using both qualitative and quantitative techniques was used to collect data, “…in an 
attempt to confirm, cross-validate, or corroborate findings” (Creswell et al. 2003:183). For the peasants, 
data was collected for the same variables, and concepts detailed in the structured questionnaire to allow 
for complementarity within the data sets, validation, verification of facts and breadth and depth and 
understanding of the phenomenon under study. However, in-depth interviews with key informants 
inquired about processes of social change, implications on policy, livelihoods and how development 
could arise from contract farming interventions given power imbalances among the actors. This section 
describes the data collection techniques applied, and methods used to select participants. 
1.5.3.1 The Sample  
According to the Zimbabwe Statistical Agency, Mazowe has a population of 232 885 and 55 997 
households with an average family size of 4.1. These households are spread over 35 wards (ZIMSTATS 
2012). On average, each ward consists of 1 600 households, which provided a sampling frame at the 
ward level. However, not all wards8 are involved in tobacco production thus necessitating purposive 
and multi-stage probability sampling techniques (Creswell 2018; Teddlie and Yu 2007) to select wards 
and then participants and actors who would best help answer research questions for this study. All this 
was driven by the propositions under investigation and as per realist sampling techniques9 (Emmel 
2013; Patton 2015). Purposive10 and probability11 sampling were used for qualitative and quantitative 
data collection respectively and at times both techniques were applied depending on the data needs. 
Selection of the sample started with purposively identifying five wards that met the researcher’s 
information needs. For instance, wards that were involved in contracted and non-contracted tobacco 
production, A1 settlements that exist side-by-side with communal areas and areas where multiple 
livelihood strategies existed (for example farming, mining) and served by the same institutions and 
infrastructure. Ward 9 is a communal settlement with established irrigation infrastructure (which is 
important for agricultural based livelihoods). While Ward 10 is communal and relies on rain-fed 
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agriculture, Wards 15 and 32 are predominantly A1. The community court presided over by the chief 
sits at Gweshe Business Centre in Ward 12, which was selected to capture customary structures that 
affect agricultural production. Given the set-up described in this paragraph, the sample allows the 
researcher to test the effects of contract farming on community economic activities. 
At the ward level, household registers kept by agricultural extension officers were used to identify 
participants. The extension officers had household data segregated by type of crop produced as well as 
by contract or non-contract farmer. Each agricultural extension officer is responsible for 400-500 
households, and on average four officers were allocated to a ward. One-hundred–and-fifty participants 
were selected from the five wards for the survey questionnaire. Each ward contributed twelve contracted 
farmers, twelve non-contracted farmers and six non-tobacco or farm workers. The distribution of the 
sample was meant to address spillover effects and the direct effects of contract farming on tobacco and 
non-tobacco producers alike. A simple random sample was drawn from the register kept by the ward 
extension officers. This was done after extracting the different farmer categories based on the order 
(Stratified Sampling) they appeared in the register. This was done to ensure that the three groups are 
represented in the sample (Teddlie and Yu 2007) and to also allow for generalisability of the study’s 
findings (Palinkas et al. 2015). Though all tobacco farmers are expected to register with the TIMB, a 
sizeable number in the sample did not have grower numbers and were therefore included among the 
non-contract tobacco farmers.  
1.5.3.2 Qualitative Sampling Techniques 
From the large quantitative sample, a simple random sample was drawn to select one participant in each 
category to allow for comparability of quantitative and qualitative data as well as to allow for the 
representation of each group when doing in-depth interviews and/or participant observation. Field 
observations often exceeded the one person selected. As farmers moved in groups when marketing their 
crops, seedling gardens were in close vicinity near water points and some routines were done in groups. 
To enable the researcher to capture extreme cases and outliers, purposive sampling of three participants 
per ward was done based on referrals (snowballing technique12) from the extension officers. These 
participants did not need to necessarily come from the randomly selected group as the major criteria 
were that they were outliers in terms of agricultural productivity and ownership of assets. The aim was 
to assess the success/limitations that affected these extreme cases in order to get rich information that 
characterised them. Where data saturation was not reached, snowballing continued. 
The researcher further used purposive sampling to identify key informants for in depth interviews at 
TIMB, Tobacco Research Board (TRB), Farmers’ Union, government officers and the farming 
community. Purposive sampling was used to select “information rich” participants (Patton 1990) who 
are experts and practitioners in agriculture production and development (Creswell et al. 2011). For 
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instance, officers at the farmers’ union and extension officers referred the researcher to high performing 
farmers. In addition to their extension work, they act as advisors on political (collective action) and 
livelihood strategies pursued by communities and hence were also key informants. 
1.5.4 Quantitative Data Collection 
Primary and secondary data were used for this study. Comparative quantitative secondary data from the 
TIMB on tobacco farmers and census data from Zimbabwe Statistical Office (ZIMSTATS) was used. 
Quantitative data were collected using a survey questionnaire (Appendix 4). The survey helped the 
researcher collect “structured or systematic set of data” through a questionnaire, interviews and other 
techniques (De Vaus 2002). What was important was to collect the same attributes for each unit of 
analysis. This allowed the researcher to be able to describe the unit of study and explain any causes of 
emerging issues. The survey questionnaire covered the demographic data of the participants, the use of 
inputs in agriculture, tobacco sales and expenses, investment patterns and preferences, use of finance 
services, assets, education, health, household expenditure, the sources of income, and community 
facilities attributed to contract farming. The survey questionnaire was administered to contract and non-
contract farmers, farm workers and non-tobacco producers. The questionnaire was administered to 
participants at their homesteads, gardens and other places of work or leisure and consent was sought 
and confidentiality guaranteed, which constituted part of the greetings and introduction of the purpose 
of the researcher’s visit. Participants were not comfortable to provide their names and identification 
details and hence some columns in the household roaster were omitted. Surveys have been criticised 
for their structured nature, however, in this study, multiple sources described in the next section were 
used to increase external validity. 
1.5.5 Qualitative Data Collection  
Interviewing was the key instrument for qualitative data collection with embedded participant 
observations and document analysis to verify and cross-check facts. The purpose was to triangulate, 
complement and validate information from survey results as well as to obtain new insight into issues 
that relate to contract farming. Further, the researcher used interviews to track “…causal processes” and 
mechanisms that gave rise to observed effects in the household and community (Prowse and Camfield 
2009:20) 
1.5.5.1 Participant Observation 
Kawulich (2005:1) describes participant observations as a “…tool for collecting data about people, 
processes, and cultures in qualitative research”. In this study, participant observation was embedded in 
interviews that were undertaken by the researcher where some participants were interviewed at their 
workstations or homesteads. This allowed the researcher “…to check description against fact and, 
noting discrepancies, become aware of systematic distortions made by the person under study; such 
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distortions are less likely to be discovered by interviewing alone” (Becker and Geer 1957:31). For 
instance, observation of tobacco marketing at auction floors was done after the questionnaire and 
structured interviews were administered to tobacco farmers. Further observations were also an active 
part of the researcher’s routine during fieldwork. Probing during interviews was a result of observations 
of visible assets such as vehicles, and operations in the seedling gardens and in curing barns. These are 
physically visible and accessible and hence Musante and DeWalt (2010:vii) observed that fieldwork 
involves "…active looking, improving memory, informal interviewing, writing detailed field notes, and 
perhaps most importantly, patience". All this allowed the researcher to establish causality and explain 
why certain processes and mechanisms led to observable outcomes. The researcher’s questionnaires 
were administered to participants while actively observing the context and environment that the 
participant lived in. Where necessary, structured questions were asked, and brief notes jotted on the 
questionnaire to capture the life history of the respondent. The iterative processes provided a better 
understanding of the context, for instance, of how tobacco was marketed and the actor constellation at 
the auction floors. In homesteads, interruptions during interviews by visitors from the community also 
provided opportunities to observe interactions between participants and fellow community members. 
People visiting to ask for or pass on information, share farm implements issues, and so on, were an 
important resource for measuring social networking and capital in the community. 
According to Musante and DeWalt (2010:264) this “…enhances the quality of the data obtained during 
field work and it enhances the quality of the interpretation of data” as it complements other data 
collection tools making it possible to triangulate. Becker (1983) suggests that it could be a yardstick to 
measure the completeness and accuracy of data accessed by other methods or tools, at the same time 
noting distortions and discrepancies emanating from the interview process (Becker and Geer 1957:32).  
The researcher was therefore able to observe the context within which transactions occurred at the 
auction floors, the power dynamics, how they were negotiated, underhand deals, how farmers interacted 
with urbanites and emerging livelihoods and the processes involved in bringing tobacco to the market 
until the final sale. In the agricultural fields, barns and gardens, the researcher observed the production 
processes, grading and relations of farmers and workers, while, during interviews in homesteads, assets 
and social networks were observed, which helped complement the questionnaire and in-depth 
interviews. 
1.5.5.2 Document Analysis 
According to Bowen (2009:29) “…documents can provide data on the context within which research 
participants operate” and “…such information and insight can help researchers understand the historical 
roots of specific issues”. Accordingly, in this study, the researcher used document analysis to 
understand the development of dual structures and social differentiation in rural areas, and how they 
impact on technology adoption and market integration of peasants. Through document analysis the 
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study also picked up on conditions that affected development of contract farming arrangements in 
communities. The study analysed documents such as Zimbabwe Tobacco Today (a Zimbabwe Tobacco 
Association publication with rich data on tobacco production and issues affecting tobacco farmers) 
Flue-Cured Tobacco Production Field Guide) a Tobacco Research Board publication detailing best 
farming practices) TIMB reports, government policy documents, ZIMSTAT 2012 Mashonaland census 
report, tobacco contracts and newspaper articles.  
1.5.5.3 Interviews 
The researcher conducted face-to-face structured and unstructured interviews in Mazowe and Harare to 
benefit from “…synchronous communication in time and place” and observe “social cues” emanating 
from the interview process (Opdenakker 2006:2). This was particularly important in Mazowe, where 
extra information was observed and illustrated by the farmer during interviews, examples of which 
included seeded operations, tobacco grading or even cues on how prices at the floor were influenced. 
Life history interviews, coupled with observations (described above) generated “…quantitative, 
qualitative and visual data” which enable the researcher to track processes that gave rise to certain 
outcomes (Prowse and Camfield 2009:21). Interviews were recorded with the consent of interviewees; 
however, some respondents refused to be recorded and notes were taken. The interview protocol was 
prepared to provide for a conversation that captured the research question within the context of the 
respondent (Castillo-Montoya 2016). Informal conversations with community members in their areas 
of entertainment also provided meaningful information about people’s livelihood strategies. This was 
made possible by extension officers and Tindo (see Apendix, 6), who introduced me as a researcher in 
these platforms, and hence people opened up on their livelihoods. 
The interview used open-ended questions and in-depth interviews with key informants, to allow for 
exhaustive discussion about their technical knowledge and how it has panned out in the communities 
they served. This allowed for the sourcing of valuable information on such issues as the dynamics of 
the land-contract farming nexus and the farmer’s life history. 
1.6  Data Analysis 
Bryman and Burgess (2002:224) propose that a researcher should “…articulate as fully as possible the 
processes associated with data analysis”. This section describes these processes for both the quantitative 
and qualitative data. Themes were developed for the two sets of data based on the structured 
questionnaire and the theoretical framework. The aim was to fit the analysis to the purpose of the study 
which is largely to examine the broad community effects of contract farming. However emerging 
themes from key informant interviews, document analysis and observations were captured wherever 
these helped provide insights into the research question.  
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1.6.1 Quantitative Data Analysis  
To infer relationships, there is a need to establish causal trends in the data. This was achieved using 
analysis of variance and simple econometric data analysis in SPSS to establish the relationships between 
variables. Descriptive statistics were used to compare national indicators and those from the study to 
facilitate effective comparative analysis within the emerging trends. Variables covered in the 
questionnaire were tested using descriptive and univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA), logit and 
linear regression model.  
1.6.2 Qualitative Data Analysis 
Qualitative data was analysed using both deductive and inductive approaches. In this dual approach 
data analysis is intertwined with data collection so as to establish emerging trends, and where necessary, 
issues were re-visited during the process of the research (Burnard et al. 2008; Mason 1994). Given the 
use of both quantitative and qualitative approaches emerging issues were revisited either through 
triangulation or search for more information. Again, given that data were collected retrospectively, there 
was a need to check and cross check information so that emerging causal effects could be attributed to 
the contract farming intervention. I adopted Mason ‘s (1994) two-stage approach where the first stage 
involved identifying themes for ease of data management and retrieval. This was followed by the 
‘creative’ part where conclusions and findings were generated through searching the “…data set for 
comparisons which help not only to flesh out the theory, but also to sharpen and test it” (Mason 
1994:103).  
1.7 Limitations of the Study 
Legal provisions restricted the researcher’s access to the Tobacco Industries Marketing Board (TIMB) 
database, which has information on farmers’ sales records and stop orders, and the data used was self-
reported by farmers. The self-reported income data included farmers with no grower numbers, avoiding 
debt repayment or side marketing. All this compounded contested limitations inherent in a case study 
approach in regard to the generalisability of the findings (Flyvbjerg 2006). There were also time and 
financial constraints mitigating against undertaking rigorous investigation within the timeframe for this 
dissertation. Assessing the ‘effects of contract farming’ would have ideally required baseline data which 
were not available. The researcher mitigated these limitations through concurrent triangulation design, 
seeking convergence and collaboration of data sources. Data were further augmented by context-
specific details as actors described and exemplified their daily activities in their lives. 
1.8  Research Ethics and Field Challenges 
Mouton (2001:238) argues that research on humans should be guided by “…acceptable norms and 
values”. This is critical for research in rural communities where social relations are considered 
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important and leadership structures are highly regarded. Community issues and events are normally in 
the public domain and hence to do research in the communities’ local leadership are important as an 
entry point. The University of Cape Town’s code of ethics was observed in its entirety. The principle 
of anonymity was observed, and pseudonyms are used in this thesis. 
Kruger, Ndebele, and Horn (2014) noted that respondents must be treated with respect and their full 
rights observed. This includes right to knowledge about the research, its purpose, aim, benefits, 
implications and risks associated with participant involvement. The participants had the right to ask 
questions which the researcher then answered. An informed participant then made a choice to either 
participate or withdraw from the interview. The researcher accorded the participants the protection in 
terms of confidentiality and anonymity they required. Creswell (2014), quoting Sarantakos (2005) also 
provides a list of issues that should be highlighted as part of gaining consent. This research observed 
such recommendations during the research process. Further, the researcher followed the university’s 
standing research protocols and read out a request to interview the participants (see questionnaire, 
Appendix 4).  
In Mazowe, a cordial atmosphere prevailed throughout my field research, which was also aided by 
people such as some extension officers who associated me with their clan. Dealing with officers at the 
Ministry of Agriculture was rather difficult, as I spent considerable time being shuffled from one office 
to another. This could have been because of the sensitivities involved in discussing the unfolding 
command-agriculture discourse (new thinking by Zimbabwe government of financing agriculture 
production), where its operation and success were subject of intense political contestations. 
1.9 Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into ten chapters. Following the introduction, Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical 
and conceptual framework for this study. In this study, contract farming arrangements are analysed 
within Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) access theory and Berry’s (1993) access to resources approach. This 
chapter describes mechanisms and processes farmers go through to access resources and eventual 
contracts. The chapter shows that farmers must expend resources in order to share in the value 
generated. The expending of resources has community-wide effects. The concepts of contract and 
livelihoods are discussed within the access to resources framework. Resources are identified as central 
in accessing contract farming and generating livelihoods, hence the three concepts feed into each other. 
Chapter 3 reviews literature on ‘the land question’ from an international perspective. The chapter 
discusses history of land reform in the global south, arguing that land reform is a result of unfair land 
distribution where the elites hold disproportionately large tracks of land which are underutilised. 
Therefore, land reform based on efficiency of small farms and equity considerations were instituted. 
The chapter then discusses redistributive and tenure systems showing that these affect resource access 
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by those who benefit from the reforms. The chapter concludes with a discussion of approaches to land 
reform that is state-led, market-based and participatory. In all this the influence of peasant movements 
is highlighted. 
Chapter 4 continues the discussion on land reform but more from a Zimbabwean perspective. In this 
chapter, it is shown that land reform supported with resources results in improved market integration 
and livelihoods. In contrast, Chapter 5 shows that radical land reforms that alienate capital result in 
declining productivity at first. However, the chapter shows that over time, farmers improve productivity 
as they build assets from the acquired land. The process is enhanced by insertion of capital from 
agribusinesses which provides supplementary resources. These two chapters show that land is important 
for commercialising agriculture. Access to land by smallholders resulted in finance capital penetrating 
agriculture through contract farming. 
Chapter 6 describes tobacco production and its role in rural economies, showing that it creates linkages 
and spillover effects that result in community-wide effects. This manifests through labour, production 
and value chain activities. However, smallholder farmers face constraints that limit their participation 
in tobacco production. This is shown by developments in Zimbabwean agriculture where supply of 
capital and resources were compromised during the FTLRP. Tobacco production is described to show 
the effects of commercial agriculture on rural livelihoods and the complexities in commercial 
production. Navigating these complexities involves expending resources that generate benefits and 
livelihood for the community through labour hiring, up-downstream activities and diversification into 
off-farm activities. This is the subject of Chapter 7. Chapter 7 describes livelihoods in Mazowe. This is 
shown through illustrations of the geographic and labour positions of Mazowe community. Central to 
the various livelihoods in Mazowe is access to land of which the FTLRP transformed access modalities. 
For communal land, access is through the traditional authorities or patriarchal route as detailed in 
chapter 7 ((Steen 2011). Chapter 7 describes the fathers’s responsibility to provide their sons with land 
and as a result this leads to subdivisions, in a process I term patriarchal route.  The chapter concludes 
by discussing insertion of capital in Mazowe.  
Chapters 8 and 9 present the findings of the study. Chapter 8 shows that farmers and the community 
benefited from contract farming and shows that resource endowments are critical in production and 
income outcomes of the farmers. During production, farmers employ locals, which generates income 
for the poor. The chapter shows that the income earned by the farmers is invested in diverse economic 
activities that benefit the community. However, despite this glossy picture, the two chapters show that 
the poor are marginalised and suffer under contract. Marginalised as they are, they also contribute to 
community welfare as they expend resources in hiring labour. Chapter 9 explains the results observed 
in chapter 8. Household characteristics heralded by resources endowments are fundamental in farmers’ 
participation and stay in contract farming. This is important, as it builds farmers’ initial asset 
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endowments and shapes the bundle of powers that determine the farmer’s stay or exit from contract 
farming. The chapter concludes by noting that power imbalance exemplified by uneven resources 
holdings affect the participation outcomes of farmers.  
Chapter 10 concludes the study by providing a summary of the key issues in the study. A discussion of 
the findings revealed that the FTLRP provided a launch-pad for successful participation in contract 
farming, which is in line with scholarly work in the field of land reform. It was also shown that access 
theory provided an understanding through which the interaction of contract farming and the FTLRP 
operated to generate community level effects. Through control and maintaining access, livelihoods are 
earned as farmers expend resources which become benefits to others. The chapter provides a summary 
of the findings and areas for further research, observing that contract farming benefited the Mazowe 
community, despite the majority struggling under contract.  
1.10  Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the thesis, identifying resource endowments as the epicentre of contract 
farming. As a result, the research seeks to investigate how contract farming participation and outcomes 
are affected by, resource endowments of Mazowe farmers. Contract farming was introduced and 
defined, and the deteriorating input-output markets in Zimbabwe described as the reason behind 
contract farming arrangements and differential asset holdings of farmers. However, FTLRP redefined 
production relations between farmers and finance-capital which shaped contract farming negotiations. 
The poor institutional arrangements have destroyed the once prosperous agricultural system in 
Zimbabwe. The institutions could have possibly been destroyed by political machinations that did not 
support development. By studying the effects of contract farming arrangements in Mazowe, the study 
contributes to the body of literature on development of capitalist agriculture in rural areas; specifically, 
how contract farming affects the household and broad community through, for instance, the 
development of local bourgeoisies who can invest locally, create employment and other economic 
activities that impact on rural livelihoods.  
The chapter then described the study area and the methodology used. The study uses a case study 
approach, where a mixed method approach is used. The processes followed in gathering and analysing 
data were described in this chapter.  
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Chapter 2  
Conceptualising Contract Farming and Community Effects: Access 
theory approach 
2.0 Introduction 
Contract farming arrangements discussed in this study are a component of vertical coordination in 
capitalist agrarian relations involving agribusinesses13 that provide capital and farmers contributing 
labour, land and at times capital. In this relationship, the agribusiness as an entrepreneur aims to access 
inputs for his industrial activities at a cost which is beneficial to the business while farmers’ (peasants 
in this case) concern is to access productive resources and markets for their produce. The farmer aims 
to receive a just reward for his/her labour from his prime source of livelihood, land, while the firm aims 
to maximise profits/value from the contractual relationship. The tension subsequently leads to 
contestations which arise with regard to the share of profits/value that arise. At the farm level, hired 
farm-workers are entangled in wage negotiations with contracted farmers, creating a web of value 
extraction at different levels resulting in community-wide effects. The relations described in this 
paragraph are often analysed from a capitalist system perspective, centered on the property paradigm 
and power relations. This tends to be inadequate where capitalist systems are not fully developed, and 
economic activity is driven by social relationships. Ribot and Peluso's (2003) access theory used in this 
study, provides a lens of incorporating social relations in the analysis of contract farming. Ribot and 
Peluso’s (2003) access theory argues that benefits are a function of ‘a bundle of powers’ held by agents 
in  socio-economic transactions. In a production and marketing relationship like contract farming, ‘a 
bundle of powers’ constitutes the various attributes held by agents for example assets, labour, education, 
identity and so on that can influence the use or exclusion by the agents. 
Bernstein and Oya (2014) classify contract farming as a post-Washington Consensus disciplined market 
intervention, which they refer to as" “market-plus”, accounting for the various roles played by agents 
in the arrangement. Following Ribot and Peluso (2003), this study analyses how, and under what 
conditions, farmers access resources needed to participate in contract farming and the effects of the 
same on production and income as well as on the farming households and broader community. 
According to Bernstein and Oya (2014:14), such exchanges should be viewed from the perspective of 
real markets14 and actors viewed “…in terms of their position in the social hierarchy and their relative 
power vis-à-vis others”. This implies that access to, and benefits from, productive farming resources 
and markets are differentiated by position in society, and hence, contract farming effects could follow 
the same trend.  
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To understand the effect of contract farming within a community, the interaction of actors, and the 
distribution of cost and benefits, this thesis is guided by Bernstein and Oya’s (2014:5) questions on 
agrarian political economy. The questions seek to understand, who owns, does and gets what from a 
contract farming arrangement. These issues have been addressed in contract farming literature from 
various perspectives though neglecting land, livelihood dynamics and the social relations in 
communities. This study further explores the fourth question: “What do they do with it?” Literature on 
contract farming has been scarce on this last question, yet it helps us to understand how the intervention 
influences the agrarian and rural economy landscape. Scoones et al. (2011) and Moyo (2009) observed 
that the FTLRP improved peasants’ livelihoods, asset ownership and participation in agricultural 
markets, yet few studies have analysed land reform as a facilitator of farmers’ entry into contract 
farming. 
The study applies Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) theory of access to contract farming, land and rural 
economy dynamics. Access analysis allows for the tracking of strands, mechanisms and processes 
farmers follow in order to participate in contract farming. The access analytic framework strongly 
complements the qualitative causal data collection techniques described in Chapter 1. This relationship 
is anchored in resource gaps between the contracting parties within their space and context, which 
necessitates innovative mechanisms to access contracts and benefits (Ribot and Peluso 2003). This 
chapter discusses the theoretical basis of this study, that is, access theory (section 2.2) and contract 
farming (section 2.3)  
2.1 Approaches to Contract Farming Studies  
Various approaches have been used to study contractual relations between farmers and agribusinesses 
of which Prowse (2012:26-36) identifies seven theories, namely life-cycle, convection, 
competency/capability, value chain, transaction cost, contract enforcement and the political economy 
of agrarian change. However, these approaches have not embraced the complexities involved in contract 
farming. For instance, they approaches skirt contract farming-livelihood linkages and “place and 
context dynamics” and, as a result, Bernstein and Oya’s (2014) questions on agrarian political economy 
remain unresolved. Such questions can be answered through a resources access lens, to allow for the 
understanding of the effects of land reform processes on peasant asset endowment and their subsequent 
participation in market-based agriculture. By looking at “…constellations of means, relations, and 
processes that enable various actors to derive benefits from resources” (Ribot and Peluso 2003:153), 
we can understand how resources (including income) are used to derive benefits for both the household 
and community at large. Through various mechanisms, actors in a contracting arrangement extract value 
from each other. Below, I provide the focal point of the main approaches pointing to their (in) 
appropriateness to this study. 
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2.1.1 New Institutional Economics Approach (NIE) to Contract Farming  
This is the dominant approach to the analysis of contract farming arrangements and it draws from 
neoclassical principles centering on the utility maximising individual (Kherallah and Kirsten 2002). 
Neoclassical assumptions such as perfect information, zero transaction cost and rational being are 
relaxed. As shown by Bernstein and Oya (2014), this emphasises market imperfections that can be 
solved through institutional means and, at times, in partnership with government to facilitate the poor’s 
participation in markets. This work is informed by transaction cost economics, which argues that there 
are costs to transactions, which inhibit agents from contracting (Coase 1937; North 1990; Williamson 
2007). Eaton and Shepherd (2001) argue that this is important in that it provides access to resources and 
markets to farmers. However, the focus is often on contracted farmers, neglecting the relational issues 
in a community, in which these farmers live. Bernstein and Oya (2014) opine that such an approach is 
oblivious to the perils of globalisation and the threats that it can cause to the local economy; for instance, 
their effects on community livelihoods. The dynamics of farmer selection and the participation of 
farmers are at times reduced to selection or self-selection bias without understanding the fundamental 
political and contextual dynamics at play. For example, most studies on contract farming acknowledge 
land as an asset that is critical for farmers’ participation (Scoones et al. 2018), the underlying social 
dynamics of land access, however, have remained at the periphery. Despite these methodological 
deficiencies, NIE has been an informative approach to understanding the benefits and cost accruing to 
participating households. It has provided valuable insights into identifying the questions of who does 
what in contracting arrangements and has been used to quantify household cost and benefits of 
contracting arrangements.  
2.1.2 Global Value Chain Approach to Contract Farming 
Value chain is defined by Kaplinsky and Morris (2000:4) as  
…the full range of activities which are required to bring a product or service from conception, 
through the different phases of production (involving a combination of physical transformation 
and the input of various producer services), delivery to final consumers, and final disposal after 
use.  
However, an extended value chain would capture and influence a broader number of actors. Bernstein 
(1996) and Raikes, Friis Jensen, and Ponte (2000) allude to the actors as political and contextual issues 
affecting the chain. Key within the chain is the generation and distribution of value; first among the 
actors directly involved in the value chain and broadly, within the community where spillover effects 
will lead to broader benefits for the whole community. Introduction of contract farming arrangements 
will permeate the whole value chain impacting on activities and services needed to support production 
and consumption in the community. However, it is not clear how the social structures are affected. Its 
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main contribution to value chain analysis is the idea of upgrading by either taking a superior position 
along the value chain or by improving quality through the adoption of better technologies (Bolwig, 
Gibbon, and Jones 2009). However, its main drawback is that it has “…not considered the broader issue 
of the terms on which poor or marginalised people participate in value chains” (Bolwig, Gibbon, and 
Jones 2009:4).  
2.1.3 Political Economy Approach to Contract Farming 
The political economy approach analyses contract farming from the perspective of class relations 
among actors and has been critical of the mainstream approach proffered by the NIE. The focal point 
has been on the power imbalance between the contracting parties and social differentiation arising from 
participation of farmers in such contracts due to capitalist tendencies to maximise profit through the 
exploitation of labour (Little and Watts 1994; Wilson 1986). Recent work by Bernstein and Oya 
(2014:15) points to the importance of resource differential within communities, which affects 
participation in agricultural markets. This is contrary to a focus on big-small farmer as the determinant 
of participation (Prowse 2012), which does not address intergroup differences. The major drawback of 
the political economy approach is that it does not delve into the distribution of value and flow of benefits 
in a contract farming arrangement. 
2.2 Access Theory Approach to Contract Farming  
Access is a concept with strong roots in common natural resource management systems, such as forestry 
(Ribot (1998), fisheries (Schlager and Ostrom 1992) and land-based resources (Shipton and Goheen 
1992; Berry 1989b) and is not one of the commonly used conceptual frameworks in contract farmig, 
identified by Prowse (2012). It has rarely been used to analyse contracted annual crops. Natural 
resources are recognized as one of the livelihood capitals necessary for the production of food (Cotula 
2008). According to Cotula (2008:17), “…institutions and processes that address power imbalances” 
could facilitate access to assets and productive resources by the poor. Access analysis provides a 
platform to understand how institutions such as contract farming provide resources to farmers and with 
what effect to the farmers. Alternatively, it also addresses questions of how farmers access contract 
farming, through what channels, cost and with what effect.  
Access theory seeks to explain means through which actors get to benefit from resources. This the 
theory argues is through ‘a bundle of powers’ held by the actors. As will be expanded on in the next 
section, ‘a bundle of powers’ can be understood as the qualities held by the actors which gives them 
control over use and enjoyment of resources or service and/or deprivation of other actors. The qualities 
could be shaped by assets, education, socio-political standing among other things. It is these variables 
that the study measures to determine the ability of households and communities to benefit from contract 
farming. The strength of access theory lies in its predictive power where social relationships dominate 
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exchanges and capitalist systems are not fully developed. As discussed in Chapter 1, agricultural 
commercialisation through contract farming benefits rural communities and, using access theory, this 
study tracked how the benefits were generated and distributed.  
2.2.1 A Theory of Access   
Access is defined as “…freedom or ability to obtain or make use of something” (Merriam-Webster 
online) while the Oxford online dictionary defines access as “…the right or opportunity to use or benefit 
from something”. Common to the two definitions is the word “use”, which connotes that access results 
in some form of value or benefit to the party who has it. Hence, Ribot and Peluso (2003) define access 
as “…the ability to derive benefits from things.” As noted by Ribot and Peluso, access is closely related 
to property which, according to the two dictionaries, relates to ownership of something legal or some 
form of bestowed right or “…enforceable claim to some use or benefit of something” (Macpherson 
1978:3) . According to MacPherson, the benefits are derived from “enforceable rights” held by a legal 
person (that is, natural individuals or artificial persons) on a given object. He dismisses the concept of 
“things” as loose language. Agrawal (1996:3) lends support to MacPherson’s perception of property 
when noting it is “…the right and the capacity to use, dispose, exclude or another action seen fit by the 
holder. The enforceable claims give rise to access as a bundle of rights.” 
According to Ribot and Peluso (2003), benefits are derived from “things”, which they say “…include 
material objects, persons, institutions, and symbols”. MacPherson argues that it is the “rights” enshrined 
in the “things” that give rise to benefits. Ribot and Peluso extend the notion of rights to include benefits 
arising from “powers” held by the actors. Powers are enshrined in law, custom or through norms, as 
well as “… a wide range of social relationships that can constrain or enable people to benefit from 
resources” (Ribot and Peluso 2003: 154). Berry (1993:15-17) argues that access is a negotiated process 
through social networks which are shaped by “…social identities and relationships”. Berry (1993:15) 
notes that the “…ability to mobilize a following” was critical in accessing resources and was a source 
of power. As a result, scholars such as Berry (1989b) and Ribot and Peluso (2003) view access as “a 
bundle of powers” which extends benefits accruing from property even to those who do not own it, who 
can get access through various other social means whether they have property rights or not. For instance, 
De Janvry, Sadoulet, and Wolford (2001) document various land tenure systems where peasants 
benefited though they had no property rights. Sikor and Tuong Vi (2005) also show that access to 
resources could be achieved by both de jure15 and de facto16 means. In Zimbabwe, Mutopo (2011) 
showed that women in Mwenezi district accessed land and markets through de facto means. Recent 
work by the CFS (2015) highlights responsible investment as one that generates positive externalities 
for actors, for instance food security, implying benefits that accrue to communities. 
 
Macpherson (1978:8) identifies three classes of property: that is, private, state and communal. In this 
study the focus is on private and communal property where private represents rights held by contractors 
(individuals) and communal property represents powers over land held by individuals in a community. 
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Ownership of “things” in communal property is both individual and communal, which gives credence 
to the notion of “powers” as a source of benefits in communities. For instance, Berry (1989a:2) alludes 
to the importance of “…social affiliations and socially constructed identities” in negotiating access to 
land and productive resources. She also notes that access to land is interwoven with access to productive 
resources that are labour and capital. Okoth-Ogendo (1989) argues that communal tenure systems go 
beyond the property rules and involve the allocation of power according to social relationships within 
a community. Evidently, access to land and productive resources is a negotiated process within the 
framework of community institutional arrangements. The commercialisation of agriculture through 
contract farming has meant that communities negotiate with agribusinesses (contractors), who operate 
within the ambit of property rights, causing daunting challenges in both land use and access to resources. 
Madagascar provides a case in point for Africa (Burnod, Gingembre, and Andrianirina Ratsialonana 
2013) where both de jure and de facto processes of access were at play, with disastrous consequences.  
At the centre of access analysis is the distribution of value derived from “things” either accessed by de 
jure or de facto means. As shown in this definition, Ribot and Peluso argue that this arises from “a 
bundle of powers”. To gain, control or maintain access, actors dispense benefits – a process that leads 
to the share of value in resources in question. In contract farming arrangements, contractors and farmers 
come together in a contract that seeks to distribute value from agricultural produce. This value emanates 
from the various rights and capacities held by the actors. Viewed from Agrawal (1996)’s topology, 
FTLRP beneficiaries have, for instance, lower capacity to use land as collateral, while the contractors 
have the capacity to unlock finance capital, technology and markets, which makes land beneficial to the 
farmer. This then defines flow of benefits among the actors. According to access theory influencing 
various “mechanisms” has the potential to increase share of the accrued value. From the foregoing 
discussion in this study access theory can be understood as: 
The ability of farmers to earn income (benefit) from tobacco contract farming (thing): This 
depends on: 
 Factors of production held by the farmer: land, assets like ox-drawn ploughs, cattle, 
barns, labour, technology, skills and other production resurces. To get these, farmers 
need ownership or finance to pay for the use or acquisition of the factors of production. 
Further, farmers can get this through their social networks, powers derived from 
political affiliation or illicit activities, cultural relations and status/identity earned 
through either age, education, gender and so on. What the farmers possess constitute 
their portfolio of ‘a bundle of powers’.  Access theory then predicts that the level of 
income (benefit) depends on ‘a bundle of powers’ controlled by the farmer. This could 
be depicted mathematical as: 
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Y (income) is influenced by X (‘a bundle of powers’) held by a farmer; where X is 
represented by all the factors discussed in chapter 9. 
2.2.2 Deriving Benefits from “Things”  
Access is about “…gaining, controlling, or maintaining benefits from resources” (Ribot and Peluso 
2003:164). These could be accessed through property rights (Agrawal 1996) or “…extra-legal 
mechanisms” (that is to say, through social identity, social relations, coercion and trickery, material 
wealth and location or stature) (Ribot 2005). This section discusses land and productive resources 
access mechanisms described by Ribot and Peluso. This extends to those with no land rights and yet 
they still benefit from that land as producers on the land. An example of “extra-legal” means is found 
in Mkodzongi’s (2018:205) study in Mhondoro Ngezi where people disregarded “…state-imposed 
cadastral processes” and extended allocated plots to benefit from land while others informally settled 
themselves. He even reports sale of A1 land under what Chimhowu and Hulme (2006) called vernacular 
land markets, all being mechanisms of access. Mechanisms are understood to mean “…means, 
processes, and relations” (Ribot and Peluso (2003:160). The mechanisms include both legal and extra-
legal ones as described by Berry (1989b); Ribot (2005). The key actors in contract farming are the 
contractors and farmers, who are the focal point in this study. Access to contract farming is determined 
by “a bundle of powers” held by the contractor or farmers as discussed in the sections below.  
2.2.2.1 Controlling Access to Contract Farming Arrangements 
Control, often enshrined in powers and authority over resources, mediates access to resources by users 
and those who intend to derive benefits. Control entails power over other actors. For instance, 
contractors control the channels to finance capital that is necessary for the provisioning of inputs, 
herbicides, paying wages and services, as well as the technology required to make the land productive. 
Further, contractors control access to markets and the value arising from the auctioning system of 
tobacco. Control of markets enable contractors to determine input and output prices, thus setting in 
motion an exploitative relationship, based on unequal power balance. Contractors access finance capital 
from their oligoponsony network and suffice is to say that this is through processes of insertion of 
international capital17 into developing countries’ agriculture. However, to create value, that is to get 
tobacco produce, they need access to land and labour controlled by the farmers. Without the finance 
capital provided by the contractors, farmers could possibly neither benefit from the land nor gainfully 
enter markets controlled by the oligopsony buyer 18that owns the same contractors. Therefore, farmers 
go through two processes to negotiate access to capital, land and labour. 
Berry (1993) observed that access to land is a negotiated process, the outcome of which is determined 
by “a bundle of powers” held by people, for instance, social identity or wealth. According to Shipton 
and Goheen (1992:307), land is used not only “…to produce the material conditions of survival and 
26 
enrichment, but also to gain control over others, and to define personal and social identities”. As shown 
in Figure 2-1 (dotted arrow), farmers dispense benefits to other parties to establish and maintain control 
within the community. Land reform, discussed in Chapters 3, 4and 5, is also one access mechanism that 
resulted in large numbers of peasant farmers controlling land. In Zimbabwe (Chapter 5), the FTLRP 
changed the power relations in land access as well as access to all productive resources, often resulting 
in contested land claims (Moyo 2011a). Heterogeneous groups of farmers in A1 farms gained access 
through various activities including patronage, passive resistance and initial wealth from rural homes 
(Mkodzongi 2018). After the FTLRP, control of finance capital remained with the traditional financial 
institutions, which necessitated new forms of agriculture finance, such as contract farming. Therefore, 
contractors became the mediators to finance capital access. Farmers’ lack of title deeds weakened land 
as a means of control and mediation to finance capital, which hypothetically tilted the power balance 
towards the contractor. However, for smallholders, this did not matter much as they did not have 
collateral. Yet, as observed by Sikor and Tuong Vi (2005) in Vietnam, access to land became an 
important mediator in negotiating access to markets. While the FTLRP weakened control over 
mediation with capital, it strengthened control over other local resources such as labour and non-farm 
activities. 
2.2.2.2 Gaining Access to Contract Farming Arrangements 
To access “things”, “a bundle of powers” matters. For instance, to participate in agricultural markets, 
Sikor and Tuong Vi (2005) observed that access to productive resources (that is, wealth) was important 
to farmers’ integration in commodity markets. Sachikonye (2016) and Moyo (2011) observed increased 
uptake of cash-crop production by smallholder farmers after they had accessed land during the FTLRP. 
Ribot (2005) identified wealth and social relations as some of the extra-legal access mechanisms. As 
observed by Shipton and Goheen (1992), overlapping land rights and affiliations mean that even those 
without land can negotiate access and participation in agricultural markets. Thus, for Mwenezi district, 
Mutopo (2011) showed that women, by negotiating with their husbands, gained access to vegetable 
plots and subsequent markets in South Africa. All this points to access to land as an entry mechanism 
to commercial agriculture.  
Literature on contract farming also points to social relations as mediating access to contract farming 
where contractors use local networks (Porter and Phillips-Howard 1997). In Malawi, Prowse (2009) 
provides evidence of a farmer who accessed capital from a relative and another through non-farm 
activities. The two farmers relied on their control of family labour to grow their tobacco business. As 
discussed under contract farming studies have found extra-legal mechanisms as contributors to 
participation in contract farming. For instance, Kruijssen, Keizer, and Giuliani (2009) found that Thai 
women involved in processing tropical fruits in Thailand were able to purchase valuable equipment that 
allowed them to enter foreign markets. In Tanzania, Sulle (2017) found that elites used their powers to 
27 
access lucrative sugar contracts, including even negotiating favourable contracts. Remittances can also 
result in “…differential access not just to capital but also to livestock and land” (Shipton and Goheen 
1992:310). All this implies that power plays an important part in accessing economic opportunities such 
as contract farming and can be understood from an access analysis perspective, which tracks access 
processes to determine how value is determined and distributed.  
2.2.2.3 Maintaining Access to Contract Farming Arrangements 
Berry (1993) observed that access in communal property is maintained through one’s ability to mobilise 
a following, status and command over wealth. For instance, land can be accessed through group 
membership, labour, or purchases or a combination of all of these (Shipton and Goheen 1992). 
Mobilising a following and maintaining status requires expending resources through gifts and, at times, 
bribery (see flow of benefits in Figure 2-1). In agriculture, new quality demands in value chains mean 
that farmers need to spend money on technology and capital investments to maintain a high-quality 
crop. Though criticised, access can be gained from contractors who provide and enforce the use of 
modern inputs and extension services that benefit communities (Baumann 2000; Kumar and Kumar 
2008). For instance, Eaton and Shepherd (2001) report on technology transfer through training, 
fieldwork and demonstration plots. In communities, there is the possibility that fieldwork could lead to 
the transfer of technology through social networks, which could improve the whole community as 
production improves. Following Ribot and Peluso (2003), technology could also be accessed through 
social structures in communities as farmers respond to new methods and governance structures of 
resource use. Singh (2002) criticises agribusiness technology transfer processes and labels it 
“appropriationism”, implying it is only for the short-term benefit of the agribusiness. He acknowledges 
that it would lead to short-term benefits with long-term damage to the community’s agricultural 
potential. This is a view propounded by the food first school of thought (Collins and Lappe 1977). 
However, long-term contracting relations could enable farmers to invest their lump sum earning in new 
technologies if they are assured that working capital would be provided by the contractor. 
It also means investment in relations to maintain adequate supplies of labour. This could be problematic 
for community members who do not command wealth and status in a community and hence, might find 
it difficult to maintain status in contract farming arrangements. Narayanan (2013) refers to this as 
“involuntary exit”, because those farmers might fail to maintain access due to poor resource 
endowments. Poor resource endowments might lead to failure to comply with contractor requirements 
leading to farmer attrition from projects. Also, De Janvry, Sadoulet, and Wolford (2001) have shown 
that, to maintain property, farmers have had to rent out land. These issues are further discussed in 
sections below. 
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2.2.3 Mapping the Nodes of Access in a Contract Farming Arrangement 
From the discussion in the preceding section, ownership/control of resources legal or illegal, coupled 
with social relationships together with ability to expend resources can generate benefits for holders, 
while non-holders benefit from expended resources. This section maps this relationship. As discussed 
in the above section, access to contract farming involves a web of negotiations and flow of benefits 
between those who control resources and users. Figure 2-1 shows the actors (nodes) involved in 
negotiating, paying and receiving payment in order for farmers to access contract farming arrangements. 
For instance, contract farmers negotiate with nine actors in order to access resources needed to 
participate in contract farming. The double continuous arrow (Figure 2-1) linking the actors shows this. 
The single dotted arrow shows the flow of benefits paid by farmers to gain or maintain access to contract 
farming arrangements, while the double dotted arrows show the distribution of value generated at the 
auction floors by national government, contractors, TIMB, service providers and farmers. Each party 
receives a share proportional to their bundle of powers.  
Tobacco farmers negotiate for licenses (grower numbers) with TIMB, the regulator, by paying an annual 
fee of ten dollars, and these are only granted after negotiations with local leadership, as discussed in 
Chapter 7. However, poorer farmers might fail to raise the fee and other complementary resources such 
as equipment and capital required to participate in contract farming (Ribot 2005). Figure 2-1 maps the 
access mechanisms, distribution of value and flow of benefits as suggested by Ribot (1998). Such access 
gives rise to production of tobacco either under contract or non-contract farming in Mazowe, issues this 
study aims to test: for instance, how social relations, means to pay for flow of benefits, and rents affect 
participation. One such means is wealth to pay for productive resources necessary to be considered by 
contractors’ service providers (extension officers). As noted by Ribot (1998), access to such resources 
depends on “…inter-related mechanisms including legal property, social identity, social relations, 
coercion and information control”. These could be exerted by those actors shown as receivers of benefits 
by the dotted arrow (see Figure 2.1). For instance, contractor extension officers may favour those who 
pay gifts, while local authorities may demand bribes to issue land access letters, which are described in 
Chapter 7. Access analysis allows for a deeper political economic scrutiny of the processes in play, 
beyond the NIE focus on cost and household, which could obscure both the understanding of benefits 
and participation in contract farming. Access analysis allowed the study to pay attention to power 
dynamics at play in the allocation of contracts, identifying who benefits/loses, and how. 
Tobacco farmers could access resources through rights enshrined in communal ownership of land and 
other natural resources. However, for those with no land allocations under either the FTLRP or 
communal tenure, social relations-based access mechanisms become important. Again, social relations 
are important in the control of labour which requires spending resources, which could exclude those 
who are poorly resourced.  
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Figure 2-1:Contract Farming Access Model: Negotiations and Flow of Benefits among Actors  
Source: Adapted from Ribot 1998 
2.2.4 A Critique of Access Theory 
As per Koch’s (2008) critique, Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) access theory could have benefited 
immensely, if they had built on earlier works by Sen (1982) and Leach, Mearns, and Scoones (1999). 
For instance, Sen makes insightful contributions with his entitlement mapping argument. This is 
important as it shows the origin of ‘power’ which Sen calls, ‘bundle of ownership’, which influences 
‘exchange entitlements’ of which the latter is akin to benefits arising from accessing resources described 
by Ribot and Peluso. Further ‘entitlement set’ could shed light on resources required for farmers’ 
production needs. It is not surprising that Koch (2008) criticises access theory as weak on its theorising 
of ‘origins of power’ and the ‘mechanisms of access’. Power could be gained through various channels 
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as Mkodzongi (2018) noted regarding Mhondoro Ngezi where the poor resorted to ‘weapons of the 
weak’ described by Scott (2008). Collective action is also another source of power. Despite these short 
comings access theory is an important analytical tool, where contractual arrangements are in place. It 
provides a basis for tracking the flow of resources and benefits to users which can easily be extended 
to community analysis, as the community members respond to this. It provides a clear route to tracking 
and separating the causes of insertion of contract farming, showing who gains what and why thus 
establishing a robust cause-effect analysis.  
2.3  Contract Farming Model  
Contract farming could be viewed as a means of access to various economic benefits. For instance, 
White (2005) found that contract farming was used as a means to access land rights in Upland West 
Java. Most studies report contract as a means of accessing inputs for agricultural and market integration 
into commodity markets (Sikor and Tuong Vi 2005) and agrarian transition (White 2005). This allows 
farmers to participate in commercial agricultural markets in a way that helps build their livelihood 
capitals. However, the problem arises in understanding the distribution of value, which might not reflect 
value added at given points in a contract farming arrangement (White 2005). White (2005:232) notes 
that small farmers, in addition to the exploitative nature of contractors, fall prey to “social-political 
predators” in their communities, who extract rents from the poor farmers. Figure 2-1 shows the flow of 
benefits (dotted arrow) where benefits flow to players who are not involved in production; this includes 
local leadership and elites. This clearly illustrates the potential of contract farming to have community-
wide effects; an issue most studies skirt when discussing the benefits of contract farming.  
Contract farming is broadly viewed as an institutional arrangement governing the production and/or 
marketing of agricultural produce between a farmer(s) and contracting firm (Bijman 2008; Minot 1986). 
Cook, Klein, and Iliopoulos (2008) described how this governance structure came into being, 
underpinned by various theoretical propositions that supported its existence. In studying contract 
farming, no evidence was found of a scholar who developed a stand-alone theory on this growing 
agricultural institutional arrangement; studies have relied on a choice of an array of multidisciplinary 
concepts, approaches and theories highlighted above depending on the type of contract under study. 
Contract farming is based on contract law and hence it is regarded as an agreement between two equal 
consenting parties. However critical political economists have shown that parties are differentiated by 
the power base and resource holdings which creates an imbalance of power in the negotiations.  
Often these contracts are underpinned by the theory of agency which provides for the rights and 
obligations of the contracting parties.  Under the agency theory paradigm contracts could be framed on 
the basis of property rights discussed above. As discussed under contract design, contracts are generally 
framed within the incomplete contract paradigm which lends them to re-negotiation and interpretation 
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by the courts. In such situations Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) ‘structural and relational mechanisms’ come 
into play as parties apply their ‘bundles of powers’ to negotiate contracting terms and enforcement. To 
understand contract farming there is need to first understand or define the nature of the institutional 
arrangement under consideration, second, the type of contract being studied and third the model being 
followed. All of which shape the final contract between the farmer and the firm. 
2.3.1 The Contract Farming Institutional Arrangement 
Following the definition given in Chapter 1, contract farming is viewed as a multiparty institutional 
arrangement, which provides credit to farmers enabling them to access production resources, services 
and markets under conditions of imperfect markets and differential power balance. Drawing from access 
theory, access in such an arrangement is largely based on ‘structural and relational mechanisms’ and 
the partial contracts paradigm. Such ‘structural mechanisms’ include  “…technology, capital, markets, 
labor, knowledge, authority, identities, and social relations”. Of which contractors own capital, markets 
and knowledge while farmers own the reminder. As observed by Sen (1981) ownership structure 
influences outcomes of an exchange. This view embraces and acknowledges the bundle of powers 
inherent in accessing contract farming arrangements. This is so because, to reach an agreement, parties 
consult and expend resources within a community for it to be socially binding. It is “socially binding” 
because it accounts for social relations and captures the norms and cultural values of communities that 
could derail a contract farming agreement. Hence Prowse (2012:8) observed the need for third parties 
to “…act as arbiters and referees”. The view captures the inclusiveness of contract farming as a 
“…business model that offers the benefits of a diversified livelihood, and an efficient connection of 
smallholders to commercial agricultural value chains, without land dispossession” (Hall, Scoones, and 
Tsikata 2017:528). Further, the “heterogeneity” of contract farming as “a diversity embracing crops, 
actors, production relations and institutional links” (Little and Watts 1994:5) justifies a definition that 
is inclusive of actors and institutions in a community where customary land tenure exists. To balance 
our understanding of contract farming relations there is a need to understand the conditions, struggles 
and characteristics of participating farmers and actors within their social and contextual environment 
and the power relations prevailing (White 2005). For instance, farmers who accessed land under the 
FTLRP in Zimbabwe accessed contracts through different processes compared to those reported in the 
mainstream contract farming literature. Wang, wang and Delgardo (2014) cite technology, risk, credits 
and markets as some of the reasons why farmers join contract farming, which tends to affect the type 
of contract farmers enter into. 
2.3.2  Types of Contracts  
Bijman (2008:5), citing Mighell and Jones (1963), classifies contract farming arrangements into 
‘’…market-specification, production-management and resources providing contracts’’. Market 
specification contracts focus on the uptake of farmers’ produce after harvest and have no effect in 
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production matters, which dominate production management contracts (Kunkel and Larison 1988; 
MacDonald et al 2004). The contract specifies the quality and quantity of product to be delivered 
(Wilson 1986) price, location and timing of product delivery (Key and Runsten 1999; Will 2015). The 
contracting firm has no say in the production processes of the farmer, who operates independently, and 
Wilson (1986) sees them as future purchase agreements meant to guarantee the uptake of the farmer’s 
produce; however, control can always be exercised in the determination of grades and quality.  
Resource providing contracts address both production and marketing issues, ranging through the 
product to be produced, the supply of inputs, farm management, technical know-how, and the marketing 
of output, and the costs are deducted from the sale price (Mackintosh 1977; Wilson 1986). Resources 
to be used and, more often, extra crops and non-farm activities undertaken by the farmer are specified 
in the contract; thus the farmer is reduced to a semi-proletarian (Clapp 1994). Reducing farmers to semi-
proletariats diminishes their bargaining power in such contracts. This type of contract is closely linked 
to production management contracts, which further specify production regimes and husbandry 
practices, thus exercising intense control over farm operations (Little and Watts 1994; Mackintosh 
1977; Wilson 1986). This is the most dominant type of contractual arrangement in Africa, 
understandably, because it addresses Africa’s major deficiencies in agricultural production such as 
resources and technology deficiency. Mackintosh (1977) argues that the relocation of production to less 
developed countries was motivated by international capital’s desire to extract more capital from 
impoverished farmers with little bargaining power. 
Singh (2002) in line with Wilson’s (1986) “continuum” argument suggest that the three types of contract 
should be: procurement contract specifying sale and purchase conditions; partial contract where the part 
of the resources provided by the/a contracting firm and the price of produce are set; and a total contract 
which is basically a resource and production management contract described above. The degree of 
control on the farmer increases with the amount of resources committed by the firm (Goodhue and 
Simon 2016; Goodhue 1999).  
What is important is to note that these types of contracts provide for responsibilities and obligations 
which are enforceable at law. However, most contracts in developing countries have been more of 
relational contracts due to the high cost of enforcing contracts. Also, the reason for contracting, cost 
and crops involved in contracting determine the model a contract farming arrangement takes. 
2.3.3 Contract Farming Models 
Eaton and Shepherd (2001) identified five models of contract farming (described below). They go 
further in specifying the contractual arrangement between firm and farmer(s), the product; nature of 
vertical coordination and their relations, as well as parties to the contract which are dependent on the 
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crop to be produced (Bijman 2008; Will 2015). The models, which specify different resource and market 
access conditions, are: 
 The centralised model, which is a vertically coordinated model that normally involves a 
firm/processor and large number of smallholder farmers. Production quotas are normally 
allocated at the beginning of the farming season. Resource supply and support ranges from 
minimal (where seeds are provided) to total support, which also determines the degree of 
control the firm has on the farmer (Will 2015). Eaton and Shepherd (2001) posit that this model 
is suitable for crops such as tobacco, tree crops, cotton, tea, and sugarcane, among others. 
Goodhue and Simon (2016) argue that the degree of control in such a model ranges from basic 
to a restrictive contract defined by resource provision and the control of production processes.  
 The nucleus estate model pioneered by CDC is one in which the firm has its own plantations 
that guarantee supply to its processing plant, but which can also buy from many farmers, as in 
the centralised model. This model also supplies inputs to farmers and is suitable for tree crops. 
Jackson and Cheater (1994) describe such a model in sugarcane production in the Triangle and 
Hippo Valley estates and tea in the Agricultural Rural Development Authority following 
resettlement programmes around the schemes. 
 The multipartite model is a joint venture, which could involve a public entity partnering with a 
private firm(s) in the provision of services to farmers and the marketing of their produce. Little 
and Watts (1994) noted that this was the dominant arrangement during the structural adjustment 
era. It could take the form of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) or joint ventures as described 
by Eaton and Shepherd (2001:50-52).  
 The intermediary model involves the processor, agent and farmer. The agent acts as a 
middleman between the farmer and contracting firm. 
 The informal model, as the name suggests, is a loose arrangement between farmer and firm 
with few services on offer. The firm makes minimal investments under this model, and often 
depends on government or other institutions to support farmers. Crops produced under this 
model require little specialisation. 
The study focuses on the centralised model, a model that is practised in Mazowe, the area of study. In 
a centralised model, contracting firms contract with many smallholders and, in theory, transmit benefits 
through the provision of capital, knowledge, technology transfer and markets to rural communities for 
the betterment of resource-constrained rural households’ livelihoods options. Evidently, this is in line 
with the ‘structural and relational mechanisms’ described by Ribot and Peluso (2003). Tobacco, the 
contracted crop in Mazowe, requires good husbandry practices and specialised assets for curing, which 
most peasant farmers’ lack. Again, production by peasants only started on a large scale after the FTLRP 
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in 2000. Access to land for tobacco production by firms and the lack of resources among peasant farmers 
could have been the reason for the adoption of this contract farming model. In Zimbabwe, the model 
was necessitated by the massive transfer of land under the FTLRP to smallholders that choked the 
traditional supply from LSCFs. In this model, actor constellation and contestation is high, given the 
differential power bundles held by the actors. Further, farmers contend with various stakeholders (see 
Figure 2-1) in accessing resources, such as labour from the community, service providers and local 
authorities, among others (White 2005). The aforesaid provides a strong case for using access analysis, 
which provides for multiple actor analysis, and further, in dealing with these stakeholder farmers 
expending benefits before they share in the distribution of value at the marketing stage of their crop. 
Tobacco contract farming is unique in that it is led by an international oligopsony buyer, which faces 
censure from various quarters such as the World Health Organisation (WHO), lack of support from 
development donor agencies and restrictive laws from various governments, because it is viewed as a 
public ‘bad’. For instance, tobacco production involves intensive use of natural resources, such as 
fuelwood and earth for brick-making, which has negative environmental effects and is considered a 
health hazard. As a result, tobacco farmers are excluded from donor finance programmes. When 
financing is availed, it is on commercial terms. In developing countries, the situation became critical 
after the structural adjustment programme took effect. Further, land reform programmes in developing 
countries, such as Malawi and Zimbabwe, have seen increased uptake of tobacco by poorly resourced 
peasants, who often rely on industry support. Again, apart from the oligoponsony, there are no other 
alternative markets for the farmers, unlike in most other food chains. As articulated by Ribot and Peluso 
(2003) control of resources, such as markets, increases bundles of power; Ribot (1998) showed that 
those who controlled the charcoal market in Senegal got the biggest share of the shared value.  
 2.3.4 Designing Contract Farming Arrangements  
“Markets rest upon institutions” and one such institution is contract design, which also rests on the 
development of markets (Greif 2005) creating an egg-chicken paradox. However, access theory 
proponents argue that contract design depends on differential bundle of powers held by parties to the 
contract. Hamilton (1995) and Pultrone (2012) provide details of the legal aspects of contract farming, 
and, as noted by Hamilton, self-interest in line with wealth-maximisation is of paramount importance 
to people who design contracts. Fehr and Schmidt (2001) have argued that not all contracting 
circumstances can be explained by self-interest; instead, there is evidence pointing to fairness and 
reciprocity in contract design. This could arise due to social relations that govern actors’ interaction. 
Contract farming studies have focused on power relations between the contracting parties and have 
argued along the self-interest hypothesis. The objective of the firm is to minimize transaction costs and 
hence to participate in contracts where it would acquire the crop at below market cost (Key and Runsten 
1999). This could also lead to farmers lowering their costs if the contractor were to pass on economies 
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of scale gained from the sourcing of inputs. However, the benefits to farmers could be proportionally 
lower than that accruing to the agribusiness. For instance, farmers with no alternative access to capital 
such as FTLRP beneficiaries, have lower bargaining power. Farmers in such situations tend to accept 
unfavourable contract terms, which lead to farmers working long hours and hence exploitative relations 
through extraction of surplus labour. 
In developing countries particularly, peasant farmers’ contracts are developed by agribusinesses and 
farmers are offered contracts on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, a situation that creates contractual bias from 
the onset (Setboonsang 2008). To mitigate this challenge, Setboonsarng (2008) argues that there is a 
need for a comprehensive legal framework that supports the successful implementation of the contract, 
a role that the government can play by enacting legal instruments that support both farmers and 
agribusinesses, a proposition supported by Wu and Roe (2007). Further, they find that, where 
government enforcement is missing, parties maintain social efficiency through private contracting, a 
gap that could be filled by contracting parties with the help of community leaders and a proposition of 
access theory where relational issues matter. However, incomplete contracts seem to dominate most 
contractual arrangements necessitating effective enforcement and coercive institutions that promote 
smooth exchange which, Schieffer and Wu (2006) believe, are welfare enhancing. Incomplete contracts 
could be welfare enhancing given the flexibility inherent in the contract that leaves room for re-
negotiation whenever contingencies arise ex-post. The fairness of such negotiations, however, will 
depend on the power bundles held by the parties.  
Pultrone (2012) argues that this document coordinates the implementation of the contract and sets the 
stage for enforcement mechanism for all obligations stipulated in the contract. Enforcement and dispute 
resolution details are also part of the contract, which could be litigation, mediation or arbitration and 
when, where and who can initiate what action. A contractual agreement between farmer and 
agribusiness is also a reflection of the prevailing market conditions, which will help to define the 
bargaining power of the parties and the potential to enter into contractual arrangements. Peasant farmers 
enter the contract arguably because of exclusionary markets, while agribusinesses enter to lower costs 
that threaten supplies to, and the profitability of their business venture. The market conditions attract 
different transaction costs that affect the contract, added to this, moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems might set-in. Such costs include benefits expended by farmers as they negotiate for access 
with various actors and are rarely analysed by researchers. As noted above, land reforms tend to be 
disruptive, which could either strengthen or weaken farmers’ position when negotiating with finance 
capital owners, which affects costs of access.  
The power imbalance and exploitative argument has been strongly debated (Grosh 1994; Little and 
Watts 1994; Melese 2012; Sachikonye 2016) and hence the need for supportive institutions, legal 
instruments or social structures that support the weaker peasants in entering contractual arrangements. 
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For such interventions to work there is a need to understand the source of “power imbalance”, which 
could be differential “power bundles” among actors discussed by Ribot and Peluso (2003). We 
deliberately use the term “entering” contracts given that, in developing countries, peasant farmers are 
contract-takers and rarely negotiate, and agribusinesses are shifting production from developed to 
developing countries partly to escape stringent contracting rules and enforcement by states and an 
informed farming community. Contracting involves three aspects: distribution of duties, responsibilities 
and risks; monitoring, grading and pricing of final product; and ex-post enforcement of the agreement. 
All these are negotiated within the FTLRP framework which redefined farmers’ production and 
marketing relations. Farmers could effectively deal with these issues when acting collectively and 
drawing from accumulated social capital (trust, social norms and local institutions) (Lyon 2000) and 
agribusinesses are behaving in a fair and reciprocal manner. For instance, Setboonsarng (2008) and  
Porter and Phillips-Howard (1997) observed the importance of employing locals in managerial positions 
as part of building successful contract farming arrangements and understanding local political 
dynamics, which might correct power imbalances between the contracting parties. 
2.3.5  Contract Terms, Enforcement and Farmer Participation  
When agribusinesses and farmers act in a fair and reciprocal manner there is also the opportunity to 
have self-enforcing contracts with built-in private benefits and penalties (Gow 2001). This principle, 
based on social relations, has been widely used in microfinance and is behind the success of 
Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank. The agribusiness could build in incentives that enhance the performance 
of contractual responsibilities such as increased credit or bonus accruing after-sales. For instance, in 
South Africa, British American Tobacco (BAT) started a multi-cropping incubator programme for its 
tobacco farmers (MASDT 2018). While contract farming is meant to be a risk-sharing mechanism, 
farmers could carry bigger risks due to lack of knowledge and manipulation by firms (Adjognon 2012). 
As a result, the farmer is likely to be exploited. This has more often been cited by farmers in quality 
and price determination during the marketing stage. Yet, it is possible that the final price paid to the 
farmers might be below the ruling world prices. Zhang (2012) suggests that contracting firms can violate 
contractual terms, given their dominant position, however, he notes the importance of strong legal 
institutions for the protection of both parties in China. Goodhue and Simon (2016) and Goodhue (1999) 
argue that effective input and production control could enhance quality, which is beneficial to farmers. 
Those that are for or against contract farming seem to point to institutions as the overarching issue, for 
example, power balance alluded to by Little and Watts (1994). Institutional economists will argue that 
these contestations and problems emanate from weak institutions that need corrective measures to 
strengthen the bargaining power of smallholders. This study argues that it is inferior ‘bundle of powers’ 
that result in low bargaining power: if farmers were well endowed with resources, their negotiating 
power would improve (Ribot and Peluso 2003). Grosh (1994) believes that governments have powers 
to curtail the exploitative tendencies of the contracting firms through policies and regulations.  
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Markelova and Mwangi (2010) noted that the agricultural production systems landscape has undergone 
huge transformation due to the growth of supermarkets that brought new opportunities and constraints. 
They argue that there is a need for farmer groups that should act collectively to meet these challenges. 
Yet Birner and Resnick (2010) highlight the need for policies that are pro-smallholder farmers to avoid 
the exclusion of the poor from interventions meant to benefit communities. Institutions take care of 
policies that facilitate and solve problems through policies, laws and rules that help with contract 
enforcement. The collective action proposed by Markelova and Mwangi (2010) also implies the setting 
up of institutions at the grassroots level where the smallholder farmers are found. This entails the 
development of farmer organisations and social capital issues recognised by Scoones (2009) as 
important for rural livelihoods. Korovkin (1992) describes successful farmer organisations in Chile, 
which helped farmers reap substantial benefits from contractors as well as negotiate favourably in 
various markets. In a study in Honduras, Imbruce (2008) found that contract farming worked better 
when farmers had alternative markets, a sign that equal power balances leads to better contracting 
arrangements. However, Sivramkrishna and Jyotishi (2008) argue for farmer organisations that 
strengthen the competitiveness of its members through promoting better farming practices, sourcing 
inputs competitively and supplying quality produce to buyers to counter power imbalances. All these 
arguments recognise the importance of collective action in shaping power bundles for individuals based 
on group action. 
In a case study of tea and sugar out grower schemes in Zimbabwe, Sachikonye (1989) observed uneven 
power balances between the contracting firms and out growers, characterised by unfair terms of 
contracts, the exploitation of rural labour throughout growers, and limited access to resources. Quality 
determination and payment forms were said to be too complex for the poor smallholders to comprehend. 
Added to this were the tight control of production systems for both tea and sugar out growers. Jackson 
and Cheaters (1994), reviewing the same schemes, concluded that the production and processing of 
both crops was capital intensive, which could disadvantage the poor growers. However, they find those 
participants’ livelihoods improved. Tea and sugar are export crops and are very sensitive to world prices 
that work against small-scale producers. The sugar scheme reduces the farmer’s powers as the land is 
mortgaged, and the terms tie the small farmer to sugar production. While acknowledging that farmers 
under contract increased their income, Moyo (2011) remains sceptical about the capitalist arrangement.  
2.4 Implications of Access Theory/Contract Farming on Community 
Economic Activities 
From the discussion on contract farming and access theory it is clear that there is an interdependence 
between land and contract farming and hence this provides a basis for the analysis of ‘benefits’ and 
‘resources’ flows accruing to the actors. Sen (1981) enriches this proposition as he shows that 
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‘ownership bundles’ determine ‘exchange entitlements’ each actor gets. For instance, contract farming 
based biofuel studies have shown a positive link with farmers’ welfare, while White (2005) has shown 
the link between access to land and contract farming. All this shows that contract farming enhances 
land productivity and land facilitates contract farming. All this results in cause-effect, where access to 
land provides for the building of resources which allows for participation in contracts and vice-versa. 
This in turn reinforces investment in land and other economic activities with the community, all 
resulting in benefits occurring due to ‘exchange entitlements’ if one borrows Sen’s jargon. As shown 
in discussions on land reform, capital and other agricultural services are critical for effective use of 
land, and this is provided through contract farming; hence the complementarity between the two. In 
chapter 8, the study provides empirical evidence to show the effect of access to resources for the farmers 
and communities through an analysis of the flow of resources and benefits akin to Sen’s entitlement 
mapping. The mechanisms of access to resources that is factors that affect access to markets, technology 
and services embodied in the contract are then discussed in Chapter 9 to explain the results in Chapter 
8.   
2.5 Relevance of Access Theory to Contract Farming Participation and 
Outcomes 
Analysis of factors affecting participation in, and outcomes from, contract farming are generally based 
on the property-rights paradigm and class analysis all focusing on the household. Access theory builds 
on this in the following ways: 
 Allows for deeper analysis of community level effects through tracing of various mechanisms 
of the flow of benefits, seeing who pays and receives 
 Provides for clarity on how complementary resources are accessed, looking at the power play 
as people negotiate, again allowing for tracking of the financial or social flow of benefits or 
expenses 
 Allows for the tracking of livelihoods changes as community members exchange benefits in 
order to benefit from things 
 Recognises the presence of multiple actors and the objective of analysis which, in this case, is 
the distribution of value from contract farming 
Wang, Wang and Delgaldo (2014:1259) makes a strong case for establishing a causal effect in contract 
farming studies, when noting that, “…it is vital for researchers and policymakers interested in exploring 
the welfare impacts of CF to understand which factors are associated with farmers’ willingness to 
contract”. This study applies this approach to analyse the distribution of value within commodity 
production. Access analysis is applied in this contract farming arrangement to understand how value is 
generated and distributed, the social and political processes peasants go through in negotiating access 
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to these resources so that they can partake in market-based agricultural production (Berry 1993). In 
Zimbabwe, access to, and the use of, land under the FTLRP had its own unique dynamics including 
localised institutional control of resources (Moyo 2011; Murisa 2014; Mkodzongi 2013). Hence, access 
theory is important in unpacking the processes involved and how they affect participation and 
contracting outcomes.  
2.6  Conclusion 
A synopsis of the three approaches that dominate the study of contract farming, namely, NIE, value 
chain, and political economy was provided. In this study, access theory is the chosen lens through which 
contract farming is analysed, mainly because it allows for the analysis of the bundle of powers behind 
contracting decisions, that is, the resource allocation decisions and choices deriving from ownership, 
control and the use of assets held by the parties. The chapter illustrated the distribution of value as 
farmers transfer benefits to those who control labour and other resources. This allows farmers to access 
and maintain their stay in contract farming arrangements. The transfer of the benefits among actors 
benefits the community via the income effect route.  
This chapter defined the concept of contract farming, noting the importance of situating it within the 
realm of community social relations and the FTLRP. Five models of contract farming were discussed, 
and the centralised model was singled out for this study, since it provides resources for the farmers, 
which were identified as the major constraint in Chapter 1. The chapter then discussed contracting terms 
and how they affect the participation and performance of farmers under contract, the decision-making 
by farmers and how all of this is influenced by the resource endowments of the farmers. Redistributive 
land reforms, like the FTLRP, affect bundles of powers held by farmers which affect their bargaining 
power, participation and outcomes in contract farming. It was shown that, through access theory, by 
analysing and tracking how actors expend resources and use the value shared, the study could 
understand how community level effects are generated in contract farming. In the next chapter, land 
reform is discussed, and it is argued that it is an important process for smallholder farmers to participate 
in contract farming activities since it allows farmers to access agricultural resource endowments and 
build assets.  
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Chapter 3  
Land Reform in the Global South 
3.0 Introduction  
Land concentration, poverty, social injustice, deteriorating rural livelihoods, agricultural inefficiency 
and lack of development are key issues that are often cited as reasons for land reform in developing 
countries (Byres 2004; Griffin, Khan, and Ickowitz 2002; UNECA 2004; Moyo 2008). Borras Jr 
(2005:119) argues that land reform is “…redistribution of wealth and power from the landed elite to the 
landless poor peasants” and Lipton (1993:644) defined it as “…land transfers to the poor that shift rural 
income, or power, toward poorer…rural groups”. It is agreed that land reform involves the transfer of 
power inherent in land ownership/use from the landed elites to the landless to address equity 
discrepancies, agricultural productivity concerns, increasing poverty and population; what is contested 
is the mechanism of transfer and what constitutes land reform and the accompanying processes. This 
definition suggests that land reform is a rural phennomen, however scholarship from South Africa has 
shown that it is an urban inasmuch as it is a rural (Walker, 2005; 2007; Hendricks, Ntsebeza and 
Helliker, 2005) though they fall short of providing an inclusive working definition of land reform.    
As discussed in Chapter 2, transfer of land to smallholder farmers increases their “bundle of powers”, 
which helps them negotiate their livelihoods. Neoliberals dominating land policy in various developing 
countries favour a market-oriented approach (Deininger 2003; Deininger 1999; Deinlnger and 
Binswanger 1999). Those of socialist orientation oppose market-based reform on the basis of its 
inadequacy in addressing the land-labour “relational” issues (Byres 2004). They argue for expropriation 
of the land because it allows for restructuring the distribution of land and redress of the source of land 
question (Borras Jr 2005; Moyo 2008). The institutional school of thought prefers to focus on 
institutional deficiencies in an attempt to aid the transfer of rights. These contestations further manifest 
in proposed post-reform agriculture production relations, where neoliberals and institutional economists 
favour market-oriented value chain approaches such as contract farming. Political economist argue that 
such  production relations are littered with power imbalances and propose government supported 
agriculture anchored on local (Bernstein and Oya 2014). Whatever approach, land reform is by nature 
a disruptive process, which affects the way people access and use resources and markets in a positive 
or negative manner. 
Chang (2012:487) contends that successful land reform processes should be “…combined with 
complementary measures to increase agricultural productivity” that will lead to better welfare outcomes 
for the poor. Walker (2005) argues for a “Re-orienting the debate on land reform to engage with a larger 
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context and set of concerns …” for successful land reforms. These complementary measures include 
access to institutions that support land administration, and which service the poor through the provision 
of agricultural services such as infrastructure, inputs, knowledge, and markets for their products, which 
could be provided through contract farming arrangements. Further, human capital and political 
interventions that promote social capital and collective action by smallholder farmers are important for 
their empowerment and protection of land rights, as well as for negotiating entry into contract farming 
arrangements. Further consideration should be on the “need and focus” for reforms given demographic 
structural changes, resource constrints and demands of the averall economy (Walker 2005). The 
aforementioned is important given the primary objective of poverty reduction and equity, which needs 
to be complimented by increased agricultural production. 
So who are the peasants? Edelman (2013) has shown that the term ‘peasant’ has various meanings to it, 
stretching to relations with land, livelihoods and political orientation. In this study peasants are 
smallholder farmers who produce for subsistence and markets using either family labour and or hired 
labour. Narotzky (2016) and Akram-Lodhi and Kay (2010) argue that this relationship with the land is 
for earning a livelihood from farming or otherwise, but, more often, peasants are oppressed by the well-
off capitalists who extract capital from their labour through coercive means, legal or otherwise. Masst 
(1994) emphasises that peasants are both a consumption and production unit and earn most of their 
income from agriculture, though they can earn income from other activities. Therefore, peasants are in 
a struggle with forces that suppress them as manifested by the proliferation of peasant movements such 
as Via Campesina, which has a presence in 79 countries in what is said to be a class struggle for power 
and control of resources (Bernstein and Oya 2014). The peasant struggle is therefore for the control of 
‘access’ as describe by Ribot and Peluso (2003); to benefit from land-based resources This chapter 
reviews literature on land reform objectives and processes, tenure systems and institutions that support 
land reform beneficiaries showing that, these affect the integration of smallholders in agricultural 
markets.  
3.1 History of Land Reform: a global perspective 
Land reform peaked after the Second World War due to declining food production, poverty and 
simmering tensions among a growing population of landless and peasant-worker coalitions against the 
landed elite forcing government interventions in most parts of the developing world (Carter 1972; De 
Janvry and Ground 1978; Moyo 2004). The situation worsened after the 2007/8 food crisis (Borras Jr 
2009; Zoomers 2010). De Janvry and Ground (1978:108) aptly summed-up reasons for reforms when 
writing that the agrarian crisis was caused by “…sharply uneven development among farms, crops, and 
regions and in massive rural poverty and political tensions”. Therefore, land reform has been, and will 
be, a question of power relations, control and ownership of resources and a struggle for land between 
the landed elite and the poor peasants (Berry 1993; Moyo 2004).  
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Land ownership rested with a few, for instance 10% landlords owned 90% of the land in Latin America 
(Carter 1972), and colonial settlers owned most of the fertile land in Southern Africa (Moyo 2004). Pre-
land reform, elites such as latifundistas (5 per cent of all landowners) in Latin America controlled 80 
per cent of the land. In China “…3.8 per cent of rural households…owned 30 per cent of the Land” 
(Griffin, Khan et al. 2002:310), and in Zimbabwe, about 6 000 farmers controlled about 42 per cent of 
the land mainly in the most productive regions of the country (Palmer 1990). Land inequalities all seem 
to originate from an act of war or the domination by one group over the other. In Latin America, Carter 
(1972) reports that large amounts of land (mercedes) granted to soldiers and encomiendas defined the 
future of large private farms that were to form and ultimately define the land struggles, power relations 
and tenure systems to this day. Most land dispossessions followed violent expropriation and alienation 
of land from the indigenous people by colonial powers, who quickly established exploitative land tenure 
systems meant to extract surplus from the indigenous people’s labour, for instance, in Zimbabwe 
(Palmer and Parsons 1977; Tshuma 1995; Mnangagwa 2017 May).  
Land reform has since taken a political and economic dimension: politically, to change the class 
structure in the ownership of means of production and redefine power relations, and, economically, to 
address productivity concerns in agriculture (De Janvry and Ground 1978). To date, reforms have taken 
different shapes and forms across the developing world. For example, successful foreign initiated 
reforms in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, a radical 1959 revolutionary reform process in Cuba, and Latin 
America’s struggle with reforms aimed at transitioning to egalitarian capitalist agriculture (Carter 1972; 
Kay 2002). Zimbabwe engaged in an unprecedented most disruptive FTLRP ever witnessed since the 
end of the Cold War with widespread economic consequences for beneficiaries and the population in 
general (Moyo and Chambati 2013). 
In Africa, reforms were generally influenced by the nature of colonial rule where, for instance, in 
southern Africa, the land question emanates from the history of dispossession by colonial masters, and 
the rest of Africa has a tenure problem (Mafeje 2003). As a result, reforms have taken different pathways 
with different outcomes: for instance, a revolution such as in Cuba changed dominant social relations 
while De Janvry (1981:484-85) believes reforms are only an institutional intervention that changes 
“economic and or political contradictions”, such as reforms in Latin America, Asia and Africa where 
the underlying economic models were not changed. Therefore, most reforms discussed here are 
institutional interventions instigated by the state, peasants and/or workers. 
After the Second World War, the polarised political environment, namely, the socialist/communist 
versus capitalist ideology, was to define the direction of land reforms in developing countries. In Latin 
America, for instance, the Cuban revolution gave impetus to Latin American land reforms of the 1960s 
more often with the support of capitalist states such as America (Carter 1972; De Janvry 1981; Kay 
2002). America was also to play an important role in the Asian land reforms, particularly of Japan, 
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South Korea and Taiwan, where individualised plots were established and backed by strong government 
support in terms of land acquisitions and agricultural support (Kay 2002).  
Ideological differences explain the different land reforms and outcomes that emerged, for instance, 
collective farms in Cuba, the Soviet Union and China, and market-based land reforms in Latin America 
and Asia. Africa was caught in-between this ideological rock and a hard place, and reforms were based 
on Eurocentric approaches with strong influence of the developmental state phenomena trending at the 
time, a situation Mafeje (2003) believes compromised the success of land reforms in Africa. Mafeje 
reckons reforms should have been made within the parameters of the African context, culture and 
norms.  
China has transformed its agriculture from collectivism to current individualised tenure system since 
the 1950s, focusing more on land use rights (Chen and Davis 1998). The reforms first established family 
farms, which were then abandoned in the mid-50s in favour of collectivist farms known as the People’s 
Commune, which were a failure. Then, in the 1970s, reforms reverted to family farms called the House 
Responsibility System (Chen and Davis 1998). This is a contract-based system that allows active 
farmers to till the land for a given period, issues Chen and Davis think have resulted in tenure security 
problems, distorted rural labour markets and uncertainty as the contract approaches its end-date. Despite 
the successes reported in Chinese agriculture, simmering equity and efficiency concerns continue to 
form the basis of further land reforms (Chen and Davis 1998). Chen and Davis (1998) believe land 
reform needs to be integrated in the whole rural economy and its rural industrialisation trajectories. 
In Latin America, land reform has remained an unfinished business, and current efforts by the World 
Bank to sponsor the market-assisted approach have not led to the intended successes. More importantly, 
the region has witnessed the emergence of powerful peasant landless movements, for instance, Via 
Campesina in Brazil, which has redefined and radicalised peasants and the land reform agenda 
(Edelman 2013; Narotzky 2016). Africa’s land pressure continues to be pushed by increases in 
population, hunger and low agricultural productivity and, in southern Africa radicalism is also on the 
increase mainly targeted at the white minority landed elite, who still control the bulk of the fertile land 
(Moyo, 2004). Zimbabwe is the exception having gone through the FTLRP without the support of 
donors, with dire consequences on agricultural production, which it now tries to correct through contract 
farming in partnerships with the private sector (Mnangagwa 2017). Africa is the only region where food 
production and poverty indicators still lag behind the rest of the developing world, creating food security 
concerns, which food first activists believe can be solved through wealth redistribution and the land, in 
particular. However, there are concerns that contract farming could result in increased food insecurity, 
unfair distribution of resources and a differentiated community (Clapp 1994; Glover 1994; Kirsten and 
Sartorius 2002; Rehber 2000), 
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Land grab by international capital for the production of industrial crops, such as jatropha, is emerging 
as a new phenomenon in the land question in most developing countries (Hall 2011; Zoomers 2010; 
Vander Stichele 2015). This could result in a new form of land dispossession or changing of tenure 
systems (particularly land use) to the detriment of food production in most developing countries. 
International capital, through contract farming arrangements and with explicit support by governments, 
is spearheading the commercialisation of agriculture and determining cropping patterns of rural 
households in most developing countries, impacting on their livelihoods strategies and coping 
mechanisms. Notably, this would affect the evolution of agricultural transformation, institutions, and 
livelihoods in rural communities (Moyo 2004; Platteau 1996) as shown by the unfolding customary 
tenure transformation in both Zambia (Chitonge et al. 2017) and in Malawi (Chirwa 2008).   
3.2 The Case for/against Land and Agrarian Reform 
3.2.1 Viability/Inverse Relationship Argument  
Redistributive land reform is generally desirable on the basis that small farms that are owner-farmed 
are more productive than LSCFs (Lipton 1993; Griffin, Khan, and Ickowitz 2002; Berry and Cline 
1979); however, the foundations of this notion are empirically and theoretically disputed (Byres 2004; 
Dyer 2004). This argument is based on the inverse relationship between its basis on labour productivity 
and management of family labour. Proponents of the inverse relationship argue that owner-managed 
farms have low transaction costs (in the use and supervision of labour) and a high rate of effort exerted 
by the owner, which results in high productivity per hectare (Byres 2004; Lipton 1993) and intense 
application of inputs (Cornia 1985). The inverse argument is also the basis of that put forth by 
agroecologists who further argue that smallholders are also sustainable and bio-sensitive farmers that 
are protective of the environment (Altieri 2009; Rosset 1999). Further, polyculture practised by 
smallholder farmers tends to increase overall farmer profitability per hectare. The polyculture argument 
is further supported by Carter (1984) in a study in India, where he tried to explain the source of the 
inverse relationship for the poor.  Agroecologists criticise LSCFs for their heavy use of industrial 
chemicals, monoculture and their obsession with profit, which has resulted in skewed crop production 
towards industrial crops such as sugarcane. This, they argue, perpetuates food security problems in 
developing countries and, given that the highest portion of the poor’s income is spent on food, poverty 
tends to increase with food insecurity and shortage.  
The inverse relationship argument rests on the existence of a dual labour market in less developed 
countries, application and supervision of family labour and thus, it could be plausible to explore how 
this increases farm productivity. According to Lipton (1993:645), “…because small family farmers 
avoid most transactions costs in labor markets (search, screening, supervision), it pays them to use more 
labor per hectare, and thus to produce more gross output per hectare year.” Feder (1985:298) further 
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claims that family supervised hired labour is more productive and working capital flows for farming 
households are “positively related to the amount of land …” owned. The inverse relationship argument 
is strongly anchored in new institutional and transaction cost economics where, given the imperfect 
rural labour markets smallholding are thought to have comparative advantage. Griffin, Khan, and 
Ickowitz (2002) noted that small size farms have a higher total factor productivity than large farms. In 
most rural areas, population increases create labour surpluses which could be used productively in 
accumulating capital if land was availed to rural household in line with Lewis’s (1954) capital 
accumulation model, suggesting that land reform has the potential to generate broad community effects. 
Land reform is designed with household numbers in mind and farm sizes matched with the optimal 
family size that can farm it. Consequently, inverse relationships can hold to a certain level and then start 
diminishing when the viable farm size is exceeded. Land reform in countries with surplus economically 
active labour will lead to labour increasing its marginal productivity as land holdings increase and 
labour is fully employed. The assumption is also that the beneficiaries will be well resourced with 
modern inputs, technology and support to facilitate their working of the land.  
The inverse relationship argument for land reform has been strongly criticised by political economists, 
such as Dyer (2004); Sender and Johnston (2004) and Byres (2004). Byres has argued that this 
phenomenon is applicable to pre-capitalist economies, while others posit that the concept is fallible 
when one considers technological adoption and developments, Sender and Johnston (2004) point to 
methodological flaws and lack of empirical evidence, particularly for Africa. While the theoretical 
foundation of the inverse relation is appealing, a general view of the problems bedevilling developing 
countries’ agriculture brings it into question. For instance, thin markets, infrastructure, human capital 
and information asymmetry are said to affect smallholder productivity (Place and Hazell 1993). Trends 
in a globalised world, where international capital is now making inroads into agriculture, demands that 
the inverse relationship be looked at from another angle. For instance, agribusinesses are increasingly 
involved in financing smallholder agriculture through contract farmers, who, in most cases, are land 
reform beneficiaries. While this might increase total factor productivity and labour in particular, it could 
lead to the exploitation of labour as the capitalists accumulate most of the surplus leaving smallholders 
with subsistence income, a criticism advanced against contract farming. Further, Berry (1993) has 
shown the declining levels of labour and a shift towards the use of wage labour in Africa. Contract 
farming, for instance, will worsen this situation given that most cash crops are labour intensive. 
Ultimately, solving this will require complementary resource endowments. 
The other challenge with the inverse relationship argument is that it does not emphasise the contextual 
issues that could have given rise to the demand for reform in the first place. In Africa, Sender and 
Johnston (2004) found no evidence or theoretical basis for inverse relationship in land reform outcome. 
This could be a reflection of the level of development of capitalist agriculture in Africa which has 
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always favoured the landed elite with access to agricultural markets (Byres 2004). Recent evidence 
shows that household asset endowments are important in market-based agriculture (Benfica, Tschirley, 
and Boughton 2006; Boughton et al. 2007), showing the complementarity of assets to labour 
productivity. In Mazowe, Zikhali (2010) showed that FTLRP beneficiaries increased productivity 
through intensive use of modern inputs and hired labour. With such differences of opinion, it is critical 
to consider the socio-economic, political and environmental objectives of a government in deciding on 
the need for a land reform. Efficiency alone could be an inadequate argument, particularly in highly 
marginalised and differentiated poor communities, where the poor have no access to any means of 
production except their labour. 
3.2.2 Equity, Economic Growth, Development and Poverty Reduction 
Income and land inequality are not good for poverty alleviation and economic growth (Binswanger-
Mkhize, Bourguignon, and van den Brink 2009; Alesina and Perotti 1996). Inequality affects poverty 
and growth in various channels, such as the expenditure, savings and even fiscal policy outcomes, which 
affect the provision of public goods. For instance, the poor have little accumulated capital and hence, 
are not able to participate in the economic activities of their communities or country, and yet, those 
holding vast amounts of accumulative capital rarely use it for public good (Binswanger-Mkhize, 
Bourguignon, and van den Brink 2009). As shown by Moyo (2004), inequality in land causes social 
upheaval, which, in itself, is not good for growth and development. Inequality in land also affects the 
choice of crops, asset holdings and livelihoods of those working and living on it. This is so because 
land provides a platform for their (non)agricultural activities, that is, “…arable production, fodder for 
livestock, and an array of biotic and abiotic resources’’ (Shackleton, Shackleton, and Cousins 2000:1), 
allowing inhabitants to earn a living. Understandably, social differentiation emanating from land 
inequality has been reported as the cause of conflict and struggles over land in various countries of the 
developing world, which is understandable, given that most people in the developing countries depend 
on farming for their livelihood.   
Land reform is therefore a political institutional process aimed at correcting this social injustice, which 
also has strong economic support. Development literature argues that if the economically active poor 
gain access to productive assets then they are equally or even more productive and this would take them 
out of poverty. Further resources are likely to be optimally used. The inverse relationship argument and 
equity in land holdings proves that small family farms could be productively put to use. According to 
Nnadozie (2003:71), “…putting idle resources to work, allocative efficiency, and comparative 
advantage” will lead to economic growth. Most large farms are rarely operated to the maximum and 
egalitarian reforms will put this idle land to productive use, thus adding to the national output. 
Optimising resource use should, therefore, lead to prosperity at the individual and national levels, as 
output increases and other factors of production are brought into economic use. The Asia land reform 
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successes (South Korea and Taiwan) taught us that surplus from agriculture was important in financing 
industrialisation.   
Levine (1999) showed that finance is an important component of growth and, hence, a nation that 
enhances savings can invest in capital goods that support industrial process, as happened in Asia. In 
South Korea and Taiwan, savings increased among the peasant farms, thus generating a surplus to 
support industrialisation. In Japan, former landlords used their entrepreneurial skills to invest income 
from land sales in establishing financial institutions that supported industrialisation and, hence, 
economic growth. This shows that equitable redistribution creates avenues that promote economic 
growth. Increases in output for the poor also means substantial savings on welfare expenditure and 
foreign currency used to import food. This foreign currency can be diverted to importation of either 
agricultural equipment or industrial goods that further increase output and, hence, economic growth. 
Lipton (2009:2) observed that increasing the land holding of the poor can raise their income through, 
“…farm labour, land, and enterprise; via non-farm activity, and through economy-wide effects on 
growth and distribution.” Further resource endowments, such as land, have been associated with market 
participation by farmers (Benfica, Tschirley, and Boughton 2006; Boughton et al. 2007). Where 
inequality is high the elites grab the economic opportunities that arise, thus exacerbating social 
differentiation (Sulle 2017). Yet, drawing from the inverse relationship discussion, land reform will 
lead to vibrant rural markets which increase rural incomes, for instance, increased demand for labour 
and local produce, as local incomes increase (Binswanger-Mkhize, Bourguignon, and van den Brink 
2009). In Zimbabwe, Scoones et al. (2011), Scoones et al. (2018) and Moyo (2011) posit that the FTLRP 
transformed the rural landscape, and farmers improved their livelihoods through participation in 
markets. Increasing rural incomes also leads to an increased demand for manufactured goods within 
rural communities. This effectively leads to the stimulation of first backward and then forward 
industries that support agriculture, and commercial industries that supply manufactured goods 
demanded by the local communities. 
Political economists (De Janvry 1981; Moyo 2004) posit that such inequality in rural areas has its 
origins in land alienations and dispossession, which need to be corrected through land reform processes. 
Changing the social relations of production in the countryside is believed to be important for the 
productive use of the land and other natural resources that come with it. This requires concerted efforts 
from the government to stimulate “…a variety of economic, political and institutional mechanisms” 
necessary for development and productive use, as happened in South Korea and Taiwan (Kay 2002: 
1092). To establish equity, the land reform would need access to other forms of “accumulated capital” 
(Alesina and Perotti 1996), such as finance and technology, to successfully farm the land. One of the 
other outcomes of inequality is conflict (Moyo 2004), which tends to create instability even for the 
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landed elite. Therefore, land reform is important as political processes that correct such social relations 
and redefine power relations and assets within communities.  
However, there is a need for a lasting solution for intergenerational transfers of land to avoid recurring 
conflict. For instance, in Zimbabwe by 1977, the communal lands exceeded their land-carrying capacity 
by two-and-a-half times, with 675 000 households and over two million people living and earning their 
livelihoods from this marginalised land (Riddell 1980). Herbst (1991) reports that forty thousand 
families were being added to communal areas thus, making the government’s objective of settling 
162 000 a drop in the ocean that would not fully address the land question permanently as rural 
households exponentially increase. After the FTLRP, fewer than 127 192 families were settled (Utete 
2003), yet population is expected to double by 2025. This would also compromise national stability as 
surely happened in 2000 when the land question became radicalised and a process of violent 
repossession followed. However, if the demographic trends continue, as reported by Herbst (1991), the 
question is whether the latest reforms will solve the land question for good. Walker (20050 suggests 
that all alternatives be explored to assess the needs of the changing population, which for instance might 
demand land for housing and jobs. 
3.3 Types of land Reforms  
Types of land reform vary in different jurisdictions; for instance, in South Africa there is restitution, 
redistributive land reform in Zimbabwe, tenurial reforms in most African countries (Mafeje 2003) and 
farm consolidation (Eastwood, Lipton, and Newell 2010). In this section, I focus on redistributive and 
tenure reforms, which are the dominant types of land reform. 
3.3.1 Redistributive Land Reform 
Redistributive land reform is viewed as “…public programs that seek to restructure equitably and 
rationally a defective land-tenure system by compulsory, drastic, and rapid means.” Borras Jr (2005), 
citing Tai, 1974:11–12). Borras Jr (2005) emphasises the scale of compensation (from zero to full 
market or more) paid to the landlords by the peasant/government as the critical defining variables in the 
definition of a redistributive reform. The closer the amount is to full payment, the less it becomes a 
redistributive reform. The latter scenario would not lead to a change in power relations and control but 
only social relations of production at farm level, which would still favour the landed elite. As noted by 
De Janvry and Ground (1978), land concentration and land reform border on the control of peasant 
labour, hence, changes to the social relations of production that are not met with changes in the 
directional flow of power could easily lead to the reversal of the reform process. While arguing for 
redistributive land reform in South Africa to correct apartheid induced-inequality, Kepe and Cousins 
(2002) note that there is a tendency for elites to capture the benefits of reforms if there is no decisive 
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shift in power relations towards the peasants. For instance, Borras Jr (2005) cites the Philippine case as 
an example of a failed reform because full payment has a tendency for the landed elite to regroup 
through their financial power to reverse the gains of the reform. 
Dai and Tai (1974) view of a land reform also connotes strong elements of radicalism as happened in 
Zimbabwe’s FTLRP recently, the Cuban revolution and other peasant-led violent land uprising. The 
justification for such action normally rests with the view that land dispossession was violent and with 
no compensation in the first place. However, the equity and efficiency objectives of a land reform are 
important issues in determining the course and approach to land reform. No doubt, a radical reform can 
lead to an equitable redistribution of land, but land on its own cannot lead to improved productivity and 
poverty reduction in rural communities, neither can full compensation market-based reforms achieve 
the same without a supporting environment (Walker 2007).  
A successful land reform is viewed as one that would lower social differentiation, both in terms of land 
and wealth gini coefficient (Borras Jr 2005). Following Cousins and Scoones (2010), one option is to 
apply the viable farm concept, thus going beyond the narrow efficiency and equity proposition of the 
market-based approach to include socio-economic, cultural and political dimensions of land reform. 
This will ensure that post-land reform benefits include “…qualitative gains, such as an enhanced sense 
of justice, self-esteem, security, dignity, and self-respect” (Chitonge and Ntsebeza 2012:88), which 
captures the contextual and value systems of reform beneficiaries. Walker (2005) proposes a land 
reform driven by capacity. Borras and McKinley (2006) noted that the failure of state- and market-
based reforms to deliver on the objectives of land reform were due mainly to the limited scope of the 
policy prescriptions. They recommended an alternative inclusive redistributive approach based on four 
pillars, which, they believe, will lead to successful land reforms. The principles are based on 
participatory and bottom-up approaches which, when successfully applied, could cater for peasants 
needs. These pillars are: formation and participation of peasants’ organisations in planning land reform 
processes; alliance-building by peasant organisations with actors sympathetic and supportive of land 
reforms to increase political muscle; increased government support and infrastructure development that 
support reform beneficiaries; and a pro-poor macroeconomic environment. An inclusive approach 
advanced by Borras (2015) could lead to positive institutional development in peasant societies capable 
of influencing and mobilising resources for post-land reform environment. Further, beneficiaries input 
in such policy issues as land ceilings and tenure systems could be solicited and used to develop policies 
favourable to all. Should this be applied, then it would result in the government governing with the 
people and for the benefit of the people. 
3.3.2 Land Tenure Reforms  
Maxwell and Wiebe (1998: 4) define land tenure as “…social relations and institutions governing access 
to and ownership of land and natural resources”, which are enshrined in the country’s statutory and 
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customary laws. Land use rights are broadly referred to as property rights, which define the purposes 
that land can be used for and the power held by person(s) owning the land (Feder and Feeny 1991). A 
land tenure system has two components: the laws (written statutes) or community laws (norms, 
practices) governing the use and transfer of land; and institutions enforcing and managing the various 
land rights allocated to various parties, for instance, land registration and titling, and adjudication. In 
communal areas, land tenure rights are negotiated between users and those in control (Berry 1997). It 
is from these two components that the Property Rights School (Coase 1960; Demsetz 1968) and the 
Customary School emerged, with the former viewing the latter as inferior and retrogressive insofar as 
development and economic growth is concerned, leading to De Soto (2000) to declare property in 
customary tenure “dead capital”.  
Moyo (2004) citing Lastarria-Cornhiel (2002) argues that forms of land tenure are ‘interwoven’ in 
socio-economic structures and context of communities. Social relations and institutions are themselves 
derived from power relations, levels of agricultural development, technological change, and markets 
prevailing within society, and exhibit tendencies by the elites (state and the landed) to exercise control 
and retain power at the expense of the peasantry and working poor (Feder and Feeny 1991; Moyo 2004). 
Consequently, contestations and power struggles tend to dominate land tenure reforms. For instance, 
the development of peasant movements had a considerable influence on land tenure systems in Brazil, 
while the settler colonial system defined the tenure system in southern Africa (UNECA 2004), and the 
radical FTLRP has drastically changed the land tenure system in Zimbabwe. Capital, through contract 
farming, is also redefining land use access patterns as it seeks to make use of the most fertile land (Eaton 
and Shepherd 2001). It is evident, therefore, that as power dynamics change, land tenure regimes 
respond accordingly within the political and ideological framework pursued by the contesting actors 
and influenced by globalisation dynamics in line with what Platteau (1996) labelled Evolutionary 
Theory of Land Rights. 
Land tenure in developing countries was greatly affected or influenced by the colonial land policies 
which generally remodelled even the customary land laws in settler colonies, resulting in a dualistic 
land tenure system (UNECA 2004; Moyo 2004). After the Second World War, land tenure was shaped 
by the ideological battles of the socialist and capitalist groups leading to collectivist systems in China, 
the Soviet Union and Cuba, while the United States promoted individualised tenure systems in countries 
such as Japan, South Korea and Thailand. In Africa, state domination and control of agriculture resulted 
in a mixed-tenure system comprising the “corrupted” customary land tenure system (Chimhowu and 
Hulme 2006) and the Western-based market-oriented version. UNECA (2004) noted that various tenure 
systems coexist in most jurisdictions.   
Sjaastad and Cousins (2009:2) identified “…land scarcity, increasing land conflicts, and increasing 
individualisation that eventually flow from growing populations and agricultural commercialisation” as 
51 
the main drivers of the evolution of land tenure in most developing countries (see also Platteau, 1996). 
The flow of international capital into agriculture transformed production relations in the countryside 
from subsistence production to market-oriented production, which has resulted in the redefinition of 
land use patterns and competition for land. De Soto (2000)’s work, Mystery of Capital, also contributed 
to government initiatives to transform land rights in the countryside with the hope of reaping benefits 
associated with land titling, such as access to credit, technology and high potential markets. Evidently, 
the power of international donor organisations, such as the World Bank and other donor countries, have 
helped in the evolution and transition of land rights in the developing world. These efforts have been 
contested on the grounds of the inappropriateness and neglect of customary and local-context systems 
of land use and rights (Mafeje 2003).   
Four categories defining property rights, namely, open access, communal property, private property, 
and state, are clearly articulated and described by Feder and Feeny (1991:137) and also UNECA (2004), 
and will not be repeated here. Land tenure systems have considerable impact on the agricultural 
outcomes of a country, and scholars generally believe they have influence on land use, on-farm 
investment and access to farming resources, such as credit, inputs and extension services (Feder and 
Feeny 1991). It is from this perspective that the neoliberal approach argues for individualised rights to 
land, which are viewed as superior when it comes to the allocation of resources, incentivising on-farm 
investment and the development of agriculture. However, empirical evidence has shown that 
individualised property rights are not superior insofar as investment, access to credit and agricultural 
production are concerned (Sjaastad and Cousins 2009). 
Exclusive property rights based on colonial land policies and elite capture are the source of land 
inequality and poverty in developing countries (UNECA 2004; Moyo 2004), which has necessitated 
land tenure reform. The coexistence of the four categories of property rights impacts the use of land as 
a development and poverty reduction tool by the poor, who are normally relegated to the less favourable 
tenure system. The problem has continued even after independence due to the State’s “…overriding 
interest in access, control and management of rural land” (UNECA 2004:12), large farmer bias (Griffin, 
Khan, and Ickowitz 2002), and the power of the landed elite (Moyo 2004), which has tended to 
perpetuate dualistic land tenure systems in developing countries. 
The neoliberal approach to correcting these anomalies focuses on the land tenure reforms that are based 
on the market system, which, it is believed, would allocate land use to the efficient user either through 
outright purchase or an efficient rental market. This approach looks to the government as a facilitator 
through institutional and regulatory interventions that should lower transaction costs between those 
involved in these transactions. This is clearly a commercial-based approach which is demand-driven. 
Following Lipton (2009)’s definition of land reform, this would not accommodate the very poor who 
live on less than $1.25 per day and find it costly to participate. Hence, such a reform would not 
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necessarily address equity and efficiency issues in land distribution. Kay (2002) proposed a 
comprehensive and inclusive approach to land tenure reform that involves all stakeholders in designing 
reforms that would lead to a successful agrarian transition, poverty reduction and economic growth as 
happened in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Although they were capitalist in orientation, reforms in 
these countries were affordable to the beneficiaries and well supported by the government – an aspect 
that might need to be accommodated in the market-based tenure system.  
The allocation efficiency argument of markets has been brought into question by empirical evidence 
that has shown that land registration and titling do not necessarily lead to increased access to farming 
resources and increased productivity in smallholder farming (Barrows and Roth 1990; Feder and Feeny 
1991; Place and Hazell 1993). Further smallholders at times find no incentives to participate in land 
registration and titling and, in Kenya, research has shown that some communities reverted to communal 
systems after previously titling their land (Place and Hazell 1993). While titled and registered land is a 
form of collateral, the allocation of credit, which is key in supporting agricultural production, is 
dependent on various factors, such as entrepreneurial abilities, information asymmetry, weather, and 
risk disposition of the individual. Even strong proponents of the land-market allocation power, 
Deininger (2003) and Deininger and Binswanger (1999), have alluded to the need to contextualise land 
tenure systems. 
Mafeje (2003) criticises the Eurocentric market-based land tenure reforms for their unsuitability to the 
African context, which, he argues, is their failure to address Africa’s land tenure problems. Mafeje, like 
UNECA (2004), also observes the distortions created by colonial land tenure systems, and Cheater 
(1990:188) notes that, through legislation, colonial distortions of land tenure were enshrined and further 
“…selectively strengthened after independence” presumably as a power base of the independent states. 
In fact Nuesiri (2014) has noted the decline and re-emergence of customary authority in land tenure 
administration, a process that coexists with state institutional arrangements in some African countries 
such as Malawi (see also Chirwa 2008).  
Though corrupted by colonial and international capital (Moyo 2004), customary land tenure systems in 
Africa exhibit a degree of dynamism and complexity (Chitonge 2015; Chitonge et al. 2017; Migot-
Adholla et al. 1991), where both communal ownership and private ownership (though not titled) coexist, 
with an array of administrative controls (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2006; Platteau 1996). For instance, 
homesteads are privately owned by the household while pastures are communally owned and there is 
evidence that the private homesteads and agricultural fields were offered in informal land markets 
(Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2006). It is this private ownership of homesteads, family assets that De 
Soto (2000) believed could be registered and titled so that they could be used in market transactions. 
Chitonge et al. (2017) provide recent evidence of land sales in Zambia’s communal lands of Bunda 
Bunda and Munguleand and Nkomesha, where the law allows for the conversion of communal land to 
53 
leasehold after being held for a period of five years. This is critical for participation in the mainstream 
neoliberal credit markets if peasants are to access agricultural resources needed to increase productivity 
and fight poverty. However, the Zambian case reported by Chitonge et al. (2017) does not delve into 
the effect that land sales have on the access to livelihood-enhancing resources, such as credit, tenure 
security, markets and viability of remaining landholding. There is the risk that the poor might end up 
landless and reverting into poverty, thus creating a vicious poverty cycle.  
It is important, then, to have statutory regimes that recognise and empower customary institutions that 
are in harmony with the evolution and dynamism of the African communities and in line with the 
devolution of power; local leadership could then facilitate the registration of land starting with 
homesteads in their areas.  Findings by Migot-Adholla et al. (1991) and Place and Hazell (1993) and 
others showing that indigenous (customary tenure) laws that do not constrain agricultural production 
need to be followed-up with institutional support to these communities to build a capacity to handle 
new waves of capital investment flowing in from agribusinesses into rural smallholder farmers. For 
instance, contract farming has been on the rise in recent years and is being promoted by African 
governments (NEPAD. 2013). This could also be supported by dispute-resolution mechanisms to 
facilitate the uptake of new technologies and the entry into new markets by smallholders. The Zambian 
case reported by Chitonge et al. (2017) has such dispute-resolution mechanisms, which could be 
developed to suit transition to capitalist agrarian systems. However, the power balance emerging in the 
communities affected would need to be supported by strong evolving institutions. Also, this would 
facilitate orderly transition into the production of cash crops and changes in land use arising from the 
commercialisation of agriculture. 
3.4 Approaches to Land Reform 
The approach to land reform affects institutions, land rights that emerge and the enforcement thereof 
(Chang 2012). Chang (2012) posits that institutions matter and that the state can provide the necessary 
context/environment for a successful land reform process that benefits smallholder farmers. Public 
policy is important in the allocation of resources, including public goods and agricultural resources to 
smallholders. In any case, all approaches to land reform recognise the central statutory role of the state, 
however, the participatory approach believes involvement of beneficiaries will lead to sustainable and 
successful reforms. 
Hall (2009) argued for a land reform process that is supported by sound institutions that lead to the 
attainment of land reform objectives. Land reform is meant to benefit socially differentiated societies 
with varying capacities and resources at their disposal. For instance, communities may have limited 
access to finance, farming knowledge, and input and output markets, which compromise their ability to 
effectively and equitably use land. Further, smallholders lack the experience and know-how to produce 
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commercial crops that will increase their income. It is the provision of these farming resources that are 
the basis and source of contestations post-land reforms. Neoliberal approaches assume that markets 
(both rental and sells) will effectively allocate these resources and, hence, land should be 
individualistically titled and owned.  
3.4.1 State-led Land Reform 
Government plays a critical role in pre-and post-land reform process and success. Through public 
policy, the government engages actors with competing needs, at times being both judge and actor, while 
advancing its political and economic motives where the prime motive might be to retain power by 
appealing to the biggest constituent, which is the poor. In short, Barraclough (1999) says it is a political 
process and Chavunduka and Bromley (2013:670) say it can be “…a productive asset, political 
instrument, symbol of belonging, and as a safety net for the poor”. Hence land reform is a power game  
over the control of resources, constituencies and at times the economy and hence, the need to identify 
the actors and their interests from the onset. The state (loosely used to mean executive, judiciary and 
the legislator) is the key player through its power to make laws and enforce them. The landed elite 
derives their power from the control of land and economic power and, at times, their influence over the 
state and the landless peasants who are poor but, in a democracy, have a strong voting power. Lipton’s 
(2009) definition of land reform emphasises the legal aspect of the reform, which gives credence to the 
central role of the state in regularising any land reform programme irrespective of the initiator. The 
state, landed elites and peasants are the main players; but in a globalised world, international capital 
through the World Bank, international institutions, civic organisation and agribusinesses have become 
important players, particularly with their influence on policy formulation processes. This has defined 
the path governments have followed in executing land reforms. 
Barraclough and Morrow (2010) describe various initiators of land reforms in Latin America, for 
example, social/peasant movements in Mexico, Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua China and Vietnam; 
insurgencies in Peru and El Salvador, authoritarian regimes in South Korea and Taiwan, and 
democratically elected governments in Puerto Rico, Guatemala, Venezuela and Chile. In all these, 
reforms were centred on the plight of the peasants, which eventually involved the state in its regulatory 
role. Pre-reform, the state has a critical role of identifying, reconciling and shaping the direction, 
financing and institutional arrangements of land reform depending on its treatment of and resolution of 
power demands of the various constitutions.  
However, the key role of the state emerges post-reform if the process is to be sustainable. A sustainable 
reform should not recede into its pre-reform state but must transfer power to potential beneficiaries and 
lead to general improvement and welfare of the beneficiaries and future generations. Further, 
mechanisms and institutions for intergenerational land transfers must be provided for. This demands a 
well-balanced statutory framework and post-reform services that address infrastructural and agricultural 
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needs of the beneficiaries. It is, however, these institutional arrangements, and their efficiency and 
effectiveness of transferring land from the elites to the landless that are contested by the market-assisted 
approach as they believe the process should be left to the power of the markets to resolve and state 
should limit its functions to regulation and facilitation of the interest of the parties involved in reforms.  
3.4.2 Market Based Land Reform 
Neoliberals, basing their argument on the Washington Consensus, have been pushing for market-driven 
land reform processes in developing countries in order to correct ‘distortions’ that resulted in the 
creation of large farms (Binswanger and Deininger 1993). They see the state as perpetuating distortions 
and, hence, its role should be minimised in land reform processes. Instead, the pro-market proponents 
believe that land reform can be achieved through incentivising large farm holders to sell to landless 
peasants through negotiated transactions (Byres 2004). This is despite the power imbalance between 
the parties and the risk that government officials would most likely align with large farmer interest. In 
South Africa, Binswanger and Deininger (1993:1452) noted the desperate and urgent need for land 
reform and believed it could be “…accomplished using judicial and market-assisted processes for the 
transfer and resettlement of land”. Because of their obsession with ‘markets’, neoliberals are concerned 
with land tenure reforms (discussed above) without addressing fundamental social relations of 
production (Borras Jr 2005; Moyo 2004).  
In Zimbabwe, the Lancaster House agreement enshrined the willing-buyer-willing-seller concept. The 
willing-buyer-willing-seller concept has its roots in the protection of property rights, a key principle of 
a capitalist economy. Property rights founded on the neoclassical theory argue that individualised land 
rights will lead to improved access to farm credit and resources, thus leading to positive agricultural 
outcomes. Landowners with secure title deeds are perceived to be keen to invest on their plots (Feder 
and Nishio 1998; Deininger 1999), though there is empirical evidence that discounts this perception 
(Atwood 1990; Place and Hazell 1993). Security of tenure in certain communities goes beyond titling 
and registration of land particularly where customary ties and lineage are strong. One is then inclined 
to think that the level of economic transition towards a capitalist state becomes an important factor. 
While acknowledging the role of the state in land reform, the market-based proponents believe that the 
state should be restricted to creating and promoting the smooth operation of land markets. Otherwise, 
the state should intervene inasmuch as it reduces transaction costs in the land markets, such as ensuring 
that land titling and registration is facilitated, and dispute resolution mechanisms are provided through 
courts. In a neoclassical worldview, markets would efficiently allocate resources pre-and post-land 
reform and hence those that are capable farmers will demand land, which will lead to efficient 
production on the farms. 
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As propounded by Deininger (1999) and Binswanger and Deininger (1993), prior to land reform, the 
state should set market mechanisms that allow would-be beneficiaries of land reform to access credit. 
The World Bank has been pushing for a market-assisted land reform in Africa, and already it has been 
implemented in Brazil, South Africa and Guetamela (Gauster and Ryan Isakson 2007) with very little 
success. The concept of market-assisted land reform was clearly articulated by Deininger and 
Binswanger (1999), the prime movers and proponents of the concept, and Gauster and Ryan Isakson 
(2007) who critiqued the idea. Here key concepts are highlighted to facilitate the discussion. 
The core of the market-assisted approach is the elimination of ‘distortions’ inherent in state-led land 
reform, which would allow the markets both land and credit to operate smoothly, thus facilitating 
equitable access and acquisition of land and credit. To achieve this there is a need to assist the poor to 
gain access to these markets and hence, Deininger (1999) proposed inclusive financial institutions that 
provide finance to groups of farmers.  
Empirical evidence has shown that markets did not form or respond as perceived by the proponents of 
market-assisted land reforms (Gauster and Ryan Isakson 2007). South Africa, one of the countries that 
adopted the system, is currently debating a move towards land expropriation without compensation. 
There is ample evidence that shows that peasants respond to incentives that improve their livelihoods 
(Griffin, Khan, and Ickowitz 2002), which then begs the question why the uptake and success of this 
new institutional innovation has been sluggish. Critics have pointed to the commodification of land as 
the problem (El-Ghonemy 1999). In developing countries land is a symbol of social relations in 
communities, which go beyond neoliberal market forces (Mafeje 2003). Borras Jr (2005:94) observed 
that land has a multidimensional function and hence cannot be understood “…in purely monetary terms; 
and … requires the intervention of the state to achieve the desired multiple goals of land reform policy”.  
He further notes that the huge financial resources required for such programmes are beyond the fiscal 
means of developing countries and their citizens. Furthermore, it is critical to look at the source of land 
alienation and the processes of dispossession, which, to this day, inhibit poor indigenous people from 
participating in such markets. For instance, land reform that benefited former tenants in Latin America 
could have different outcomes to those that benefited former workers. Deininger (1999) has argued that 
this is because of differentials in entrepreneurial disposition. This is the situation in settler-induced land 
dispossession, where most landless people were farm workers or subsistence producers in marginalised 
lands. 
The World Bank more often reports that the poorest people in developing countries live on a dollar a 
day which makes it incomprehensible how such people can participate and repay loans in a land market 
(Carter and Mesbah 1993). This may indicate that the target group is the rich rural peasants, which 
would mean social differentiation is exacerbated. From a neoliberal perspective, the big question is who 
should benefit from land reform. Clearly what the market-assisted models propound is production for 
57 
the market as it emphasises the design of business plans (Deininger 1999), but most of the poor produce 
primarily for subsistence. 
Since the end of World War Two, interventions in land reform by foreign states, such as America in 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, were meant to ward off the spread of socialism and, by default, 
entrench the ethos of capitalism (Kay 2002). From this perspective, neoliberal-oriented land reform 
should be viewed through an individualistic capital accumulation lens, which implies it would always 
be designed for those with a profit motive, namely, the well-off in rural areas or economically active 
poor, who would be able to transit from subsistence to commercial agriculture. This then brings into 
question the notion of egalitarian land reform as articulated in the market-assisted approach to land 
reform. For instance, it is a fallacy to believe that the rural poor with limited human capital can cope 
with “…titling process used, the rights of different parties, the rules of evidence, and the benefits of the 
appeal” (Deinlnger and Binswanger 1999:260).  
This Eurocentric approach will be difficult for communities anchored on kinship and lineage land rights 
as articulated by Mafeje (2003). For this to be attained, communities’ social relations of production 
need to transit to a capitalist level, which is compatible with Deininger and Binswanger (1999)’s 
prescriptions, with rural institutions geared towards managing such processes. As discussed by Berry 
(1993) and Ribot and Peluso (2003), access to resources involves negotiation between those who control 
and users, which is affected by historical, contextual social relations. However, land and credit markets 
are thin in developing countries (Griffin, Khan, and Ickowitz 2002) and institutions have not formed to 
meet the demands of the new production system arising from the land reform process. It is not surprising 
that the market-assisted reform has left a trail of indebted beneficiaries and high desertion (Gauster and 
Ryan Isakson 2007). Again, corruption and power dynamics immediately manifest, which all works to 
the disadvantage of the poor (Byres 2004). This has resulted in calls for reforms based on, and involving, 
participants’ needs. 
3.4.3 Bottom-up and Participatory Reforms 
The weaknesses in the state- and market-based reforms have resulted in a call for participatory land 
reform processes that draw on the needs, context, and skills of the local people. Ng'ombe et al. 
(2012:1777) observed the benefits of the “…bottom-up approach where every stakeholder is involved 
in decision making so that they are empowered by way of increasing their level of knowledge, influence, 
and control over livelihoods and activities.” This comes from the realisation that peasant/community 
organisations are an important cog in the development of institutions that support pre- and post-land 
reform in rural areas. Moreover, the need for an integrated rural development approach demands that 
communities decide on the nature of land reform since it affects multiple land-based livelihoods.There 
is a belief that a hybrid (devolution of state function plus market) coupled with beneficiary participation 
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(Hall 2008) could facilitate empowered service delivery and administrative needs of the land reform 
beneficiaries (Hall (2008), citing Binswanger and Nguyen 2004:9-10).  
Quan (2005) reports of Farm Africa involvement with Northern Cape farmers, where the non-
governmental organisation was involved in facilitating the participatory processes post-land reform. By 
providing skills and knowledge, the NGO helped farmers improve their human capital, which enabled 
them to engage with other market players on an equal footing. In Latin America, social movements 
have taken up the advocacy role rather more forcefully, thus attracting government attention and 
participation in pre-land reform, as in Brazil, where these movements are involved in land occupations 
and negotiation of reform modalities (Wolford 2010). Wolford gives a detailed account of how landless 
movements, such as the Landless Workers Movement (MST) and the Catholic Land Pastoral (CPT), 
influenced the pattern of land reform and forced National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian 
Reform (INCRA) to negotiate with them as equals. By including the voice of the beneficiaries in the 
reform processes, the power balance would tilt towards the poor, and institutions that speak to their 
needs could form. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed land reform from a global perspective, highlighting the origins and history 
of the land question where through colonisation and feudal systems land dispossessions were being 
resisted by the oppressed. The economic and justice aspects of land reform were discussed, and the 
inverse relationship argument advanced as critical for alleviating poverty, since land reform will lead 
to an increase in smallholder productivity, though concerns remain due to differential asset 
endowments. As a result access to complementary resources are seen as important for a successful land 
reform.The ‘justice’ argument is based on correcting the wrongs of the past, which saw indigenous 
people being deprived of their land. The chapter then reviewed the key approaches to land reform, 
namely, market-based, state led and the participatory approach. Financial institutions have been funding 
market-based reforms, which they believe will correct deficiencies in agriculture thus promoting 
agricultural development, a case strongly opposed by the justice school which believes expropriation 
(at its extreme, without compensation) is the right approach. This leads to the various types of reforms 
proposed by the different schools: redistributive for the ‘justice’ school and more tenurial market-
assisted reforms for neoliberals. Tenure systems are important for agricultural production, though the 
type of tenure and its effect on production and access to resources is contested, secure and stable tenure 
rights are considered important for agriculture investment and productivity. A good tenure system 
facilitates both access to land and productive resources. What emerges from this chapter is that land is 
a contested resource and that access to it comes through negotiations, which are, at times, violent. 
However, it is also evident from the discussion that complementary resources are needed for a 
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successful land reform and that these are affected by differential power balance among actors. Elites 
tended to benefit in land reform processes due to the influence and resources they commanded. In the 
whole land reform is important as it enables the poor to access and benefit from land for their sustenance 
and participation in mainstream economy and agricultural market as envisaged by access theory 
discussed in Chapter 2. Distribution of land among many peasant-households is likely to stimulate rural 
economies with widespread community effects. However, this chapter showed that depends on 
balancing land reform objectives and access to capital by beneficiaries. The issue of the Zimbabwean 
land reform, which will be discussed in the next chapter, exhibits twists and turns in the redistributive 
and market approach arena and illustrates the land reform and capital nexus. 
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Chapter 4  
Land and Agrarian Relations in Zimbabwe 1890-2000 
4.0 Introduction 
The legacy of colonialism left permanent footprints in the history and future of Zimbabwe’s land, 
agrarian structure, livelihoods and the economic wellbeing of its population; footprints which can be 
traced from the arrival of the Pioneer Column in 1890 to post-independent Zimbabwe’s land reform 
(Roth and Bruce 1994). Through coercive power and legislative manipulation, Zimbabweans were 
dispossessed of their land (Moyana 2002; Palmer and Parsons 1977; Riddell 1980; Tshuma 1995), a 
process some scholars have argued repeated itself during the land repossession process (Chitiyo 2000; 
Sachikonye 2005). Land dispossession affected asset holdings and the livelihoods of indigenous 
Zimbabweans, justifying the need for reforms. The need for land reform is a universally agreed 
principle; what differs are the processes and mechanisms of achieving the reforms. In Zimbabwe, these 
were clouded by the changing government position after the expiry of the Lancaster House agreement 
in 1990, as articulated in Bowyer-Bower and Stoneman (2018). However, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
equity, justice, land shortage and poverty necessitated redistributive land reform in Zimbabwe. The 
failed willing-buyer-willing-seller process (1980-90) was followed by a violent FTLRP in 2000. 
Though broadly, Zimbabwe undertook land reform as described in Chapter 3, there are unique nuances 
detailed in this chapter.  
This chapter traces land dispossession and the processes of alienation by settler colonial powers, how 
it affected indigenous people’s access to resources, resource endowments, livelihoods, and their 
participation in agricultural activities and non-farm wage-earning employment. It is shown that land 
reform with complementary resource-provision increased the welfare of resettled farmers, market 
participation and staple food supply in the country. The historical analysis shows that, over time, 
peasants were disenfranchised and were not able to build any meaningful asset endowments to sustain 
agricultural production. However, as noted by Arrigh (1970), increased income was often accompanied 
by increased discretionary consumption for instance of durable goods like cars, bicycles, motor bikes 
and  furniture.  
4.1 Zimbabwe’s Land Question: the Legacy of Colonialism 
There is no denying that the colonial land grab and the related legislation that marginalised indigenous 
people were key in defining the nature of the land question in Zimbabwe today. At the heart of the land 
question is the deprivation of livelihood strategies for the local indigenous people through violent and 
coercive means and the forced creation of a labour reserve, which the colonial power could exploit in 
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the generation and accumulation of capital (Arrighi 1970). Indigenous Zimbabweans depend on the 
land for their socio-economic and cultural wellbeing, and land has multidimensional purposes (Mufema 
1997; Borras Jr 2005). Scholars, such as Rukuni (2000), for example, thus identify socio-political 
integration together with economic growth as some of the key objectives of land reform, a view shared 
by the Zimbabwean government during the failed 1997/98 planning process (Bowyer-Bower and 
Stoneman 2018). Land issues have had a polarising effect on Zimbabwean people both pre- and post-
independence, particularly because of the violent nature which accompanied both the dispossession and 
repossession of land from 1890 to the recent FTLRP (Cliffe et al. 2011; Sachikonye 2005; Chitiyo 
2000). Efforts to execute successful land and agrarian reform in Zimbabwe, as in other developing 
countries, have failed partly because of the need for a “…thorough understanding of the complex social 
and political contradictions, which have ensued from colonial and post-independence land policies” 
(Moyo 2008: 1).  
Post-colonial governments largely followed neoliberal approaches to land reform (Moyo 1995), which 
have not accounted for the social and cultural dimensions of the indigenous people. The Lancaster 
House agreement prescribed the willing-buyer-willing-seller approach, which was largely applied until 
the onset of the FTLRP in 2000. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, the FTLRP is a hotly contested 
process devoid of proper plans that could address fundamental socio-economic needs of the resettled 
farmers (Palmer 2000). The effect is that land has remained a contentious issue to this day because 
livelihood issues that gave rise to land reform still trouble peasants currently. 
4.2 Land Dispossession: Historical perspective and Lancaster House 
Compromise 1890-1980 
The land question in Zimbabwe arises from colonial land dispossession, discriminatory land reforms 
and legislated land alienation since 1890 (Moyo 1995), an issue exacerbated by competition among 
white settlers for labour in mines, industry and agriculture during the whole imperialist rule (Tshuma 
1995). This section describes the various activities, legislation and other tactics used by the colonial 
settlers to marginalise and exploit indigenous people in Zimbabwe, resulting in the destruction of 
indigenous agriculture, which was flourishing when the white settlers arrived (Cousins 1991). More 
importantly, it negatively affected indigenous people’s capacity to generate assets necessary for 
agricultural development and livelihood sustenance.     
4.2.1 Land Dispossession and Alienation 
History suggests that land dispossession started with the signing of the Rudd Concession in 1890, and 
what followed was a trail of systematic land dispossession of the indigenous people till independence 
in 1980. The British South African Company (BSAC), equipped with the Lippert Concession of 1889, 
started the process of expropriating indigenous land, seizure of indigenous cattle, and, in 1898 through 
the The Native Order in Council, the formation of native reserves and settler settlements on racial lines 
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took effect (Zimbabwe 2000). As shown on Figure 4-1, land distribution never accounted for 
demographic patterns existing throughout the colonial period. The seizure of assets was accompanied 
by taxes and levies meant to dispossess indigenous people of their assets through forced sales of cattle 
and cheap labour in settler mines and agriculture. 
Blacks became tenants on their own land and were forced to pay rent in cash or kind wherever they 
remained on European land. During this time, Europeans were preoccupied with mining, and, when 
these ventures failed, they turned to farming in great numbers and, by 1930, the numbers had swelled 
from 1 324 in 1911 to 2 355 in 1921 (Arrighi 1970; Tshuma 1995). This marked the beginning of 
competition between indigenous farmers and settler farmers in the agricultural markets necessitating 
the establishment of statutory discriminatory marketing boards and the Land Apportionment Act of 
1930, consolidating the racial division of land, which, in 1930, was as shown in Figure 4-1.  
When the settler whites arrived in Zimbabwe in 1890, they wanted to pre-occupy themselves with 
mining of gold. Agriculture was not a priority and land that was allocated and sold to Europeans was 
held mainly for speculative purposes. Around 1890, when it became apparent that gold was not as 
abundant as in the South African Rand, white settlers were encouraged to take up agriculture. At this 
point, African farmers were already profitably farming and trading their agricultural produce at the 
mines, and hence, they were an immediate threat to the viability and profitability of white farmer 
agriculture, which had just started (Tshuma 1995). The settlers responded to this competition by 
imposing taxes and levies and further marginalising blacks through further land dispossession and 
alienation primarily meant to force them to participate in wage-employment (Arrighi 1970). For 
instance, in 1931, the Maize Control Act and the Cattle Levy Act were enacted with the prime aim of 
forcing Africans to provide labour as a means of accumulation by the settler government. This 
legislation was followed by the Native Husbandry Act of 1951; all meant to tacitly or directly remove 
the indigenous people from the land. Added to all this changing ‘discretionary’ consumption on the part 
of Africans changed labour and production relations to meet expenditure for the new necessities 
(Arrighi 1970). Economic rationality, at times, forced the indigenous people to move to the designated 
communal lands, which were already congested. The relocation of blacks from European lands 
continued until the 1970s, effectively ending land rental on European farms (Tshuma 1995). 
Two tools were then used to remove the indigenous people from the land. First, livelihood deprivation 
was achieved through discriminatory prices, taxes and levies imposed on indigenous farmers such as 
the 10 percent maize levy of 1931. Second, blacks were forced to migrate from their land, through 
evictions by white farmers taking up farms, which were now rented to blacks though they were not fully 
utilised by white settlers. This changing tenure system was to define the livelihoods of indigenous 
people; institutions that governed their land affairs and power relations between the colonisers and the 
indigenous people. Population pressure on marginalised lands also meant that subsistence production 
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took precedence over cash-crop farming, as the land was no longer adequate to support the growing 
population. The power relations were to change in line with political events in the 1950s, the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence, and subsequently, in the post-colonial era. 
The 1930 Land Apportionment Act and Native Husbandry Act of 1951 were key legal instruments used 
by the settler government to define the emerging land tenure system. Figure 4-1 shows the various 
categories of land tenure systems that emerged from the 1930 Land Apportionment Act, where freehold 
land was for the whites and communal lands largely for blacks. The Native Purchase Areas were for 
affluent blacks that could afford to buy land; however, these operated as more of a buffer between white 
freehold land and the communal land in the Tribal Trustland managed by the Native Commissioner 
(Tshuma 1995; Matondi 2012; Cousins 1991). This period marked the beginning of a dual agricultural 
system in Zimbabwe and social differentiation at three levels, settler versus indigenous, indigenous in 
Native Purchase Areas versus indigenous in communal areas, and within the communal area itself, thus 
defining emerging class structures in Zimbabwe, which have continued to exist in post-independent 
Zimbabwe. Further, this defined mechanisms and processes through which livelihoods were to be 
negotiated. For instance, within the communal areas, differentiation in land ownership, and 
subsequently in wealth, depended on the ownership of assets, particularly a plough and cattle, which 
enabled those who possessed these to farm large swatches of land and, during good seasons, market 
surplus produce. In rural areas, land was not distributed equally, but more often by one’s ability to use 
it. Again, those indigenous people who worked for settlers also managed to buy ploughs and cattle to 
further improve themselves through investment into retail of manufactured consumables. Through this 
process, differentiation in rural areas took root, effectively defining the social relations of production 
and livelihood strategies in the communal areas as well. For instance, those with assets could rent out 
their ploughs and assets and employ labour as well. All this defined new resource access mechanisms 
for indigenous people. 
The Native Commissioner was tasked with managing land issues in communal areas; however, chiefs 
and headman were co-opted into the system to help the commissioner to exercise power in the 
communal lands. This gave rise to new power relations in rural areas with customary land ownership 
defined from a Eurocentric perspective, meant to perpetuate Europeans’ hold on power, while at the 
same time, marginalising the indigenous people. Again, class formations responding to the new order 
emerging from the capitalist mode of production started emerging as competition for land, a once 
abundant resource, increased. New institutions to manage land emerged with the chiefs now fronting 
the Native Commissioner and ensuring that colonial land policies were implemented.  
In 1951, The Native Husbandry Act was passed to control land use partners and the ownership of land 
along a freehold system, a system meant to develop African agriculture along European lines of property 
rights (Machingaidze 1991). Indigenous people, who perceived it as worsened suppression by the 
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colonial rulers, met this with full aggression. The segregatory nature of The Native Husbandry Act gave 
impetus to the struggle against white rule, as both the landed blacks and landless felt threatened by the 
Act, and the anticipated absorption of blacks into wage labour did not materialise. Conciliatory land 
reforms of the 1950s by Todd, the then Prime Minister, were short-lived as the more liberal Rhodesians 
lost power in 1962 to the Rhodesian Front, which was keen on strengthening racial segregation on land 
ownership. After the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Ian Smith in 1965, the Land 
Apportionment Act of 1930 was replaced by the even more segregatory Land Tenure Act of 1969, 
which divided the land equally between races, further marginalising blacks (Palmer and Parsons 1977). 
4.2.2 Uneven Development and Differentiation 
Land dispossession forced labour and repressive legislation all set the tone for uneven development and 
differentiation in Zimbabwe. The self-provisioning of high-quality land and exclusion of indigenous 
people from markets ensured unhindered capital accumulation by white colonial settlers (Shonhe 2017), 
while the majority of the blacks were pushed into reserves where accumulation was next to impossible. 
Legislation, such as the Land Apportionment Act of 1931, Maize Act and Native Husbandry Act of 
1951, all pushed the indigenous people to the margins and hence, the creation of the centre and periphery 
and the entrenchment of uneven development. As Arrigh (1970) noted, reserve labour from the 
communal lands was exploited both in the mines and on large-scale farms for the benefit of white 
farmers, miners and industrialists. Subsidies also helped to enshrine white supremacy in Zimbabwe. 
This took the form of discriminatory state support for agriculture, for instance, and the concentration of 
cash crop production in white settler farms (Masst 1994). Further, there was general segregation in the 
production and marketing of cash crops. For instance, during the 1940s, the whites were producing 
tobacco and other high-value crops for export, while indigenous people produced 5 percent of marketed 
maize and 10-15 percent of cotton. Huge differentials of up to 40 times in wages between the races 
were common (Masst 1994), which worsened racial differentiation. 
Differentiation among the indigenous people was also a product of the colonial set-up. For instance, 
those who managed to acquire assets, such as the plough, through working in the mines and on farms, 
instantly acquired a new status in the communal lands where they too could increase land ownership 
and production and accumulate capital at the expense of their fellow blacks. The acquisition of assets 
and cyclical labour migration allowed worker-peasants to engage in expanded production, allowing 
them to create exchange value while the rest were in simple reproduction for subsistence (Cousins, 
Weiner, and Amin 1992). The Native Purchase Areas also provided a valve for the further 
differentiation of indigenous people through the creation of an indigenous bourgeois class, also 
accumulating through exploitation of fellow indigenous labour and access to better land and farm 
implements. It is from this class that the source of nationalism also originated. Other programmes, such 
as the Master Farmer training, also provided avenues for select blacks to take opportunities created by 
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the capitalist sector. These programmes were  spearheaded by Emory Alvord, starting at Makoholi (now 
Alvord Training Centre) where he introduced the 'Gospel of the Plough' thus marking the westernisation 
of agriculture in the 1920s (Sadomba, 2008). The well-off indigenous people were also able to invest 
in education, setting the basis for better opportunities for their children. This historical background sets 
the basis of differentiation in the independent Zimbabwe. 
As Cousins, Weiner, and Amin (1992) noted, the historical tendencies in the use of remittances or 
money for reproduction in communal areas have continued, further exacerbating differentiation within 
communal areas. The issue becomes critical when one considers the high levels of unemployment in 
the formal sector and the general economic challenges that worsened since the start of the SAP. 
Differentiation and the subsequent uneven development within communal lands were driven by 
remittances from off-farm income, asset ownership, and political power (Cousins, Weiner, and Amin 
1992), which could have increased through the land reform processes. Across communal lands in 
Zimbabwe, differentiation emanates from the quality of land holding and the ecological region, where 
rainfall patterns become an issue. Hence Masst (1994) notes that most of the marketed maize after 1980 
was concentrated in the Mashonaland and Midlands regions, while the communal areas in Regions Four 
and Five were dependent on government welfare programmes. 
 4.2.3 Zimbabwe – Britain and Donor Approach to Land Reform in Zimbabwe 
As discussed above, Zimbabwe inherited a dual agricultural system in 1980, which was perpetuated by 
the Lancaster House constitution. This limited land redistribution to market-based willing-seller 
willing-buyer principles instead of the liberation movements’ (ZANU PF and PF ZAPU) preferred 
radical approach (Palmer 1990). Land reform has become a contested diplomatic area between Britain 
and Zimbabwe since the negotiated Lancaster House Constitution of 1980, and the failed 1998 donor 
conference on land reform culminating in Zimbabwe unilaterally engaging in the 2000 FTLRP leading 
to the current economic decline in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe agreed to the willing-buyer-willing-seller 
principle negotiated in the Lancaster House constitution purportedly under pressure from the Frontline 
States who were eager to end the war, which had drained most of their resources and affected their 
economies (Palmer 1990). Further, the constitution all but guaranteed the continuity of bureaucratic 
institutions administering government and land issues; even the Minister of Agriculture, for example, 
was from the Commercial Farmers’ Union (CFU). From the onset, government was facing institutional 
bottlenecks deriving from the constitution, deeply unequal-racialised land ownership, and “…acute land 
scarcity and growing landlessness in some areas alongside unused and underutilised land in others” 
(Riddell 1980: 2). 
Land demand was a big challenge for a government emerging from the war with an expectant 
population, and hence, the Lancaster House agreement provided a compromise, which would allow the 
government to stabilise the economy and balance the competing economic and equity needs, at the same 
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time kick-starting the land reform. Kinsey (1982:94) noted the third point (importance of agriculture to 
the economy) as crucial, given the “…disparity in production and economic importance between the 
commercial and peasant sub-sectors of agriculture”, and its implications on resettlement and the state 
of the economy as a whole. This demanded immediate institutional interventions. However, it is 
surprising that, despite these challenges, the government only came up with the first land legislation in 
1985, having implemented the reforms via policy prescriptions since September 1980. The Lancaster 
House agreement has been blamed for the slow land reform process due to insistence on market-based 
land transfer system paid for in foreign currency. Further the revolutionary parties failed to extract firm 
commitments for land payments from colonial powers (O’Donogue 2009).  
This added to challenges for a government facing massive reconstruction needs for an economy that 
had been ravaged by war and with most of its people homeless. Again, as has already been observed, 
the government also acted slowly in crafting legislation that could at least facilitate land acquisition. 
Whether this was to be the Achilles heel for land redistribution, is then debatable. As will be seen in the 
next section, land reform targets were not met by the end of the Lancaster House constitution, and yet 
negotiations continued with the British, who seemed keen on pacifying the Zimbabwe government so 
that they could retain the willing-seller-willing-buyer principle. The processes leading to the well-
attended (over 40 countries and organisations) 1998 conference all but pointed to a market-oriented 
land reform. In 1998, negotiations were resuscitated, culminating in the 1998 land conference, which 
seemed to bring hope of international donor community participation in the reform process. Even the 
communique (International Donors’ Conference 1998) all pointed to a market-assisted reform; 
however, the process was stalled, as the Zimbabwean leader castigated the West at every possible 
opportunity. The gloves were off and international diplomacy firmly in the dustbin as President Mugabe 
told Prime Minister Blair, "Blair, keep your England and let me keep my Zimbabwe."(Mlambo and 
Chitando 2015:8). Since 1998, Zimbabwean land reform processes have been an internal issue funded 
from the Zimbabwean fiscus, land expropriated and the ‘people’ leading their resettlement efforts. New 
agrarian relations emerged divorced from the yoke of the Lancaster House agreement; the big question 
was how agriculture transformation would shape-out. In the next sections, post-independence land 
reform is discussed; the processes involved, challenges, successes and lessons learnt since 1980. 
4.3 Land Reform and Resettlement 1980-90   
Zimbabwe’s liberation war was fought to reclaim land that was violently and systematically taken from 
the blacks from the onset of colonisation (Moyo 1995). The ‘dispossession’ and subsequent 
‘repossession’ of land has been characterised by acts of violence creating “...a society traumatized by 
fear, withdrawal, and collective depression based on past memories of violence, intimidation and 
harassment” (Sachikonye 2011a:xvii). Violence since the colonial times has shaped Zimbabwean 
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society, its political structure, institutions and the livelihood of its people. Sachikonye (2011b) 
articulates how a history tainted with violence compromises the development agenda. Chitiyo (2000) 
similarly notes that violence could lead to flawed agrarian policies that compromise development. 
Despite this violent past, the then Zimbabwean Prime Minister, Mugabe, announced a policy of 
reconciliation, a policy which was lauded as progressive and which was to shape Zimbabwean 
economic programmes for the next decade, land reform included. 
 
Figure 4-1: Land distribution at independence 
Source: Cousins, 1991 
In 1980, Zimbabwe inherited a land ownership structure, which was inequitable, as shown on the figure 
4-1 above, and hence, the international community could have expected a radical takeover by the 
landless Zimbabweans, who had suffered iniquities since 1890. Figure 4.2 shows that the land 
distribution patterns had not changed by 2000. However, the violent culture inherited from the settler 
colony remained bottled, to explode only in the 2000s due to the slow land reform process. Moyo (1995) 
notes that the land question remained an unresolved issue during the 1980s and, by the 1990s, had 
developed a new dimension where interest groups, such as black capitalists, women and urban-based 
activists, were beginning to make claims to land. This led Moyo (1995:11) to argue for a transparent 
and equitable land reform “…focused on the productive use of land for agro-industrial and other 
development processes”. More importantly, these competing interest groups would also have different 
lobbying powers for agricultural production resources, such as finance, with potential for further 
marginalising the smallholder farmer in communal and resettlement areas. This situation evidently 
prevailed during and after the FTLRP.  
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Figure 4-2: Land Ownership Patterns Prior to the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (as at 30 June 
2000) 
Source: Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Development 
4.3.1 Resettlement Models: Structure, Selection and Administration of Scheme 
According to Moyo, (2009:343), there are three types of land reforms: 
These are the “state,” “market,” and “popular” models, and they entail five elements: (1) the 
selection of land, (2) the method of acquiring land, (3) the selection of beneficiaries, (4) the 
method of transferring land to the beneficiaries, and (5) support to beneficiaries.  
The state and market were discussed in Chapter 3, and Moyo posits that the popular version emanates 
from the actions of the land poor through squatting and illegal occupations, all of which were witnessed 
in Zimbabwe since independence, resulting in state-led land reform. The path taken depends on the 
objectives and nature of the land reform ( Moyo, 2009), for instance, the self-selection of beneficiaries 
in market-assisted reforms exemplified in South Africa (Lahiff, 2007) and the state-led models, in which 
the state plays a critical role (Kinsey 2004; Moyo 2009). Consequently, this impacts on the quality and 
cost of land access by beneficiaries; for instance, market-assisted programmes could lead to increased 
participation by beneficiaries in all the five elements identified by Moyo (2009), while, in a state-led 
approach, the beneficiaries might incur fewer expenses and would generally be passive recipients of the 
land. In Zimbabwe, the planned state-led model dominated until 2000, when the state was responsible 
for all the five elements mentioned above; but during the FTLRP, the state, while playing a critical role, 
was mainly responding to the ‘popular’ demands of land occupiers. Whatever process is followed it is 
important that beneficiaries have secure tenure, dispute resolution mechanisms and support to facilitate 
the attainment of reform goals, such as reducing poverty, equity and conflict management. 
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Zimbabwe’s land reform objectives have evolved over time, first focusing on the poor and landless. 
Roth and Bruce (1994:23) identified these as “…(a) having no land or too little land, (b) not employed, 
(c) poor, (d) married or widowed with dependents, (e) aged 18 to 55 years and physically fit, (g) returned 
Zimbabwean refugee, or experienced and master farmer”; other beneficiaries must give up their 
communal plots, see also (Gonese and Mukora 2003). The net was expanded to include skilled and 
better equipped peasants into the A1 model and the commercialisation of agriculture by involving elites 
into large-scale commercial farming (Moyo 1995). In 1990, a new National Land Policy emphasised 
agricultural productivity and was tilted towards capable small commercial farmers (Chitsike 2003), a 
position reflected even in the 1998 donor conference document. However, when the FTLRP started in 
2000, the landless poor were a major part of the whole occupation movement. Model C catered for 
outgrower farmers in tea and sugar plantations (Moyo 1995). Other models, B, and D schemes were not 
successfully implemented, and very little information is available (Kinsey, 2004). The model A scheme, 
which was popular and has been used even during FTLRP, will be discussed in detail below. 
Since independence, over 90 percent (71 000) of resettled families were in this A-scheme (Kinsey 
2004). It is a nucleus village settlement of 500 families comprising a homestead of 2 500 square metres, 
communal grazing area supporting a herd of five to ten cattle and a five-hectare piece of arable land 
(Moyo 1995; Roth and Bruce 1994). Beneficiaries of this scheme were issued with three permits in line 
with the Rural Land Act and the three-land uses mentioned above. However, security of tenure remained 
a problem, given that the ability to remain on the scheme rested with the Ministry of Lands and the 
permits were open to abuse by authorities. The model A scheme was well supported with infrastructure, 
credit and extension services, which were developed as part of the resettlement programme. Contrasted 
to this model is the accelerated resettlement programme, which was a response to squatter settlements 
and hence lacked the services offered to the planned model A programme (Tshuma 1995). Such an 
accelerated resettlement programme resembles the modified model A now referred to as A1 under the 
FTLRP, which lacked planning and government support. These resettlement initiatives shared the same 
objectives; implementation was the only difference.  
4.3.2 An Evaluation of the 1980s Resettlement Programme 
In 1980, the Zimbabwean government embarked on land reform constrained by the Lancaster House-
based constitution, which required that a neoliberal approach of willing-buyer-willing-seller be used in 
the acquisition of land. Understandably, this derailed the aspirations of the Zimbabwean government to 
speedily distribute land and possibly change institutions to support this cause. However, it is interesting 
to note that, with these restrictions and constraints, various authors have documented early successes of 
the land reform that led to increased marketed output by smallholder farmers (Sachikonye 2003). The 
Overseas Development Administration (ODA) and Comptroller and Auditor General (Zimbabwe) 
reported an impressive economic rate of return for the land reform programme, noting the welfare gains 
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of the beneficiaries (Cusworth 2017; Chitsike 2003). The early successes were attributed to the policies 
and programmes that were put in place by the Zimbabwean government in 1980. 
In 1980, the Zimbabwean government levelled and opened the agricultural playing field by improving 
access to farming resources and markets, which catalysed smallholders’ production. Apart from 
increasing access to already existing institutions and organisations, the Zimbabwean government never 
substantially reformed the agriculture sector to meet the demands of smallholder farmers. Credit, an 
important aspect of agriculture, continued to be supplied by the Agricultural Finance Corporation (a 
pro-white commercial farmer institution), which later ran into viability problems due to non-performing 
smallholder farmers loan books. Furthermore, pre- and post-independence Zimbabwean agriculture was 
strongly interlinked with international capital, which the state failed to untangle (Sachikonye 1991). 
The question arises as to whether this was the proper platform and approach to an egalitarian land 
reform targeting the lower echelons of a highly differentiated rural community.  
Kinsey (1982) points to several omissions; problems bedevilling the planning and implementation of 
Zimbabwe’s early land reform processes. Karumbidza (2004) has strongly questioned the success of 
the 1980s reform programme citing several institutional and planning deficiencies and, like Kinsey 
(1982), observes several problems with the whole system. Some of these omissions include the lack of 
consultation and participation of beneficiaries that were to be resettled and analysis of contextual issues 
that also included administration issues necessary for the successful implementation of the programme. 
Alexander (1994) observed that institutional deficiencies and lack of skills resulted in the new 
government adopting precolonial programmes, such as the Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA) 
provisions. Kinsey (1982) notes that the process involved learning and doing during planning and 
implementation.  
Kinsey’s (1982) article brings to the fore the dilemma that Zimbabwe faced, namely, the need to address 
land inequalities and poverty, while at the same time increasing economic growth to help fund these 
processes. As documented by Sachikonye (1991), the institutions and structure of Zimbabwe’s economy 
and agriculture were controlled by, and favoured, international capitalists. This position was further 
consolidated during the structural adjustment era. These dilemmas seem to have continued to hound the 
Zimbabwe government till the 2000s, when it embarked on the FTLRP which was subsequently 
followed by unprecedented economic turmoil, when international capital withdrew from agriculture in 
protest.  
The key question is whether the policies adopted then were suitable for the rural poor with no farming 
resources, knowledge and expertise in producing marketable farm produce. Indeed, this policy worked 
well for the colonial settler farmers who were fully supported by a vibrant CFU and enjoyed preferential 
treatment from the regime of the day. These institutions guaranteed sustainable access to finance capital 
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and markets for the commercial farmers. Chang (2012) argues that government support is important for 
agricultural development. Following Chang’s argument, an egalitarian land reform must provide 
farming resources and services within the constraints and capacity of the beneficiaries, particularly 
considering social differentiation in communities. One such mechanism could be the provision of free 
inputs that would relieve debt burden on the poor and allow them to build their asset base. 
It is important to note from the onset that the 1980 resettlement programme was implemented under the 
auspices of the Lancaster House constitution that allegedly compelled Britain [O’Donogue, (2009) 
disputes this] to provide funding for the programme on a 50-50 basis with the Zimbabwean government 
(Karumbidza 2004; Kinsey 1982). Further donor support for development in resettlement areas was 
made available [Karumbidza (2004) citing Rukuni and Jensen, 2003:248]. This ensured that “land and 
money”, identified as important by Masst (1994), were available to the farmers in reasonable 
proportions leading to possible success of the programme. Participation of the donor community in the 
1980s resettlements could have provided the much-needed institutional support as well as building 
strong oversight, though of a temporary nature, given the fluidity of international capital. 
Eicher (1995:805) attributed the success of the resettlement programme and the accompanying maize 
revolution in the 1980s to “…hybrid maize varieties, expanded access to credit, higher guaranteed 
government maize prices, and marketing subsidies”; a view shared by many other scholars (Gunning et 
al. 2000; Kinsey 2004; Eicher 1995; Mabeza-Chimedza 1998). Arguably, this shows the supremacy of 
institutions in the transformation and evolution of agricultural practices. A response to a policy of this 
magnitude was also accompanied by changes in norms and farming practices among smallholder 
farmers. Changes in policies by the Zimbabwean government improved access to markets and the 
restoration of peace in 1980 all triggered agricultural activities in the country-side. It is the sustainability 
of these institutions that is questionable, as the supply of credit, extension services and markets were 
compromised starting from the 1990s. 
Despite the purported resounding success of the Zimbabwe land reform programme in the 1980s, 
sceptics were on board to discredit the increased levels of productivity among smallholders 
(Karumbidza 2004). Chimhowu and Hulme (2006), in a study of Rengwe (spontaneous settlement) and 
Nyamakate (government sponsored resettlement), noted the convergence of livelihood strategies 
following the withdrawal of government support due to the failure of beneficiaries to cope with risk, 
which, at times, led to their withdrawal to communal areas. The early successes of the agricultural 
miracle couldn’t be sustained into the 1990s. The poor repayment of loans led to the collapse of the 
credit system to smallholders. The agricultural and resettlement financing models that neglected 
smallholder farmer risk coping mechanisms never allowed poor farmers to build assets, leading to 
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subsequent repayment problems. Risk is an important element of farming, and it becomes worse for 
smallholders with little knowledge of producing marketable crops and livestock. 
Kinsey reported poor planning as a concern for the success of reforms, an aspect that was clearly visible 
during the FTLRP discussed in Chapter 5. While lauding the resettlement programme, the ODA 
evaluation report also noted flawed institutional support to beneficiaries in the provision of credit, 
extension services and access to input-output markets. Added to this was the plight of those settlers who 
lacked productive assets (Cusworth 2017), which was also the main handicap of the FTLRP’s A1 model. 
Chitsike (2003) also notes that the Comptroller and Auditor General’s report observed poor 
coordination among the various ministries involved. Political interference and lack of capacity impacted 
negatively on implementation of land resettlement, and further, they suggested this could be solved by 
beneficiary contribution more like the market-assisted land reform articulated by Lahiff (2007) for 
South Africa.   
In his assessment of the overall performance of the 1980s resettlement programme, Moyo (2005) 
believes that it failed to meet its major objective of poverty reduction because of the poor-quality land, 
and reduced state assistance to farmers after SAP, and a land market controlled by landlords; as well as 
restrictions imposed by the Lancaster House agreement (Moyo 1995). To Moyo, poverty and equity 
problems were not resolved due to contradictions of the neoliberal agenda, which was in place during 
the first two decades and which deprived peasants of the land and resources needed to increase 
productivity of the land. 
4.3.3 Debates around Resettlement Processes 1980-90 
As Palmer (1990:165) noted, the revolutionary parties, ZANU and ZAPU, were keen on a “radical land 
reform on achieving political power”, however due to the limitations imposed by the Lancaster House 
agreement, the reforms were to proceed along the willing-seller-willing-buyer route, managed by a 
bureaucratic process that was fully anchored in colonial systems of governance. To implement the 
reform programme needed the coordination of over 19 government ministries or departments (Chitsike 
2003) and high levels of skill – a capacity the new government did not have. Kinsey (1982) also reports 
of early planning deficiencies, which improved as the programme progressed. Bureaucrats were tasked 
with acquiring land and surveying and demarcating it to ready it for settlement. This included 
identifying both infrastructural needs and the resettlement of beneficiaries in line with set criteria. When 
the resettlement programme started five months after gaining independence, the objective was to resettle 
18 000 families on 1.2 million hectares, a figure that was later increased to 162 000 in the Transitional 
National Development Plan of 1982 (Roth and Bruce 1994). In 1981, the Growth with Equity policy 
document also prioritised the development of agriculture, while alluding to the need to deal with 
iniquities in the sector (Zimbabwe 1981). In 1985, the Land Acquisition Act was enacted with more 
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powers for government, though it maintained the willing-buyer-willing-seller principles (Roth and 
Bruce 1994). It is these institutional arrangements that generated debates in the early days of land reform 
in Zimbabwe.  
Alexander (1994) elaborates on how Zimbabwe adopted pre-colonial institutions and programmes in 
delivering the land reform programme; in a way, institutions “fit for purpose” were retained by the 
Zimbabwean authorities. The appointment of Denis Norman as Minister of Agriculture helped cement 
ties with the CFU, an organisation which was to influence policy in the first decade. For instance, 
Mufema (1997) reports that the 1971 Licensing and Levy Act is still in use in the administration of 
farmer organisations, as are other laws and practices that were subject to contestations between 
smallholder black farmers and the colonial regime. Sachikonye (2003) noted the socialist orientation of 
Zimbabwe’s development policy and yet, in practice, neoliberal policies were being implemented; for 
example, collectivism was overshadowed by the individual A1 resettlement scheme since 1980. This 
approach by the Zimbabwean government in 1980 provides a basis and context for debates and the 
evolution of agricultural institutions that are in place today. 
Moyo (2011a) posits that debates on land reform have been polarised, hence leaving critical issues 
undebated. Debates on the desirability of land reform centred on economic efficiency and moral 
arguments, with opponents believing landless peasants were less efficient and could spell economic 
disaster, and hence, the need to retain the current large-scale commercial farming system. Scholars such 
as Moyo (1995), noting the underutilisation of land in large-scale farms, argued for a broader land 
holding base to empower blacks and hence pushed for reforms even without proper tenure systems. 
Further, Moyo and Yeros (2013) believe it was important to radically take over land first before issues 
of institutions and productivity could be addressed, arguing that this was people power. As it turned 
out, Zimbabwe went this route in 2000 with disastrous consequences experienced to this day. It is within 
this framework that institutions emerged and formed. Given the fluidity and contestations within the 
Zimbabwean political sphere, institutions could possibly reflect short-termism to save the needs of the 
authorities rather than the poor. 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter showed that access to land supported by resource provisioning institutions increased 
farmers’ productivity and income both for colonial and smallholder farmers post-independence. Since 
its occupation of Zimbabwe, the colonial government provided large-scale white farmers with financial, 
technical and marketing assistance, which helped farmers improve their performance. Indigenous 
farmers, who managed to access land through the Native Purchase Areas, also performed better than 
their counterparts in tribal lands. Central to this differential agricultural performance were 
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discriminatory laws in the access to markets and productive resources. This resource-induced 
performance differential was observed among post-independence land reform beneficiaries, who led 
the Zimbabwean green revolution. The introduction of SAP was followed by a dip in agricultural 
production and livelihood options due to constrained access to resources. The chapter showed that land 
dispossession and discriminatory laws retarded asset accumulation by indigenous people, which 
affected their integration in markets. Chapter 5 builds on this story and shows that land reform needs 
complementary resources and support for its beneficiaries to improve their income and livelihoods. 
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Chapter 5  
The Fast Track Land Reform Programme and Agrarian Transition in 
Zimbabwe 
5.0 Introduction 
The effects of the FTLRP on equitable land holdings are debatable; however, consensus is developing 
that beneficiaries improved their livelihoods due to better land holdings, which allowed them to access 
markets as well as acquire assets (Moyo 2011a; Scoones et al. 2011; Scoones et al. 2018). As identified 
by Moyo (2008), low levels of food security and high poverty experienced after the economic SAP still 
persist in Zimbabwe debatably at a larger scale now, given the high unemployment levels, 
informalisation of the economy and severe cash shortages that have made life unbearable for the rural 
poor. Despite this, Mkodzongi (2013) has argued that beneficiaries gained access to multiple livelihoods 
derived from the land. The former farm workers’ plight, which was ignored during resettlement 
(Sachikonye 2003), the uncertainty facing land beneficiaries (Dekker and Kinsey 2011) and the 
perception that only ZANU PF supporters benefited (Palmer 2000) are issues that remain unresolved. 
However, despite the gloomy picture painted, there is the realisation that farmers are beginning to 
increase production (Zikhali 2010). Land conflicts and contestations about land ownership are ongoing 
struggles, indicating that land reform is unfinished business in Zimbabwe. Despite all this, FTLRP 
provided farmers access to bigger plots, of which some farmers used to build initial capital and venture 
into agricultural markets. This chapter discusses those aspects of the FTLRP that impact, or impacted 
on farmers’ integration into agricultural markets. 
5.1 Events Leading to the Fast Track Land Reform Programme 
By the late 1990s, Zimbabwe was facing severe fiscal constraints, and agriculture financing received 
little attention from government, yet it was important both as a political tool and for the poor with 
diminishing livelihood options (Sachikonye 2003). Farmers faced challenges in accessing input-output 
markets and urbanites, who lost their jobs in towns, relocated to rural areas, further stretching the few 
resources in these communities. Moyo (2005) narrates the explosion of the Zimbabwean economy in 
the mid-1990s following the currency collapse, the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and 
deteriorating relations with international donor organisations, which triggered massive retrenchment 
and poverty, leading to unprecedented strike action in 1998 as food prices rose. According to Gonese 
and Mukora (2003:1) “…limited livelihood and productivity opportunities, and general poverty 
provided impetus for popular demand for greater access to the land and other natural resources to 
ameliorate declining livelihoods”. Given the dependency of the rural population on remittances from 
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urbanites, poverty was both an urban and rural phenomenon. This laid the ground for radical land 
reform. Presumably, the peasant-worker group had been stretched to the limit and this was an attempt 
to restore and regain their livelihood base. Again, Moyo (2005) has shown that SAPs marginalised rural 
areas, as the demand and competition for communal land increased and conservancies were established, 
further marginalising people from both arable land and access to natural resources. 
Selby (2006) documents fractures that developed between the CFU and the state, which were optimised 
by the tobacco levy in 1996, at a time when farmers were supposed to be getting export incentives in 
line with 1990 SAP provisions. An alliance was developing between war veterans and the Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE) lobby group, one which was reminiscent of earlier alliances that 
developed in the 1970s to resist marginalisation by the Rhodesian government. These alliances were to 
later incorporate peasants, new capitalist farmers and proletariat (Moyo 1995). The alignment of the 
CFU with the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) during this period was to shape agricultural 
programmes and institutions for the next decades to come, as the ruling party partnered with war 
veterans and BEE to unleash compulsory land acquisition during the FTLRP (Laurie and Chan 2016). 
Mufema’s (1997) categorisation of land as both an asset and a political tool helps explain the changing 
face of the government and the development of alliances and institutions. This explains the politicisation 
and contestations characterising land reform in Zimbabwe since the colonial period.  
Matondi (2012:19) noted that “…the need to address poverty in communal areas, landlessness, 
homelessness, and the need to de-racialise commercial agriculture” continued to be government 
priorities; however, he documents simmering pressures that contributed to 2000 FTLRP occupations. 
The period from 1990 to 1999 is full of contestations and political manoeuvres, alliances and changing 
power relations that led to violent occupations of white-owned land in 2000. During this period the 
British Labour government also broke tradition and abrogated its responsibility to contribute funding 
for the land reform (Laurie and Chan 2016). Peasant radicalisation, which emanated from excruciating 
poverty after the adoption of SAP, led to peasants in the Svosve communal lands invading nearby farms 
on 18 June 1998 (Nyandoro 2012; Matondi 2012). Stemming from this are Zimbabwe’s deteriorating 
economic fortunes and its isolation from the international community. Further, Britain’s refusal to 
support land reform, poor response from the donor community, legal challenges by white farmers with 
listed land and the rejection of the 2000 constitution all ignited the FTLRP (Moyo 2006).  
Despite engaging donors on what looked like a promising donor’s conference on land and resettlement, 
Zimbabwe later decided to go it alone and engage in the compulsory acquisition of land (International 
Donors’ Conference 1998; Moyo 2006). The government blamed the donor community and LSCFs 
contestations for the failure of the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme Phase II19 (LRRP-2) 
inception stage and decided to quicken resettlement through the ‘Fast Track’ route (Government of 
Zimbabwe 2001).  
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5.2 The Fast Track Land Reform Programme 
Events detailed in the section above provided a fertile ground for the start of farm invasions after the 
government lost in a constitutional referendum in 2000, of which land expropriation was one of the 
proposed ammendments. Three years earlier (1998), government had used force to stop Svosve land 
invasions and hence, scholars (Sachikonye 2011a; Sachikonye 2011b) argue that political machination 
was at play, as government used land to solicit support for political power in elections (Laurie and Chan 
2016). However, not in dispute is the fact that access to land and land demand from people who had 
lost a livelihood in urban areas, marginalised communal dwellers, and aspiring agricultural 
entrepreneurs fueled the invasion process and provided popular support that ignited the programme.  A 
senior war veteran intimated that they told the then president that “It’s either you lose power or white 
farmers lose land” (Interview 16 July, 2017). This position is in line with Sadomba’s (2008:57) 
observation that the president thought the war veterans and the surging land revolution were an asset in 
maneuvering around this impending political loss. As it turned out, the white farmers who had enjoyed 
the president’s support since 1980, lost the land, confirming Mufema (1997)’s assertion that land can 
be an asset or a political tool.   
5.2.1 Objectives of Fast Track Land Reform Programme  
The objectives of the FTLRP were derived from the LRRP-2 objectives but strongly anchored in the 
political climate prevailing in 2000, which Laurie and Chan (2016) claim were a smokescreen to 
government’s power retention agenda. Phase Two aimed to decongest the crowded rural communities, 
mitigate poverty and integrate indigenous black farmers in commercial agriculture, among other things 
(Zikhali 2010). According to Moyo (2004), this second phase started in 1997, with the aim of 
compulsorily acquiring five million hectares of land from white commercial farmers and redistributing 
it to address land imbalances and poverty and increase the base of productive agriculture utilising idle 
land (Zimbabwe 2000 ; Kinsey 1999). The aim was to settle 150 000 land-constrained peasant families 
from congested rural areas and commercial oriented farmers (Gonese and Mukora 2003). The 
indigenous-black commercial farmer objective was targeted at agricultural graduates and resourced 
individuals who wanted to get into commercial agriculture. For A1 farmers, the objective was primarily 
social, aimed at subsistence production (Matondi 2012). The programme then coined ‘fast track’ due to 
the accelerated nature with which it was to be executed. The FTLRP then started with the minimal 
objectives of compulsorily acquiring and demarcating land and settling people with minimal 
infrastructural development (Government of Zimbabwe 2000).  In practice, even the minimal 
infrastructure and perceived institutional setup was lacking and the whole process was spearheaded by 
formal and informal institutions. This had a considerable effect on the uptake of land by farmers, 
productivity and general outcomes of the programme (Utete 2003). Visible outcomes included 
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economic decline and decline in agricultural production, and hence, the effects of the FTLRP have 
continued in scholarly literature, focusing on livelihoods and how to get agricultural production back 
on track (Anseeuw, Kapuya, and Saruchera 2012). Access to resources by smallholder farmers was then 
to be understood from this policy stance, which was exclusionary when it came to resource allocation. 
For instance, the mid-2000 government input and equipment schemes favoured A2 farmers (Anseeuw, 
Kapuya, and Saruchera 2012). It is not surprising that contract farming became an attractive channel of 
resource access and participation in agricultural markets for the elites and subsequent competition 
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5.2.2 Chaotic Encounters (Jambanja)  
Land invasions started in Masvingo, and quickly spread throughout the country (Sadomba 2008; 
Mamdani 2009), with war veterans in alliance with government structures, also manned by war 
veterans. For instance, institutions, such as the police, army and prisons, were headed by war veterans, 
which helped with the coordination of invasions both at a social group and government level. The 
invasions proceeded in a violent fashion, which became popularly known as Jambanja.20 Night parties, 
dancing and singing at bases resembling guerilla war night vigils characterised Jambanja. Whether this 
was through coercion or voluntarily is debatable, as the same strategy was to dominate ZANU PF’s 
campaign for political office from 2002 to 2008. People moved in groups from one farm to another 
owned by white farmers. The invasions involved people of different persuasions, playing different roles: 
some as negotiators leading the invasions, others as suppliers of provisions such as food, airtime to 
facilitate communication and transport for the leadership, among other things (Interview 16 July 2017). 
The roles differed according to powers and resources held by participants. However, peasants were the 
foot soldiers camping at bases night-in-night-out. In a guerrilla military style, war veterans led the surge 
on farm invasions, mobilising support from local and government leadership. Though the invasions 
were generally chaotic, some areas, such as Mhondoro Ngezi (Mkodzongi 2013), experienced peaceful, 
negotiated take-overs. Incidents of extortion, or leases involving fee payments (for elites) through 
negotiation or coerced were wide spread (Laurie and Chan 2016; Muronzi and Mambo 2017 December).  
War veterans’ sterling role in the invasion process were to set them in pole positions in decisions to 
identify, allocate or sanction “…the majority of Model A1 settlers” when the resettlement process was 
formalised (Gonese and Mukora 2003:11). For instance, war veteran structures, such as the Committee 
of Seven21, became part of the district land committees, working together with chiefs, district officials 
and other local government institutions at the districts. Access to land was negotiated in such an 
environment, which the critics then argued was spoiled by patronage. 
5.2.3 Towards Regularisation of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme  
Under pressure and desiring to take ownership of the chaotic land reform, the government launched the 
LRRP-2 on July, 15 2000 (Government of Zimbabwe, 2000). The FTLRP aimed to identify and 
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compulsorily acquire land, demarcate it and resettle people, with minimal infrastructural development. 
The government introduced the A2 scheme to create an indigenous-based commercial farming system, 
paying attention to the emerging forces of the BEE alliance. This group of farmers was expected to be 
skilled, resourced and ready to take up commercial production with the assistance of government in 
resource provision (Gonese and Mukora 2003). For the A1 model (the focus of this study), the FTLRP 
aimed to decongest rural areas, increase the productive agricultural base, and provide basic 
infrastructural and administrative services. Zhikali (2010) argues that A1 was mainly for subsistence 
production with marketable surplus in good years. True to its ‘Jambanja’ nature, the rules of the game 
kept changing in response to any legal challenges thrown at the government by the commercial farmers. 
The constitution was amended and various amendments to constitution and realignment of the judiciary 
followed (Mamdani 2009). The judiciary was reconfigured to meet the demands of the government land 
acquisition strategy and Chief Justice Antony Gubbay unwillingly took early retirement in March 2001. 
A charismatic war veterans leader had this to say on Gubbay’s retirement: “I talked to him personally 
and I told him to vacate the office today. No one is above the law,’ Mr Chinotimba said afterwards. 
‘We ought to teach him how cases are finalised here. We will declare war’" (McGreal and Osborn 2001 
March). All this made local and foreign financial institutions hostile (traditional sources of agriculture 
finance like banks refused to fund new farmers), to the FTLRP, and farmers then found it difficult to 
access productive resources. 
Ad hoc administrative systems were put in place from ministerial to ward level to identify land, settle 
people and attend to disputes on the farms (Zimbabwe 2001). At the district level, the Committee of 
Seven was integrated into district structures with some participating in district land committees. At 
national level, a Land Commission was set up, which, as at 2018, was still tasked with the issue of land 
audits and normalising land ownership in resettlement areas. In Chapter 7, the study discusses a typical 
A1 model and a replica of the processes involved in issuing A1 permits to land beneficiaries.  
5.2.4 Resettlement Models 
In 1980, Zimbabwe preserved the colonial land tenure (Roth and Bruce 1994) of freehold land alongside 
the customary land tenure system; however, a permit system for model A resettled farmers, which 
specified land use patterns, was instituted. This permit system described in section 4.3.1 was used, with 
modifications, for the A1 resettlement model (villagised) during and after the FTLRP alongside a self-
contained version established after 2000. The self-contained model provides for grazing, homestead 
and arable land for the farmer and is more like the smaller A2 commercial farms, the difference being 
that permits specify the conditions of land use as in the ordinary villagised A1 model. The selection of 
farmers under the FTLRP was heavily influenced by war veterans who had set up infrastructure in 
commercial farms to coordinate the farm invasions, and, in most cases, did not stick to policy guidelines 
(Gonese and Mukora 2003). Zikhali (2010), like Gonese, also identifies problems around multiple and 
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differential interpretation of rules on selection, which, at times, negated the set goals, for instance, rural 
decongestion. The differential application of the selection rules affected women, youth and farm 
workers who were often discriminated against and excluded from the programme. This affected their 
potential to independently participate in agricultural economic activities. For beneficiaries, the “…many 
different types of temporary licenses” resulted in tenure security problems (Zikhali and Chilonda 
2012:144) with consequences on how farmers accessed resources and accumulated assets. 
As shown in Table 5.1, 145, 775 farmers were settled under A1 and 16 386 under A2. Figures on how 
many and who benefited are contested, as government and researchers make counter claims on the 
success of the programme [ for example, Mamdani (2009), puts the figures at 72,000 A2-farmers on 
2.19 million hectares and 127,000 A1-farmers on 4.23 million hectares]; however, the Utete report 
showed that the FTLRP component achieved modest success, even questioning the uptake of plots by 
farmers. The main reason cited for low uptake initially were poor infrastructure, lack of services and 
security of tenure. The A2 model, introduced after 2000, is self-contained commercial farms where land 
use is flexible. These were allocated to well-resourced individuals with assets elsewhere; however, this 
system discriminated against women, most of whom had no assets registered in their names (Matondi 
2012). The A2 model farms averaged 30 hectares (small), 100 hectares (medium) and 300 hectares 
(large) and are expected to be allocated on 25- or 99-year lease. A 99-year lease is issued to a beneficiary 
who opts to buy farm improvements existing on the farm at the time of allocation (Matondi 2012). The 
leases are renewable.  
By the end of the FTLRP, about eleven million hectares of former white commercial farming land had 
been redistributed, which helped to reduce racial injustices and equity issues. One of the questions that 
remains to be asked is whether or not there was gender equity in the land reform. Did all the socially 
differentiated classes benefit? Moyo (2011a), for example, reports that, among the beneficiaries of the 
land reform process, only 14% were women. This is important given that women are the most 
marginalised group. Women also play an important role in the welfare and upkeep of the household 
(Mutopo 2011). Mutopo notes that the FTLRP allowed women to access land through “intra-household 
negotiations”, which enabled them to participate in economic activities. While the desired outcome that 
Mutopo alludes to was realised, the question of how equitable the redistribution was remains 
unresolved. Sachikonye (2003) has also documented the plight of the former farm workers who were 
largely excluded from the FTLRP process, again pointing to weaknesses of the redistributive policy. As 
a result, these groups found it difficult to participate in market-based agriculture, such as contract 
farming. 
The processes of land reform described above affected the way resources were accessed in A1 farms; a 
culture of patronage took root, as farmers coalesced around war veterans and government officials who 
were in control of the process (Zamchiya 2011). This is shown by the small percentage of women 
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beneficiaries and as a result, for this group, access to productive agricultural programmes, such as 
contract farming, was compromised. Scholars are, however, divided regarding the transparency of the 
whole land access process. For instance, Moyo and Chambati (2013) argue that the systems put in place 
by government were transparent, while others argue the whole process was politicised (Marongwe 
2009). Whatever view one takes, it is evident that the processes shaped how resources were negotiated 
and accessed. 
5.3 Lack of Support for A1 Fast Track Land Reform Programme 
Beneficiaries 
Debates on the FTLRP have been extensively covered (Cliffe et al. 2011; Moyo 2011a; Laurie and 
Chan 2016) and it will suffice here to refer to institutional developments that evolved to support 
beneficiaries’ access to resources (Mkodzongi 2016). From the onset, government perceived a situation 
where it would support A2 farmers with resources to engage in commercial agriculture but there was 
no clarity on how the A1 beneficiaries were to be effectively supported (Gonese and Mukora 2003; 
Zimbabwe 2000). Consequently, A1 and communal farmers received minimal support from the 
government. This was mainly due to budgetary constraints and dwindling multilateral financial 
institutional support. 
Just like after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965, the unilateral land reform agenda 
adopted by Zimbabwe in the 2000s attracted targeted sanctions from the West and withdrawal of 
funding by multilateral financial institutions, leading to substantially reduced agricultural support. The 
spat between Zimbabwe and Britain worsened Zimbabwe’s international relations. The United States 
removed Zimbabwe from African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and introduced the Zimbabwe 
Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (S. 494)  (ZIDERA). Zimbabwe pulled out of the 
Commonwealth. All this culminated in Zimbabwe’s suspension from international donor agencies, such 
as the International Monetary Fund. All this put the country in a precarious position in the 
implementation of its agrarian reforms. This meant Zimbabwe had to go it alone in its land reform 
programme “…in a context of increasing economic decline and international isolation” (Moyo, 
2005:350). As already indicated, Zimbabwe was already facing fiscal challenges and hence, was in 
desperate need of financial support. This became the biggest challenge in financing agricultural 
activities. Zimbabwe was at a crossroads, fighting the neoliberal Washington Consensus agenda they 
fully operated within.  
Neoliberalism, even the moderated post-Washington Consensus version, is strongly anchored in the 
supremacy of property rights at any level of social strata (Spiegel and Stiglitz, 2008). This is the 
contradiction that Zimbabwean agriculture found itself in since the 2000s, a financial structure that is 
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fully capitalistic and expected to support an egalitarian land reform agenda. Donors refused to work 
with the government in funding FTLRP beneficiaries, opting to circumvent government structures when 
assisting communal farmers (Anseeuw, Kapuya, and Saruchera 2012). The government, in turn, focused 
on FTLRP beneficiaries through the Reserve Bank’s input schemes, coordinated by war veterans and 
the army (Anseeuw, Kapuya, and Saruchera 2012). The military style operations that followed did little 
to stimulate agricultural production in the face of hyperinflation and the deteriorating macroeconomic 
environment.  
In its first decade, the FTLRP was generally considered a failure because agricultural productivity and 
output levels had reached all-time lows (Chavunduka and Bromley 2013). Rukuni et al. (2006) 
attributed this decline to the collapse of institutions that supported and facilitated the provision of the 
six prime movers to which he had earlier attributed the 1980s agricultural revolution successes. A host 
of other scholars blamed the free-fall on agricultural production to the ‘chaotic’ FTLRP, with 
neoliberals pointing to the property rights violations and severing of ties with the international 
community (Anseeuw, Kapuya, and Saruchera 2012; Richardson 2005). Zimbabwe’s agriculture, 
interwoven as it was into fluid capitalist capital, could also explain the free-fall. Yet there is also 
evidence of the abuse of the Reserve Bank’s supplied inputs and equipment by the resettled farmers 
(Anseeuw, Kapuya, and Saruchera 2012). Why would land-hungry farmers who had fought bruising 
land repossession misuse resources? There is no definite answer, but the whole set-up points to 
macroeconomic and institutional weaknesses, and culture and beliefs of the beneficiaries. Lack of 
coordination and enforcement, and vision and basically not knowing what to do with the land after the 
successful take-over contributed to wanton abuse of resources (Hall 2009).  
Lack of foresight could have serious economic repercussions: the “…popular land self-provisioning 
and elite grabs” (Moyo, 2011a:260) were in no way in line with government plans. Moyo (2011a) 
documents the government’s reactive behaviour in trying to respond to the unfolding situation, as it 
promulgated laws as the BEE, war veterans and peasants repossessed land. This shows the underlying 
problem could have been institutional. Anseeuw, Kapuya, and Saruchera (2012) have indicated that 
Zimbabwe’s agriculture needs reconstruction, that is the development of its infrastructure, capital and 
human resources base . This is necessary if land reform is to have meaning to beneficiaries; the desired 
structural change should be articulated, coordinated and diffused to all concerned parties. For example, 
the agricultural financing model. 
Six years after Anseeuw, Kapuya, and Saruchera’s (2012) report, Zimbabwe is still grappling with land-
reform induced agricultural productivity problems. For instance, in the 2016/17 agricultural season, the 
government introduced Command Agriculture, a five-hundred-million-dollar programme executed by 
2000 farmers (Freeth 2016). Suffice it to say that such an intervention was in place in 2006, with little 
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success. Freeth (2016) is pessimistic about its success, but time will judge. However, what is needed 
are long-term and sustainable institutions that will support land reform beneficiaries to transform 
Zimbabwean agriculture.  
The processes that unfolded during the FTLRP considerably affected farmers’ access to agricultural 
production assets and markets, which were previously mediated by private financial institutions and 
mostly through white commercial farmers’ establishments. The magnitude of the programme meant 
that government was overwhelmed in the supply of extension services, and the shrinking economy 
affected input supplies to farmers, while the hyper-inflationary conditions made it profitable to trade 
inputs/equipment in neighbouring countries. All this necessitated the introduction of contract farming 
to stabilise agricultural production. 
5.4 Post-FTLRP Experiences in Zimbabwe 
A key outcome of the FTLRP is that it “…has reconfigured Zimbabwe’s agrarian question, reflecting 
new problems for the transformation of agriculture and industrialisation, including the trajectories for 
technical change, productivity, labour utilisation, mechanisation and support institutions in the public 
and private sphere” (Moyo 2005:362), deepening poverty and continuing polarisation in the country’s 
economic development discourse. Land reform remains a politically contested issue within Zimbabwe. 
In a campaign rally in Marondera, for example, the former president raised the issue with the early 
2000s vigour. Despite Mugabe’s claims, the opposition believes that what remains to be done is to 
provide the necessary support to existing farmers (Phiri 2017 July). Indeed, challenges in agriculture 
are big and daunting. As will be discussed in the next chapter, agricultural production has yet to reach 
pre-FTLRP reform levels; however, more importantly “…practices and people’s responses on the 
ground are what define the character of the reforms and their future” (Matondi 2012:2). 
Without establishing causality, it is now known that Zimbabwe’s macroeconomic situation deteriorated 
rapidly between 2000 and 2008 with annual inflation reaching 89.7 sextillion percent on November 14, 
2008, before inflation stabilised after dollarisation in 2009 (Hanke and Kwok 2009). Agricultural 
production declined by 45 percent between 2000 and 2008, and the Zimbabwean government has been 
importing food over these past years. The economy’s formal sector has continued to decline to this day, 
with the situation of high unemployment being blamed by critics on the land reform. Yet recent studies 
have shown the upward trends in agricultural production and welfare of land reform beneficiaries 
(Cousins and Scoones 2010; Moyo 2013). For instance, the 2018 tobacco output was 252,603,251 
kilograms, surpassing the 236 946 295 kilograms achieved in 2000 at the onset of the FTLRP (ZTA 
2018). From the start of the FTLRP, there was no clearly defined policy to benchmark the reforms. 
Hence, it is often judged by pre-land reform scenarios on agricultural output, macroeconomic 
performance, poverty levels, reform processes, the aborted LRRP-2. The government of Zimbabwe 
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blamed the international donor community for reneging on the funding of LRRP-2 hence its collapse. 
Consequently, the valuation of the FTLRP varies depending on the disposition of the researcher or 
evaluator. 
A starting point could be to look at changes in the land ownership structure. As indicated earlier, 
however, land reform is a continuing process and the figures often vary depending on the source (Cliffe 
et al. 2011). Table 5.1 shows land that was acquired from LSCFs and allocated to black farmers since 
1980. As can be seen in Table 5-1, a massive 12 404 196 hectares of land changed hands during this 
period, with 1 095 805 remaining with white/black farmers who held freehold land. Since 1980, about 
60.82 percent of land has been transferred from the white commercial farmers to peasant farmers. Table 
5.1 shows land transfers per category of farmers during the two phases of land reform. The landed LSCF 
lost land to the indigenous farmers namely A1 and A2 farmers as shown on table 5.1. 
Table 5-1: Distribution of Land after the Fast Track Land Reform Programme  
Resettlement Phase Number of 
Farmers 
Land Acquired  
(in Hectares) 
% Acquired Balance Held by 
LSCF 
Large Scale Commercial 
Farmers (LSCF) land in 1980 
which was distributed 
6 000   15 500 000 
Phase 1 (1980-97) 71 000 3 498 444 22.57 12 001 556 
Inception Phase (1998-2000) 4 697 168 264 1.09 11 833 292 
Phase II A1 Resettlement 
(2000-08)  
145 775 5 759 154 37.16 6 074 139 
Phase II A2 Resettlement 
(2000-08)  
16 386 2 978 333 19.22 3 095 805 
Other  2 000 000 12.90 1 095 805 
Approximate remaining 
farmland held by LSCF 
(includes indigenous-owned, 
white-owned land, 
institutions and estates) 
excluded companies and 
estates 
  7.07 1 095 805 
  14 404 196 100 1 095 805 
Source: Matondi, 2012a 
A study by Matondi (2012) presents qualitative analysis of land allocation by class. Most of the high 
potential farm land in Mazowe went to commercial A2-farmers while A1-farmers were allocated land 
on the periphery, where land quality is low. As Matondi (2012:10) noted, “…Shamva and Mangwe, A1 
dominated, demonstrating a planning frame that aimed to appease the ‘the poor’ in nonstrategic pieces 
of land” see also (Cliffe et al. 2011). This is at variance with the efficiency argument discussed in 
Chapter 3 and can dampen poor peasants’ participation in commercial agriculture, particularly if such 
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a situation was replicated throughout the country. Surely, if smallholder farming is efficient, then 
allocating quality land to peasants would lead to a better performing agricultural sector.  
Moyo (2013), Scoones et al. (2011) and Matondi (2012) report that overall, the land reform benefited 
ordinary people in Zimbabwe; however, Scoones et al. (2011) note problems with data that could lead 
to inaccurate information. Difficulties in classifying beneficiaries also make it difficult to determine the 
origins of beneficiaries, whether urban or rural, as well as knowing who was ‘ordinary’. This is 
important if we are to assess the objective of decongesting rural areas where population pressure has 
continued to mount, as well as the desire by the government to have qualified agricultural personnel 
tilling the land as per LRRP-2. Reports by authors cited in this paragraph indicate that substantial 
numbers of urbanites were allocated land, which could compromise these twin objectives. Zamchiya 
(2011) reports of patronage-based allocation of land in Chipinge, while Zikhali (2008) laments the 
gender imbalance against women in the allocation of land, which is estimated at 18 percent for the A1 
and 12 percent for A2 schemes, this even though women constitute over 50 percent of the population. 
Neoliberal literature emphasises the importance of land tenure in agricultural production decisions, farm 
investments, access to credit and farming resources; hence, Richardson (2005) attributed the decline in 
Zimbabwean agricultural productivity to the FTLRP. Scoones et al. (2011:989) recognised the 
importance of land tenure and recommended that “…a flexible system of land administration is required 
one that allows for expansion and contraction of farm sizes, as well as entry and exit from farming”. 
This was also supported by Zikhali (2008)’s study in the Mazowe district of Zimbabwe, which, using 
the ordinary least squares method, found that the FTLRP had created insecurity among reform 
beneficiaries and that this affected their investment in soil conservation. However, she notes that 
households, who believed that farm investment enhances tenure security, were likely to invest in land 
improvement. In Mhondoro Ngezi, some farmers invested in retail shops as their land security became 
assured. From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that Zimbabwean land tenure needed to balance 
the need for productivity/efficiency and equity in order to address the demands for land by its citizens. 
Despite the issuing of permits and leases, land tenure in Zimbabwe continues to be characterised by 
uncertainty, disputes and politicking around land ownership; for instance, the recent comments by the 
former President threatening the appropriation of white-owned farms and reducing farm sizes to cater 
for those who missed-out. On February 27, 2015 former President Mugabe was quoted in the Herald 
saying: “The A2-farmers, I think the farms we gave to people are too large, they can’t manage them,’ 
he said. ‘You find that most of them are just using one third of the land” (Machivenyika 2015 February). 
There is a need to bring to finality the land reform process in Zimbabwe and develop institutions that 
would replace district land and other ad hoc-committees set up to distribute land. 
Institutions that govern land reform and tenure processes are important determinants of partnership 
arrangements that arise between farmers and agribusiness that want to enter into partnerships. These 
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institutions help define rights, obligations, security and enforcement mechanisms that are necessary for 
the efficient and effective running of the partnership. For instance, a good land tenure system defines 
land use rights that allow both parties to know what crops or livestock contract farming arrangements 
to engage on in plots. Land rights held by smallholder farmers also affect the longevity and capital 
investment of contract farming arrangements. 
5.5 Agrarian Relations in Fast Track Land Reform Programme         
Settlements 
The processes discussed above were not within the dictates of capital and, as a result, financial 
institutions withdrew financial services to the agricultural sector arguing that there was no collateral. 
Shonhe (2017) provides a detailed analysis of the reaction of capital after the FTLRP, which was largely 
negative. The most affected were the A1 farmers who could not access finance from the government 
through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe’s quasi-fiscal activities. As a result, A1-farmers were 
constrained when it came to acquiring assets. International capital responded to the FTLRP crisis by 
changing agriculture-financing modalities. The government of Zimbabwe responded to the financing 
crisis by engaging the Brazilian and Chinese governments (Mukwereza 2013) and the latter introduced 
massive tobacco farming ventures in Zimbabwe. This, together with pioneers of tobacco contract 
farming, Tribac and BAT, shaped tobacco production relations in Zimbabwe since 2004 along 
international practices described below. All this together with the processes of the FTLRP changed the 
livelihoods of farmers and the communities where production took place. Scoones et al. (2011) widely 
report such changes in Masvingo and, later, in Mvurwi. 
5.5.1 Labour Relations after the FTLRP 
The exclusion of most former farm workers from the FTLRP created new labour relations dynamics in 
Zimbabwe. Mechanisms of accessing labour and workers livelihoods changed. Former farm workers 
faced many challenges: they lost their permanent employment status and many sources of livelihoods 
including housing, schooling for their children and health facilities (Sachikonye 2003). Most farm 
workers are now engaged in contract or piece work, working for poorly resourced FTLRP-beneficiaries 
(Sachikonye 2003); others earn their livelihoods from a variety of activities ranging from trading, illegal 
mining, and farming on unallocated land (Magaramombe 2010). This has defined their relations with 
the new land owners, who have resorted to various means of negotiating with farmers, including land 
and barter exchanges involving labour services. To alleviate some of these problems and create access 
to livelihood resources, Moyo, Rutherford, and Amanor‐ Wilks (2000) suggested a transformative land 
reform that could provide former workers with a residential and subsistence agricultural plot together 
with recreational land and access to forests for fuelwood. This seemed logical, given that it enabled 
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farm workers to build their bundle of powers (Ribot and Peluso 2003), which they could bring to the 
table when negotiating with farm owners. To this end, Moyo and Chambati (2013) contested the thesis 
that farm workers were heavily marginalised and were victims of the FTLRP, pointing to the 8 percent 
who got land, some resettled in rural areas and those that remained in A1-farms were absorbed in 
various agricultural activities in farms. It is those that remained that this thesis is concerned with. 
Scoones et al. (2018) find that those who remained had small plots, received little remittances, and were 
engaged in subdued production for the markets. 
Those that remained provided labour to farmers and several studies recognise that this was through part-
time or contract labour (Scoones et al. 2018). However, due to social differentiation, these farmers 
found it difficult to match their resourced counterparts, providing room for exploitation. Apart from 
drawing labour from former farm workers, new farmers also drew labour from LSCF’s traditional 
labour reservoir in surrounding communities. All this required negotiating access, depending on 
networks that were established during and after the FTLRP. This also shaped farmer integration in 
commercial agriculture, such as contract farming. All this involved competition with communal farmers 
involved in cash-crop production as shown by the TIMB (2017) data.  
5.5.2 Private Financial Support to Smallholder Agriculture after the FTLRP 
A new form of capitalist infusion in agriculture is shaping agricultural production, distribution, 
marketing, food and income security of the poor; arguably contract farming is the institutional 
arrangement fronting this capitalist development (Clapp 2014; Clapp and Helleiner 2012). The 
development of agriculture after the 2007-8 food crisis has attracted new players, changed the form of 
foreign direct investment, as financialisation transformed agricultural production, land ownership, 
consumption, production and power relations particularly among peasant agriculture as capital seek to 
extend their horizons of capital accumulation (Burch, Dixon, and Lawrence 2013; Burch and Lawrence 
2009; Clapp 2014; Clapp and Helleiner 2012). Cotula (2013) and Hall (2011), as discussed earlier, 
noted increased land grabbing as corporates seek to grow industrial crops, while Reardon and Barrett 
2000 and Reardon and Timmer (2007) describe involvement of supermarkets through vertically 
integrated production and marketing processes, a process referred to as agro-industrialisation of food 
production. A few firms now control a bigger chunk of the agricultural value chain, from input and 
equipment supplies to distribution and marketing  (Burch, Dixon, and Lawrence 2013). In industries, 
such as tobacco, for example, only five conglomerates control more than half of the world’s production, 
distribution and marketing system (Scoones et al. 2018). At the farm-gate level, contract farming 
arrangements have been used as the main drivers of agro-industrialisation, an approach, which, as 
discussed earlier, is seen by most governments as attracting private sector capital into agriculture. 
FTLRP beneficiaries were caught up in this international arrangement and, in Zimbabwe, this 
manifested strongly in tobacco and cotton production (Sachikonye 2016; Moyo 2011a). 
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The objective of agro-industrialisation from a capitalist perspective is to earn profits for shareholders 
of the stock-exchange-listed companies (Vander Stichele 2015), while governments view it as an 
agriculture growth strategy. This obviously has effects on the portfolio of food crops produced, food 
security and the integration of smallholders into such systems. Burch, Dixon, and Lawrence (2013:216) 
describes how “…supermarkets are coming to determine what is produced, where, to what standards 
and price, and the outlets from which food is to be sold” through their control of financial resources, 
limited in-store shelf-space, quality, and branding, among other things. This is the same scenario with 
none-food products, such as tobacco, where branding and product modification influence tobacco 
production by farmers. For instance, preferences in the quality of tobacco differ in different markets. 
While Chinese markets might prefer lemon flavour, Europeans prefer orange flavour, issues that are not 
known by smallholder farmers at the production stage. Also, unilateral decisions made by big-
agribusiness, such as the ban on coal-cured tobacco in certain markets, affect smallholder farmers in 
developing countries (Marufu 2018 January). 
That Zimbabwe needs investment is not debatable. However, the question is: Which investment is more 
suitable for its post-FTLRP agriculture? Hallam (2009) proposes investments that meet host country 
needs. For example, investment through contract farming tends to involve smallholder farmers and have 
more spillover benefits to local communities (Smalley 2013), while outright land purchases deprive 
locals – mainly smallholders – of their land, which could have minimising effects on their livelihoods, 
more so given that the produce is consumed elsewhere (Cotula 2013; Hall 2011). It is within this logic 
that contract farming after the FTLRP was viewed as beneficial to communities that engaged in it. 
It is important to identify the farmer’s need for finance if the right model is to be achieved. For example, 
credit might be required for inputs, transport, tilling, labour or infrastructure, which demands specific 
financing models. In Zimbabwe, Pearce (2003) reports a supplier-based input scheme where CARE (a 
non-governmental organisation) worked with rural traders to supply inputs on credit to farmers through 
its AGENT programme. Yet long-term infrastructural projects, such as irrigation activities, could be 
effected through Public Private Partnership, such as the Negomo Irrigation Scheme in Mazowe, where 
German investors partnered with the Zimbabwean government to construct the dam and establish an 
irrigation scheme for peasants. A financing model tailored to the farmer’s needs is likely to address 
information asymmetry and institutional deficiencies associated with traditional financing models (Hoff 
et al. 1994; Stigler 1967).  
Literature on contract farming has burgeoned in the post-Washington Consensus era. Except for recent 
studies in Zimbabwe, however, no notable efforts have been made to situate it within land reform 
dynamics (Sukume et al. 2015; Scoones et al. 2018). In most jurisdictions, smallholder contract farming 
was a post-land reform intervention, examples of which include the Kenyan Tea Development 
Association, tobacco contract farming in Malawi, tobacco contract farming in Zimbabwe (Scoones et 
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al., 2018) and the growth of contract farming after the Housing Responsibility System and Bananas in 
the Eastern Caribbean (Grossman 2000). Despite evidence that shows that land (tenure) reform 
preceded contract farming in most jurisdictions, it is rarely articulated as a context within which contract 
farming is occurring, which obscures our understanding of resource access dynamics, which are 
anchored in history and community livelihoods. Land reform provides the context within which 
peasants negotiate and access asset ownership and use, and (dis)incentives for contracting by firms.  
5.6 Conclusion 
The Fast Track Land Reform Programme drastically changed the agrarian landscape in Zimbabwe, yet 
there is still uncertainty whether the land question has finally been resolved. The agricultural sector still 
faces challenges and agrarian transition is still a work in progress. The issue of tenure security is yet to 
be fully resolved and this has affected investment decisions in farms; however, work by Scoones et al. 
(2018) has shown that there is potential for agricultural development and accumulation. What is not 
clear, though, is how far behind or ahead the current farmers are in terms of pre-2000 production levels. 
Scoones et al. (2018) and Sachikonye (2016) have shown an increased uptake of cash crop production 
after the FTLRP, which they attributed to increased landholdings and access to private capital by 
smallholder farmers. Tobacco is one cash crop where the number of producers increased more than ten 
times. The next section discusses the dynamics of tobacco production. 
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Chapter 6  
Tobacco Production Dynamics after FTLRP 
6.0 Introduction 
FTLRP provided the land for peasant farmers to venture into cash crop production in large numbers. 
This, even though farmers faced serious credit constraints and the know-how to produce crops such as 
tobacco. Farm workers who remained in the resettled farms provided the necessary technical know-how 
to produce the crop, though most of the knowledge was restricted to routine tasks as most managerial 
functions were done by the white farmers. Despite this drawback, the spread of cash crop income among 
many farmers presented an opportunity for equitable distribution of cash-crop income and assets.  For 
example, tobacco is a labour-intensive crop, and its adoption by large numbers of peasants generated 
employment for the household and hired labour and supported (up) downstream economic activity and 
rural livelihoods. Further, the income generated from tobacco production is shared among many 
farmers, who benefited from the FTLRP. The number of producers increased more than tenfold. If the 
inverse relationship discussed in Chapter 3 holds, then tobacco production would have strong 
community effects as farmers hire local labour and expend resources in the local economy. This is 
contrary to LSCFs, who have the capacity to access labour both locally and nationally, as happened 
during the colonial times (Rubert 1998). This chapter discusses tobacco production dynamics, including 
its history and the move from bank finance to contracting arrangements. As postylated bythe access 
theoty 
6.1 History of Tobacco Production: a global perspective 
Tobacco has four  varieties produced around the globe of which over 80 percent is used in the production 
of cigarettes, and the rest goes into cigars, (Van Liemt 2002). The varieties are flue-cured virginia, 
burley, oriental, dark air cured tobacco, of which in 2018 only virginia was produced and marketed in 
Zimbabwe (TIMB 2017). History shows that tobacco production started in the Americas; however, 
recent trends show a shift in farming of the green leaf and cigarette smoking to less developed countries, 
while the concentration of manufacturing is still in developed countries (Jacobs et al. 2000). Capital, 
therefore, continues to accumulate in developed countries while the hazards of production and 
consumption are borne by citizens of developing countries. One percent of the world’s agricultural land 
is under tobacco farming; however, there has been a shift of leaf production to the global south, where 
land under tobacco has more than tripled, while in the west, it is on the decline. China, the biggest 
tobacco leaf producer, has seen an exponential growth in farmland under tobacco, which more than 
tripled; the same applied to impoverished countries, such as Tanzania and Malawi (Eriksen, Mackay 
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and Ross 2013) and, for Zimbabwe after land reform, the more than hundred thousand smallholder 
farmers have even more land under tobacco farming. Apart from the many hours of family labour 
diverted to tobacco farming, food security and supply to the community could also be jeopardised 
because of land of high agricultural potential being used for tobacco production see agroecological 
zones Figure 6.1 and tobacco production regions Figure 6.2), all this with significant effects on rural 
livelihoods. It has been noted, from a pack of tobacco cigarettes (the final product), only two cents 
accrue to the leaf producer, while forty-nine cents go to the oligopsony. According to proponents of 
tobacco control, contracting arrangements under which most tobacco is produced, have increased 
smallholder farmers’ indebtedness to the oligopsony buyer, which finances the crop and which has 
locked farmers to the unfair practice (Nsiku and Botha 2007; Leppan, Lecours, and Buckles 2014). 
Where land is scarce, tobacco could lead to declining food production and food security concerns for 
the community. 
6.2 History of Tobacco Production in Zimbabwe  
Flue cured Virginia tobacco was first grown in Zimbabwe in 1890 after colonisation by BSAP, and the 
industry soon experienced growth, though in certain years interrupted, underpinned by strong 
government support and effective collective action by farmers (Rubert 1998). Access to coerced labour 
(Chibaro), large tracks of virgin land suitable for tobacco farming and plentiful markets enabled colonial 
settlers to establish profitable tobacco commercial farms (Rubert 1998). African labour was, next to the 
purchase of the land itself, arguably the most important factor in establishing a tobacco farm, and the 
exploitation of labour became the trademark of the success of a tobacco farmer (Prowse 2009). Until 
2002, tobacco was largely produced by white farmers and fewer than 8 000 smallholder farmers, who 
produced the less lucrative burley tobacco, which is air cured. During this period tobacco was financed 
through private bank finances supported by freehold land collateral. LSCF were thus able to benefit 
from the land because they controlled and had access to productive resources either by coercion or legal 
means as per Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) access theory. 
After the land reform, smallholder farmers took up Virginia tobacco production in large numbers with 
the 2018/19 registered producers increasing by 65-percent from 98 000 to over a 160 000 (Chikwati 
2018 November). This development means that tobacco production has a big impact on community 
livelihoods22 in terms of resource access, self and hired labour, income effects and the general way 
people earn a living in rural areas. However, after FTLRP banks stopped financing tobacco production 
due to lack of collateral and land tenure security problems described in the last three chapters.  
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6.3 Organisation of Tobacco Production and Marketing in Zimbabwe  
The tobacco industry in Zimbabwe is regulated by TIMB, and TRB provides research services to the 
industry. Various other players complement these two government institutions, which include 
contracting firms (20 in 2017), transporters and input suppliers who serve leaf producers. At the agro-
processing level, there are processors who prepare the crop bought at the auction and contracting floors 
for export; these have no contracts with leaf producers. TIMB, as the regulator, registers all players in 
the tobacco industry; that includes producers, contracting firms and transporters at a fee of US$10 (for 
farmers) or more depending on the timing of the registration. For other categories, fees vary. 
In Zimbabwe, a dual marketing system is in place, where an auction system operates alongside 
contracted production. The two systems, however, both depend on ruling international market prices on 
the day of sale in determining the sale price. This system is translated into local price structure through 
TIMB’s price matrix, which is released daily during the marketing season and forms the basis of auction 
prices; however, for contracting firms, their prices cannot be below the auction price (which is their 
minimum benchmark), it can only be the same or higher. The auction system is demand-driven. At the 
floors, bidding is initiated by a Starter, who calls out the start bidding price. The auctioner then takes 
over until only one bidder is left. 
 
Figure 6-1: Zimbabwe’s Agroecological regions  
Source: FAO 2006 
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Tobacco is mainly produced in agroecological regions I, IIA, IIB (see figure 6-1 on page 92). As shown 
on Figure 6.2, most of the tobacco growing areas are in high potential agricultural zones I, IIA, and IIB. 
This can threaten the country’s food security as most small scale farmers shift to tobacco production. 
However, due to perceived high income, farmers in all farming regions have now taken up the 
production of the crop. Eighty-three percent of registered A1 and communal farmers produce 54.6% of 
the tobacco crop and farm 70.4% of the total hectarage under tobacco in Zimbabwe; however, they 
earned only 48.7% of the income generated from leaf tobacco sales in 2016 and 55 % in 2017 (TIMB 
2016b, 2017). A1 and communal farmers also constitute the rural peasantry where the majority have 
poor access to agricultural productive resources. However, poor access to productive resources resulted 
in low productivity (1 137kgs for communal and 1 280kgs for A1) compared to 2 561 kgs for A2 
commercial farmers. This is also reflected in low average prices. There is a marginal difference in 
average hectares (0.04 ha), yield (0.143 kg) and price (1 cent) for communal and A1 farmers, which 
shows the two groups are almost homogenous and comparable in terms of their tobacco agricultural 
production.  
 
Figure 6-2: Tobacco Growing Areas of Zimbabwe  
Source: Tobacco Research Board, 2017 
Table 6-1 below shows the various classes of tobacco leaf producers in Zimbabwe and their contribution 
to the tobacco industry; A2 commercial farmers contribute the most despite their smaller numbers and 
total area under tobacco, and the data show that their yields are more than twice those of communal and 
A1 farmers. 
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Table 6-1:  2015 Grower Distribution by Class 
Grower 
Sector 
No. of 
Growers 
Mass Sold in 
kgs 
USD Value Price 
USD/kg 
Hectares Average 
hectares 
per farmer 
Yield in 
kgs per 
hectare 
A1 27 282 51 283 419 135 149 635 2.64 40 072 1.47 1 280 
A2 6 982 70 892 762 237 697 628 3.35 27 662 3.96 2 561 
Communal 35 253 57 290 484 150 493 984 2.63 50 367 1.43 1 137 
Small-Scale 
Commercial 
Farmers 
5 875 19 867 426 62 756 241 3.16 10 352 1.76 1 919 
Grand Total 75 392 198 954 849 586 444 231 2.95 128 454 2.64 1.551 
Source: TIMB (2015) 
Tobacco products manufacturing and marketing are controlled by a small cartel of multinational 
companies, namely, Philip Morris, R J Reynolds, BAT, Imperial Tobacco, and Japan Tobacco. Not only 
have multinationals defined the nature of tobacco products manufacturing and marketing the world 
over, they also have subsidiary companies (contractors) in countries producing the raw tobacco 
(Poulton, Kydd, and Kabame 2007). Recently, Chinese tobacco companies have also come on board. 
For instance, Scoones et al. (2018) have shown that most contracting firms, such as Tribac (a subsidiary 
of Japan Tobacco), Northern Tobacco (BAT) and Mashonaland Tobacco Company (Alliance One 
International) in Zimbabwe, are owned by these multinationals. The twenty contracting firms therefore 
operate at national level as agents for the big multinational companies, financing production, buying 
the tobacco and exporting it to the parent or principal companies.Therefore, consolidated international 
capital is responsible for financing production operations in developing countries and in Zimbabwe with 
84 percent of tobacco produced under contract (TIMB 2017). Again, the multinationals have established 
processing and handling plants in grower countries leading efforts to support tobacco production, such 
as in Zimbabwe, where companies, such as Tobacco Processing Zimbabwe founded in 1987 and owned 
by Northern Tobacco Company (Pvt Ltd), Inter-continental leaf Tobacco, and Tribac process tobacco 
on behalf of the multinationals. This is a manifestation of the collusion and concentration of capital 
within the tobacco industry and continued alliance building for the extraction of capital through 
exploitation of poorly-resourced peasants who now dominate the production of the crop. 
In developing countries, such as Zimbabwe, tobacco production is dependent on foreign capital and the 
farmers are exposed to international markets (Scoones et al 2018). Furthermore, tobacco production is 
a highly specialised, input-intensive process (labour, fertilisers and pesticides) and requires specialised 
curing facilities, such as curing barns, which, in turn, demand huge initial financial outlays (Poulton, 
Kydd, and Kabame 2007), which means it affects various structures of the community as people 
converge to provide these services. Surplus labour and a conducive climate in Zimbabwe, for instance, 
has meant that it has a comparative advantage in producing tobacco, and hence, multinationals position 
themselves to extract capital that emanates from this comparative advantage. Despite the input intensity 
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and capital requirements, tobacco has remained lucrative because of its high returns compared to staple 
crops. Mut and Foti (2008) estimate that its returns are six times that of staple crops. The inclusion of 
smallholder farmers into commercial tobacco production and land reform processes that transferred 
land to the poor necessitate (due to lack of financing for small farmers) the establishment of contract 
arrangement schemes in developing countries; this is also coupled with declining production in 
developed countries due to health risks associated with tobacco production.  
In Zimbabwe, multinationals release financing to their subsidiaries, who then register with TIMB as 
required by the country’s regulations before they contract with tobacco farmers to produce on their 
behalf. In 2016, 16 firms were contracting farmers in different parts of the country (Scoones et al. 2018) 
and 84 percent of tobacco was produced under contract. The main actors directly involved with contract 
farming in Zimbabwe are the TIMB (the regulatory authority), agribusinesses and farmers that are 
described in Appendix 1. While the state is said to have played a negligible role, its functionaries (such 
as the police and extension officers) actively assisted with the selection of beneficiaries (Scoones et al. 
2018). Ribot and Peluso (2003) have classified such access channels as illegal and based on coercion 
while Leach, Mearns and Scoones (1999) identify them as institutions that facilitate access. All this 
influence production relations on farms.  
6.4 Tobacco Production  
In the foreword of the Flue-cured Tobacco Production Field Guide, Masuka writes: “Tobacco 
production is labour-demanding and skills-intensive, in addition to requiring higher inputs per hectare 
than most crops” (Tobacco Research Board (TRB) 2011). In this guide, TRB articulates a production 
cycle starting from the seedbed until the tobacco is sold in a marketing season, which could stretch to 
over six months starting around March of every marketing season. This overlaps with a long farming 
period of up to nine months or twelve months, if one considers all the preparatory work that goes into 
tobacco production that helps create more jobs than most seasonal agriculture (Rubert 1998). For 
instance, during the marketing season in March and April, the farmer could be grading tobacco, 
ploughing and clearing the tobacco fields to contain diseases; this is in addition to other farming chores 
for smallholders, who use their family labour.  
Tobacco production begins with land preparation around March before the last rains end, followed by 
nursing of the seedlings from July to September, and their eventual transplantation to the field from 
September to December, where ridges would have been prepared in advance. The application of 
fertilisers and chemicals and the maintenance of the plant through weeding, pruning and disease 
management and thereafter, reaping, is followed by curing of tobacco in the barns (TRB 2011). 
Transplanting seedlings from seedbeds to the field is a labour-intensive process that involves the 
examination of each seedling for quality, transporting it to the field, making holes, applying basal 
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fertilisers to each hole and plant, as well as watering each plant depending on the weather. For a hectare 
of tobacco, fifteen thousand plants are transplanted; a taxing activity for a farmer using family labour, 
and hence, access to labour becomes the most critical resource in determining acreage allotted to 
tobacco farming (Rubert 1998). To obtain a uniform plot of tobacco, transplanting should be completed 
within a day or two, thus necessitating long hours and even working in the rains to ensure the successful 
completion of the task. Also, during harvesting, curing and grading, labour is important to speedily 
prepare tobacco for the barns, and there is a need for constant monitoring of barns to ensure that there 
is a constant supply of firewood to the furnace. Delays in curing the tobacco compromise quality. The 
handling of the tobacco leaf, chemicals and fertilisers is also associated with diseases, such as green 
tobacco sickness, added to this it has devastating effects on the environment, deforestation and soil 
fertility depletion (Keyser 2002). 
Apart from labour, tobacco farming demands ownership of assets that are hard to lease in a community 
of tobacco farmers, such as draught power and scotch carts to transport the tobacco. Ownership of 
enough barns is also important, given that tobacco takes seven days to cure and harvesting is a weekly 
activity. The green leaf cannot be warehoused; it loses quality and hence, everything that doesn’t go 
into the barn within 24 hours is normally disposed of. Most smallholders use ox-drawn ploughs and 
scotch carts for ploughing, ridging and transporting harvested tobacco for curing.   
Tobacco curing is a process that should be done meticulously, as this defines the quality of tobacco, its 
colour, texture and presentation at the market; for instance, inadequately cured tobacco could have green 
portions on the leaf, which could affect its classification at the auction floor. Soon after harvest, tobacco 
should be transported to the sheds and tied and prepared to be placed in the barn for curing. The barns 
are fired by coal or firewood; however, these are environmental depleting methods on the ozone and 
forest. The processes described above require labour, maintenance of barns and assets, and that  
generates employment for the community. In a study of tobacco farmers in Mount Darwin, 
Mashonaland Central, tobacco farming was said to be viable, and the authors encouraged the uptake by 
smallholder farmers, despite noting the negative environmental effects (Masvongo, Mutambara, and 
Zvinavashe 2013). However, this depends on the ability of the farmer to access labour and other 
productive resources as discussed in chapter 2 and depicted on Figure 2 on page 29. 
There is also strong lobbying against the production and consumption of tobacco on health and 
economic reasons spearheaded by the World Health Organisation, under the Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control (FCTC), of which most of the tobacco-producing countries are signatories. As a result, 
this has led to policy contradictions when implementing tobacco control measures at the same time as 
pursuing poverty alleviation and economic growth objectives (Barraclough and Morrow 2010), and 
hence, the sustainability and role of tobacco in meeting the twin government objectives of economic 
and peasant development can be constrained by the FCTC. The distribution of value in this chain could 
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also reflect capitalist development in the global south vis-a-vis the western world, which could lead to 
exploitation of the periphery by the centre through uneven development and accumulation processes. 
The processes described above show the capacity of tobacco production in the absorption of labour and 
generating income for economically active members in tobacco-producing areas, which could benefit 
the community at large.  
6.5 Livelihood Effects of Tobacco Production 
In 2011, 1 066 287 Southern Africa Development Community tobacco farmers employed 3 661 914 
workers, who, in turn, supported 16 959 332 dependants from income earned from tobacco leaf; another 
quarter of the workers were employed within the value chain, which numbers exclude support industry, 
such as transport, financial services, and input suppliers (NKC African Economics 2012), which shows 
the importance of tobacco in livelihoods. About two-thirds of these farmers, employees and dependants 
are in Malawi and Zimbabwe, the major regional producers and exporters of leaf tobacco, and arguably 
the poorest countries in the region (Diao et al. 2002). The same scenario obtains in other major tobacco-
producing countries from less developed countries, such as Brazil (FAO 2003). These positive effects 
on employment benefit communities through income effects, which allow people to access food and 
other livelihood capitals. Further downstream and upstream industries directly benefit through transport 
and other service provisions further creating employment for rural communities. The FTLRP provided 
land to some of the communities, which allowed them to participate in tobacco commercial production 
and hence reap primary benefits in the share of income. Evidence from tobacco-farming regions shows 
that farmers benefited. This is in line with observation that tobacco is a major employer in the 
agricultural sector. 
Tobacco contributes 25+ and 50+ percent to foreign currency earnings, and 10 and 15 percent to GDP 
for Zimbabwe and Malawi, respectively, yet the impoverished rural population of the two countries has 
the highest levels of malnutrition (FAO 2003; NKC African Economics 2012; Nsiku and Botha 2007). 
There is no doubt that tobacco generates foreign currency and revenue for government, despite known 
health and environmental challenges (Keyser 2002). The major question is who benefits from tobacco 
production if the same peasants who produce the crop are languishing in poverty. Critics of tobacco leaf 
production argue that the main beneficiaries are the oligopsony buyer and political elites, the latter 
benefiting from patronage and lobbying fees, while the poor in developing countries are enticed into 
tobacco production and consumption for the benefit of the oligopsony.  Further, because of the long 
hours, days and months needed to work on tobacco, it is alleged that this compromises food security 
and nutrition for these poor farm workers, as family labour is diverted to tobacco to mitigate constraints 
inherent in tobacco production, though this was not the case in Mazowe as will be shown in chapter 8.  
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However there is evidence that cash crop production support food security as shown in this paragraph. 
Cash crop production supports food security through improved supply to modern inputs, farm 
implements (income effect) and training (Govereh, Jayne, and Nyoro 1999). In studies in Mozambique, 
Kenya and Zimbabwe, (Govereh, Jayne, and Nyoro 1999) found that cash crop production complements 
staple crop production, as farmers’ access cash to pay for modern inputs. This study observed that 
contract farming provided staple food input that increased food production. This trend seem to be taking 
root among the tobacco oligopsony buyer as evidenced by BAT’s mixed farming incubator model for 
tobacco and food crops in South Africa (MASDT 2018). Govereh and Jayne (2003) also found similar 
results in Gokwe North in Zimbabwe, itself a product of land reform, which provided farmers access to 
larger virgin and fertile plots. As in these studies, this study also noted spillover effects to people who 
were not involved in cash crop production. This is what Sen (1981) argues creates favourable ‘exchange 
entitlements’.  The supply of staple food inputs is one way of commercialising agriculture as envisaged 
by Von Braun (1995) through adoption of modern inputs, technologies and markets. Thought of in 
terms of access theory, contract farming provided a financial ‘strand’ that allowed farmers to use 
modern inputs to boost food production. Use of modern inputs and hired labour was also found to be a 
contributing factor in increasing FTLRP beneficiaries’ production and income (Zikhali 2010; Riera and 
Swinnen 2016). 
6.6 Constraints to Tobacco Production 
Zimbabwean smallholder farmers have had mixed experiences since the British South African 
Company (BSAC) took over the administration of what was then Rhodesia in 1890. From that date until 
1980, agricultural institutions were established that supported the settler white farmers, explicitly 
excluding blacks, who were in marginal agricultural lands. The consistently discriminatory, pre-
independence agricultural policy formed the backbone of early successes in the commercialisation and 
capitalisation of the sector in general and for particular crops, such as tobacco. Rubert (1998) reports 
that this was achieved through targeted capitalisation, marketing, production and labour policy aimed 
at sustaining white tobacco farmers. During this period, the formation of the CFU, commodity-based 
associations, such as Zimbabwe Tobacco Association and financial institutions, such as Agricultural 
Finance Cooperation, were meant to cater for colonial farmers’ needs. Also, clear subsidy policies 
ensured the successful commercialisation of targeted crops. Yet government maintained such 
discriminatory policies. All this deprived indigenous farmers the opportunity to acquire experience, 
technology and market know-how required in the production of tobacco. 
However, peasant farmers responded to market exclusion through local initiatives which Bessant and 
Muringai (1993) referred to as a moral economy. This resulted in Mazowe farmers fruitfully 
participating in maize markets during the colonial era. Mafeje (2003) argues that the ‘middle peasant’ 
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emerged at the back of investments from non-farm activities. In Zimbabwe, colonial institutions, such 
as research and extension services, formed the launch pad of Zimbabwe’s agricultural revolution. 
Indigenous people were differentiated through such programs as the master farmer and small-scale 
resettlement. At independence, the Zimbabwean government adopted a policy of growth with equity 
that was aimed at promoting smallholder farmers through resettlement and agricultural intensification. 
For a decade, the Zimbabwe government established institutions, such as the Grain Marketing Board 
(GMB), in rural areas to distribute inputs and buy agricultural outputs from smallholder farmers 
(Mabeza-Chimedza 1998). The proximity of the institutions to farmers led to equitable access and the 
increased use of hybrid seeds, fertilisers and extension services resulting in the doubling of agricultural 
production. All of this allowed farmers to build assets that supported their agricultural productivity and 
livelihoods. However, the government found itself perpetuating the same policy thrust that supported 
white commercial farmers, and no sustainable growth-enhancing institutions were put in place to 
support smallholder agriculture. For instance, the financial support extended through Agricultural 
Finance Corporation only reached a few farmers and the financing model was not sustainable and hence, 
it collapsed. Other interventions, such as subsidies were also not sustainable and collapsed under the 
economic SAP. Notable in Zimbabwean policies was the lack of clarity on the economic model pursued, 
whether it was capitalist or socialist, and the government seemed to shift policy depending on political 
prudence. 
Institutions that were developed in the 1980s to support communal and resettled farmers with input and 
with output markets faded in the 1990s, when the failed SAP started. Incentives to smallholder farmers 
were withdrawn, as the government’s weak fiscus could not sustain agricultural institutions in rural 
areas, leaving farmers exposed to free market operations. This was followed by the declining use of 
modern inputs, extension services and the elimination of incentivised marketing services, which were 
replaced by private agribusinesses. Low agricultural productivity meant low income, poor nutrition and 
health, and low capacity for rural households to earn assets for the diversification of livelihoods. 
Agricultural virtually collapsed after the FTLRP forcing the government to promote contract farming 
arrangements as discussed in chapter 5. 
6.7 Tobacco Contract Farming in Zimbabwe 
Until 2004, tobacco production was financed through commercial bank credit, all this changed with the 
changing tenure system which gave rise to unbankable 1999-lease agreements to A2 farmers and 
permits to A1. Most A1-farmers were excluded from bank credit. Consequently, the government 
promoted contract farming to reap benefits alluded to by proponents of contract farming. Proponents of 
contract farming argue that agribusiness firms provide resources, services and markets for farmers to 
produce cash crops that meet their requirements (Minot and Sawyer 2016). The resources and services 
said to be beneficial to farmers include: 
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• Supply of farming inputs, fertilisers, and herbicides  
• Advice and extension services to farmers 
• Technology on production of new crops 
• Guaranteed markets for the farmer’s produce 
• Credit without the need for collateral and rigorous credit worthiness checks 
Indeed, these benefits, though contested by most political economists, were observed in Mazowe 
(Scoones et al 2018) and among tobacco producers in general. Production increased, contract grower 
numbers swelled, farmers accessed finance and agronomic advice (Sachikonye 2016) 
Despite these perceived benefits and the dire need of finance by FTLRP farmers, scholars still doubted 
and questioned contract farming as a viable arrangement. For example, Sachikonye (2016) points to the 
contemporary issues raised by critical political economists. These include pricing, dependence and 
ecological disaster that could threaten sustainable agriculture.  
In this way tobacco contract farming has taken the same trajectory critical scholars have observed in 
contemporary debates. These scholars point to the profit motive of contracting firms, which always 
leads to an inclination towards exploiting the uninformed, poor smallholder farmer. At a macro-level, 
Mafeje (2003) has questioned the appropriateness of market-based approaches to commercialising rural 
agriculture, suggesting rural smallholder farming could be developed through the local-based 
harnessing of resources and access to markets. Mafeje (2003) observed banding23 as one such method 
used by peasant farmers producing for markets. He argued that this will lead to farmers negotiating and 
participating in markets as equals. Farmer dependence on contractors also leads to an exploitative 
relationship (Yeros 2018).  
At the micro-level, Sachikonye (1989) and Porter and Phillips-Howard (1997) all hone in on the 
exploitative nature of contract farming, pointing to the self-exploitation of labour by smallholders. They 
argue that it can increase differentiation in communities and exploits the poor smallholder due to an 
unequal power balance in contract negotiation. This unequal power balance extends to farmers’ 
negotiations with labour. Indeed, Ribot and Peluso (2003:153) argue that “a bundle of powers” affect 
access to resources which could lead to differentiation. This is a pertinent observation considering that 
contract farming provides only partial resources and that farmers have to negotiate for complementary 
resources. In Zimbabwe, FTLRP resulted in the reconfiguration of power, resources, and market access 
opportunities for communities, which ultimately affected their livelihoods (Moyo 2011a; Scoones et al. 
2011; Scoones et al. 2018). 
As Sachikonye (2016), observes tobacco production reached an all time low after FTLRP due mainly 
to lack of productive resources among a highly differentiated farming community. Work by Bernstein 
and Oya (2014) has shown the effect of rural social differentiation in accessing markets, indicating the 
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role initial assets play in accessing contracts (Vicol 2015). In Mozambique, asset endowments were 
found to be important in accessing markets, showing the importance of initial livelihood conditions 
where the rural elite have a better chance of getting into contract farming compared to the rest of the 
poor community members. All this exposed farmer to exploitative contracting conditions as discussed 
in chapter 7  
The biggest Chinese contractors preferred contracting with large A2 farmers (Sachikonye 2016, 
Mukwereza 2013). Selection bias in the process of choosing participants excludes smallholders really 
in need of assistance. This also took an access dimension where coercion and patronage play a part in 
accessing resources (Ribot and Peluso 2003; Leach, Mearn and Scoones 1999). Scoones et al (2018) 
provides an example of this in Mvurwi, noting the role state agency played in accessing contracts. 
Questions also arise as to whether smallholder farmers receive a fair share of the prevailing international 
prices from the value chain. Simmons (2002) has argued that the contracting firm and smallholder 
farmers aim to reduce transaction costs in entering contract farming arrangements, meaning the poorer 
members of society viewed as risky will be excluded and/or marginalised. As a result, poorly resourced 
farmers may not participate and when they do, may not sustain the demands of contract farming. Despite 
this, contract farming is viewed as an institutional arrangement that has the capacity to provide 
resources, modern technology and markets for smallholder farmers, thus creating community 
bourgeoisies that can facilitate the development of capitalism in rural areas (Kennedy 1994). Increased 
economic activity could have wider community-effects through employment and income effects.  
6.8 Conclusion  
This chapter discussed tobacco production in Zimbabwe. Tobacco production was historical dominated 
by white commercial farms who were ably supported by government institutions and farmer 
organisations. These institutions provided services that equipped farmers with production and 
marketing skills. However, after independence government maintained policies that were biased against 
smallholder farmers and hence were deprived of the necessary knowhow and experience to produce 
tobacco. This effectively put them at a disadvantage and they faced constraints in the uptake of tobacco 
production. This was despite the fact that tobacco production was beneficial both to the people at 
government. The chapter shows that farmers benefited from tobacco production whenever they had 
access to productive resources like labour, finance and institutional support as argued by Ribot and 
Peluso (2003). After FTLRP, contract farming was promoted as an intervention to promote access to 
finance and technology for the FTLRP beneficiaries and tobacco farmers in general. Contract farming 
is reportedly helping farmers deal with constraints such as the lack of technology, finance and insurance. 
However, the old tendencies of farmer exploitation persist. The next chapter shows that Mazowe is an 
area suitable for tobacco production, however farmer participation was affected by power imbalances 
that favoured the contractor. 
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Chapter 7  
Land, Agriculture and Livelihoods in Mazowe 
7.0 Introduction 
Agriculture is the main source of livelihoods in Mazowe, supporting subsistence and cash needs of the 
community. Other livelihoods include gendered non-farm activities, such as beer brewing and trading 
by women, and mining, fishing and brick-making by men. Access to land is important for people to 
access natural resources, such as firewood, minerals and participation in contract farming activities; 
however, access to capital has been the major constraint resulting in farmers seeking to join contract 
farming. Capital was recently introduced to the community in the form of contract farming 
arrangements, the injection of artisanal mining capital for smallholder peasants, and irrigation schemes, 
such as the Negomo Irrigation scheme financed by the Zimbabwean government and German investors. 
All this has shaped the way livelihoods are gained, controlled and maintained through various channels, 
such as kinship, social relations and political association, shaped by historical and contemporary 
developments as suggested by Ribot and Peluso (2003) and Berry (1993). In maintaining access, for 
instance, benefits are transferred to other actors giving rise to community level effects as discussed in 
Chapter 9. 
This chapter describes the case study area, Mazowe, and the processes that affect it, such as 
demographics, infrastructure, land (particularly FTLRP), the state of agriculture, livelihoods, and 
markets. All of these affect farmers’ participation in contracting arrangements in Mazowe, as farmers 
harness them to build assets and access to resources. In doing so, there are community wide effects that 
arise. 
7.1 Mazowe Infrastructure, Natural Resources and Climate 
This case study is in Mazowe, one of the seven districts in Mashonaland Central, Zimbabwe. Mazowe 
lies between 40 and 107 kilometres from the capital city and Concession, the administrative centre, is 
60km north of Harare. A tarred road cuts across the district linking the farming districts of Centenary 
and Mount Darwin further north, and another tarred road linking Mvurwi and Centenary to the west 
and Bindura (provincial capital) to the east; gravel feeder roads connect the farming community to 
tarred roads. The roads link the modern urban settlements fast developing in Concession, where 
government offices are located, Aspindale, Nzvimbo growth point and Mvurwi, which Scoones et al. 
(2018) described as a vibrant centre, and, further north, Chaona growth point. This infrastructure 
facilitates good accessibility to and from farms and markets in Harare, which makes the area a preferred 
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destination for agribusinesses and commercially oriented farmers. The district covers an area of 453 892 
hectares and, as shown on the map, about a quarter of the area (210 000 acres) is communal, sandwiched 
by former LSCFs. After the FTLRP, most A1 farmers were settled on farms bordering the communal 
areas, creating a symbiotic relationship between these villagised communities. 
Mazowe lies in natural regions II and III (see Figure 6.1 page, 92) 1 249m (4 097ft) above sea level on 
17⁰ 30´14´´ S latitude and 30°58′25″ E longitude with average rainfall of 750-1 000 ml, which is 
suitable for various crops and livestock production. The good soils and rainfall patterns allow for diverse 
cropping and animal husbandry activities; such good ecological conditions attract contracting firms. 
Over 60 percent of peasants who were interviewed or surveyed indicated that they were involved in 
multiple cropping activities to supplement and diversify their income options. These activities include 
crop production, horticulture, citrus, wildlife, seed production and dairy (Sukume et al. 2015) practiced 
by the various land owners. For instance, survey data showed farmers producing cash crops (60 percent) 
were involved in market gardening (70 percent) and 99 percent of respondents produced staple crops, 
which occupied over 70 percent of the land holding of the household. Evidence from Mazowe indicated 
that farmers produced tobacco because it was the most profitable crop, with a ready market at the 
auction floors. Matondi (2012) observed that farmers in Mazowe had 50 percent of their arable land 
under maize production. Crop diversification was mainly aimed at developing alternative sources of 
income in the case of crop failure. Hence, the integration of farmers into contract farming arrangements 
should be viewed as a livelihood strategy.  
The rainy season stretches from November to April and the dry season sets in from June till October. 
Rain-fed agriculture occurs during the rainy seasons and is concentrated in region III, however, irrigated 
horticultural production continues in areas such as Negomo and farms in region II such as citrus in 
Mazowe. Sukume et al. (2015:12) describe the farming zones in Mazowe as “…technically divided into 
four Intensive Conservation Area (ICAs)24, namely the Barwick, Marodzi-Tatagura, Mvurwi and 
Glendale ICAs” with different soil types. The sand to sandy loam soils are suitable for tobacco 
production and these soils are found in all the ICAs except Marodzi-Tatagura, which has red clay soils. 
The ICAs managed environmental issues within a given ecological area, ensuring the cropping patterns 
and natural resources were used in a sustainable manner. 
Mazowe’s ecological region also boasts a vegetation that is supportive of tobacco production, where 
curing energy is needed. A farmer in Ndire noted: “Our forests are gone. We have been paying a 
reforestation levy to TIMB for the past few years but nothing is being done for us. One day we will 
have no firewood to cure our tobacco.” Deforestation is so severe that mature Brachystegia spiciformis 
(musasa), Julbernardia and globiflora (mutondo) varieties, which are used as curing energy, are hard 
to find within the village. After the FTLRP, the demise of ICAs meant there was no peer enforcement 
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of environmental concerns; however, in Mazowe, attempts to resuscitate ICAs were observed and are 
being spearheaded by local leadership through ward-based resource officers.  
 
Figure 7-1: Mazowe Map showing Ward boundaries  
Source: Sukume et al., 2015 
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The Great Dyke belt, which has vast mineral deposits, such as gold and lime, cuts across the district, 
and a couple of mining activities also contribute to livelihoods and economic activities in addition to 
commercial and subsistence agriculture 
The map in Figure 7-1 shows Mazowe district. To the right and north of the green line lie the Chiweshe 
communal areas, bordered by Bindura to the east and Centenary to the north; the rest are former 
commercial farms. Most A1 settlements are on boundaries of communal areas, with the exception of 
the Forester farms, which are owned on bilateral agreements between the German and Zimbabwe 
governments. Mazowe has good infrastructure, such as Howard Hospital in the Chiweshe communal 
area, and other public goods that support agriculture. The provision of public goods has also attracted 
agribusinesses to the area, as discussed in chapter 8. 
7.2 Mazowe Demography and Labour Supply Dynamics 
Mazowe’s population is largely of a diverse African origin, with people coming from all over the 
country since the advent of the land reform. As in most FTLRP resettlements discussed in Chapter 5, 
former-farm workers remained on the farms with no alternative livelihood options and hence, they feel 
compromised when negotiating labour contracts. A former farm worker confirmed this, as follows: 
My parents came from Malawi and worked as farm workers. I grew up working in these farms. 
After the farms were taken by war veterans, I remained in the compound. The new farmers hire 
us for a fee of US$3 a day; they need our skills because they don’t know how to farm tobacco 
thus why they allowed us to stay. The problem is they don’t pay well. 
Since 2002 the population has grown by 22% due to FTLRP-induced inward migration (Sukume et al., 
2015) increasing the supply of labour in the community. There are 233 450 people of whom 49.8 and 
50.2 percent are male and female, respectively; 90.8 percent of the people live in rural areas, and 104 
809 (44.9%) are economically active (ZIMSTATS 2012) and derive their livelihood from agriculture 
or natural resources, such as mining. While Mazowe is predominantly rural, it has a young economically 
active population in paid employment (37.2%) and 43.8 percent are own account workers. On average, 
4.2 people live in a household where 72.9 percent are headed by males and the adult population (from 
15+) literacy rate is 96 percent. Men dominate economic activities, such as cash crop production, 
participation in contract farming and mining. Though there are generally more females than males in 
Mazowe, the distribution shows that there are more males in A1 settlements where the percentage of 
the population is above 50%, a sign of the patriarchal nature of the community and bias in the 
distribution and access to economic activities.  
A1 communities are a diverse group from different parts of the country, both rural and urban areas. 
Occupations range through formal employment, farm workers, miners, former farm workers, rural 
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peasants who are dependent on the sale of their labour for subsistence, and government workers 
(teachers, nurses, policemen, and soldiers) who dominate the working class and double up as farmers 
often investing their income from salaries in agriculture. This is in line with other rural-based workers: 
for instance, Randela (2005) observed this in a study of Moutse and Nkomazi in South Africa. These 
workers were attracted to Mazowe by the favourable agroecology, proximity to Harare and mineral 
deposits found in the area. However, this has implications on the share of value generated from Mazowe 
land. For instance, interviews revealed that farmers from other regions drew labour from their former 
homelands while also reinvesting income generated in the same pattern thus minimising positive 
community wide effects of contract farming in Mazowe. 
Most of those in formal employment live in urban set-ups within the district, such as Concession, 
Glendale and Nzimbo, and shuttle to and from their farms. The colonial government forcibly settled 
black peasants in these communal lands, near the white farms so that they could be a ready source of 
labour. Consequently, most people in Mazowe worked in commercial farms producing cash crops, 
gaining skills they now apply as labourers or cash crop producers in their own plots. This pool of 
knowledge is attractive to both the contractor and contracted farmers who have access to trained labour 
who are ready to produce tobacco. All this has affected how access to labour is negotiated, with those 
in professional jobs and elites using their social status and identity to negotiate for labour services. 
Labour is negotiated through various informal social structures that link the A1 and communal 
communities, for instance, women’s clubs, churches, socialisation during beer drinks, referrals, lineage 
structures and immediate family. The binding force in the negotiations seems to be the need to access 
resources, such as land, for production purposes, which has given rise to some form of share cropping 
arrangements, or exchange of inputs, tillage services and, at times, food for subsistence purposes.  
Most labour arrangements were part-time, though mostly repeated over various tasks and seasons. For 
instance, respondents, who reported that they did not have enough food, exchanged their labour for food 
and inputs within their social networks; for example, in 2015, Tindo weeded a half acre of tobacco crop 
for two turkeys (birds) for breeding purposes. At the time of the field work in July 2017, the turkeys 
had multiplied to 50 and he was selling them to meet his children’s school fees (see Appendix 6).  
Tobacco farmers, mainly new heads of households with no resources, worked for the well-off farmers 
in exchange for tobacco seedlings, tillage services and assistance with marketing of their tobacco at the 
auction floors. This formed some of the complex mechanisms through which people accessed resources 
to earn a living. For instance, the well-off used their resources to access labour for their contract farming 
activities, while the vast pool of labour benefited from employment opportunities arising from contract 
farming initiatives. As will be shown in Chapter 9, these are some of the various ways through which 
community wide effects manifested in Mazowe. 
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7.3 Community Infrastructure and Public Goods 
Mazowe is endowed with a robust physical infrastructure that supports farming activities in various 
respects, such as transportation of inputs and outputs to markets. The good road network facilitates trade 
with Harare markets and has also attracted a considerable number of well-off people, who double-up 
work in urban areas and commercial crop production. For instance, most people, who rented land for 
cash crop production, commuted from Harare as and when certain tasks needed to be completed. 
Horticultural farmers were also attracted by the good road network and the district’s proximity to 
Harare, and hence, most horticulture ventures concentrated on the southern part of Mazowe, which is 
close to Harare. Since the advent of the FTLRP, tobacco production has increased in Mazowe and now 
the district is the third-highest producer behind traditional tobacco producing districts, such as 
Hurungwe and Makoni. This is mainly because of its proximity to Harare, which reduces transport costs 
for the farmers and contracting firms.  
Communication infrastructure is also in place, and most places that we visited had network connectivity 
for both data and voice allowing for extensive cell-phone use in the district. The availability of 
communication services is important for farmer organisation information-sharing initiatives. For 
instance, ZTA had a farmer WhatsApp group to “…disseminate relevant information to Zimbabwe’s 
tobacco growers” (Zimbabwe Tobacco Association 2017: 2). The good cellphone network coverage 
allowed for easy payments through mobile phone platforms, such as Ecocash, as well as easy bookings 
for the tobacco sales and coordinating of inputs deliveries. An extension officer with a contractor had 
this to say about the infrastructure:  
I enjoy working with Mazowe farmers; the roads are good, the network coverage is perfect, 
which makes communication with the farmers easy: a group message and all my work is done. 
Some of my farmers have smart phones and we share pictures about the crop, which allows for 
prompt advice to reach the farmer (Interview October 7, 2017).  
Barrett et al. (2012) observed that good infrastructure attracted agribusinesses to communities because 
it reduced transaction costs, a factor which could be attracting contracting firms to Mazowe. The 
proximity of the district to major urban areas also made it possible for contractors to attract specialised 
extension officers, who could easily work from the comfort of the urban settlements. 
Mazowe has good water bodies, such as Mazowe River, and various dams, which were constructed on 
various farms by former commercial farmers in the district. Borehole water can also be accessed within 
40-50 metre depth thus providing supplementary water sources. This sets the district on a sound 
agricultural path; however, this has been compromised by the destruction of irrigation equipment during 
the FTLRP and contestation on use rights of the water bodies given that farms were subdivided into 
smaller units among owners from different regions and persuasions. Despite a government directive 
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that existing farm infrastructure should be shared, the use of communal water bodies is compromised 
by weak institutional arrangements. Households have generally good access to water for agricultural 
and household use (Towindo 2017, June; ZIMSTATS 2012), which allows them to partake in market 
gardening and tobacco seedbed operations, which require watering three times a day. Contestations and 
power imbalances have tended to marginalise peasant farmers’ access to water resources and hence, the 
participation in market-based agricultural activities. Also, the power game among the elite and poor 
peasants  comes into play in the distribution of electricity.  
Use of other agricultural infrastructure, such as tobacco barns left by displaced former commercial 
farmers, has been highly contested and, at times, was a source of conflict. At Thorncreek, such farm 
houses were being converted to schools and barns were being rented-out, however nobody took 
responsibility for maintaining these structures which were being slowly run-down. As a result, such 
infrastructure did not benefit the community. 
Though Mazowe has a good infrastructure, its use has been compromised by institutional deficiencies 
and political power imbalances, which continue to favour the rich, as in colonial times when 
infrastructure use was tilted against the black rural community. The exclusion of the poor from such 
infrastructure as water and electricity also tends to exclude them from market-based activities, such as 
tobacco contract farming arrangements, where water is critical in irrigating or seedbed management. 
Like agribusiness, the community has invested in short-term social institutions at the expense of 
investment into access to infrastructure management institutions, possibly because of the unpredictable 
nature of the state and the state’s role in access to resources. However, according to one agribusiness 
representative in Harare, good infrastructure in Mazowe was one of the main reasons that they 
established contracting arrangements in the area (Interview September 24, 2017). 
7.4 The FTLRP: Differential Access to Land among Peasant Farmers 
Land is the most significant asset that people in Mazowe depend on for their agricultural and non-farm 
activities in a community where livelihoods straddle agriculture and non-farm activities. Land also 
defines who gets access to what economic resources. The processes and outcomes of the FTLRP have 
been broadly assessed and documented, and Mazowe has been fertile ground of such research 
(Chiweshe 2011; Matondi 2010; Matondi 2012; Scoones et al. 2018; Sukume et al. 2015), where issues 
relating to access, use and the welfare of land reform beneficiaries were the focal point. This section 
describes land access in Mazowe from the colonial to the recent FTLRP era. 
7.4.1 A1 Farmers Settle in Mazowe  
Mazowe’s large-scale commercial farming community was not affected by the Lancaster House 
prescribed land reform of the 1980s, and symptoms of discontent started appearing in 1998 (Sadomba 
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2008; Sukume et al. 2015). Sadomba (2008) documents increased movement towards reclamation of 
land during the period before the FTLRP, led by spirit mediums and war veterans, whom he claims, 
mobilised local people towards the reclaiming of their forefathers’ land. However, he also notes the 
broader alliance war veterans sought from farm workers bringing into question the role of spirit 
mediums. At the start of the FTLRP, peasants in Mazowe did not enthusiastically occupy farms 
bordering the communal area as seen by the number of beneficiaries observed in this study (39% of the 
sample were from Chiweshe). Matondi (2010:iii) notes that “Chiefs from Chiweshe communal area 
argued that land reform had not benefited ‘vana vemuChiweshe’ (the people originating from 
Chiweshe)”. 
This could have been due, in part, to the fact that war veterans leading the invasions originated from 
areas outside Mazowe and failure by local leadership and spirit mediums to mobilise people for the 
invasions. Sadomba (2008:136) suggests kuramwa (to become impatient) by spirit mediums could be a 
possible cause. In 2000, when the wave of farm invasions was at its peak, farm invaders came from 
Chiweshe and surrounding districts, and urban centres. A war veteran who originated from Masvingo 
described how they came to Mazowe, thus: 
In 2000, I and a few comrades from Harare and other districts invaded this farm. We were later 
joined by a few locals we invited to our base to boost our numbers. When we pegged the plots, 
people who were here at the base participated in the lottery to pick plots (Interview November 
10, 2017).   
A farmer at Thorncreek, who originated from Mount Darwin, had this to say:  
People from Mount Darwin moved in groups southwards in search of farms which were not 
occupied. When we got to a farm, some occupied and others who could not fit on that farm 
moved on. Our group finally settled on this farm. When time came for the District Administrator 
to peg and allocate the land we got the first preference because we had already settled (Interview 
July 15, 2017). 
Most of the farmers at Thorncreek farm were from Mount Darwin. A few former farm workers who 
joined the war veterans also got land, though there was discrimination against those of foreign origin, 
who remained landless and confined to the farm compounds.  
7.4.2 Access to Land in Mazowe: post-FTLRP 
The processes of land allocation during and after fast track followed standard application procedures 
through the local authorities, with invaders drawing lots at the farms they occupied, and others going 
through local authorities or direct to the district administrator’s office. Consequently, those already 
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occupying farms had a better chance of being allocated land, as one A1 farmer from Mount Darwin 
observed: 
When we invaded this farm, Chiweshe people thought it was a joke which would be reversed 
and hence, they saw no need to waste time. We arrived at this farm in 2000 and established our 
base next to the workers’ compound. After a few months, the District Administrator came and, 
asked us to draw a lottery where we picked our farms. We then got the offer letters. (Interview 
July 23, 2017).  
Farm invasions became a mechanism of access, including those who participated, while marginalising 
and excluding those who remained home. The Chiweshe communal areas remained congested and short 
of arable and grazing land affecting their livestock herd, which is a source of draught power and 
participation in market-based agricultural activities. 
Due to land shortages in the communal areas there is still talk among politicians to repossess land for 
further subdivisions into smaller units to accommodate more beneficiaries (Towindo June, 2017), thus 
bringing to the fore viability concerns that need to be considered in setting farm sizes in relation to land 
potential and population size (Cousins and Scoones 2010). In July 2017, communal peasants were 
registering for land with the hope of getting it through fresh land grabs and the former president was 
propagating for this during his Youth Interface rallies. This shows the importance of political power in 
allocation of land, and hence, using bundles of powers vested in the office of the president such 
proclamations could result in access to land though as suggested by access theory recipients have to 
play the patronage card. 
As in the 1950s, traditional authorities are working hand-in-glove with government structures to deal 
with land distribution and management issues. This is also in line with the constitution and various Acts 
that govern the administration of communal lands. Emerging land governance issues in A1 schemes 
show that the land reform is but an extension of communal areas, given the recent extension of 
traditional authority structures to these areas. This is even more so if one considers the Zimbabwe 
constitution definition: “Communal Land, means land set aside under an Act of Parliament and held in 
accordance with customary law by members of a community under the leadership of a Chief” 
(Zimbabwe, Government of 2013). The extension of communal structures to A1 communities where 
traditional authority structures, Village Development Committees, Ward Committees and 
transformation of Committees of Seven into development units, as in communal lands, attests to this 
extension. In both jurisdictions land is held under permit from the District Administrator. It is the 
governance structure under chiefs (though contested [Matondi, 2010; Matondi, 2012]), which was 
observed in Mazowe. A scenario observed by Chipenda (2018) in neighbouring Goromonzi district, 
which has “…reinstated the juridical, political and social powers of the chief over land which included 
its allocation, resolution of disputes and use” (Murisa 2018: 6), is underway in Mazowe. By extending 
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the chief’s authority to A1 settlements, it is, by default, extending the communal area boundaries to 
these settlements. Mkodzongi (2016) reports such processes in Mhondoro Ngezi, where chiefs have laid 
claim to their ancestral land and with it, administrative roles. 
There is an emerging land rental market in A1 and communal areas driven by the ever-declining land 
holdings in rural areas in which rentals are paid for in cash or kind in the form of inputs, or some form 
of sharecropping. At Thorncreek farm, an A1 beneficiary of the FTLRP indicated he earned a living 
from renting out portions of his six-hectare plot for a fee ranging from $90 per-hectare for a cropping 
season or ten to twenty-percent of the harvest, depending on demand. Most of his customers were 
former farm workers and urbanites from Harare (Interview July 20, 2017). Farm workers in the area 
confirmed this arrangement and this is also in line with survey results that showed 20 percent of farm 
workers, urbanites, and farmers in communal areas actually rented agricultural land for their cash crops. 
For communal people, land was rented to facilitate tobacco contract farming production and rotation as 
their farm sizes were small and prone to diseases; as Kevin Cooke notes: “It doesn’t allow for the 
inevitable drop in yield for growers planting the same land for the 10th year in a row” (ZTA 2017:3). 
To diversify their incomes, communal peasants rented land mainly, but not exclusively, from A1 
farmers. Five A1 farmers also reported renting land from fellow A1 farmers, who were largely rich 
peasants who were accumulating above average in the community. 
This section shows that access to land was achieved through violent means (involvement in invasions), 
rentals based on one’s wealth and social relations, and customary routes where local authorities took 
centre stage. This confirms access theory propositions discussed in Chapter 2. Both de jure and de facto 
means were used to access land (Berry 1993; Ribot 1998; Ribot and Peluso 2030). As a result, rentals 
and labour-land exchanges had broader community effects, as people were able to access land for cash 
or staple crop production. 
7.4.3 Structure of Land Ownership in Mazowe 
Mazowe district has a land ownership structure which comprises communal, villagised A1 resettlement, 
old resettlement and commercial A2. The land is characterised by differential use ranging from 
mechanised commercial production in A2 and some A1s to ox-drawn ploughs for the majority of A1s 
and communal areas; communal grazing facilities for A1 and communal areas and A2 that can largely 
be described as self-contained. This land ownership structure has its roots in colonial land dispossession, 
which created a dual structure, and, in correcting the dualism, the FTLRP resulted in Mazowe having 
an A1, A2 and communal land holding structure and, further north in Chaona, the old resettlement 
scheme. 
Before the FTLRP, Mazowe had a dual land ownership structure: the large commercial farms alongside 
the communal areas, which were embedded within the commercial farming areas. On the map (figure 
112 
7.1), the green triangular part, which mainly consists of wards 1-15, known as Chiweshe Reserves, was 
a creation of the colonial government. Surrounding Chiweshe were about 450 large commercial farms 
(Chiweshe 2011), which generally drew labour from the communal areas. The FTLRP, resulted in 
homogenous six-hectare villagised A1 settlements, which are largely communal in terms of their modus 
operandi, the main differences being the land size, the offer letter held by A1 beneficiaries and the high 
influence of political and government bureaucratic management of these settlements.  
The communal areas have varied land sizes, the ownership is a product of colonial, patriarchal or 
traditional authority allocation control of which has been retained in the hands of traditional authorities 
as it was during the colonial times. Due to the patriarchal nature of the Chiweshe community, land 
continued to be subdivided to accommodate marrying sons, who were ready to start a family. This 
practice has continued to this day and land per household has shrunk to an average of 0.6 hectares (Steen 
2011). This leads to the break-up of household assets (Foster and Rosenzweig 2002) and diminishing 
land holdings for the households. Over 80 percent of those from the communal areas, who responded 
to a survey questionnaire, indicated that land was not enough to meet their farming needs; an 
observation that was also made by all community leaders interviewed. Survey data also show that fewer 
people from the communal areas were in tobacco production because of inadequate land for required 
rotation. 
The shortage of grazing land in the communal areas was also a source of on-going conflicts with 
neighbouring commercial farms. The researcher observed cattle that had strayed into a nearby 
commercial farm being confiscated, pending payment of a fine, failure of which could lead to the loss 
of livestock. This has implications on the number and quality of cattle owned by people in communal 
areas. It also increases the need to herd cattle all day and thus withdraws labour from other productive 
farming and non-farming activities. Ownership of cattle is important for risk management as well as for 
draught power; in fact, it is one of the most important assets in negotiating rural livelihoods, for 
example, drawing scotch carts for firewood, water, and during harvest and even carrying the sick to 
hospitals. 
7.5 Livelihoods   
7.5.1 Livelihoods in Mazowe: a Historical Perspective 
People in Mazowe earn their livelihoods from an assortment of activities, such as agriculture, mining 
and services (Sukume et al. 2015). Most of the people are own-account workers25 in agriculture, which 
is the main source of livelihoods. Before the 2000 FTLRP access to economic activities, resources and 
markets were primarily defined along colonial patterns of accumulation and hence, to understand the 
emerging profile of economic activities, there was a need to do a historical analysis through document 
analysis as well as oral evidence from senior citizens in Mazowe. These included kraal heads and 
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peasant farmers in their seventies, who, through narrating their stories, revealed the changing forms of 
access to economic assets, such as land, labour, capital and natural resources, which are important in 
participating in contract farming. A historical analysis, as detailed by Bessant and Muringai (1993), 
provides succinct details of the Mazowe “moral economy” and describes processes that define 
agricultural production in Mazowe communal areas, which were also supported by elders. Bessant 
(1992) notes that the Chiweshe peasants were always quick to respond to changing economic activities, 
citing the way they integrated into the maize marketing programme spearheaded by Wane (Native 
Commissioner) and their adoption of rice production when prices changed. After the FTLRP, 
availability of land in nearby A1 farms and encouragement from the government triggered the adoption 
and production of tobacco by peasants, some of whom went on to rent land in A1 schemes. It is 
important to note that these developments shaped the adoption and integration of peasant farmers into 
the cash economy, where, through the Land Husbandry Act of 1951, restrictions were put on African 
agricultural activities.  
Bessant and Muringai (1993) have shown how the diverse Chiweshe communal part of Mazowe moved 
towards the individualistic capitalist mode of accumulation as the community responded to the infusion 
of the capitalist cash economy. The co-existence of LSCFs and peasant community defined the labour 
market, which is evident to this day, where ZIMSTAT (2012) census shows 37% of the economically 
active population is involved in paid labour driven by historical experiences, fluid social identity and 
status (Berry 1989). Mazowe community’s livelihoods have remained intertwined with commercial 
farming activities as suppliers of labour as shown by the survey data, with tobacco farmers employing 
labour from communal areas and former farm labourers in A1 settlements, showing a considerable 
decline in reliance on family labour.  
Interviewees from the five wards indicated that there was a close relationship between the communal 
and their sister communities in A1 settlements, and resources flowed within these communities. A 77-
year-old man confirming these historical ties, observed: 
These commercial farms have always been a source of our livelihoods, since the times of white 
commercial farmers, and even today our children seek livelihoods there. People work in farms 
for cash or exchange of commodities we need (Interview August 8, 2017).  
He observed that the main difference now is that the tractors and lorries that used to transport workers 
between communal and commercial farms are long gone and negotiation for labour is primarily on an 
individual basis. During colonial times. “rich farmers” diversified into other activities, such as retail 
shops, using income from marketing tobacco, a trend which the current cash farmers have adopted. 
Agriculture was the main source of revenue facilitating diversification into non-farm activities and 
absorbed most labour into agricultural employment.  
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7.5.2 Non-Farm Livelihoods 
Several livelihoods straddling the A1 and communal communities were observed during the study; such 
as wage-based, trade in beer, staples and vegetables, and services such as artisanal work involving 
building houses and barns, vehicle repairs, and transport services, and exchange of natural resources, 
such as firewood among other things.  Mazowe community is also closely integrated with urbanites 
from Harare, who trade in second-hand clothing and/or groceries in exchange for crop staples, such as 
maize and sweet potatoes. Contract farming invigorated these activities as reported in chapter 9. Barter 
trade was a major source of livelihood facilitation both within the community and with urban areas, 
creating strong linkage in urban-rural livelihood strategies. This practice has taken root in Zimbabwe 
since the cash crisis deepened, (Zivira 2017, September; Butaumocho 2015, April). Retailers and other 
traders from Harare would exchange commodities for maize, which they sell at GMB depots for a profit, 
leading to government introducing controls on maize marketing to curb side marketing (Butaumocho 
2015, April). While this practice was caused and necessitated by cash shortages, it also speaks to thin 
markets in rural areas, which form fertile ground for the exploitation of the poor peasants, who are 
excluded from the financial system and hardly use other modes of payment or receipt of payments. The 
well-off in rural areas took the opportunity to accumulate assets that included animals. 
7.6 Access to Resources through Extension Officers and Collective Action in 
Mazowe 
As discussed in section 7.1, Mazowe consists of diverse people, which has made collective action 
difficult to form beyond the single goal of claiming land from the white commercial farmers. 
Consequently, this lack of social relations is manifested through individualised access to such resources 
as labour, assets and contracts. Collective action observed in Mazowe was thus driven by institutional 
formations operating in the area, such as contractors and extension officers. Bessant and Muringai 
(1993) report that even the communal areas responded to markets through more individualistic efforts.  
Before the land reform, farmers organised themselves in groups, a notable group being that of Burley 
tobacco producers. The Burley tobacco farmers were coordinated by the now defunct Burley Marketing 
Zimbabwe. The company organised field work, brought farmers together, and bought tobacco from the 
farm-gate. This relationship resulted in farmers contributing to the construction of the auction floor in 
Harare as shareholders. A farmer who produced Burley tobacco recalled how they organised themselves 
in the 1990s: 
We formed groups of about twenty Burley farmers and every season we would have specialists 
from Burley Marketing Association teaching us about tobacco production, from the farm to 
packaging. At first, they would come and buy the tobacco as soon as it had dried. Our crop was 
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almost uniform because we used the same inputs, and everything was organised (Interview 
September 11, 2017). 
As Bratton (1986) observed, farmer organisations formed to gain information and market access, which 
was the main motivation for the Burley producer. Another form of collective action reported by Bessant 
(1992) are the work parties in Mazowe. During work parties, farmers shared use of assets, such as cattle-
drawn ploughs during tilling, hoeing labour and scotch carts. However, this waned over time, as people 
became more individualistic with the development of capitalist markets in Mazowe. The organisation 
of peasant farmers was generally at the instigation of government, either for resource provisioning or 
marketing purposes, which was done through extension officers with the support of non-governmental 
organisations. One farmer did not see the benefit of joining such organisation, he commented: 
It is of no use joining a group; politicians lie, and their promises come to nothing. In the past, 
NGOs would organise us and we knew we were going to get something. (Interview November 
18, 2017). 
In the survey, 95% of tobacco farmers reported that they did not belong to any farmer organization; 
however, farmers were involved in various activity-based groups, such as seedbed demonstration plots, 
field days and rocket barn construction as reported in Chapter 8. However, interviews with farmers at 
these plots indicated that it all ended with activity at hand, and never extended to other farming 
activities. Bratton (1994) referred to such farmer organisation as voluntary associations. The tobacco 
crop did not attract much support from non-governmental organisations and hence, they did not organise 
farmers into groups. In A1 farms, civic organisations did not participate or offer support because of the 
contested nature of the land.  
The Mazowe community generally needed some nudging for them to work as an association, suggesting 
heightened contestation for resources. This reflects the model (Figure 2-1) described in Chapter 2 where 
benefits are only accessed by expending/transferring benefits to those who hold resources. However, 
this is negotiated through prevailing social networks and long-held social relations based on social 
identity and status in society (Agrawal 1996) 
7.7 The Emergence of Agribusiness Capital in Mazowe 
Contract farming in Mazowe is a recent phenomenon. Literature shows that it started at Negomo 
irrigation scheme in 1994, when Selby contracted farmers to produce vegetables for its export market. 
This is even though agribusiness-state capital injection into smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe through 
contract farming arrangements dates to the 1950s (Jackson and Cheater 1994). In 1996, the completion 
of Negomo Dam resulted in 296 smallholder farmers, each on 1.2 hectares, producing under contract 
for the export market. This project was supported by German donor funds and the Zimbabwe 
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government. However, the FTLRP resulted in the withdrawal of the Germany donors and the collapse 
of the contracting arrangement at the same time as funding for tobacco through commercial banks dried-
up. There have been few contracting activities in Mazowe; first, before the FTLRP, large farmers 
financed their operations through bank finance using land as collateral and, after the land reform, donor 
communities did not support activities in resettled areas. However, marketing contracts for flowers and 
other horticultural produce were reported in farms closer to Harare; Matondi (2013)’s study in Mazowe 
and Goromonzi reports a very limited number of women involved in horticultural contracts. In Mazowe, 
contract farming has been associated with donor-assisted projects, and tobacco was one initiative fully 
funded by the private sector in the area. Consequently, farmers in Mazowe had no experience dealing 
with agribusiness as contractors, having been accustomed to spot markets for trading their agricultural 
produce. The massive growth of tobacco contracts was therefore a learning experience, which is still 
ongoing. 
Until 2000 and the start of the FTLRP, tobacco was produced and marketed under different financing 
conditions through private banks. In 2004, tobacco was produced under contract following the collapse 
of supplies of flavour flue-cured Virginia tobacco to oligopsony buyer markets and new emerging 
markets, such as China, though on limited scales. The CFU representative observed that “…it was a 
business deal to bring the product to the market” (Interview September 24, 2017). BAT and TRIBAC 
led the way in facilitating tobacco contracting. Recent work in Mvurwi has shown how capital has 
transformed the agrarian landscape (Scoones et al. 2018; Sukume et al. 2015). This study builds on such 
work, focusing on the effects of capital on A1 and communal smallholder communities, which are 
similar in terms of mode of production and livelihood strategies. Recent events point to government-
supported tobacco contract farming through its command agriculture brand. 
Tobacco contract farming started in 2004 on a very limited scale and was concentrated in the Mvurwi 
area, where most of the tobacco was traditionally grown. After signing a memorandum of understanding 
with TIMB, contracting firms set up their operations in targeted areas. In Mazowe, contracting firms 
reported approaching the District Administrator and then local councillor, where they introduced the 
agribusiness extension officer, who would coordinate the recruitment of farmers in the area. Several 
contracting firms operate within the same area, contracting communal and A1 farmers. 
7.8  Implications for Contract Farming Arrangements 
As discussed in Chapter 2, land is one of the important considerations for firms that want to maximise 
profits using the best land and agro-conditions prevailing. This brings into question competing land use 
regimes, with contract farming critics arguing the best land used by locals for food production is 
diverted to cash crops, an issue discussed in Chapter 9. For instance, Scoones et al. (2018) observed 
that tobacco production has reduced the amount of staple food production in Mazowe with obvious 
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consequences for food security. Inasmuch as the geographic conditions are the same, land size 
differentials between FTLRP beneficiaries and communal areas affect land allocation to tobacco 
production and the probability of a farmer being offered a contract. This also affects tobacco farmers’ 
access to other productive resources, such as labour; for a resourced farmer access to labour through 
contracts would not be an issue given a pool of experienced farm labour in Mazowe (Scoones et al. 
2018). However, for farmers, who fail to access contract farming arrangements, weak institutions in 
Mazowe might affect their access to production-enhancing institutions, such as extension services and 
farmer associations that could potentially help organise services. 
The land differentials between A1 and communal areas discussed in this chapter consequently affect 
access to contracts and economic opportunities. As a result, the effects of contract farming within 
Mazowe reflect the differences in productive resource holdings of farmers aided by participation in 
contract farming arrangements discussed in Chapters 8 and 9. 
7.9 Mazowe Farmers’ Participation in Tobacco Contract Farming 
In chapter 6 it was shown that tobacco produced under contract was increasing, though with mixed 
outcomes, due to varied contract terms offered by contractors. This section discusses contracting terms 
offered to farmers and how farmers perceive these terms. As discussed in Chapter 2, contracting terms 
are influenced by “bundle of powers” held by the actors, which, in turn, affect acceptance or rejection 
of contracts by the farmers and subsequent household and community effects. This section demonstrates 
the power dynamics and processes behind the designing of contracts and contracting terms. Resources 
were provided to farmers under the centralised model, though with differential access by different 
categories of farmers. It was observed that the contracting terms favoured contractors, and among 
farmers, the asset-rich were more likely to be selected for the contract farming arrangement. However, 
contract terms that provided staple food inputs resulted in increased supply of food, which had positive 
community nutritional effects (see Chapter 8 for a detailed discussion). Power imbalances were 
observed between contractors and farmers, as well as within the farmer class, in negotiating and 
accessing contracts. As shown in the model developed in Chapter 2, this involved the flow of benefits 
from farmers to other actors as the farmers tried to maintain access to contracts. Simmons, Winters, and 
Patrick (2005) emphasise the importance of understanding contract terms and design, which, in a way, 
determines the selection and participation of farmers in these arrangements. This section shows that the 
contracts offered to farmers were unfair, but farmers accepted the contracts because they had no 
alternative sources of credit or productive resources to grow tobacco. 
7.9.1 Contract Terms 
All contracting firms operating in Mazowe used the centralised model. Farmers are offered individual 
one-year renewable contracts, which are resource providing. By this is meant that the contract provides 
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seedlings, fertilisers, chemicals, curing energy, extension services and, at times, cash advances for 
labour, which are deducted at the point of sale. The farmer largely determines his production protocols 
after receiving the inputs. This is contrary to Shonhe (2017)’s observation in Wedza, where some 
contractors were fully in control of farm operations, a difference which could be explained by Goodhue 
and Simon (2016)’s consideration of basic and restrictive types of contracts discussed in Chapter 2. 
Interviews with farmers showed that they determine when to nurse tobacco seedlings, transplant, weed, 
harvest and cure their tobacco, with the extension officer providing advice where necessary, which 
showed a tilt towards a basic contract. Swain (2012:174) provides a description of a typical gherkin 
crop restrictive contract, where the firm was in control from “…the stage of seed planting to crop 
harvesting” with standard operational guide lines, which also included extension teams carrying out 
some tasks and record keeping by farmers. Farmers in Mazowe had no records of their crop regime, 
neither was the monitoring by the extension officer as intensive as in the gherkin crop; it was random 
and dependent on the farmer’s request. Such terms of a contract are important determinants of the final 
quality of the crop, as Goodhue and Simon (2016) observed that farmers on a restrictive contract 
performed better in terms of quality due to the intense extension services received. The opposite could 
be true about a basic contract where wide variation in product quality could be expected, as observed 
in Mazowe. The performance differentials could be partly due to farmers’ unobservable characteristics, 
such as skill- or resource-endowment in tobacco production, where initial investment in specific curing 
facilities is needed. This is more likely given that experience was a prerequisite for engagement into 
contract farming. 
The contractor, within the framework set by the regulator (TIMB), determines some contract terms, 
such as quality and prices. Prices are derived from prevailing international prices as reflected by the 
auction price. Contract enforcement and monitoring issues are not specified within the contract, with 
the contract appearing more like a symbolic reflection of the relationship binding the parties. Within 
the community, contractors provide resources to farmers depending on past performance, with asset 
and land holdings as the determining factors. Consequently, farmers have differential access to 
resources from the contractor, which affects their production outcomes. 
The contract is initiated by the contractor and offered to farmers, who either reject or accept and sign 
the contracts to participate in contract farming. This is the common practice observed in most contract 
farming arrangements regardless of which, however, the contract is biased in favour of the firm that 
designed the contract. This is similar to Swain (2012)’s observation in India. Contracts offered to A1 
and communal farmers are homogeneous, though differences can arise on the amount of inputs, cash 
and acreage contracted and the contractor contracting the farmers. The inputs and financial support 
provided are often not enough for the plot size contracted; an officer from one leading agribusiness 
indicated the quantity of inputs and financial support was dependant on the risk and capacity profile of 
the grower (Interview February 15, 2018). The differences also reflect the performance of the farmer, 
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where some high performers are upgraded, and the poor performers are downgraded [what Narayanan 
(2013) calls involuntary attrition] to accommodate the risk profile of the farmer. The contractor charges 
a mark-up to cover expenses, such as the transportation of inputs to a central point for collection by 
farmers and extension services.  
There is generally no transparency on how these costs are calculated and passed on to the farmer. The 
Zimbabwe Tobacco Association (ZTA) believes this lack of transparency compromises farmer viability, 
and hence, applauds agribusinesses that make cash transfers to farmers, who can then source inputs at 
competitive rates (ZTA 2011). However, in an interview with an officer of a farmer organisation, it was 
revealed that the organisation preferred a situation where farmers were consulted on their input needs, 
particularly with regard to how they were sourced and paid for (Interview 2017). Such arrangements 
are viewed as effective in improving farmer welfare where they supply to a monopsony or oligopsony, 
as in the case reported by Sivramkrishna and Jyotishi (2008). For instance, an association could 
negotiate the pricing of various inputs and services offered by the contractor, which could then be 
specified in the contract. Further, contract farmers did not know that extension services were charged 
for, neither did they know how the price of fertilisers, chemicals and coal were calculated. The 
contractor delivers inputs to a central point within the ward, where farmers collect their allocation as 
per their contract. The ZTA is of the belief that the services provided should be negotiated and agreed 
to by the contractor and farmer.  A former ZTA chairman observed: 
” …growers must have input into the decision-making process of which inputs are bought at 
what price and there must be total transparency between growers and companies on what 
handling fees/mark-up are being charged” (ZTA, 2017:4). 
Document analysis revealed that this lack of transparency resulted in a situation where the contractor’s 
inputs were priced at a premium for a half hectare, the expected cost is estimated at US$473 for inputs 
and yet the contractors charged anything in the region of US$850 plus, and farmers were not informed 
about how the costs were calculated. As a result, this reduced both the farmers’ income and growth 
potential. The middle farmers said they were tied to the contracting arrangement since they could not 
raise enough capital to self-finance future crops from profits, a position that the contractor exploited in 
this skewed contractual arrangement. 
While it seems prudent that the agribusiness avoids excessive risk exposure to the farmer, the flip side 
of the story is that it sets the farmer up to fail, as inadequate inputs also mean a low-quality crop. For 
instance, with no cash to pay for curing energy, labour, planting, harvesting and grading, all these 
become difficult, which often leads to differential growth of plants due to planting over long periods, 
and loss of leaves due to mismatch during harvest and curing. Furthermore, there is no clarity on the 
pricing of input and produce. All respondents to the survey indicated that the contract did not specify a 
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pricing model. Inputs were specified on the addendum to the contract and their deliveries were reported 
to be satisfactory. 
Despite these shortfalls, however, farmers accepted the contracts. In a survey of 109 respondents, 
farmers provided the reasons tabulated below (figure 7-2) for accepting the contract, which show that 
they went into contract farming for inputs and the premium price offered by the contractor. Further 
interrogation showed that farmers wanted assured supplies of inputs, given the horrific experiences of 
the inflationary years when inputs were difficult to obtain. Lending credence to the survey, a farmer 
said; “Getting inputs was a nightmare, and the contractor assured us with supply of inputs though they 
are expensive (Interview September25, 2017). While this seems to confirm findings on farmer 
participation in contracts (Abebe et al. 2013; Masakure and Henson 2005), the major push for accepting 
the contracts seems to be market failures compounded with deep mistrust and fear of a repeat of the 
hyperinflationary environment experienced after the FTLRP. This fear was confirmed after the 
surrogate currency lost value against the United States dollar, trading at US$ to 6 bond notes in October 
2018 contrary to the official position which put the two at par (Mhlanga et al. 2018 October). Willems 
(2014), using Zimbabwe Rural Households Dynamics Study, found that 50% of tobacco farmers used 
purchased seed while the others relied on gifts, a strong indicator why most farmers wanted to access 
inputs from contractors. On page  106, I also explained that other farmers exchanged their labour for 
inputs.  
The question is whether this is a viable option for smallholders with competing livelihood challenges. 
The contractor cost of eight bags of fertilizer and other chemical applications for a half-hectare crop 
and coal were estimated at US$850 to US$950 depending on contractor. However, retail prices of eight 
bags of fertiliser, chemicals and coal were estimated at US$600, which meant the contractor charged 
from 30% to almost 60% more for the services offered. This threatens farmer profitability and viability, 
as it increases indebtedness and reliance on the agribusiness. 
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Figure 7-2: Reasons for Participating in Contract Farming 
Source: Author’s survey data 
Survey results showed that all contracted farmers combined agribusiness finance and self-financing to 
see-through the production of their crop. This was caused by two things: first, the inadequacy of the 
package offered by contracting firms that excluded labour costs and/or other on-farm expenses, and 
secondly, the fact that farmers increased hectarage above the contracted level to a level they thought 
was an economically viable plot size for a tobacco crop. For instance, the capacity of a tobacco barn 
was the key determinant of economically viable tobacco plot. Tobacco barns observed in the study area 
were designed to cure tobacco from a one hectare plot. 
The contract terms described in this section were both inclusionary and exclusionary, in that, without 
the necessary resources prescribed by the contractor, farmers could not participate. Further, the majority 
who participated struggled to maintain their position in contract farming because of the inadequate 
supply of resources by the contractor, which they could not self-provide due to lack of capital. Yet, for 
for those with access to other or their own resources,  facilitated effective participation and sharing 
of the value generated. 
7.9.2 Competition among Contractors  
Contractors seek to attract the best farmers. Four contractors operate in the study area, and all offer 
standard services described above with differences in cash advances for labour, curing energy and input 
supply for staple crop production. Notably, Chinese firms offered higher prices and attracted the best 
farmers. According to Govereh, Jayne, and Nyoro (1999), this is because contractors hope to reap 
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benefits from the complementarity between food and cash crop production. The provisioning of inputs 
for food crops is meant to mitigate food security concerns of the farmer and is in proportion to the 
contracted acreage, these incentives help retain and attract good farmers, a point made by Goel (2014). 
Further, they have broader effects on supply of food within the community. These extra contract 
provisions have also seen farmers shift from one contractor to another and this has increased 
competition among contractors. For similar cases, see Swinnen, Sadler, and Vandeplas (2007), Swinnen 
and Maertens (2007) and Swinnen and Vandeplas (2007). The increased competition has been 
beneficial to the farmers in terms of input supplies (Swinnen and Vandeplas 2011) and technology 
transfer to both the cash and staple crops (Kuijpers and Swinnen 2016). One farmer who had a 
successful 2016/17 cropping season changed contractors “…to access more funding, for tobacco and 
food crop production” (Interview October 23, 2017).  
Contracts in Mazowe cater for production and incentivise farmers to produce tobacco by providing 
inputs and price premiums. This is important, as it provides start-up credit (in the form of working-
capital) for poor farmers to partake in tobacco production. Though the working capital is not adequate, 
it does provide some financial additionality (Moyo 2014) that complements the farmer’s own resources, 
as shown by contract farmers who extended their plots after going into contract farming. For example, 
a farmer at Thorncreek farm noted: 
I started with half a hectare of plot using my own resources, when I got into contract farming I 
extended to one hectare. I am happy I can sell at better rates compared to those at auction 
(Interview August 4, 2017). 
The provisioning of inputs is in line with other annual crop schemes, where farmers are provided with 
inputs, such as seeds, fertilisers and chemicals (Ton et al. 2017). This is a form of quality control in 
production as the use of the right inputs is perceived to provide the desired quality (Goodhue and Simon 
2016; Goodhue 1999). Contractors provide inputs for staple crops to support farmers’ food security; 
furthermore, to ensure that farmers use tobacco inputs for the contracted crop, thus dealing with the 
problem of diversion of inputs to other crops.  
A contractor in Harare indicated:  
We provide our farmers with enough inputs so that we are assured of a good quality crop. In 
addition, we provide them with fertilisers for their maize to ensure that they have enough food 
for the year to feed their family and workers. Tobacco work involves long hours, and this 
requires a full stomach (Interview November 22, 2017). 
Cockburn and Eaton (2013) report on crop diversification by tobacco contracting companies in Fiji and 
Indonesia. They argue such contracts are sustainable and welfare-enhancing with potential spillover 
effects to community. A similar package is reported for Malawi tobacco contract farmers by Shaba et 
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al. (2017). This is the same trend tobacco contractors in Mazowe seem to be adopting, in order to ensure 
increased staple food supply and food security for the farmers and the community.  
7.9.3 Enforcement of Contracts  
Contract enforcement is important for the reduction of holdups, the transfer of technology (Kuijpers 
and Swinnen 2016) and the overall success of the contract, as discussed in Chapter 2. The contract 
offered to farmers had no explicit enforcement mechanisms stipulated. Contract enforcement at the 
marketing stage of tobacco is a highly contested process, which the farmers believe is littered with 
corruption and biased against the farmers, who always lose against the contractor. A farmer noted, 
“Even if you complain nothing changes, its only small-small change in price’’ (Interview August 16, 
2017). This emanates from contested grades and classifications. TIMB is the enforcing agent at the 
floors; farmers follow appeal processes stipulated by TIMB, and the contractor becomes a passive 
principal. However, an independent arbitrator, as proposed by Larsen (2002) could improve contract 
enforcement.  
Contract enforcement is also important to minimise negative externalities that can harm society. Within 
the community the enforcement of good agricultural practices are of concern to local leadership and the 
community at large. For example, a headman complained: “They just come in my area and mess up 
everything. Their farmers don’t want to listen to us and just leave their fields uncleared’’ (Interview 
August 21, 2017). Interviews in the study area revealed that farmers were concerned about the uncleared 
tobacco stalks, the wanton cutting of trees and the pollution of shared water sources, which were blamed 
for environmental degradation and threats to livelihoods. The contract ignored the environmental and 
social effects of the production of tobacco in the community, a task that was taken up by community 
leadership, as this affected the community’s access to livelihood activities, such as access to firewood, 
clean water and agricultural related diseases in their fields. 
There was general apprehension in the way the contracts were designed, as farmers feared for the loss 
of their assets if repayments were not met. The contract empowered the contractor to attach assets as a 
form of closure to credit advanced, yet farmers felt that the weather and farm conditions should be taken 
into account before enforcement. However, in the study area, no attachments of assets were reported 
during the period of study. 
A day at Chief Negomo’s traditional court revealed the intricate roles that the court played in directing 
the use of resources and enforcement of social relations in the Mazowe district, however, there were no 
formal agreements involving the contracting firm and local leadership in modalities of enforcing of the 
primary contract’s consequential effects on the environment. Private enforcement emanates from 
contractual arrangements entered into by the contracted parties in their pursuit of the objectives of the 
primary contract. Other alternative contract enforcement processes noticed include the clearing of stalks 
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after harvest and the cutting of trees, which the government extension officers reported to local 
authorities for enforcement. 
As seen in this section, contract enforcement was also a deterrent to contract farming, particularly for 
the risk-averse farmers who feared losing their assets. These are the majority of farmers in the 
community. As a result, unfavourable contract terms could dilute positive community effects that are 
likely to accrue through participation in contract farming. This also reflects Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) 
argument that those who are not endowed with wealth and social relations (capital) would not be able 
to negotiate their way into contracts. This is clearly reflected in the discussion on factors that affect 
farmer participation in contracts in Chapter 9. 
7.10 Conclusion 
This chapter provided a synopsis of Mazowe, the case study area, and its physical and human 
geography. It was noted that the area is endowed with good soil, minerals and good weather, which are 
suitable for production of various cash and staple crops. Because of its good geography Mazowe 
attracted a diverse group of people who settled there for economic reasons. Contractors also seem to be 
attracted to the region by the good geography. The chapter also discussed infrastructure, natural 
resources management and enforcement by traditional courts, which are important in tobacco 
production.  
The Mazowe community derive their livelihood from land where they produce both their staple crop 
and cash crops to earn income. However, in communal areas, it was observed that land was in short 
supply and access was through the patriarchal route. The study described how the A1 farmers settled in 
Mazowe and their land holdings were formalised. In all this, access to land takes the form described by 
Ribot and Peluso in their access theory, where bundles of powers play an important part. For example, 
political connections and party affiliation were said to be very important in accessing land, in this case 
social relationships and political activism were key ‘bundles of powers’. 
Extension Officers are a key institution in Mazowe, which facilitates both agricultural production and 
rural livelihoods. Ad hoc farm-level institutions also form on demand, for instance, demonstration plots, 
field days and training groups emerge at various times of the year, yet farmers are not organised as a 
farmer organisation. These are important in nudging farmers to engage in collective action. The chapter 
concluded with the insertion of capital in Mazowe, which has shaped Mazowe’s agrarian and livelihood 
structure, which we discuss in the next three chapters. Participation of farmers in contract farming was 
heavily influenced by power imbalances, mainly deriving from resource endowments differentials. This 
resulted in differential household and community effects discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 8  
Effects of Contract Farming on Tobacco Production and on Mazowe 
Community 
8.0 Introduction 
This chapter identifies and explains the effects of farmers’ participation on household income and 
production, and effects on the Mazowe community. Winners and losers of the contracting arrangement 
were differentiated by initial resource endowments with the former using contract farming to build on 
their privileged positions while the latter with poor asset portfolios struggled to establish viable 
economic activities. According to Key and Runsten (1999:381), “…contract farming may also create 
positive multiplier effects for employment, infrastructure, and market development in the local 
economy”. Yet there is a possibility that it can harm other actors within the community (Little and Watts 
1994; Porter and Phillips-Howard 1997). Evidence from this case study shows that there were primary 
and secondary (multiplier) effects, for instance, primary effects on income and production, while 
secondary effects arose from investments by accumulators, which affected service provision and 
employment. Assured input supplies allowed resourced-contract farmers to relocate cash lump-sum 
earnings into investment in income-generating activities, while the poor invested in household 
consumables. As discussed in Chapter 2, community effects developed as actors extracted and 
appropriated value from each other and through spillover effects arising from networks and interaction 
of actors. This chapter focuses on contract farming outcomes and answers the following questions: 
 What are the effects of contract farming on tobacco farmers’ production and income? 
 How does income from tobacco contract farming affect household and community economic 
activities? 
This chapter shows that some contract farmers increased their production and income and diversified 
their income-generating activities, investing in agriculture and non-farm activities that created 
employment for the community. Some barely sustained production through the self-exploitation of 
household labour and perpetual indebtedness to the contractor, while losers exited and resorted to 
employment and miniature trading for survival. Further notable spillover effects were observed in 
technology transfer, food production and distribution systems. Both A1 contract and non-contract 
farmers outperformed their communal counterparts. This better performance by A1 farmers could be 
explained by access to land under the FTLRP. This chapter shows that the FTLRP was central to 
successful tobacco production and the performance outcomes of farmers once under contract.  
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8.1 Effects of Contract Farming on Tobacco Production  
This section argues that access to contract farming after farmers accessed land under the FTLRP allowed 
for improved productivity through the use of modern inputs in adequate proportions, expansion of area 
under production and quality improvement of the tobacco crop. This is borne out by the 66 percent of 
contract farmers, who ranked the contractor the highest source of finance, against 34 percent who said 
personal savings. This shows the importance of contract farming in the provision of capital for tobacco 
production after the FTLRP. Interviews revealed that some farmers who ranked the contractor highest 
had inadequate inputs, no alternative resources to finance tobacco production, thrived on the self-
exploitation of labour and were more likely to be exploited by the contractor, who benefited from the 
long hours (often not factored in production costs) the farmers put to generate surplus value. However, 
farmers were in contract farming for supplementary purchased inputs, while labour and curing energy 
were accessed through alternative channels. Access to resources that is, land, inputs, technology and 
extension services explain the different benefits accruing to farmers.  
8.1.1 Effects of Contract Farming on Plot under Tobacco: Output and Income  
After joining contract farming, farmers increased plots under tobacco by 54 percent, output by 95 
percent and income by 118 percent, while non-contract farmers increased marginally as shown in Table 
8-1. Most of these contract farmers were FTLRP beneficiaries. Higher productivity observed in FTLRP 
land is consistent with Zikhali (2010)’s finding in Mazowe that FTLRP farmers are more productive 
than communal because they used more fertilisers and hired labour (in this case provided by the 
contractor). Evidence from interviews suggests that farmers used the extra inputs and credit provided 
by the contractor to expand acreage and production, which had a positive effect on both output and 
quality, as reflected by the more than doubling of income. The study supplemented these descriptive 
statistics with a realist approach (see endnote 4) to establish causality, where, observations and life 
history with contract farmers revealed that contract farming was the reason for increased acreage and 
better performance of farmers.  
Table 8-1: Changes in Plot size, Output and Income after Adoption of Contract Farming 
 Type of Farmer Year 0 Year 1 2017 % change 
Size of plot in 
hectares 
Contract  0.84 1.14 1.30 54.00 
Non-contract 0.86 0.94 0.94 0.08 
Tobacco Output in 
Kilograms 
Contract  1 293.00 1 776.00 2 519.67 95.00 
Non-contract 1 000.16 1 063.55 1 328.87 32.88 
Tobacc Gross 
Income in US$ 
Contract  3 430.56 5 032.41 7 482.41 118.00 
Non-contract 2 723.39 2 803.23 3 787.26 39.00 
Notes: Year zero=first year of tobacco production; year 1 = year zero + average year before joining 
contract; 2017 is year of study 
Source: Author, compiled from Survey data 
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From this data, it can be argued that contract farming positively influences the quantity and quality of 
tobacco produced, given that non-contract farmers experienced minimal changes. Observable and 
unobservable factors have been known to cause selection bias in production outcomes of farmers. 
Though the study did not apply stochastic approaches to deal with selection bias, Chapter 9 will show 
that selection into contracts was non-random, and was based on relational consideration (status, identity 
and wealth) and hence could affect the outcomes of contract farming. However, as alluded to above 
observations and interviews with farmers confirmed that contract farming was the cause of the increased 
productivity. 
Communal farmers said that land size limited both the size of the plot under tobacco and the capacity 
to expand, while A1 farmers increased plot size because farmers had enough land and extra capital to 
invest in their operations. An A1 farmer said: “I have been in tobacco for many years, but my business 
was not growing though I had the land. I had no capital, so when I got into contract farming I took the 
opportunity to expand my tobacco plot” (Interview August 30, 2017). The farmer used the extra 
financial resources to extend the plot under tobacco, construct extra tobacco rocket barns, and build a 
grading shade and to buy a used car. It was also observed that those with resources constructed rocket 
barns resulting in the supply of a better-quality crop to the contractor. This result confirms the 
prescriptions of the access theory (Ribot and Peluso 2003) framework described in chapter 2. 
Figure 8-1 shows pictures of the traditional barn on the left and rocket barn on the right. The main 
difference is in efficiency and safety of the barns, for instance rocket barns use about 18m3 of wood and 
have higher energy conversion compared with 43m3 for the traditional barn, which gives an efficiency 
advantage to elite A1 contract farmers (Munanga et al. 2014). According to a TRB expert, the rocket 
barn maintains relatively constant temperatures, which results in even curing of the leaf and good 
quality as a result, compared to wide fluctuations from the traditional barn (Interview 27 November, 
2017). The rocket barn is expensive to erect, and a few resource-rich farmers afforded them. Hence, 
farmers cited financial challenges as the main reason for failing to construct modern energy-saving 
barns and sheds and they wished that the contractor could provide adequate finance to cover fixed costs. 
One farmer said: 
I wish the contractor could provide us with long-term loans to build rocket barns, sheds and 
other farm infrastructure. Banks will never give you such loans and, without this infrastructure, 
you cannot produce a quality leaf (Interview September 11, 2017). 
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Figure 8-1: Traditional barn (left) and Rocket barn (right) showing heat movement 
Source: ProBEC/GTZ (2006) 
An agronomist suggested that, for any parcel of tobacco produced by a farmer, they needed at least two 
tobacco barns, since tobacco was harvested every week during harvest time and curing take up to eight 
days. The curing, grading and classification of tobacco is a crucial step in readying the crop for the 
market, and at this stage, most farmers fall short 
On average, contract farmers had 1.05 curing barns compared to 0.51 for non-contract farmers, which 
was significant (F 1, 106) =8.722, p=.004) at 0.05 level of significance. Contract farmers had, on 
average, enough barns to cure tobacco from a one-hectare plot, though most were traditional barns. This 
helped to increase their income. However, for some, it was observed that the barns were not of the 
standard suggested by TRB and used considerable amounts of energy.  
Though descriptive statistics paint a glossed-over picture for contract farmers, interviews revealed that 
most contract farmers were undercapitalised. The middle farmers described in section 8.3.2 had  fewer 
and inefficient and inadequate traditional barns, which increased their operational cost and loss of 
tobacco leaf. As explained in page 96, section 6.4 leaf must be loaded in the barns delays in curing can 
Traditional Barn            Rocket Barn 
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lead to loss of the leaf and pure quality. However, due to data limitations the study could not ascertain 
the net loss of the leaf as farmers did not keep records. The further expansion of area under tobacco was 
accompanied by inadequate use of inputs, which affected quality for the middle farmers. Average 
income figures reflect the high contribution of resourced-farmers among the contract farmers.  
8.1.2 Effects of Contract Farming on Quantity of Tobacco Output 
This section presents results of variables that affect tobacco output. These factors are explained in 
section 9.1 starting from page 157 onwards. The study hypothesise that the quantity of tobacco sold 
(dependent variable) is positively affected by casual labour, extension services, plot under production, 
farmer status, gender, age, occupation, cattle, scotch carts, ox-drawn cart and barns. These variables are 
all needed in the production of tobacco. Tobacco production gives rise to the quantity of tobacco the 
farmer takes to the market. Both correlation (Table 8-2) and econometric model (Table 8-3) show that 
factors that affect participation in contract farming (farmer status), influence the output a farmer gets 
from his/her plot. 
Table 8-2:  Factors affecting Quantity of Tobacco Output   
 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
 Casual 
labour 
Extension 
services 
Plot 
under 
tobacco 
Farmer 
status 
Gender Age Occupation Cattle Scotch 
Cart 
Ox-
drawn 
cart 
Barns 
Quantity 
of tobacco 
sold 
Pearso
n 
correla
-tion 
0.492 0.294 0.571 -0.503 164 0.064 -0.398 0.304 0.455 0.375 0.189 
 Sig  
(2-
tailed) 
0.0001 0.008 0.0001 0.0001 0.143 0.568 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.001 0.091 
Source: Author from survey data 
The Model 
In this section, the study tested the model, 𝑌 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2  + 𝛽3𝑥3 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑛, where Y is the 
dependent variable (Quantity of tobacco sold) and the predictors represented by X are: tobacco contract 
and non-contract farmers, size of plot under tobacco, gender and age of respondent, number of casual 
labour, education level of household head, and farm assets. The study hypothesises that contract farming 
positively influences the predictors in the model thus increasing quantity of tobacco sold. The results 
of the Multiple Regression show a model based on these predictors could predict 78.7% (58.4% 
adjusted) of the variance in quantity of tobacco sold significantly better than zero [F(7, 76)= 17,631, 
p<.001]. Table 8-3 shows that the predictors, tobacco contract and non-contract (negative), size of 
plot under tobacco, number of casual labour, education level of household head and farm assets, 
significantly explained the variance in quantity of tobacco sold. The size of plot under tobacco had 
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the biggest positive effect, showing the importance of the quality and size of land in tobacco 
production, where rotation is important for soil fertility and maintenance over time.  
The results show that, given differential holdings of farm resource endowments, farmers’ benefits 
would vary, with substantial differences in quantity of tobacco sold. Qualitative data provide supporting 
evidence that these predictors influence production outcomes. For instance, farmers provided with cash 
advances to pay for labour reported timely planting, weeding, harvesting and grading, which allowed 
them to deliver a quality crop to the contractor. As discussed in the next sections, this allowed them to 
get better prices and income compared to non-contract farmers. Age and gender did not explain the 
variance occurring in tobacco production. 
Table 8-3: Multiple Regression Model Summary: Determinants of Tobacco Production Output 
 B Beta 
(β) 
R =787**                                
R-square  
=.619                                  
Adjusted 
R  =.584 
Tobacco contract 
non-contract 
farmers 
-625.751 -0.26 
Size of plot under 
tobacco 
596.971** 0.345 
Gender of 
respondent 
87.335 0.033 
Age of respondent -2.281 0.02 
Number of causal 
labour 
108.237** 0.312 
Education level of 
household head 
206.208* 0.177 
Farm assets 27.477* 0.201 
Intercept = 
153.270 
  *p ≤  .05; 
*p ≤  .001 
Source: Author from survey data 
The high adjusted R (58.4%) confirms the proposition that contract farming influence the productivity 
of initial asset endowments held by farmers and these were critical in the participation and performance 
of farmers under contract. For instance, in section 8.1.1, it was noted that access to land via the FTLRP 
allowed farmers to access contracts, expand production and earn more income than non-contract 
farmers. Farm assets and education significantly explain tobacco production. What is more revealing is 
that the size of plot under tobacco is also significant, showing the complementarity between contract 
farming and household asset holding in tobacco production. Farmers with both access to resources had 
bigger plots, more tobacco barns and farm assets which are significant in this model. Overall, the model 
shows that farmers’ asset endowments, such as access to land and household assets, complemented by 
contract farming resource provisioning, explain most of the tobacco output generated by farmers. This 
formed the basis of differential incomes discussed in the next section, which show the importance of 
contract farming. Interviews with farmers collaborated this, with both contract and non-contract saying 
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their production outcomes were determined by their asset holdings and access to contract farming. For 
example, a contract farmer said, “I bought my cattle from the proceeds of the land I got during 
‘Jambanja’ and this enabled me to get into contract farming. This boosted my tobacco production and 
family income.’ (Interview August 21, 2017). This shows the interdependence between land and capital 
provided by the contractors. Chapter 9 provides a detailed analysis of the effect of these predictors on 
farmer performance. 
8.2 Income Effect: a Comparative Analysis by Farmer Category  
Contract farmers earned more income from tobacco production than non-contract farmers, and also earn 
higher income from other cash crops and non-farm activities than all other groups. The ANOVA results 
show that the difference is significant at the 0.01 (p = .000) confidence level. However, there were wide 
income differentials observed within the groups, with a range of $24 500.00 for A1 contract farmers 
showing the intensity of the differentials within the groups, this differential is evident as shown on 
Table 8-4 below.  
Table 8-4:  Comparative Tobacco Income for Mazowe Farmers 
 Statistic A1 contract 
farmer ($) 
A1 non-contract 
farmer ($) 
Communal 
contract 
farmer ($) 
Communal 
non-contract 
farmer ($) 
ANOVA results 
Income 
from 
tobacco 
Mean 8 993.24  3 087.78  4 526.09   2 479.39  F(5,144) = 11,058, 
 p = .000 
SD 5 776.07  2 730.33  2 853.52  3 151.09  
Range 245 000.00  2 857.14  95 000.00  175 000.00  
Source: Author from survey data 
Furthermore, mean income shows that contract farmers with better initial asset endowments are better 
off than non-contract farmers, though farmers in A1 (contract) settlements outperform those in 
communal areas as shown in Table 8-4. Land and contract farming intervention are two observable 
differences among the farmers that could explain within and/or between group differences. For instance, 
contract farmers are differentiated by their access to land provided through the FTLRP, while, between 
contract and non-contract farmers’, contractor resources are the main difference. Yet there could be 
unobservable factors giving rise to income differentials. Between the A1 and communal areas, for 
example, land is the main source of income differential in that the FTLRP allowed contract farmers to 
build more assets compared to non-contract farmers. Table 8.4 showed that A1 farmers (contract and 
non-contract) had bigger plots, more land under tobacco production, and the difference in land holdings 
was statistically significant at the 0.01 (p=.000 confidence level. As discussed in section 8.1.1, contract 
farming provided additional financial resources that allowed resourced contract farmers to put more 
land under tobacco production, which increased their output and subsequent income. These differentials 
are shown in Figure 8-2, as more contract (both A1 and communal) earn more income in dollar terms. 
Further, the density curve shows the importance of access to land under FTLRP, as more A1 farmers 
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earned more income in their respective categories. This shows the importance of resources provided by 
the contractor, which also confirms observations in Mhondoro Ngezi and Mazowe, respectively, where 
resourced farmers outperformed the poor (Mkodongi 2013; Zikhali 2010) . The density curve in Figure 
8.2 shows that access to both contract farming and FTLRP plots resulted in superior income by A1 
contract farmers compared to all other groups of farmers. 
 
Figure 8-2: Comparison of Farmer Performance by Class and Location 
Source: Author, compiled from survey data 
Further histogram density curves in Figure 8-3 show that contract farmers outperformed non-contract. 
The differences in income observed among tobacco farmers could also be explained by the differential 
access to productive resources, as one A1-non-contract farmer noted:  
I don’t have enough inputs for my tobacco, and the quality is not of high standard. I wish I 
could get a contract like my neighbour so that I produce a similar crop and get better prices 
(Interview September 22, 2017). 
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Figure 8-3: Comparative Income of Contract/Non-contract Farmers in Each Income Bracket 
Source: Author, compiled from survey data 
Interviews with non-contract farmers showed that access to and use of inputs were sporadic and, at 
times, compromised by unexpected expenses faced by the family, resulting in low quality crop and 
income, as shown by the density curve in Figure 8-3. The better performing contract farmers had 
alternative sources of income, such as remittances, other cash crops and non-farm activities, which 
complemented contractor credit (see chapter 9). The finding is also in line with the observation that 
contractors favour resource-rich farmers, who go on to outperform the poor and discriminated-against 
non-contract farmers. 
The density graphs above show gross earnings of farmers. The cost of production for contract farmers 
is high. For instance, TRB (2011) estimates indicate that smallholder tobacco production cost is 
US$1404 per hectare, but contract farmers produce at US$2000.00 per hectare. If labour, maintenance 
and tillage costs are added, this figure increases to US$3500 to US$4000, approaching the commercial 
farmers’ production figure of US$5200 reported by TRB. Interviews showed that tobacco farmers, such 
as large-scale farmers, use almost the same production system as Large Scale farmers and hence, 
farmers earning below US$6000 struggle, given that, on average, contract farmers produce 1.3 hectares 
as shown in section 8.1.1. Above US$6000, interviews showed that farmers produced tobacco on two-
hectare plots, which pushes their expenses to +USD6000. In section 8.3.2, these farmers are described 
as middle-farmers, who are struggling to cope under contract. 
Non-tobacco farmers have more income from other crops and non-farm activities (though not 
statistically significant) than A1 and communal non-contract farmers, showing the resource strain faced 
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by the non-contract tobacco farmers, as they spread their resources to the cash demanding tobacco crop. 
This shows that the ability to access and benefit from productive resources is critical. One possible 
explanation is that the personal resources of A1 non-contract farmers are concentrated in tobacco and 
maize production, and, unlike the communal groups, they do not participate in labour market or other 
resource-based activities, such as brick moulding, firewood sales and fishing. Also, the fact that they 
are relatively new within the Mazowe community might explain the lack of social capital required for 
tradables, which could be dominated by communal areas.  
The fact that farmers used personal savings, added cropping area to the contracted plot, and mixed sales 
(some including friends’ outputs) makes estimation of the causal effect of contract farming complex 
and difficult to control even for observable differences. As a result, I used correlations coupled with life 
history interviews and observations to assess the degree of association between tobacco income and 
variables that contract farming studies associate with income-effect. For instance, Miyata, Minot, and 
Hu (2009) controlled for labour, education, farm size and technical assistance, while Boughton et al. 
(2007) emphasised the importance of asset holdings as a strong correlate in contract farming. As shown 
on Appendix 2, assets are correlated with tobacco income showing that the farmer’s resource 
endowment and income diversification strategy are important contributory factors in increasing tobacco 
income. Contract farming, however, provides additional finance which allows for on-farm growth, as 
shown on Table 8-1. As discussed in section 8.5, contract farmers participate in high-value non-farm 
activities, which require substantial capital, such as passenger transport, and most are more educated 
and in formal employment, which provides them with extra resources for tobacco production. This is 
in line with Reardon, Crawford, and Kelly (1994:1175) observation that “…education also tends to be 
correlated with ability to mobilize capital through nonfarm activities.”  
Analysis of data from TIMB (2017) documents shows that 7 583 Mazowe tobacco farmers earned 
US$48 914 886 in 2017. Contract farmers contributed 84 percent of the earnings, which is in line with 
the data presented above. Sukume et al. (2015) observed a similar trend, where earnings of US48 937 
072, 72 percent were from contract farmers (Appendix 3). The increased cash in flows (Appendix 3) 
resulted in investment in various business activities, with community-wide effects manifesting through 
secondary effects in service and commodity markets. Further, tobacco income was received as lump 
sum cash payments, which resulted in increased, though differential, expenditure by contract and non-
contract farmers. As discussed in Chapter 5, tobacco is an important livelihood source for tobacco 
producing communities. The next section discusses how this manifested for different classes of Mazowe 
residents. 
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8.3 Farmers’ Investment and Livelihood Patterns: Accumulation and 
Diversification  
It was observed that contracted farmers were more likely to invest in high-value businesses than non-
contract farmers and farm workers. Cash lump sum earnings from tobacco and other economic activities 
determined farmers’ diversification strategies.  This finding is in line with Scoones et al. (2018) for 
Mvurwi, however, including communal farmers in the analysis strengthens the argument that the 
FTLRP is indeed the main driver of such accumulation. As in Scoones et al. (2018) in Mvurwi, and 
Mkodzongi (2013) in Mhondoro Ngezi, and Buch‐ Hansen and Marcussen (1982) in Kenya, three 
similar categories of farmers (described below) were observed in Mazowe, namely:  
 Accumulators: prospective capitalists  
 Middle farmers: challenges coping under contract  
 Poor peasants, capitalist misfits, struggling to survive 
8.3.1  Accumulators: a Case of Successful Capitalist Integration  
Accumulators, or aspiring capitalists, were farmers who earned surplus income above US$3500 
production costs for contract farmers as a whole. This income came from employment, other cash crops 
and tobacco contracting. Most of them were FTLRP beneficiaries, and involved in multiple agricultural 
and non-farm activities (see Appendix 5 for a typical case), which qualifies them as capitalist (Korovkin 
1992) or rich peasants (Mkodzongi 2013). Income per hectare from their contracting activities (mean 
of US$4 526.09) showed profits well above the TRB tobacco production budget of US$1 408 per 
hectare. However as seen in section 8.2 this figure was over US$3 500 for contract farmers. They also 
received favourable tobacco contracts (see section 7.9), which provided inputs, cash advances for labour 
and contract on bigger plots. This group relied on hired labour and some had permanent employees 
attending to off-season operations, such as land preparation and stalk clearing, in preparation for the 
planting season. The group also produced other cash crops, such as maize, using staple food inputs 
provided by contractors. For some, the six-hectare plot was not enough and they rented land within the 
A1 farming community; a few communal farmers did the same. The favourable contract terms allowed 
these farmers the freedom to exercise their entrepreneurial abilities using the high income, particularly 
in the form of cash lump sums after tobacco sales (shown in section 9.2). The lump sum cash payments 
were invested in income-generating assets and cost-reducing farm consumables described below. Non-
contract farmers with no alternative sources of inputs bought farm-consumables, such as fertilisers and 
chemicals, for the coming season. Contract farming provided credit, which resulted in differential 
investment and expenditure among contracted and between contract and non-contract farmers. For 
instance, some contract farmers used chemicals to clear weeds, saving on hoeing-labour. A farmer 
commented on his operation thus:  
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I operate my plot commercially. I apply labour saving chemicals instead of hoeing. This has 
helped release labour to more demanding operations, and my income has more than doubled 
since I joined contract farming. I managed to invest in the popping machine, farm equipment 
and my children are in boarding schools (Interview September 19, 2017).  
This group sends their children to boarding schools with better quality education and where fees are 
US$2000 plus per annum, helping build human capital for the community. As shown in Table 8-5 
contract farmers have the capacity to send their children to expensive schools and higher institutions of 
learning. One contract farmer said: “My tobacco income enabled me to send my son to a university in 
South Africa” (Interview September 23, 2017). A1 households had both high household size and 
dependents. The big household was a source of family labour. 
Table 8-5: Household Size and Expenditure on Education 
 Statistic A1 
contract 
farmer 
A1 non-
contract 
farmer 
Former 
farm 
worker 
Communal 
contract 
farmer 
Communal 
non-
contract 
farmer 
Non-
tobacco 
farmer 
ANOVA 
results 
Household 
Expenditure 
on 
Education 
Mean 
(US$) 
2085.86 519.12 17.72 1562.57 400.91 177.5 F (5,25) 
=2,721,  
p= .043 SD 
(US$) 
2072.88 854.92 45.9 1776.55 1061.32 179.13 
Dependent 
members of 
household 
Mean 2.76 2.06 1.17 2.65 2.18 1.81 F(6, 142) = 
2.640, p =019 SD 1.75 1.6 1.11 1.9 1.51 1.62 
Household 
size 
Mean 6.38 6.18 3.17 6.35 5.12 4.55 F (6, 143) = 
5.999   
p =.000 
SD 2.43 3.21 1.7 1.97 1.82 1.87 
Source: Author, compiled from survey data 
In wards 10 and 15, some contract farmers contributed US$6 000.00 to buy an electricity transformer 
which they said was important for curing tobacco. This, they said, would save on firewood, which was 
becoming difficult to get. A connected farmer said: 
We teamed up with fellow farmers and contributed towards the purchase of the transformer and 
we were connected. Anyone who wants to connect to the grid must now pay US$6 000.00 
(Interview July 19, 2017).  
However, the elite benefited at the expense of the poor, as illustrated by a resident who felt cheated by 
community leaders and noted:  
We contributed five dollars at the start of this project, bought poles and wires, but the cost kept 
going up and now they don’t have the decency to reimburse our contributions. Some of us will 
never raise the money they want (Interview July 19, 2017). 
The project was conceived for the whole community and the grid was intended to pass through most 
households, however, households who could not afford the transformer fee were not connected. 
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These businesses were also employing more labour and serving the community, for instance, haulage 
and traction services, and passenger transport added to the community’s welfare. Survey results showed 
that some contract farmers acquired high-value assets, such as tractors and haulage trucks, transport 
business and had generally diversified their income-generation activities beyond agriculture to non-
farm activities. Figure 8-4 below shows investment in productive assets and business ownership by 
farmer category. Investment in tractors and haulage trucks, while they were complementary business 
activities to tobacco growing, also showed the differential capital intensification and diversity of earning 
potential of tobacco producers. These assets also earned the farmer extra income through hiring out 
tractors for tillage and transport of farm produce within the farm. Haulage trucks, for example, are 
hired-out to transport tobacco to the auction floors serving both contract and non-contract farmers. They 
also transport other cash crops, serving those producers. It was also observed that most routes were well 
served by eight to 18-seater commuter minibuses. The address details on the vehicles and conversations 
with drivers revealed that the vehicles were locally registered and owned by tobacco farmers. When I 
inquired about a taxi to Ndire at Gweshe Business Center, one tout shouted, “Get in this successful 
farmer’s taxi; it will take you to your door-step because he is a local” (Interview July 19, 2017). Later, 
a conversation with the driver revealed that the owner was a contract farmer who owned five 18-seater 
taxis and two 8-seaters, the latter plying the short route from Ndire to Gweshe; the 18-seater taxies, 
plying the Harare route because there was need for a licence (Interview July 15, 2017).  
Interviews with some contract farmers showed that they exhibit capitalist accumulation tendencies for 
more surplus through investing in diversified portfolios (Patnaik 1971). In wards 32 and 15, for 
example, a maize popping machine and freeze-it (soft drink) making machine owned by a contract 
farmer were producing snacks. The community brought their maize, which was popped at a cost of 
US$2.00 per 20-kilogram bucket thus providing snacks for learners. A woman who had just completed 
popping her maize indicated that a twenty-kilogram bucket was enough for her three children for the 
month. 
These business endeavors had beneficial effects to the community, such as increased employment, 
incomes from which had further spillover effects to downstream industries. The proprietors of these 
businesses were contract farmers operating in A1 settlements where they operated at workshops left 
behind by the former commercial farmer. The popping machine operator explained: “I started this 
business after realising there was demand from local students, and maize was in abundance from FTLRP 
beneficiaries at a reasonable price, so I decided to rent the workshop from the Committee of Seven” 
(Interview July 21, 2017). The farmer explained that he bought the machinery after getting a lump sum 
payment from the contractor and he decided to invest it in an income-generating project since he was 
assured of inputs from the contractor. The farmer had adequate farm implements, sheds and barns, 
which were financed from his maize crop after he moved to the A1-scheme.  
138 
 
Figure 8-4: Non-Farm Investments by Class 
Source: Author from survey data 
It is evident from the discussion above that income from tobacco contract farming was central to the 
farmers’ investment patterns. The above stratum of farmers represents a small percentage who were 
doing well and investing in high-value activities, compared to the majority who earned only enough to 
reproduce the household. These farmers as per access theory, because of their high income and land, 
had control over labour  and which allowed them to benefit from contract farming.  I discuss this group 
next.   
8.3.2 Middle Farmers: Not all Contract Farming Participants Benefit  
For most contract farmers, contract farming had minimal effects on their agricultural activities and 
livelihoods. These farmers were just breaking even. These farmers were characterised by a low asset-
base and received inadequate inputs from the contractor that negatively affected their farming 
operations. This is the group Yeros (2018) said was dependent on the contractor because of high 
opportunity costs of diversification. In Mhondoro Ngezi under the FTLRP, Mkodzongi (2013) noted 
that this group could not fully develop their plots, a scenario observed in Mazowe. Compared to the 
elites described above, this group of farmers was not coping under contract farming but hung on in 
contracts because they did not have alternative access to productive resources and had low initial asset 
holdings, which compromised investment in productive assets (see Tindo life history on appendix 6). 
They received small lump sum payments after sales, as most of their income covered their debts with 
the contractor and workers accrued during the farming services. Whatever remained was used to buy 
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manufactured foodstuffs, which were often bought in bulk. In Figure 8-4, they constitute the bulk of 
farmers with no investments.  
Like all tobacco farmers, these farmers employed casual labour, which was strongly supplemented with 
family labour, who worked for long hours in the fields to complete tobacco production tasks. For most 
of the tasks, such as tobacco curing, the farmer used family labour. This group includes farmers 
contracted on half-hectare plots and are provided with inputs, but which exclude cash advances for 
labour. As a result, they finance part of the contracted crop. Like the above group, some are provided 
inputs for the staple crop; however, their labour resources are stretched as they need labour for the 
intricate tobacco procedure describe in Chapter 6 in addition to hoeing for the staple crop. As a result, 
to complete the tasks, the household works long hours, thus self-exploiting family labour.  
The farmers hang on to contract farming for guaranteed inputs and credit despite mounting debt and 
overpriced inputs. Further, the farmers were tied to contracts by asset-specific investments, such as 
tobacco barns, from which they hoped to get a return through the premium price paid by the contractor. 
However, the premium price was often below the interest charged on the credit advanced because of 
the stringent quality requirements applied by the contractor. To survive under contract, some farmers 
resorted to side-marketing to evade debt repayment, access better prices and manage price fluctuation 
risks. A household head said: ‘My wife and son both have grower numbers. If I have too many 
deductions, I sell through my son at the auction or another contractor. At worst I sell through friends, if 
I suspect the extension officer can pick on us.” (Interview 29 August, 2017). Farmers colluded with 
peers and middlemen, popularly referred to as makoronyera, in order to get a better price more often 
from the contractor. This was also observed by Sakata (2018) in Mashonaland East, Zimbabwe.  
Among this group are non-contract farmers, financing their tobacco from personal resources. Unlike 
the accumulators, this group spends less on education and their children attend local government 
schools where fees are around US$50 and US$150 per annum for primary and secondary schools 
respectively. However, these households live from hand-to-mouth, invest in low value microenterprises, 
and at times, sell their labour when they have unexpected expenses. Vicol (2015) referred to such 
farmers as the middle farmers, who could be said to have an income elasticity closer to 1 if we apply 
Nieuwoudt and Vink (1989) surplus-deficit farmer categorisation in southern Africa. Their major source 
of livelihood is agriculture; however, they generate very little surplus to embark on investment outside 
agriculture and their consumption pattern is biased towards normal goods.  
Most of these households rely on natural resources for their income-earning activities. For instance, a 
contract farmer said: “For curing tobacco, I use firewood. Even though the contractor provides coal, my 
barn is not suitable” (Interview November 10, 2017). Other households also traded firewood, local in-
season naturally occurring fruits such as sugarplum, mushrooms and honey that were traded in 
surrounding urban centres and in Harare. They also traded farm produce, such as groundnuts, sweet 
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potatoes and roundnuts, in markets in Harare, such as Mbare Msika. All this supplement their incomes 
and supports their agricultural activities. A builder was optimistic about contracting activities in the 
area and shared the source of his joy: “This year is ending well. I got several contracts to build rocket 
barns because the contractor said it will only recruit farmers with such barns” (Interview November 10, 
2017). Some in this group are involved in artisan work, crafts that require little working capital and are 
often carried out by individuals. Some of these activities were financed through microfinance activities 
undertaken by women, such as savings and lending schemes, which had too little capital to finance 
high-capital projects. These farmers lacked alternative sources of finance, which constrained their 
livelihood diversification activities, and hence, invested in reproducing the family from their 
agricultural services. Investments were tailored to maintaining their status quo in contract farming, and 
those, who aspired to enter, invested to meet the selection process, a negotiation strategy (Ribot and 
Peluso 2003). This group relied on social relationships to access labour, some productive assets and 
better prices from the market. However, this group was beneficial to the community as it also assured 
a proportion of employment for the poorer members of the community not involved in tobacco 
production.  
8.3.3 Poor Peasants Languishing in Poverty: Capitalist Misfits 
Farm workers and young households in communal areas dominate the poor peasant group (see Mr 
Banda case Appendix 7) group. They own few assets (for instance data show that most of them have 
no cattle or scotch carts), have no draught power for reproducing the household, send their children to 
public schools but often pay in kind either by offering their labour to the school, or maize, which is 
accepted as a form of payment by most schools in the area. While they produce their staple crops, it is 
not enough to last the whole year and they must sell their labour to the well-off farmers to survive. The 
group neither has adequate land to produce cash crops nor finance to acquire the necessary assets 
required to access contract farming. These are the households Nieuwoudt and Vink (1989) referred to 
as “deficit” producers. They also dominate the miniature microenterprises, such as vegetable vending, 
firewood sales, fishing, beer-brewing and brick-making. The group rarely receives any lump sum 
payments from their trade, nor do they have sustainable remittances. In contract farming arrangements, 
this group offers labour services to contracted farmers; however, contract farming studies often neglect 
them. A woman in Ndire reported making about US$25 a month from beer sales, she said:  
My husband died three years ago from AIDS and life has never been the same. I withdrew the 
children from school because I cannot afford to pay from the US$25 I make from brewing beer. 
We are not even able to produce anything from the plot, which has been lying idle since my 
husband’s death (Interview July 20, 2017. 
Her elder son works for an A1 contract farmer, where she claimed, he earns US$50 per month with an 
allowance of maize, which his family uses for food. Some work even for used clothing. The plight of 
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this woman confirms the importance of complementary resources in agricultural production. Again, the 
group is heterogeneous, with some working themselves out of poverty. Through barter transactions 
some managed to produce tobacco, which they sold through other farmers’ grower numbers. In Chapter 
9 the study reports on farmers selling their labour for tobacco seedlings and other farming inputs, which 
brought these farmers into the agro-markets. 
The high traffic flows attracted roadside businesses, such as roasted mealies (from Negomo Irrigation 
Scheme), tomatoes, fruits (mainly oranges from Mazoe citrus sales) and nuts, among other edibles, 
which could be sold in their raw state or easily prepared by the road side. This created opportunities for 
the less-resourced members of the community to establish microenterprises. Young men made a living 
as touts, organising commuters at taxi ranks. It was evident that they benefited from the offshoots of 
accumulators’ investment, though they could barely save. This group earned income from contract 
farming as suppliers of labour; though agricultural wages are inelastic, provision of maize as part of a 
barter exchange guaranteed them adequate food supplies. In chapter 2, page 27-28 and figure 2.1, this 
is the group shown as the community which receives payments from tobacco farmers in exchange for 
their labour and other services. This stabilised their consumption through the thin seasons. According 
to Nieuwoudt and Vink (1989), increased income from agriculture is associated with an increase in 
demand for labour, and hence, the increased cash inflows to Mazowe would have a positive effect on 
the employment prospects of these farmers.  
8.4 Community Effects of Contract Farming   
Community effects discussed in this section, arise when increased income leads to increased spending 
on various commodities and services that prompts increased investment in supply of the same, thus 
generating a virtuous cycle. As observed in Mazowe, this resulted in increased income, employment 
and diversification into other economic activities. This is important, given the interlinkage between cash 
crop and staple crops discussed by Govereh, Jayne, and Nyoro (1999). Contract farmers diversified 
their cropping and livestock production because of the additional credit from contractors allowing them 
to exploit these new markets.  
8.4.1 Farmers Benefited from Contract Farming Networks 
Non-contract tobacco farmers, workers and some members of the community benefited from spillover 
effects of contracting activities. For instance, contractors supplied seedlings in hectare-equivalent 
packets and farmers, who planted half-hectare plots, exchanged the extra seedlings for labour, thus 
benefiting poor farmers, who could otherwise not access the inputs. Further, 97.8 pecent of the farmers 
shared knowledge about best farming practices while attending demonstration plots, which were open 
to all members of the community as discussed in the next section. Descriptive statistics also show that 
farmers shared equipment, like scotch quarts, ploughs and sheds, and this was confirmed by 97.3 percent 
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of the respondents. The popular way  of sharing was in form of pooling resources (62.5 per cent) among 
the less resourced farmers. A farmer had this to say, “I and my friend each have a cow each, so we work 
together to plough the fields, we also share tobacco barns because we do not have enough” (Interview, 
29 July 2017). Forty percent of the contract farmers said they helped others who worked for them, one 
farmer said some of his workers borrowed his equipment like ploughs or even cows. This was however, 
in exchange for labour service.  Through social ties, farmers also assisted each other to market their 
tobacco through side-marketing, as described above. Side marketing was practiced by 93 percent of the 
farmers, though in most cases better-off farmers were the major beneficiaries. These farmers also 
indicated that they pooled resources in transporting tobacco to the market.However, to the farmers this 
provided an access channel to sell their tobacco at the best price, which benefited farmers who would 
otherwise not have access to contractors. In most cases these were non-contract farmers selling through 
contracted farmers where the prices were at a premium. For instance, survey data showed that farmers 
sold their tobacco to the best paying floor.  
8.4.2 Effects of Contract Farming on Technology Adoption and Transfer by 
Smallholders  
Technology transfer took various forms, such as moving to rocket barns, moving from seedbed nurseries 
to float trays, use of modern inputs and the use of less harmful fertilisers, access to which all foster 
‘Good Agricultural Practice26’ (GAP). In ward 10, the researcher observed farmers being trained in 
rocket barn construction, a demonstration that was funded by the contracting firm. This also involved 
training builders on how the barn was constructed, the materials required and how it was fired. Building 
skills learnt from barn construction are transferable. Farmers also learnt how tobacco leaves were to be 
hung in the barn. The demonstration was open for both contract and non-contract farmers.  
At Thorncreek, contract and non-contract farmers attended a float-tray seedbed technology 
demonstration sponsored and arranged by the contractor. The extension officer had this to say:  
In a community, it’s difficult to exclude people who just walk in when doing such training, but 
for me it’s important because it increases the pool of potential farmers I can recruit as contract 
farmers without the need to retrain them. We brought TRB so that our farmers can learn the 
best practices in nursery management, a quality crop begins here (Interview September 12, 
2017). 
The lead farmer in the demonstration plot indicated that he would share the seedlings with some of the 
farmers who helped with the watering of the seedbed and were going to help with the transplanting, 
thus further transferring technology use. Neighbours learned from each other and through experience 
as they nursed, planted, harvested and cured their tobacco. Farmers were hesitant to change their 
production system partly because of the cost involved in setting-up the new system. The rocket barn 
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costs more than US$1 200 to construct, while the float tray needed US$357 to set up. For example, a 
contracted farmer highlighted financial constraint as the major limitation and saying: ‘It is good to have 
these new barns and float trays, but some of us can simply not afford them without credit” (Interview 
September 22, 2017). 
By providing modern inputs, contract farming fills an input supply gap in tobacco, which was observed 
to be around 50 percent by Willems (2014) in a study based on Zimbabwean Rural Households 
Dynamics Study (ZRHDS) collected from 1993 to 1997. The middle farmers, while exposed to the new 
technology, could not adopt it due to resource constraints and hence most continued to rely on the 
inefficient traditional barns and seed-beds. Consequently, the poor initial resource endowments of 
middle-farmers meant that they could not finance and adopt the new technology, while elite resourced-
farmers were able to adopt and benefit from it. 
8.4.3 Increased Food Production and Food Security  
Contract farming had positive effects on food crop production and distribution, which contributed to 
food security in Mazowe. It was observed that contract farming had positive spillover effects on staple 
crop production through the provision of staple food inputs, cash advances for labour and extension 
services to farmers who were encouraged to do crop rotation. Further, maize yields increased due to 
residual fertiliser remaining in the soil during crop rotation. Use of fertilisers increases output, as 
observed by Zikhali (2010) for FLRP beneficiaries in Mazowe. The increased food production enhanced 
food security through improved food availability, access, stability and utilization. Also, food-for-work 
exchanges and wage-employment from contractors ensured food access by the poor.  
In this study, food security concerns were addressed on two fronts, through provisioning of staple crop 
inputs, and putting a bigger parcel of the plot under staple food and other consumable crops, as reported 
earlier. Some contractors made conscious decisions to support the food security of their contracted 
farmers, which had spillover effects to landless people who could not produce their own food. Further, 
the price of a bucket of maize remained stable at US$3, which was cheaper than buying processed maize 
meal which was three times this price. Contract farmers, who participated in this survey, had adequate 
stocks of maize and all indicated they had enough food to last until the next harvest, and some had 
enough surplus to trade in exchange for labour services. This increased the community’s ability to 
obtain food, which was readily available. However, this finding is contrary to Mazwi, Chambati, and 
Mutodi (2018)’s finding in the neighbouring districts of Zvimba and Goromonzi, where they found that 
contract farmers faced food security risks. 
Added to the adequate production of staple crops, increased income from contract farming (discussed 
in section 8.2) had positive secondary effects on the purchase of manufactured consumables. Most 
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contract-farmers reported stocking enough manufactured goods during the marketing season. A female 
contract farmer described her shopping habit:  
Lump sum cash from tobacco provides us with the cash we need to buy agricultural inputs and 
non-perishables like sugar, cooking oil, soap, tea leaves, and kapenta fish. In a good season we 
buy assets as well (Interview September 29, 2017   
She indicated that prices were now the same in Mazowe as Harare, though she preferred to buy from 
Harare where she could use her bank-card. Some wholesalers and traders set up shop at the auction 
floors during the marketing season; some agricultural suppliers rent space at the auction floors, while 
food stuff retailers sell from mobile trucks and trailers. The researcher observed farmers loading 
groceries and farm inputs for their journey back home.  
Since 2000, the land under tobacco production (nationally) has increased by 22 689 hectares (26.74%) 
(TIMB 2017). In Mazowe, Scoones et al. (2018:5) report that, before FTLRP, “…large-scale farms 
grew flue‐ cured tobacco on 8,157 hectares in Mazowe district”, which has since increased by 52 
percent to 12 362 hectares (TIMB 2017). This is due to advantageous climatic conditions, proximity to 
markets and high uptake by communal farmers, who were not producing the crop before. These good 
conditions resulted in above-national-average growth in grower numbers and area under tobacco in 
Mazowe. This did not dampen food production in Mazowe; contract farmers, who benefited from the 
FTLRP, had bigger plots and access to modern inputs from contractors, which more than compensated 
for land loss to tobacco. An A1 farmer remarked: “With more land, I am now able to plant more of 
every crop, but my tobacco gives me more income to finance the increased acreage in my staples and 
market gardening activities” (Interview November 15, 2017). This shows that farmers invested income 
from contract farming in staple crop production, a further sign of spillover effects of contract farming. 
All respondents indicated that they produced their own staple crops, on their own plots, rented plots or 
unallocated spaces in the hills or swamp areas. However, the adequacy of staple crop varied with size 
of plot cultivated. One of the major concerns about contract farming is that it compromises food security 
through mono-cropping and changes in the land tenure system in the contracted region (Baumann 
2000). This concern is given credence by the few studies linking food security and contract farming 
(Ton et al. 2017). Contracted farmers had, on average, less than 30% of their plots under tobacco 
production, and hence, the question of mono-cropping did not arise and was not a requirement by the 
contractor. As observed by Goldsmith (1985:1131), “…companies put a ceiling on contracted acreage, 
which allowed farmers to leave some of their land in food or other crops”. The ceiling in Mazowe was 
in the amount of inputs provided. 
However, among non-contract farmers the priority was farm inputs before buying of manufactured 
foodstuff, as indicated by one male-farmer, “I secure my inputs first. At times, the money is not enough, 
and we just buy what we can during the year. We work for some of these manufactures” (Interview 
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August 19, 2017). This differential was also observed among contract farmers, some of whom were just 
breaking-even, while others left the floors with very little. For example, a 24-year old farmer said:  
All my sales went towards covering my debt I only got US$100, yet people who worked for 
me are waiting for their payments. At least I will get inputs next year, and I hope I will get it 
right (Interview August 19, 2017). 
Food-deficient farmers catered for this through working for contract farmers to smooth their 
consumption during lean periods, another sign of spillover effects. On average it was observed that 
contracted farmers were more food secure and had surplus maize stock and enough manufactured food 
stuffs, such as sugar, flour, cooking oil, soap and tea to last the year. This looks plausible, given that 
contract farmers had access to supplementary staple crop inputs and higher incomes they could use to 
acquire more inputs.  
8.4.4 Labour Market Development  
Contract farming resulted in employment opportunities induced by spillover effects, creating a diverse 
labour market straddling farm and non-farm sectors, though agriculture remains the main employer in 
Mazowe. For example, Table 8-6 shows that contract farmers employed more people during the tobacco 
farming season than non-contract farmers. Interviewes reported that tobacco-related jobs were barn 
construction and maintenance (which is a seasonal activity) part-time construction jobs and driving 
haulage trucks. This has created opportunities for the community to generate income that supports most 
of their livelihoods outcomes. 
Table 8-6: Hiring of Labour by Class of Farmer 
 Statistic A1 
contract 
farmer 
A1 non-
contract 
farmer 
Former 
farm 
worker 
Communal 
contract 
farmer 
Communal 
non-
contract 
farmer 
Non-
tobacco 
farmer 
ANOVA 
results 
Permanent 
employees 
Mean 0.59 0.55 0 3.9 3.1 0.05 F (5,141) = 
2.155    
p = .001 
Casual 
labour 
Mean 5.27 2.83 0 4.3 0.24 0.42 F (5,144) = 
11.780   
 p = .000 
Source: Author, compiled from survey data 
Business people reported a high number of non-farm jobs in passenger transport, gold panning, and 
service sector jobs in shops and garages, particularly during peak periods. All of this was attributed to 
spillover effects of contract farming. For instance, interviewees indicated that, before the onset of 
contract farming, there were two buses plying the Mazowe route via communal areas. However, 
contract farmers invested in 18-seater taxis that employ many locals that now ply tarred and gravel 
roads in Mazowe. A business health inspector also had this to say: “The growth of contract farming has 
seen growth in the number of retail outlets being licensed. These include beauty salons, food outlets, 
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garages and general dealer shops” (Interview November 11, 2017). The availability of these services 
were confirmed by 92 percent of the respondents to a survey questionnaire, who however said the 
government and contractor had not provided any services to the community. A contractor was said to 
have bought school uniforms for a football team which was deemed not enough.The activities created 
employment in Mazowe. 
On average, casual workers earned three dollars for a day’s work, reaching sixty to ninety dollars per 
month, depending on the number of days worked. Most people from the local community preferred to 
work part-time reserving time to produce staple crops in their own fields; even some former farm 
workers would work on undesignated or rented land to produce their staple crop. In communal areas, 
working for others was a means to an end, mainly to raise finances for farm inputs, and household 
consumables. All this shows the strong spillover effects arising from contract farming as the income 
generated was also spent in the community. 
All farm workers interviewed indicated that they belonged to no organisation; that is, they were not 
unionised. This also applied to casual workers, who preferred to negotiate as individuals. As such, 
ascribed social status and identity played a critical role in negotiating employment relations. Contract 
farmers were preferred employers because there was a general notion that they held more assets, were 
better funded, and hence could afford to pay wages. The individualistic approach to negotiating access 
to labour is in line with Berry (1993)’s characterisation of access to labour. However, in communal 
lands, labour was also negotiated informally between kith and kin (family arrangements) and were not 
regarded as paid-work. For instance, Tindo’s wife believed that it was part of her responsibility to draw 
water, fetch firewood or even help her in-laws with field chores, which they believed was the norm in 
the village. A 57-year-old woman, trained in tobacco production, indicated that she helped grade her 
brother-in-law’s tobacco at no cost and, at times, would be rewarded in kind; as she observed: “We are 
family. He helps with a lot of things” (Interview July 23, 2017). The family worked in the fields as a 
unit and, at times, children would help with some tasks, particularly in those families that could not 
afford to hire enough labour. A farmer indicated they could not afford to hire labour and the family 
helped in the planting and harvesting of the tobacco. He commented: “My children are very helpful 
when it comes to planting: I dig the holes and using five-liter containers they put water in the holes and 
then seedlings. These are light tasks and they also learn farming at early age” (Interview July 30, 2017).  
The situation was different in A1 settlements, where former farm workers with no plots to sustain 
subsistence relied mainly on the sale of labour to access livelihoods, though they also preferred piece 
work just as their communal compatriots did. Magaramombe (2010) provides a succinct description of 
former farm workers’ labour practices in ward 20, which was also observed in ward 32. However, in 
ward 32, it was observed that negotiating access to labour was intertwined with access to resources, 
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such as land use and household consumables. Payments were also barter-based and, in a few cases, 
cash.  
8.4.5 Increased Business Activity in Mazowe Community: Income Effect 
‘Business is booming’ is the sense that one gets on a visit to Mazowe during the tobacco-marketing 
season. According to a councillor in Chiweshe, tobacco production, together with contract farming, has 
been a major business stimulant in the area because of the spending patterns of farmers and workers 
during tobacco-marketing season (Interview July 25, 2017). A hive of activities was observed at retail 
outlets, for example, which were fully stocked with a variety of consumer goods, and loud music played 
at every store and market stalls that form during this period as businesses enticed customers. This is not 
surprising, given the positive agricultural income effect observed by Nieuwoudt and Vink (1989) for 
southern Africa. Again, in Chapter 6 it was shown that tobacco supports livelihoods of a large 
population in Zimbabwe. Consumption of manufactured goods and luxuries increase due to income 
elasticity associated with these goods. This is more so given that maize is readily available at stable 
prices (Nieuwoudt and Vink, 1989). As reported in Chapter 9, tobacco workers get paid during the 
marketing season. In July, during tobacco marketing season, high volumes of traffic (passenger 
carriers), and brisk business at bottle stores, informal market stalls selling used clothing, and retail 
outlets within the tobacco farming community were observed. As explained by Nieuwoudt and Vink 
(1989:169), “…expenditure on clothing increases significantly as income increases”, so too the other 
luxuries. This conspicuous expenditure confirms Prowse’s (2009) observation in the central region of 
Malawi where tobacco farmers went on a ‘cooling-off’ (conspicuous consumption) spree after receiving 
lumpsum payments for their tobacco. When the researcher returned to these areas in November (after 
the tobacco marketing season) the center were almost deserted. In a way, tobacco production opened 
more access channels for the community to earn a livelihood, these channels ranged from diversified 
investment in crop production, poultry businesses, and services and manufacturing as described above. 
Those involved in poultry production supplied local retail outlets and local communities, thus providing 
a source of protein for the community.  
However, farming input markets were depressed due to the modus operandi of contractors that included 
delivery of inputs to farmers. This resonates with Little and Watts’ (1994:226) observation that 
“…contract farming schemes rely on external inputs and markets and do not maintain strong linkages 
to the regional economy, except with labor markets”. A retailer noted: “Agricultural inputs have no 
market here because the contractor supplies everything; now they even supply maize-seed we used to 
sell” (Interview November 21, 2017). However, the stockists of seedlings and fertilizers were found in 
bigger centers, such as Concession and Glendale, which were reachable by public transport at an 
average cost of US$4 for the return journey. One of the councillors, a retailer, indicated that three points 
explained the lack of inputs at retail shops: first, the proximity and ease of access to Harare; second, 
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most inputs were supplied to the farm gate by the contractor; and third, farmers sourced their inputs in 
Harare soon after the tobacco sales for the coming farming season.  
The Tobacco Industry Development Support Institute for Southern Africa (TIDSI) has been calling for 
the decentralisation of tobacco auctions to growing regions (Nyoni 2018, February) to cut transport 
costs and this could also assist with the development of markets. For instance, people within the district 
could operate food stalls, and sell used clothes and farm implements, as was observed in Harare. The 
decentralisation of tobacco marketing has been caught-up in bureaucratic chains since 2012, when the 
Minister of Finance announced:  
Government together with TIMB are exploring alternatives for decentralising the marketing of 
tobacco to provinces and districts following concerns related to high transportation costs and 
congestion at the current auction floors (Biti 2013). 
Decentralisation creates overheads for agribusinesses and reduces business opportunities for big 
business, for instance transport issues, which could be affecting the adoption of this long-standing 
initiative. However, the lack of decentralisation has not dampened local farmers’ investment initiative, 
as discussed in the next section. 
Apart from tobacco contract farmers’ investments, a private school was established near Negomo 
Irrigation Scheme by two local brothers, and the main attraction for the school was said to be the high 
incomes from contract farmers, who were now demanding better education for their children (Interview 
October 24, 2017). As shown in Table 8-5, on average, tobacco contract farmers spent more on 
education. Other businesses, such as motor vehicle service provisioning and the sale of spares, were 
also set-up in response to the increased volume of traffic in the area. A Negomo irrigation horticultural 
farmer at Rosa business center opened a garage, which now employees two people. He said: “I noticed 
an increased number of vehicles and equipment people were buying and servicing in Harare and decided 
I should open this garage. Most of my clients are tobacco farmers, who are contracted by firms operating 
here” (Interview October 27, 2018). This is in line with Reardon and Barrett (2000) observation that 
such an increase in equipment and agro-processing industries gave rise to rural non-farm activities. 
Similar accumulation patterns were also observed by Scoones et al. (2018), which they attributed to 
tobacco farming. All these had employment spillover effects within the community. 
8.4.6 Access to Markets at the Auction Floors 
Successful contract farmers used cash inflows from contract farming to produce other cash crops and 
engage in trade, which resulted in the creation of secondary markets in Harare and Mazowe. 
Furthermore, drawing from TIMB (2017) secondary data, this thesis shows that a tenfold increase in 
the number of smallholder tobacco farmers, of which 84 percent produce under contract, resulted in the 
formation of vibrant informal markets at auction floors and in Mazowe. According to economic 
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rationality, income and population concentration are important variables in the formation of markets, a 
phenomenon that arose due to contract farming in Mazowe. Farmers responded to the secondary 
markets as described below.  
Figure 8-5 shows that more contract farmers produced high-value vegetables for the market compared 
to non-contract farmers. Despite the disappointment in classification and the pricing of their tobacco, 
auction floors present farmers with opportunities to market some of their agricultural produce, create 
networks and source commodities from the vibrant informal markets that develop during the selling 
season. A farmer said: “I sell maize, indigenous chickens and vegetables to ladies running these food 
market stalls for cash, even if am not selling tobacco” (Interview October 19, 2017). Various other items 
are on sale at these informal stalls and even some manufacturers display their products for the farmers. 
Relationships develop where some traders from Harare use farmers as entry points into rural markets 
to sell their used clothes, and at times formed partnerships to open similar market stalls in the rural 
areas. A farmer I accompanied to the floors said, “I established connections and now I even supply 
home grown-chickens to some of the food vendors who have operations at Mereki (a popular braaiing 
place in the high-density suburb of Warren Park D)” (Interview July 17, 2017). At Gweshe business-
centre, market stalls were observed during the peak of the tobacco seasons, and urbanites were the 
suppliers of used clothing bales sold at these stalls. These urbanites employ locals to work on the stalls. 
 
Figure 8-5: Number of Farmers Producing High Value Vegetables for the Market by Class 
Source: Author, compiled from survey data 
Contract farmers were the major beneficiaries because of their diversified cropping systems. A contract 
farmer said, “I produce a variety of edible cash crops, which I sell at Mbare Msika and restaurants in 
Harare; but during the tobacco marketing season I have a lucrative market at the auction floors, where 
I sell to direct users at a better price for cash” (Interview September 19, 2017). This farmer invested in 
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water pumps and borehole and had a flourishing market garden producing high-value produce, such as 
butternuts, peas, onions and okra, among others. He attributed this to income generated from contract 
farming activities, which, he said, released finances for other things. This created opportunities for 
employment-multiplier effects as observed by Key and Runsten (1999). This position was reflected by 
the survey data, which showed that more contract farmers were involved in market gardening, (see 
Figure 8-5). Though non-contract farmers produced for the market, they produced traditional 
vegetables, such as tomatoes, with low returns due to the flooded market, which they preferred to sell 
at Mbare Msika. 
All entrepreneurial oriented tobacco farmers combine their tobacco sales with either participation in 
markets as buyers or sellers. As buyers the auction floors provides them an array of commodities needed 
for farm level activities, such as ploughs, scotch carts, tobacco curing pipes and even foodstuffs. In 
Mazowe, locals responded to the increased number of farmers and income by providing income-
generating services. Due to the demand for commodities, such as firewood, barn maintenance and other 
non-farm service, there was an increase in the number of ‘own-account workers’ responding to the 
demand of such commodities. For instance, while, Tindo keeps stocks of bricks for resale on demand, 
other villagers also keep stacks of firewood ready to sell during the peak season when the demand for 
curing firewood increases. We also observed women brewing the local version of distilled beer, called 
kachasu and bartering for food or natural resources, such as firewood. Though it amounted to excessive 
working hours, most people in the area were involved in some form of economic activity throughout 
the year as permanent, casual or own-account workers.  
8.4.7 Land Market Development: Enhancing Access to Productive Land 
A land rental market is developing in Mazowe, driven by inadequate land to meet subsistence needs, 
diversification/expansion of cropping mix, and participation in cash crops, such as tobacco contract 
production. This resonates with Akram‐ Lodhi’s (2005) reasoning on why farmers rent in and out land. 
Renting in land was driven by profit motive for farmers who wanted to expand teir tobacco plots and 
still various other staple and cash crops.  The  farmers who rented out land had  resource access 
challenges, did not have drought power or aplough. The development of the rental market is 
characterised by individualised informal agreements, paid for both in kind or cash, and involves the 
poor and rich. All interviewees who said they paid fixed rentals for land were contract farmers and 
wanted to expand plot under tobacco, and the poor were involved in some form of sharecropping based 
on labour exchange or sharing output. A member of the Committee of Seven, indicated that they were 
aware of the practice; however, it was necessary, because “…they all want enough for survival” 
(Interview August 25, 2017). However, he indicated that land rental was illegal but only became 
‘commercialised’ out of greed after people realised that farmers were making money from contract 
farming. The communal and A1 land tenure system does not allow for land rentals, hence most of the 
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transactions are informal. Tis is because of the customary and permit tenure  (see section 3.4.1and 5.2.40 
system that operates in A1 and communal system  Further discussions revealed that A1 farmers rented-
out land to keep the farm productive for fear of repossession.  
Three categories of people renting land were observed: 
 Landless urbanites, generally to embark on cash crop production. These had access to resources, 
such as cash and contract farming, which they accessed through illicit means, and rented land 
from A1 farmers. One farmer indicated he was brought into the scheme by a friend, who is the 
extension officer in the scheme, and they decided to start this partnership. The partnership 
worked well because of insider trading which normally meant their tobacco attracted a better 
price (Interview July 30, 2017). 
 Communal people expanding into cash crops and were short of land. These rented land from 
communal areas and A1 farmers to allow for crop rotation and increased plot under tobacco 
production after getting into contracts. In addition, there were communal farmers involved in 
some form of share-cropping, where they worked plots of rich peasants in exchange for a small 
plot to produce staple crops. A communal farmer in Ndire, who was producing under contract, 
rented all the plots where he produced his tobacco. A letter of introduction to TIMB that allowed 
him to get a grower number was based on his communal plot, as he noted, “…nobody makes a 
follow-up” and hence, anybody could get a letter of introduction from the headman even if they 
didn’t have land (Interview July 16, 2017).  
 A1 farmers expanding operations rented land from fellow A1 farmers. These produced multiple 
cash crops, such as beans and soya beans, and were involved in command agriculture as well 
as tobacco contract farming. These were also among the accumulators observed in the cases 
above. Through patronage, they had good access to resources; some were said to be active in 
politics as sponsors, though themselves never occupied political office. Some of the favours 
included transporting people to political rallies. 
An A1 farmer, who rented out his plot, indicated that he had no resources or knowledge of farming, had 
no job and hence he was reaping fruits of his participation in Jambanja through renting out his plot 
(Interview July 16, 2017). Access to resources and asset endowment were key drivers of the developing 
land rental market and the sharecropping arrangement (De Janvry, Sadoulet, and Zhu 2005), and hence, 
those able to access resource-providing institutions or draw from personal resources were able to 
participate in rental markets. The distribution of benefits, household and community effects were 
affected by power imbalance which are discussed next.  
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8.5 A Case of Power Imbalance in Contract Design  
Survey data show that no respondents participated in the drafting of the contract, a case of power 
imbalance discussed in Chapter 10. All farmers said that contracts are clear on the amount of inputs, 
acreage and contractor rights on debt recovery. However, 82 percent said the contracts were silent on 
the resolution of disputes, though they had never had disputes. Risk-sharing mechanisms (98%), and 
pricing and grading (98%) were the main contested processes. As was discussed in the literature review, 
critics of contract farming arrangements (Little and Watts 1994; Wilson 1986) cite such issues as the 
source of the exploitative nature of contracting arrangements being power imbalances.  
The grading and classification of tobacco at the floors was a highly contested issue and often led to 
confrontation due to unclear classification standards. According to TIMB rules, the contractor is 
expected to grade and classify the tobacco and then insert a price that should not be less than the auction 
price prevailing the previous day. Hence, 86 percent of contract farmers felt that the grading system 
was neither transparent nor fair, as they were at the hands of the contractor who was at liberty to 
manipulate the grades. A complex grading system with a possibility of generating near infinite grades 
is used in the classification of tobacco. One farmer complained: “The contractor does not even specify 
the tobacco quality he wants, we are only told this is low quality” (Interview 2017). As observed by 
Eaton and Shepherd (2001), grading, classification and pricing is of great concern and, in Zimbabwe, 
farmers resort to industrial action to attract government attention. Larsen (2002) observed the use of 
independent arbitrators in the cotton sector in Zimbabwe as a possible remedy for grading disputes, a 
practice that TIMB could also adopt. The other contentious issue was the payment for the tobacco that 
goes through the integrated TIMB payment system. The problem here, though, is the shortage of cash 
within the economy and some cases of unauthorised deductions, which then require the farmer to rectify 
with TIMB, who run the system.  
Most contracts provide inputs that are enough for the contracted plot. However, two issues were of 
concern to the farmers: 
1. The lack of transparency in the grading and pricing of tobacco, which farmers felt could be 
spelt out in the contract prior to the start of the farming season. The quality of tobacco is 
dependent on field operations and curing in the barn which produces the two colours mainly 
traded in Zimbabwe, either orange or yellow; yet farmers are not informed of the desired quality 
which eventually affects grading and prices at the auction floors.  
2. The input and services charges. Most farmers were not aware of the cost structure.  
One motivation for contract farming is that the contractor and farmer would share market and 
production risk, which could potentially increase the farmer’s profit (Key and Runsten 1999; Simmons 
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2002; Swain 2012; Wolf, Hueth and Ligon 2001). The contract offered to Mazowe farmers, however, 
leaves them fully exposed to price and production risks. For instance, document analysis revealed that 
prices are fully dependant on the market forces and are only known on the day of sale. The contractor 
bears no production risks arising from natural phenomena that may cause crop failure. The contractor 
does not insure, nor do they expect farmers to insure, their crops against any potential risks, as reported 
by 100% of the contracted farmers. Contract farmers reported that market failure was dealt with through 
negotiation (65%) and the rescheduling of risk (85%); alternatively, 69 percent of farmers invested in 
other assets and multi-cropping to cater for risk. There were no reports of legal action on defaulting 
farmers. The farmers who involuntarily exited the contracts and had outstanding debts, still negotiate 
for repayment. They were not expecting any legal action from the contractor. This arrangement is what 
Narayanan (2011) refers to as relational based contract. 
As discussed above, the contractor designs, administers and adjudicates over the contract within the 
broad prescriptions provided by TIMB. For instance, rule 2.2 (TIMB 2017) states: “The contractors 
should not buy tobacco that they did not finance its production”; however, the contract does not mention 
the tonnage expected from the contracting arrangement; yields from contracted plots vary in line with 
agro-ecological conditions and farm management practices. This is contrary to standard contract 
features suggested by Eaton and Shepherd (2001). Consequently, side marketing was rampant, as 
contracted farmers sold tobacco from other farmers as well as their extended plots, since there was no 
output quota. Another TIMB (2017) clause stipulates: 
Pricing of tobacco will be based on an agreed grade-price matrix using TIMB classification 
system. In the event the agreed price paid for the same tobacco at the auction floors the grower 
shall be paid the higher price prevailing at the auction floor at the time 
This effectively means that the pricing model is auction price plus a premium which is provided at the 
discretion of the contractor. Yet this is not known to the growers, as shown by 100% of respondents 
who indicated that the contract did not specify the method of determining the tobacco price. What is 
problematic is that the same contractors are also active participants in the auction floor purchases, 
posing a risk of price manipulation in favour of the contractor. Contractors are buyers at the auction and 
hence set the auction price, which becomes the benchmark in the determination of the contract price. 
Such mechanisms of price determination for tobacco are done in Tanzania, but the farmers are made 
aware of the price determination mechanism and their cooperatives or farmer organisations are active 
participants in the process (Sambuo 2013). 
The farmers bear the cost of any market and production risks, such as the fall in international prices 
below cost. Again, all respondents indicated that the contract did not provide for such unforeseen risks 
as hailstorms, drought or prices falling below cost. The auction price is driven by the world market-
price prevailing on each selling day and can be below production cost depending on the forces of 
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demand and supply. As shown in section 7.9, the power balance in the contractual arrangement is 
skewed against the farmer; all the variables are determined by the contractor and the farmer is a taker 
of the contract terms. Again, the contractor is the enforcer of the contract, as TIMB also gives the right 
to recover credit advanced to the farmer before any payments are made to the farmer.   
The contract strongly favoured the contractor against famers who were restricted to grade and price 
taking with little recourse to any remedies. The contracts offered to farmers are substantially incomplete 
in respect of material issues of a contract, that is, quality and price determination, enforcement 
mechanisms that are left to the discretion of the contractor and or the regulator, and risk-sharing 
mechanisms. This confirms Prowse’s (2012) observation on incomplete contracts. This impinges on the 
sharing of the value generated and dilutes any benefits accruing to farmers. 
 8.6 Conclusion 
The chapter presented data that showed that contract farmers had higher tobacco production output, 
income and livelihood options compared to all other groups. This was mainly driven by their access to 
land after the FTLRP, and extra agricultural financing, which helped them hedge against risks, adopt 
better technologies, and expand their farming operations. Assured inputs also allowed the farmers to 
diversify their farming activities as well as venture into non-farm activities. Because of the high income 
they earned they tended to invest in high-value non-farm microenterprises. Non-contract farmers and 
other groups were involved in low-value microenterprises, such as street vending, artisanal work and 
natural resource-based activities. They benefited from employment and services provided by the 
contracted farmers, which also had a positive effect on their agricultural activities and, for some, 
participation in cash crop production. Technology was transferred to non-contract farmers, though the 
lack of finance constrained its adoption. Contract farming had positive effects on the quantity and 
distribution of food in the community through barter exchange of labour for maize and consistently 
uniform prices throughout the year. Tobacco production was also a source of finance for food crop 
production, all this courtesy of access to land after the FTLRP. 
Farmers adopted side-marketing strategies to manage price differentials among contractors and auction 
floors through sound local networks, helping each other sell tobacco in better rewarding contract or 
auction markets. Again, the well-resourced benefited from such transactions, which helped them reduce 
transaction cost by tying such arrangements to labour negotiations. Contracting arrangements provided 
a platform to cover financing risks emanating from bad weather and subsequent poor sales; as farmers 
noted, they were assured of inputs to continue production, which allowed farmers to diversify their 
livelihood activities into non-farm investments that benefited the community. Power imbalance 
influenced the distribution of benefits in the community.  
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Chapter 9  
Factors which Influence Farmer Participation in Contract Farming in 
Mazowe 
9.0 Introduction 
This chapter reports on factors that influence farmer participation in contract farming and the 
subsequent effects of household and community economic activities. There is evidence that these are 
the causal factors to the household and community effects reported on in chapter 8. The chapter draws 
from Wang, Wang and Delgaldo (2014)’s conception that to understand the effect of contract farming 
a researcher needs to understand the causes. In reporting on the factors in this chapter the study draws 
from Ribot and Peluso (2003:162) conception of ‘structural and relational mechanisms’ of benefit-
resource nexus discussed in chapter 2. Contractors and farmers hold resources in different proportions 
which affects participation and benefits accruing from contracting. Sen (1982) argues that ‘ownership’ 
would result in ‘exchange entitlements’ which are akin to benefits in access theory. This chapter is 
about how ownership of various endowments and actor attributes explain the effects reported on in 
chapter 8.  
Participation in contract farming arrangements is influenced by contractor and farmer attributes, 
endowments (for instance assets, education, networks and so on) which connstitute the ‘bundle of 
powers’ held by the parties. In aa production relationship, the bundle of powers can therefore derive 
from the control of the various factors of production andhow agents getto use them. In Mazowe, it was 
observed that contractors had control over the design of contracts, which defined the conditions of 
participation as discussed in chapter 7. Farmers, on the other hand, owned land and other assets, which 
influenced their decision to accept, participate and stay in contracts. Contrary to most arrangements 
discussed in literature that involve the government, farmer organisations, multilateral institutions and 
donors, (Glover and Kusterer 2016; Barrett et al. 2012), the contracts were negotiated between the 
contracting firm and the farmer with little third-party involvement. According to a CFU official, this 
business relation was an initiative of business, motivated by serious product supply bottlenecks 
experienced after the FTLRP, a condition that Goodhue and Simon (2016) argue can give rise to 
contracting arrangements. In this case, businesses were keen to get Virginia tobacco leaf while 
smallholder farmers wanted access to productive resources.  
The rest of the chapter presents and discusses factors and mechanisms of resource access that gave rise 
to the effects of contract farming in Mazowe, using qualitative data from interviews, descriptive 
statistics and a logit regression model. Evidence from the study suggests that the initial capital 
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endowments of farmers influenced farmer participation and outcomes from tobacco contract farming 
and that asset-rich farmers are more likely to stay in these contracting arrangements while the poor exit. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, access theory predicts that those who control and can expend benefits can 
benefit from such interventions as contract farming. This result was confirmed by both the quantitative 
and qualitative data sets.  
9.1 Factors Influencing Farmer Participation in Contract Farming 
The contractor uses a selection criterion, which favours those who have assets, are in social or 
professional networks, experienced and landed, which is exclusionary to young, and communal farmers 
with little land holdings. The section further provides evidence that shows that these factors affect the 
farmers’ ability to maintain their position in contract farming. The poor, who are the majority, struggle, 
while the well-off smoothly negotiate and pay their way to a bigger share of the value generated. As 
shown in Chapter 8, this is further invested in activities that benefit the household and community. All 
this is done as they seek to maintain and expand their hold on contract farming and hence, become the 
contractor’s preferred farmers. 
The contracting firm has standard selection criteria for all potential beneficiaries. They include 
experience in tobacco production, and that one be a registered tobacco grower with TIMB and have 
assets that include land, draught power, ploughs and labour, which the extension officer is supposed to 
check and verify through local authorities. Because contractors prefer farmers with larger farms and 
assets, better-off farmers are more likely to get contracts on favourable terms, such as cash advances 
for labour. When contracted farmers (N=63) were asked about the contractor’s requirements to join 
contract farming, farmers responded as shown in Figure 9.1. Figure 9.1 shows that farmers perceived 
holding assets, such as cattle, barns, and scotch carts, as an important consideration for participating in 
contract farming. These constitutes ‘a bundle of powers’ held by the farmer. Education and experience 
reflect the ability of farmers to enter into networks that improved farmers’ productivity. 
From the sample, 37 FTLRP beneficiaries (A1) with bigger land holdings, better assets and education 
got contracts compared to 26 communal peasants and hence, a communal farmer noted: 
Most of us in the communal area are excluded from these contracts because we have no land; 
even if we wanted to, where will we plant our food crops? Even the government’s command 
agriculture is for the rich” (Interview July 21, 2017).  
To the farmer, being rich was also associated with big land holdings and power and hence he thought 
contracts were allocated to the influential members of society. A 23-year-old farmer indicated that he 
applied but the extension officer rejected his application because he had no plot or assets of his own. 
He narrated his story thus: 
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My father allocated me this plot, which is less than a hectare, where I built my house. I wanted 
to use half of my plot for tobacco, but the extension officer refused saying I had no experience 
or resources and I could not use my father’s assets who is also a contract farmer (Interview 
August 28, 2017) 
 
Figure 9-1: Requirements to join contract farming as perceived by the farmers  
Source: From author’s survey data. 
This is supported by survey data which showed people were excluded due to lack of farming 
implements. Youth, particularly those under 30 years old, had difficulty getting contracts due to lack of 
trust, as they were viewed as more mobile and unsettled. This is in line with Bolwig, Gibbon, and Jones 
(2009) observation that households’ endowments are important predicators of contract participation 
leading to the non-random selection of farmers into contracts. Adjognon (2012) explained that “…the 
unequal access to contract farming schemes may even reflect to some extent the prevailing inequality 
in the society”. A contractor extension officer explaining the non-random selection noted: “You cannot 
experiment with the youth; they are adventurous and still looking for better income opportunities. For 
instance, if gold is discovered, they easily leave tobacco.” (Interview August 29, 2017). All this explains 
the uneven and differential access to benefits observed in chapter 8. The next subsections discuss the 
factors highlighted in Figure 9-1. 
9.1.1 Household Composition Influences Participation in Contract Farming  
The composition of the household, that is, its size, age of members and sex, affect economic and 
livelihood decisions taken. For instance, access to land showed a bias against women, as shown in Table 
9-1 where 115 households were male-headed and 35 female-headed. Interview results revealed that 
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those decisions on the cropping mix, allocation of resources and whether to participate in contract 
farming or not were taken by the household head. Surprisingly, ANOVA results show that there is no 
significant difference in terms of age and sex. However, contract farmers had higher average age. 
Interviews with contractors and farmers indicated that male farmers over 40 years got preference 
compared to the under 40s. It is plausible that the variables explain participation, given the ownership 
structure of assets in a family.  
Age is an indicator for experience and position of the household’s life cycle (Randela 2005), and, for a 
crop such as tobacco, older farmers are expected to join contract farming to take advantage of premium 
prices observable at the auctions. Barrett et al. (2012) found that age was negatively associated with 
contract farming participation. With age, people acquire assets and information that allow them to ‘go 
it alone’; however, the deteriorating and uncertain macroeconomic environment in Zimbabwe forces 
farmers to join contract farming. Mazowe farmers needed to invest in tobacco production to be 
considered for tobacco contracts. This observation is in line with Simmons et al’s (2005) observation 
that demographic factors affect contract participation according to crop type. 
Descriptive statistics show that men dominate tobacco contract farming. In A1 farms, 13 women said 
that they were in contract farming; however, some were fronting their husbands engaged in full-time 
employment in Harare and the surrounding towns, who often remitted cash to support agricultural 
ventures. This is in line with the number of male-headed households and the proportion of 12% women 
land beneficiaries, showing male control of household resources (Moyo 2011; Mutopo 2011). A woman 
farmer said:  
The contract is in my husband’s name. He organises everything with the contractor: input 
deliveries, implements, the marketing, and hiring of labour. We pay our workers from the 
money he sends (Interview September 17, 2017).  
With no-support, fewer women ventured into cash crop production and only three A1-war-veterans 
receiving a pension were involved as tobacco non-contract farmers. Female farmers are generally 
discriminated against in contract farming arrangements, and those who participate derive fewer benefits 
than their male counterparts which confirms Barrett et al.’s (2012) conclusion from a review of the 
literature. The discrimination against women manifests in the control of resources, which is vested in 
men in patriarchal societies. For crops such as tobacco, the demanding curing schedule needs overnight 
attention to maintain temperatures, and initial investment in assets might act as a deterrent to a poorly 
resourced female-headed household, an observation that confirms Heald (1991) findings among Kuria 
tobacco farmers in Kenya. 
The variable, economically active members of the family, was significant. Contract farmers had larger 
households due, in part, to the high number of permanent employees they engaged. According to the 
inverse-farm theory (Heltberg 1998), farms worked on by household members are more efficient and 
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productive than those operated through hired labour. It was observed that the more economically active 
members in a household, the more productive the household, possibly given the reduced cost of 
supervision and moral hazard.  
Table 9-1: Demographic and Household Characteristics 
 Statistic A1 
contract 
farmers 
A1 non-
contract 
farmers 
Former 
farm 
workers 
Communal 
contract 
farmers 
Communal 
no-
contract 
farmers 
Non-
tobacco 
farmers 
ANOVA 
results 
Male Number 31 15 10 17 26 16 F(5,144) 
=.844, p 
=.521 
Female Number 13 3 1 6 7 5 
Age Mean 44.3 40.6 50.2 45.6 41.9 53.5 F(5, 
144) 
=1.539, 
p = .185 
Economically 
Active 
Mean 4.2 3.1 2 3.9 3.1 2.8 F(5,110) 
=4.533, 
p =0.001 
Source: Author. Compiled from survey data 
This shows that farmers with more economically active members were in a good position to participate 
in tobacco contract production due to their access to an adequate labour supply needed in tobacco 
production; an observation further confirmed by the logit model in section 9.2. Miyata, Minot, and Hu 
(2009), using a probit model, found the variables, age and economically active members of the 
household, insignificant factors in explaining the participation of farmers in onion and apple contracts 
in China. Similarly, Miglani (2016), though noting the ambiguity in these variables, also used them and 
found mixed results. Ton et al. (2017)’s systematic review quotes several scholars who applied the same 
variables and others used in this study with differential outcomes, which goes to show that crop type 
matters.  
 9.1.2. Asset Holding  
Table 9-2 shows that there is a statistically significant difference in asset holdings and that, on average, 
contract farmers have higher asset holdings, followed by tobacco non-contract farmers, due mainly to 
their participation in cash crop production. Farm workers who are not involved in cash crop production 
have the least assets. Initial asset holdings play a major role in tobacco production and admission into 
tobacco contracts, and hence, members of the community with no assets were excluded. Most contract 
farmers indicated that they had accumulated assets, such as tobacco barns, cattle and scotch carts, before 
they joined contract farming. In Mvurwi, Scoones et al. (2018) noted that the ownership of assets was 
a source of exclusion or inclusion in contract farming, and that richer households participated more in 
such contracts. 
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Table 9-2: Differences in Asset Holdings  
 Statistic A1 
contract 
farmer 
A1 non-
contract 
farmer 
Former 
farm 
worker 
Communal 
contract 
farmer 
Communal 
non-
contract 
farmer 
Non-
tobacco 
farmer 
ANOVA 
results 
Cattle Mean 8.6 7.94 0.4 8.74 5.25 4.69 F(5,135) 
=4.018, p 
=.002 
SD 5.04 11.5 0.97 4.11 7.05 5 
Range 18 48 3 15 5 17 
Scotch 
cart 
Mean 1.34 1.06  1.26 0.75 0.38 F(5,135) 
=12.123, p 
=.000 
SD 0.59 0.9  0.62 0.76 0.5 
Range 2 3  2 2 1 
Ox-drawn 
plough 
Mean 0 0.94  1.43 0.9 0.81 F(5,135) 
=8.319, p 
=.000 
SD 0.7 0.66  0.66 0.95 0.75 
Range 3 2  2 4 2 
Tractor Mean 0.17 0.17  0.17 0.003 0 F(5, 135) 
=1388, p 
=023 
SD 0.38 0.38  0.49 0.18 0 
Range 1 1  2 1 0 
Barns Mean 1.28 0.65  0.96 0.41 0.13 F(5,135) 
=6.324, p 
=.000 
SD 1.43 0.7  0.77 0.71 0.34 
Range 6 3  3 2 1 
Source: Author, compiled from survey data 
Using an asset-based approach in Mozambique, Benfica, Tschirley, and Boughton (2006) showed initial 
asset holdings were important for farmers’ participation in higher return markets. The contract designed 
by Mazowe contractors favoured experienced farmers with tobacco producing assets, such as barns, 
acquired during their earlier years as non-contract farmers. It is not surprising that the well-resourced 
farmers participated in contract farming and were offered better contracts compared to the poor. This 
allowed them to generate benefits at the household and community level. As observed by Barrett et al. 
(2005), household asset endowments play an important role in the choice of livelihood strategy and 
hence, options available to diversify. Poor farmers who could not raise capital for barns and other 
tobacco implements would self-select out of contracting, not by choice but due to lack of assets.  
9.1.3 Tobacco Farming Experience  
On average, contract farmers got contracts after 4.8 (A1) and 4.9 (communal) years of tobacco farming, 
and an analysis of variance showed the mean difference was significant (F (4.103) =3.824, p = .006). 
Overall, contracted farmers had 9.5 and 10.10 years of experience compared to 6.5 and 6 years for non-
contract farmers in A1 and communal areas, respectively, and the analysis of variance was statistically 
significant (F (1.14) =7.301, p = .017). According to Goldsmith (1985), experience allows for farmers 
to adopt good farming practices learnt over time, through networks and informal learning. As time-
based variables, experience and age tend to be highly correlated and can be used interchangeably. 
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Experience in tobacco production is assessed through the number of years the farmer delivered tobacco 
to the auction floors; again, the grower authorises the contracting firm to access his records held by 
TIMB to confirm his/her trading record. Some contracting firms do a credit check through local 
leadership, assessing the risk profile of the farmer. Experience is a package of household factor 
endowment (Barrett et al. 2005), which is important for self-selection into contracting schemes, given 
that historical ties come to bear. In Mazowe, farmers producing tobacco shared experiences at the 
auction floors, during field days and on other informal platforms, thus building some form of social 
capital. This became handy as farmers in the same circle get into contracts through referrals, as shown 
in section 9.1.7, where, through snowballing, the extension officer recruited farmers into contracts. It 
also explains the exclusion of the poor who, Barrett et al. (2005: 28) explained, “have less human and 
social capital on which to draw”.  Networks are important in agriculture and are formed through working 
together over long periods, a situation observed in Mazowe, among tobacco farmers and working 
professions who used the networks to access resources. The poor were excluded from such networks 
though most of them had experience in producing tobacco as workers. This is a form of capital 
workers/poor could not build on because it was not backed by complementary productive assets, and 
hence, some made it through patronage. This involved negotiating for resources through labour and 
resource exchanges as shown in Figure 2-1 in Chapter 2. This explains the accumulator, middle farmer 
and poor peasant categorisation described in chapter 8. 
9.1.4 Plot Size 
An agribusiness officer in Harare indicated that land size was an important determinant in decisions on 
whether to offer a half-hectare contract or more. This is not surprising given that the question of access 
to land has been described as an important facilitator to alternative livelihood strategies and economic 
opportunities (Chitonge and Ntsebeza 2012; Scoones et al. 2011). Access to land also enables the farmer 
to handle different crops’ agro-ecological demands and their food requirements. In arriving at this 
decision, the contractor considers the farmer’s food crop production needs, the need for crop rotation 
and the labour at the farmer’s disposal to work on the tobacco crop (Interview November 15, 2017). 
This was also observed in Kenya, where BAT allocated contracts based on land size to allow for crop 
rotation, and different crop uses (Heald 1991). Survey results showed that less than 30 percent of the 
farmer’s plot holdings were allocated to tobacco production. On average, farmers were contracted on 
less than 20 percent of their plot, however, the farmers increased acreage without the consent of the 
contractor, financing operations from personal resources.  
The selection of farmers into contracts was always intended to leave them with enough land for other 
crops. Contracted farmers also concurred with this selection process, though they alleged it was littered 
with corruption due to jostling for participation, therefore peasants in Mazowe are contract-takers and 
have no say in the contractual relationship. Initial contracts were for a half-hectare plot; however, high 
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performers with land were rewarded with increases in hectarage and finance to cover labour costs on 
the renewal of the contract. This speaks to the importance of land in accessing productive resources and 
contracts. Literature on the adoption of cash crop production shows that land is an important 
determinant in cash-crop production and is intertwined with the farmer’s food security concerns 
(Fafchamps 1992; Jayne 1994). Therefore, the size of a household’s plot becomes important in decisions 
about its crop diversification strategy.  
Table 9.3 shows that land sizes are significantly different for the farmers. For A1 farmers the mean plot 
size is almost the same, showing the uniform size of land allocated during FTLRP. However there are 
wide variations when it comes to communal farmers, interviews revealed that this was due to continuous 
subdivision of land as fathers allocate land to their sons. As a result A1 farmers were more likely to join 
contract farming compared to communal.  This trend is manifested in plot under tobacco where A1 
farmers have bigger plots compared to communal. Interviews with farmers showed that farmers  
prioritised staple food production before cash crops which could explain the smaller plots allocated to 
tobacco by communal farmers. Land differentials were very high in communal areas as shown by the 
high figure of the range. 
Table 9-3: Plot Size in hectares 
 Statistic A1 
contract 
farmer 
A1 non-
contract 
farmer 
Communal 
contract 
farmer 
Communal 
non-contract 
farmer 
ANOVA 
results 
Size of plot Mean 5.79 5.6 4.5 3.32 F(4,100) 
=3.333,  
p =013 
SD 0.98 1.1 1.48 2.97 
Range 7 5 5.8 14.25 
Plot under 
tobacco 
Mean 1.44 1.23 1.11 0.75 F(4,99) 
=7.926,  
p =.000 
SD 0.62 0.7 0.92 0.31 
Range 2.5 2.5 4.5 1.5 
Plot under 
other crops 
Mean 4.31 4.7 3.12 2.59 F(4,100) 
=5.218, 
 p =.001 
SD 1.11 1.84 1.42 2.01 
Range 6 8.5 6 13.75 
Source: Compiled from survey data 
As observed in Mazowe, all farmers allocated a bigger portion of their land to staple/other crops as 
shown in Table 9-3 below. For instance, non-tobacco farmers with a mean plot size of 1.45 said they 
could not embark on tobacco production, neither could they qualify to enter into contracts due to 
inadequate land holdings.In tobacco, land is important for crop rotation, farmers also need to set-aside 
land for staple crop production, which, Cai et al. (2008) noted, affects land under cash crop production. 
Consequently, there were five farmers who said they were renting land because they owned none or 
that what they had was not enough. The more affluent farmers also rented land to expand their 
commercial production. This was necessitated by the introduction of command agriculture which 
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required more land and hence, a farmer said: “I rent land from fellow A1 farmers who cannot use it, 
because I need more land to produce soya and maize under command as well as for my tobacco contract. 
I cannot forgo these opportunities” (Interview September 13, 2017). As noted by De Janvry, Sadoulet, 
and Wolford (2001), land rental is motivated by “…unequal ability between owner and user to access 
credit, own machinery, bear risk, and engage in contract farming” and uneven resource endowments 
among households. In Mazowe, A1 farmers were renting out land for fear of losing it, if it was seen to 
be unproductive. As discussed in chapter 3 and 4, successful land reforms need to be accompanied by 
resource provisioning strategies which guarantee access to farming resources. This differential in land 
and asset holding affected farmers’ access to contract farming and benefits accruing to the household 
and community. 
The maximum contracted plot size was 3 hectares and most farmers were contracted for half a hectare, 
though tendencies to increase plot under cultivation financed from personal resources were observed in 
both the A1 and communal areas. A farmer explained why they increased the parcels under tobacco: 
 It is not economic to produce a half hectare; first, the seedlings and chemicals are sold in 
hectare packs. The barns we construct are big enough for a hectare and a harvest from a half-
hectare might not be enough to fill a barn, as a result, you end up mixing and compromising 
quality” (Interview September 11, 2017).  
Another farmer had another reason:  
I started producing tobacco from my own resources on a half-hectare. When I got on contract I 
expanded production to increase my revenue since I had more capital (Interview November 10, 
2017).  
Farmers in communal lands did not enjoy this privilege because of their small landholding; some could 
not even participate in cash crop production due to land shortages. This shows that FTLRP beneficiaries 
with enough assets and labour had better chances of participating in contracting arrangements compared 
to communal farmers. This is also consistent with the inverse-farm relationship argument for land 
reform proffered in Chapter 3 (see also Heltberg 1998). It is not surprising that most farmers who 
received more income and invested in farm and non-farm activities were from A1 farms. From this 
discussion, it is evident that access to land under FTLRP was crucial for farmers’ outcomes in tobacco 
production, 
9.1.5 Effect of Occupation and Education on Farmer Participation in Contract 
Farming  
Figure 9-2 shows the main occupations of the respondents by farmer category. Six A1 farmers doubled 
up as formal employees and contract farmers and their full-time work provided extra funding sources 
for tobacco and agriculture infrastructure, and hence, one woman indicated that her husband’s salary 
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was an important source of infrastructure funding for their tobacco production. This is in line with the 
asset-based approach, which sees factor endowments as a prerequisite to expand one’s operation (Carter 
and Barrett 2006; Boughton et al. 2007). Most of them who were in the ‘own farm’27 category were 
pensioners and were better connected to resource-providing networks, contrary to non-contract farmers 
who were bound by lineage networks. Farm workers represented the least educated group with low-
level occupations and had no formal access to land. A similar trend was observed by Scoones et al. 
(2018) in Mvurwi. 
 
Figure 9-2: Occupation of Respondent 
Source: Author, compiled from survey data 
Figure 9-3 shows that contract farmers are more educated than other members of the community, 
however correlation data shows that there is no significant relationship with contract participation. This 
result is in line with multinomial logistic regression results in Table 9.5 on page 172.  However, 
education was found to be an important variable in explaining farmers’ decision to participate in 
contract farming as observed in scholarly work indicating the allocative efficiency of education 
A1 contract
farmer
A1 non-
contract
farmer
Renting
Former
farm
worker
Communal
contract
farmer
Communal
non-
contract
farmer
A1 non-
tobacco
farmer
Communal
non-
tobacco
farmer
Formal job 6 0 3 0 3 2 0 1
Casual jobs 0 0 1 4 0 0 1 1
Unemployed 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0
Own farm 31 16 2 0 20 29 1 16
Farm worker 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 1
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Occupation of Respondent  
Formal job Casual jobs Unemployed Own farm Farm worker Other
165 
Narayanan (2011)’s findings are revealing, as they show that the importance of education depends on 
the crop. For papaya, for example, she found a positive relationship, while marigold was negative. 
Papaya is an export crop with no local market while marigold has a strong local market, and hence, 
tobacco, an export crop, is influenced by education levels. Boughton et al. (2007) also found a similar 
result for tobacco farmers in Mozambique.  
  
 
Figure 9-3: Education Levels of Household Head 
Source: Author compiled from survey data 
However, interviews with farmers showed that education mattered in decision-making and access to 
complementary resources. The findings from interviews were not surprising, given the importance of 
social networks observed in Mazowe, which were based on people’s professions and, by default, 
education, which could cause much information asymmetry. While education supports innovativeness 
and productivity (Swain 2012), tobacco is a crop where tacit knowledge is an important aspect of 
transferring knowledge, and hence, statistical results observed in this study. Kalirajan and Shand (1985) 
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distinguish between formal and informal education and find that the latter is more important in 
agricultural production and they say even the illiterate can improve production with good extension 
services. 
9.1.6 Other Sources of Income 
In Mazowe, ANOVA results showed that income from other cash crops or non-farm activities was 
statistically insignificant. However, interviewees reported other sources of income as important sources 
of start-up and working capital in tobacco production and subsequent participation in contract farming. 
The income range was huge though ANOVA results show that this was not significant, indicating 
inequality within the community of Mazowe. As shown in section 8.3.1 a few farmers were successful. 
This also means that investment in assets would be differentiated along the diversity in earnings 
observed.  
Table 9-4:Comparative Income of Mazowe Community 
 Statistic  A1 
Contract 
farmer 
A1 non-
contract 
farmer 
Forme
r farm 
worker 
communa
l contract 
farmer 
Communal 
non-
contract 
farmer 
non-
tobacco 
farmer 
ANOV
A results 
Income 
from other 
crops 
Mean  2362.16 512.5  1761.36 178.79 1099.4
1 
F(4,30) 
=1.646 
p = .189 SD  3354.05 1035.29  2153.06 543.57 2310.6 
Range  15000 3900  7000 2400 7000 
Income 
from non-
farm 
Mean  4464.86 836.24 357.27 4226.96 920.65 991.67 F(5,69) 
=1,875, 
p= .110 
SD  6345.75 1568.91 209.05 5658.09 3229.76 2482.4
3 
Range  30000 5000 650 23000 16000 10500 
Source: Author, compiled from survey data 
Tobacco income was significantly different among the groups. To enter tobacco contracts, one would 
have been tobacco farmers’ ex ante, and hence income from tobacco explains the probability of a farmer 
getting into contracts better than the other sources of income. Household expenditure is also 
significantly different showing the income effect of tobacco. Farmers invested income raised from 
tobacco sales before joining contract farming; for instance, a farmer said: “I started producing tobacco 
five years ago and, from the lump sum I got over the years, I built my barns and bought cattle that 
allowed me to join contract farming” (Interview November 19, 2017). Such organic investments were 
necessary for farmers to meet the needs of the contractor, and hence, tobacco income and assets could 
be correlated. 
9.1.7 Social Capital: network effects of contract farming 
Social capital in this thesis means networks and social relationships among actors in the community. 
The selection of farmers into contracts, sharing of inputs and assistance with marketing of neighbours’ 
tobacco are some examples of the role of social capital emanating from the introduction of contract 
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farming arrangements in Mazowe. Sutherland and Burton (2011) describe the importance of social 
capital in farm-level operations, which included sharing assets and assisting each other. In Mazowe, 
farmers self-selected into contract farming according to their social class and networks, along social 
groups observed by Scoones et al. (2018), and, as  discussed in the earlier, shared seedlings in exchange 
for labour and assisted each other with marketing of tobacco (Chapter 8), all signs of social capital 
aimed at achieving farm level goals. Farmers were either invited into contract farming by a local leader 
(12.3%) or contractor (74.4%) or by personal application (10.5%). The contractor and local leader relied 
on a system of networks within the community, which drew on social relations in it. Following 
Bourdieu’s (1986) conceptualisation (see section 10.2 for detailed explaination) of social capital 
Sutherland and Burton (2011) characterise this as farm-level cultural capital transforming into social 
capital. For instance, gifts, such as home-grown chickens and agricultural produce given to extension 
officers attracted reciprocal favours, which led to consideration or referrals for contracting 
arrangements. The allocation of contracts also showed relations stretching into sports clubs, church 
groups, political associations or even socialites’ networks. 
Social capital played an important part in enrolling farmers as shown by data in Figure 9-4. Most 
respondents (75.4%) indicated that they were invited by the contractor, showing the snowballing effect 
in the recruitment of farmers. Entry into the community by the contractor is through government officers 
who have records of tobacco producers, which are used to recruit the first set of farmers. Non-contract 
farmers (48%) indicated that they were not enrolled because 74.5 percent lacked farm implements, 53.8 
percent had no draught power and 19.7 percent had no experience in tobacco production; an observation 
which is in line with asset endowment discussed in the preceding sections. A few respondents, 4.2 
percent, said that they did not have an established source of income, while 11.1 percent said they were 
excluded for other reasons to do with their social status. These reasons were also advanced by both 
contract farmers and contracting firms as requirements for selection and participation into contract 
farming. While assets played a central role in participation in contract farming arrangements, interviews 
with farmers also revealed that contracts were also accessed through influential people, such as 
politicians and local leaders, some of whom had good working relations with the extension officer, who 
had the sole mandate of recruiting farmers in his jurisdiction though within a given budget from the 
head office. Relations with the extension officer were also cited as an important factor, and these were 
built around social networks at clubs and churches as well as through gifts, such as home-grown 
chickens and farm produce. Invitation by a contractor or local leader showed one’s position in social 
networks. 
Apart from this standard selection process, agribusiness extension officers reported contracting farmers 
referred to them by local leadership, both traditional and political, a decision one officer said “was 
politically correct” and allowed for smooth operations in the field (Interview 2017). In Ndire, two 
farmers with no assets and rented land accessed contracts through their political connections. Initial 
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selection processes were also reported to have been heavily influenced by local leadership. This is 
similar to Scoones et al. (2018: 6)’s observation: “State functionaries—whether agricultural extension 
workers or the police—are, however, involved in tobacco value chains, through helping to establish and 
negotiate contracts or enforce them”. They further note in their research in Mvurwi that farmers entered 
contracts through various channels. During the researcher’s stay in the wards it was observed that 
networks and socialisation was more on class basis: teachers and extension and police officers, among 
 
Figure 9-4: Channels used by Farmers to Access Contract Farming 
Source: Author compiled from survey data 
other professionals, socialised with other influential people in the community and, in such circles, 
lobbying for resources was done. In a conversation with an Apostolic sect member at Ndire shopping 
centre, it was indicated that, though his church forbids hanging out in beer-halls, he frequented the place 
at night to socialise with these professionals because they have the “…latest news, so [he did not] want 
to be left behind in important projects” (Interview July 23, 2017). Ownership of assets tends to ascribe 
people to certain classes and networks, and, in most cases, contracts were allocated through these 
networks. The selection process was influenced by social networks, which, are in turn, influenced by 
social status, identity, assets and professional circles in a community, which, by default, excluded the 
poor who could not enter these social networks. To enter into contracts, access to assets and influential 
social networks is very important in Mazowe where contracts are offered on an individual basis. This 
exhibits a strong self-selection bias of farmers into contracts, with its consequent bias in resource 
allocation and performance of farmers involved in contract farming. Simmons (2002) argued that 
farmers with the highest incentives enter contracts, suggesting that the most constrained would self-
select to join. However, in the Mazowe case, the well-resourced self-selected and muscled out the poor, 
presumably because the contract offered premium prices and supplementary resources.  
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9.2 Factors that Impact Participation in Contract Farming  
This section reports the results of a multinomial logit regression that tested the proposition that 
contracting terms, household characteristics and initial asset endowments influence the probability of 
farmers taking up contract farming in Mazowe. The model includes farm assets, such as cattle, barns, 
scotch carts and ploughs, because these are the key production resources needed by tobacco growers. 
These assets are difficult to rent or lease during the tobacco production period, and hence, ownership is 
critical, and further, the contractor expects farmers to have these assets. Tobacco barns are specific to 
tobacco curing and have little value in any other agricultural activity. Asset specificity is expected to 
influence the probability of a farmer’s deciding to produce or stay in a contracting arrangement (Lajili 
et al. 1997; Key and Runsten 1999; Bijman 2008; Simmons, Winters, and Patrick 2005); it might also 
lead to outright exclusion as farmers fail to raise the initial capital required for barn construction 
(Narayanan 2014). Cattle play multiple roles in a household’s livelihood strategies: as a source of draft 
power and working capital, or social identity. Cattle also serves as a source of manure, which is 
important for soil fertility and maintenance (Eghball 1999). The ownership of cattle is important for 
farmers who use the plough as the main means of tilling the land; it can also be a source of cash for 
starting tobacco production and investing in productive assets required for tobacco. Consequently, 
contract farmers with high average number of cattle are expected to participate in contracting activities. 
A contracting firm that tries to minimise transaction costs will most likely contract with resource-rich 
farmers to reap the benefits described above. I therefore hypothesise that farmers who are resource-rich 
will access and participate in contract farming arrangements. There is also a possibility that these 
farmers will self-select (Simmons et al. 2005), given the social capital that builds in the community 
(Lyon 2000; Sutherland and Burton 2011). Contract farming literature shows that farmers join contract 
farming to access credit, even if contracting terms are skewed against them. If this is the case, it defeats 
the underlying assumption that farmers are rational beings who would accept contracts that maximise 
their welfare. Barrett et al. (2012:719) commented thus: “A smallholder’s participation in the CFA does 
not imply, however, that he perceives the contract as fair. It merely implies that the smallholder expects 
to be better off with than without the contract.” Some studies on the determinants of contract farming 
participation use nonlinear binary response models, such as binary logit (Saigenji 2012; Abebe et al. 
2013; Swain 2012) and probit (Benfica, Tschirley, and Boughton 2006; Boughton et al. 2007; Miyata, 
Minot, and Hu 2009). A logit model is chosen because “…with its maximum likelihood method it is 
often preferred due to its consistency of parameter estimation associated with the assumption that error 
term v in the equation has a logistic distribution” (Saigenji 2012) citing Ravallion, 2001. Compared to 
probit, a logit model is preferred for small samples for its robustness against multivariate normality.  
Studies on contract farming often compare contract against non-contract farmers. While the definition 
of a contract farmer is clear, the identity of the non-contract farmer remains a grey area. For instance, 
170 
Swinnen and Maertens (2007) refer to “non-contracted activities”, while most studies focus on the 
comparison of contract and non-contract for a similar cash crop. This study uses a multinomial logit 
model to capture a third category that is parties interested in contracting activities, but often not directly 
referred to in other studies. Contract farming is about producing cash crops. Normally crop-specific 
analysis tends to compare people involved in cash crop production leaving out members of the 
community who could have wanted to participate in cash crop production but, either out of preference 
or other conditions, do not. Interviews in Mazowe showed that people not producing tobacco were also 
interested but that they could not clear the first step of getting into cash crop production due to the lack 
of specific assets needed in tobacco farming. I include this group as non-tobacco farmers in the model. 
This creates a dependent variable with three categories non-contract, non-tobacco farmer and contract 
farmer that is my reference category. 
In the preceding section Pearson correlation, results were presented and variables that were significantly 
correlated with farmer status and applied to three categories of farmers in the dependent variable were 
selected for the logit model. I therefore postulate that farmer status (y) is positively affected by 
independent variables (xi) where x is education of household head, economically active members of 
household, A1 or communal area (a proxy for land) and assets categories (livestock, household and 
agricultural assets) which are used to perform a multinomial logistic regression at .05 statistical 
significance level. The study tested the model of the form: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑦 = 1) = log (
𝑝(𝑦 = 1)
1 − (𝑝 = 1)
) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑥 + 𝛽 ∙ 𝑥𝑖2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑝 ∙ 𝑥𝑖2 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1 … 𝑛. 
 
The model fit was significant at X2(16, N=109) =114.212; Nagelkerke of 74.6%, p < .000. The 
Likelihood Ratio Tests showed that all variables chosen explained the model, and as shown in 
Table 9.5, significantly explain the likelihood of farmers joining contract farming. For non-contract 
farmers the settlement area was significant and it explained 46.9 percent of the odds of a farmer 
joining contract farming. Settlement area was insignificant for   non-tobaccco farmers, indicating 
that some people were in non-farm activities or not interested in tobacco production.Farmers who 
owned  livestock were more likely to join contract farming as shown in table 9.5. Household and 
agricultural assets showed that farmers were less likely to join contract farming with a higher 
magnitude for non-tobacco farmers. 
The model indicates that farmers with more assets and land were more likely to participate in contract 
farming than those who are constrained, which confirms earlier studies by Boughton et al. 2007 in 
Mozambique. This also confirms interviews with non-contracted farmers who indicated that they were 
excluded from contracting due to lack of assets, showing that, for contracts to be inclusive, there is a 
need to build poorer members’ assets base, such as cattle ownership, ploughs and land. FTLRP 
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beneficiaries with more land used the opportunities to diversify their livelihood activities including 
participation in market-based agricultural production of other crops, which provided complementary 
income to support tobacco production.  
Education level of the household head is not significant for both non-contract and non-tobacco 
categories, which might indicate that education has no effect as a determining factor in joining contract 
farming. However, qualitative data showed that farmers networked according to their professional roles 
and status, all of which are proxies of education. For non-contract tobacco farmers the variable 
economically active is significant , indicating the importance of family labour in tobacco contract 
farming.   
Table 9-5:  Multinomial Regression Results 
 B(SE) Odd ratio Lower 05%CI Upper 95% 
CI 
Non-contract tobacco vs contract tobacco farmers 
Livestock .189 (.064)** 1.208 1.065 1.37 
Agricultural Assets -.843(.303)** 0.43 0.238 0.779 
Household Assets -557(.232)** 0.573 0.369 0.888 
Settlement Area 2.469(.656)** 11.809 3.269 42.713 
Education Level of 
Household Head 
13.411(407.432) 603429.342 9659046.757 136335487.6 
Economically Active -.514(.232)* 0.598 0.379 0.942 
Non-tobacco farmers vs contract farmers 
Livestock .338(.091)*** 1.402 1.172 1.676 
Agricultural Assets -2.121(.600)*** 0.12 0.037 0.389 
Household Assets -1.754(.525)** 0.173 0.062 0.485 
Settlement Area -16.942(740.085) 4.39E-08 0  
Education Level of 
Household Head 
-2.412(1.943) 0.09 0.02 4.035 
Economically Active -.202(.374) 0.817 0.393 1.698 
** = .05 significance level; *** = .01 significance level 
Source: Author compiled from survey data 
 
9.3 Staying or Exiting the Contract 
When asked whether they wished to produce under contract in the coming farming season (Figure 9-5), 
seven (11%) A1 and communal contract farmers indicated they were quitting contract farming, while 
twenty-one (54%) of non-contract farmers said that they do not intend to join contract farming. The 
reasons advanced by this set of farmers were similar and mainly resulted from dissatisfaction with the 
contracting arrangement. Non-contract (48%) and non-tobacco (75%) farmers who wanted to join 
contract farming shared the same view that they wanted to access resources. Five farmers in the contract 
group changed contractors for want of better service and six moved out to join command agriculture. 
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One contract farmer did not produce tobacco for two successive seasons due to death in the family. He 
said:  
I used all my tobacco income, and sold cattle to pay for the funerals, I cannot even raise the 
necessary resources to look after the extended family, pay for wages or repair my barns. 
(Interview August 8, 2017). 
Risk exposure is a documented constraint in rural agriculture; death in a family can result in withdrawal 
from cash crop production, as happened to the farmer quoted here. Narayanan (2013) explored the 
dynamics of farmer attrition from contract farming in India; the broad categories of risks she observed 
in India were also advanced by farmers in Mazowe.  
 
Figure 9-5: Farmers  Production Status Next Season 
Source: Author from survey data 
In Mazowe, poorer farmers were forced out of contract farming due to defaulting on repayments of 
credit advanced in kind by the contractor. I tracked some of the farmers for in-depth interviews that 
revealed that these farmers joined contract farming without the requisite resources needed for tobacco 
production. Five of these farmers had no tobacco barns of their own; they rented from friends. All the 
farmers who exited had small plots, no scotch cart, cattle or any source of draft power and they relied 
on hiring-in such services. They also did not have enough income to hire-in these services and relied 
on selling or exchanging their labour for these services. They planted, harvested and cured their tobacco 
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late, which in most cases had no adequate inputs applied. As discussed in Chapter 2, these farmers had 
no resources to transfer benefits to those who controlled access to productive resources such as capital 
and labour. One of these farmers, who got into contracting through his chairman said:  
I had no experience in tobacco production, so many things went wrong. I have no cattle or 
money to pay for tillage or workers. I sold some of the inputs, because I thought we would be 
protected and now am in trouble (Interview August 8, 2017). 
Another said:  
I did not have enough resources to farm a half-hectare, so when my tobacco harvest is small, I 
avoid deductions by selling through my neighbour since the contractor refused to renew my 
contract. (Interview August 12, 2017). 
In Chapter 5, the study described the intricate details of tobacco production, which a farmer with no 
resources finds difficult to cope with. Some farmers left contract farming because of setbacks that they 
could not recover from. 
It was interesting that some non-contract farmers did not intend to join contract farming. Most of these 
felt that the contractor was exploitative and cited the potential of losing assets as a risk they would not 
like to take. An elderly farmer said, “I worked very hard to get to where am; I don’t want to wake up 
with nothing. Out of contract I produce what I can and no one pushes me” (Interview September 13, 
2017. 
Another small group moved in and out of contract based on their socio-economic position at the time, 
particularly shocks, such as death in the family, discontentment with the contractor or investment into 
other failed economic ventures. For instance, one farmer who shifted to command agriculture was back 
into contract production for the 2017/2018 season because of the uncertainty in delivery of command 
agriculture inputs. This farmer had this to say: 
“Farming is about prompt delivery of inputs, everything must be done in time, so I came back 
to contract farming where am assured of inputs in good time” (Interview October 23, 2017).  
Non-tobacco farmers from communal lands indicated that, as much as they wanted to produce cash 
crops, land was the limiting factor. Statistically, this group has significantly less land compared to other 
farming categories. 
Though attrition was observed along the lines observed by Narayanan (2013), farmers remained 
involved in agriculture as either tobacco, staple or cash crop producers, and no farmer from the sample 
left agriculture for exclusive non-farm activities. Some upgraded their farming activities to include 
traction services that were hired to other farmers, a scenario similar to what Imbruce (2008) observed 
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in Honduras and Scoones et al. (2018) describe as accumulation from below in Mvurwi. The 
distinguishing fact was access to alternative resources, which helped farmers cope with risks.  
9.4 Conclusion 
This chapter presented results on farmers’ characteristics, selection and participation of farmers into 
contract farming arrangements. It showed that household composition, asset holding, experience, plot 
size, education, other sources of income and social capital affect participation in contract farming. These 
factors interact and are driven by asset endowments of a family. It was observed that access to contracts 
is differentiated along asset holdings of the farmers, and that the networks ascribed by the holding of 
these assets (meaning those with better initial asset holdings) were more likely to enter and successfully 
participate in tobacco contracts. Contracting terms favoured those farmers with large tracts of land, and 
these were mostly FTLRP beneficiaries. FTLRP beneficiaries had more assets derived from the land, 
which influenced them to join contract farming because they had enough land to allocate to tobacco 
while retaining some for subsistence production. 
This has implications on social differentiation within communities as the poor are excluded for lack of 
assets creating social strata where the better-off become employers and the poor are workers, as 
discussed in Chapter 8. In Chapter 8, the study showed that the differential access to contracts resulted 
in differential outcomes in tobacco output and income. The discussion in this chapter sets out the basis 
for exchanges that evolved and were discussed in chapter 8, as Sen (1981) observed exchange benefits 
are best understood from the ‘ownership bundles’ which are the factors described in this chapter. This 
chapter showedthat ‘a bundle of powers’ held by a farmer were the key determinant of theirparticipation 
and performance under contract, showing the predictive power of access theory. 
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Chapter 10  
Findings, Discussion and Conclusion 
10.0 Introduction 
This study set out to investigate household and community effects of contract farming within the context 
of the FTLRP. Specifically, how peasant farmers got to negotiate participation into capitalist 
agricultural production and the effects of such participation on the contracted households and the 
community at large. The research question framing this case study aims to extend the dichotomous 
microanalysis of contract farming to broader community livelihood effects, thus extending the 
“threshold effect” (Benfica, Tschirley, and Boughton 2006) analysis from household to community. To 
achieve this, this thesis answered the research question; “What are the household and community effects 
of contract farming arrangements in Mazowe?” The question was aimed at understanding the processes 
that farmers follow to get into contract farming, their performance and ultimately the impact of 
participating in contract farming. The change in land owership from LSCF (who produced 95% 
ofthetobaccobefore FTLRP) to A1 amd A2 farmers after the FTLRP resulted the re-entry of capitalist 
agriculture system in tobacco production. This  revitalised smallholder tobacco production, and 
benefited the Mazowe commuity. Access to land was central to farmers’ participation, performance and 
outcomes from tobacco production. 
This study was done within an access theory framework (Ribot and Peluso 2003) to allow for the 
tracking of mechanisms and processes of access, role of resource endowment in participation and 
outcomes of contract farming, and the distribution of value among contracting parties and the 
community in general. The study hyphothesised that contract farming benefits households and rural 
communities. The study tested this using access analysis to gain a deeper understanding of economic 
and socio-political power relations governing multiple actors’ roles, participation and outcomes from 
contract farming. As predicted by the access theory framework, the study found that social relationships 
were important in farmers’ participation and exchanges with the capitalist system of contract farming. 
Mazowe is a dynamic heterogeneous, rural community comprising FTLRP beneficiaries and communal 
lands that provided an ideal setting for testing the effect of capital injection on livelihoods in a dual 
rural set-up with differential land holdings. The FTLRP resulted in redistribution of land, which 
consequently increased farmers’ land holdings and became one “strand” that facilitated participation of 
peasant farmers in contract farming arrangements (Sukume et al. 2015; Scoones et al. 2018; Sachikonye 
2016; Moyo 2011a), and, as observed by Sachikonye (1989), performance was influenced by class and 
the capitals held by the farmers. This study used a case study approach, given that contract farming is 
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deemed context-specific (Scoones 2009) and resource access dynamics are space-specific (Ribot and 
Peluso 2003), coupled with mixed method data collection and analysis techniques. All this from a realist 
approach (Maxwell 2004a) to gain deeper insights from respondents on how contract farming affected 
their livelihoods. A concurrent triangulation design was used to collect data, which was then merged at 
the analysis stage. It was observed that tobacco farmers are a heterogeneous group whose participation, 
performance and outcomes (including livelihood strategies) from tobacco production and marketing are 
influenced by access to initial resource endowments. Access to productive resources was both uneven 
and contested, with visible competition and contestation among various classes, mainly due to 
dysfunctional input and output markets (Moyo 2011a).  
The data revealed that A1 contract farmers outperformed communal ones, and a similar result was 
observed for A1 non-contract farmers’ vis-à-vis the communal, though the difference was marginal. I 
chapter 9, it was shown that the factors of production which constitutes ‘a budle of power held by the 
farmers favoured FTLRP beneficiaries with those contracted benefiting the most. This shows the 
importance of resource-backed access to land under the FTLRP. Resource endowments provide a 
‘strand’ through which farmers gain and maintain access to contract farming, at the same time 
establishing control over the use of income that arises from participation in it. For instance, the FTLRP 
was central in availing land used by farmers for commercial tobacco production, as well as building 
assets before they joined contract farming. Access analysis allows for the analysis of ‘mechanisms’ and 
‘strands’ through which FTLRP-induced interaction of local livelihoods strategies affect dynamics of 
contract farming participation and outcomes. From this perspective, the thesis argues that household 
resource endowments are the key drivers of contract farming participation and the resultant outcomes. 
Consequently, the success and outcome of contract farming is dependent on farmers’ access to 
productive assets (Scoones, Mavedzenge, and Murimbarimba 2017).  
This study shows that resource-rich farmers benefited from contract farming and invested their lump 
sum cash earnings, which had strong spillover effects to the community through income effects and 
related consumption decisions. The majority middle farmers were dependent on the contractor; and 
struggling to cope with the demands of contract farming because of limited access to productive 
resources. The middle farmers had no other alternative sources of capital besides the contractor and 
their minimal household resources. The struggles of the middle farmer reflected the unfair contractual 
arrangement, which favoured the contractor, who held disproportionate power in the determination of 
the credit/input quantum, cost of input/service supplied, and grading and pricing of produce, all of which 
led to indebtedness by the farmers. The aforementioned problems show that the re-entry of capital in 
agricultural production has not changed as it continue to supply minimal resources, with farmers still 
bearing risks as was in earlier tea and sugar contract farming relations (Sachikonye 1991; Jackson and 
Cheater 1994). For tobacco what has evidently changed is the over tenfold increase in farmers after 
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FTLRP, and the financing model.  The high number of producers benefited the community; from 
improved access to services, food security and employment availed as a result of community members 
participating in contract farming. This chapter concludes the thesis by providing a summary of key 
findings, brief discussion of empirical findings, contribution, policy implications and areas of further 
research. 
10.1 Summary of Key Findings 
The re-entry of capitalist system and the change in the financing model (contract farming) for tobacco 
production had mixed outcomes for farmers and community as presented in this findings section. 
Through social relationships, some farmers participated  and benefited from contract farming through 
legal or illicit means, while the majority struggled. Those who struggled, were sustained through their 
social relationships with their compatriots. Farmers with access to resources accessed contract 
farming, and depending on the quantum of their resources benefited or stayed in exploitative 
contractual arrangements because they had no alternative sources to finance tobacco production. A 
comparative analysis of the results revealed that A1 beneficiaries outperformed their communal 
counter parts in production and marketing outcomes. This trend was also observed in the influence 
A1 farmers had in negotiating access to resources such as labour and barter exchange transactions. 
This showed that access to land through the FTLRP enhanced A1 farmers social relationships, and gave 
them a leverage in negotiating for resources 
10.1.1 Contract Farming Benefited the Community  
Contract farming had positive effects on food security and rural employment, due to the network, 
income and expenditure effects of contract farmers. Further, investments in complementary agricultural 
services, transport and retail activities provided employment to the community thus creating a virtuous 
cycle of development through spillover effects within the community.  The findings reflected a ‘strand’ 
which could be traceable from resources to effects of contract farming as described by Ribot and Peluso 
(2003). Asset endowments, power, and social relations were the key drivers of both households and 
community effects which confirmed the prescriptions of access theory discussed in chapter 2. Contract 
farming provided vital resources which differentiated household performance and their impact on 
community economic activities. However, in all this power imbalances resulted in unfavourable 
contracting terms which subdued some of the positive household and community effects from contract 
farming. 
10.1.1.1 Contract Farming Improved Food Security 
Contract farming had a positive effect on food security for both contracted and non-contracted members 
of the community. This was made possible by the supply of staple food inputs by the contractor, and 
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the interlinked barter exchange market for food, land and labour. The price of staple food remained at 
US$3 a bucket throughout the year and was below the market price, which enabled the poor to access 
food either through food-for-work or outright purchase. This finding is contrary to critics of contract 
farming, who argue that it causes food insecurity. For example, Mazwi, Chambati, and Mutodi (2018), 
observed that contract farming threatened food security and contract farmers in Zvimba and Goromonzi 
were reported being food-deficient. The differences in findings are interesting; however, two issues 
could explain the difference: first, the supply of staple food inputs and, second, the 45 percent of land 
allocated to tobacco against the average 30 percent in Mazowe. As postulated by access theory, the 
ability to access to inputs was important for increasing productivity. However, the increased production 
and income noted in the Zvimba/Goromonzi study could compensate for staple food production 
deficiencies if the Pinstrup-Anderson (1983) criteria detailed on page 181 above are met. Further, it 
could improve food security, as discussed in section 10.2.5.1. 
In addition to the primary effects through the direct production of food, benefits were also observed in 
secondary food transactions. Production and market synergies were also observed in Mazowe with the 
poor exchanging their labour for staple food or inputs, which improved food security in the area. This 
trend reflects the distribution of a stream-benefits depicted by Figure 2.1. This shows that by expending 
resources farmers generate benefits as suggested by access theory. 
10.1.1.2 Community Benefited from Networks Spillover Effects 
Contract farming resulted in dissemination of information and knowledge among tobacco producers 
and would-be producers through field days and demonstration plots, which were open to all farmers in 
the community. Following these demonstration plots, farmers with surplus inputs shared with those 
who could not afford to run a seedling nursery, thus further benefiting disadvantaged members albeit in 
an input-labour exchange arrangement. The transfer of technology extended to cash crops because of 
food crop input supplies. 
Farmers with no grower numbers, indebted, and those who simply wanted to get a premium price from 
contractors, sold their tobacco through contracted farmers. This helped integrate the poor into markets, 
though in an informal way. As a result, some among the poor managed to slowly accumulate assets and 
register as independent growers. This relationship favoured the contract farmers, who were paid a 
commission for providing this service. Through networks, farmers accessed resources, such as tilling 
services, firewood transportation, tobacco grading and sharing of other farm assets, most of which were 
linked to labour exchanges which benefited the resource-rich smallholders the most. The Community 
benefited through artisanal skills training like building. 
179 
10.1.1.3 Investment by Contract Farmers had Positive Externalities on the Community 
Contract farmers accounted for most benefits accruing to the community through on-farm jobs created 
as farmers diversified and expanded their cash crop production. Further, these farmers invested in non-
farm activities that provided employment and services that provided income to the poor who managed 
to smooth their consumption. Other community members responded to the increased flow in income by 
establishing businesses, such as schools, garages and retail outlets. This further created jobs and income 
for the community. 
10.1.2 Farmers Investment Patterns were Influenced by Resources  
Differential tobacco income and resource endowments affected the investment pattern of community 
members, who could broadly be categorised as accumulators, middle farmer and subsistence, that is 
those who were living from hand to mouth. This thesis showed that accumulators had diversified 
investment portfolios ranging from agricultural enhancing assets and non-farm assets and businesses, 
while the majority middle farmers invested in activities that reproduced the family, and their non-farm 
activities were of minimal value. The third group lived from hand to mouth, with a few who were 
investing in improving their housing. 
Differentials in human capital investment were telling: accumulators were able to send their children to 
better schools and tertiary institutions thus perpetuating social differentiation within the community. 
Education is a facilitator of entry into non-farm employment and activities, which is deemed better 
rewarding. The lower group which was just surviving sent their children to local schools; but of concern, 
was the fact that these children were, at times, withdrawn to provide labour during school hours further 
diminishing their opportunities of climbing the livelihood ladder. However, they benefited from 
investments made by the elite group that provided them with employment opportunities and other 
livelihood supporting exchanges, such as labour-maize barter.  
10.1.3 Access to FTLRP Land and Inputs Allowed Farmers to Build Assets and 
Expand Production 
On average, A1 farmers had bigger plots, accessed during the FTLRP. It was observed that some of 
these farmers used these plots to build more assets before and after joining contract farming. These 
farmers had bigger plots under tobacco, produced a variety of cash crops and had surplus staple food. 
Large plots enabled them to practice crop rotation thus managing the prevalence of diseases and 
improving their yields and quality of tobacco. This earned them better prices at the auction floors. 
These farmers got favourable contract terms in terms of input supply due to their good performance. 
Access to these inputs allowed them to diversify economic activities, both farm and non-farm. As a 
result, they generated more community benefits as reported above. Ownership of land therefore created 
180 
a virtuous cycle of asset ownership, good exchange entitlements and control of labour within the 
community. This ‘virtuous cycle’ is typical of the access theory model described in chapter 2, and 
depicted in Figure 1. As shown in access theory this multifaceted control of resources increases holders’ 
benefits.   
10.1.4 Initial Asset Endowments Increased Likelihood of Farmer Participation 
in Contract Farming  
Initial asset endowments of farmers increased the probability of farmer participation in tobacco contract 
farming and asset-rich farmers were more likely to enter and stay in these contracting arrangements 
while the poor exit. Those who acquired land after the FTLRP had better chances of enrolling and 
participating in contract farming activities. First, the contracting terms offered by the contractor 
required farmers with assets and experience in tobacco production, which meant a farmer would have 
acquired specific assets, such as tobacco barns, and generic agricultural assets, such as scotch carts and 
cattle necessary to produce tobacco. This study showed that those with more cattle and other agricultural 
assets got into contract farming given the start-up capital required to start tobacco production. For non-
tobacco farmers, lack of access to land was one of the most critical assets that affected their entry into 
contract farming. Most non-contract farmers in communal lands had inadequate access to land, 
preventing them from entering or expanding tobacco production. This thesis showed that this was 
because land was important for crop rotation and food production, which was always a priority, and 
hence, non-tobacco farmers never attempted to join contract farming or diversify their cropping 
patterns, while non-contract farmers prioritised food crop production. It was argued that contractor and 
farmer-self-selection bias influenced the selection of farmers into contracts, given the use of a referral 
system in picking beneficiaries, which excluded the poor who lacked social capital endowments. 
Contractors preferred farmers with access to productive resources. While this is understandable for a 
crop with asset-specific investments, such as tobacco, the poorer members of the community are 
generally excluded from contracting activities. 
Access to contract resources, such as inputs, was based on prior-year farmer performance, which 
determined the set of inputs advanced on credit. This affected the farmer’s performance and continued 
stay in contracting activities. The differential provision of credit resulted in differential production 
outcomes and emerging social differentiation among and within farmer groups. This thesis showed that 
the middle farmer was into contract farming for the inputs, showing their need for credit if they were to 
effectively participate in cash crop production. However, the elite farmers were more concerned with 
the supplementary resources and price premium offered by the contractor.  
10.1.5 Contract Farmers had Superior Production and Income Outcomes  
On average, contract farmers had superior production and income outcomes, this confirms similar 
observations by Scoones et al. 2018 for A1 farmers in Mvurwi. Due to selection bias problems causality 
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could not be conclusively established from regression analysis.  However, using life history and field 
observations farmers confirmed the importance of contract farming in their income and production 
outcomes. Underlying higher production was access to land, which enabled farmers to expand 
production plots when credit was advanced by the contractor. For example, FTLRP A1-contract farmers 
realised better incomes (mean US$8993.24) compared to communal contract farmers (US$4526.09) 
due to high output. The resultant high output maximised the use of other assets, such as barns, and 
hence, the quality of the tobacco produced, which attracted better prices at the auction floors. Those 
with small plots could not expand production even if credit was available, leaving them with low output 
to take to the market.  
The grading and classification of tobacco at the auction floors affected the price offered at both the 
auction and contract floors. Again, this could be traced back to lack of resources on the part of farmers 
who had no grading sheds, or adequate curing facilities or labour to handle their crop, on time which is 
sensitive to time and exposure to weather. At the floors, it was observed that elite farmers were paid 
above-average prices, while most peasants were paid average to below-average prices, which was 
attributed to poor handling and grading of their tobacco. Prices were further distorted by the poor market 
transmission price mechanism (FAO 2014), dwindling quantities offered at auction floors, and the 
domination by contractors in both markets distorted the prices 
Peasant farmers responded to the average to below-average prices through collaborations where farmers 
assisted colleagues sell to the highest buyer in a process they called kuberekana (see also Sakata 2018). 
This study argued that this was beyond side-marketing and more of a price risk management tool that 
helped farmers improve their earnings. It was a response to deemed unfair pricing by contractors. It was 
argued that it helped poorer members of the community, who produced tobacco either through share-
cropping, independently or as part of a labour-land rental arrangement, participate in markets. Through 
networks, peasants were able to improve their livelihood options.  
It was shown that, added to contested prices on grades, farmers were also disgruntled by the lack of 
cash payments, which they claimed were important for transacting purposes in rural areas. The study 
has shown that this affected their capacity to access services in communal areas, as a result being 
charged premium prices when paying for goods at retail outlets who applied a three-tier pricing system. 
Overall, non-contract farmers had a risky journey to the floors, starting with transport arrangements, 
putting-up with middle-men who demanded bribes to facilitate good prices, and spending time at the 
floors. Contract farmers benefited from the facilitation of the contractor. It was observed that the 
marketing process disadvantaged non-contract farmers in terms of the take-home price through payment 
of bribes, and, at times, commission for the assisted sales, compared to contract farmers for whom prices 
were generally higher. This affected non-contract farmers’ livelihood options and investment in 
agriculture and non-farm activities. 
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10.1.6 Farmer Characteristics Affect Selection and Participation in Contract 
Farming 
In this study, gender and age were not correlated with contract farming participation. This was 
surprising, given the importance of land, and the fact that the FTLRP discriminated against women and 
the youth (Moyo 2011a; Mutopo 2011). Evidence from interviews, however, showed that these 
variables matter in negotiating access to contract farming and building networks. This confirms 
Mutami’s (2015) findings that household characteristics influence agriculture. For instance, if women 
were discriminated against during the FTLRP, they would not have enough land to engage in 
agricultural based production to generate income and assets on like their male counterparts, which, in 
turn, led to discrimination in contract farming arrangements. Household characteristics, such as 
education and profession, played an important part in accessing resources through social networks. In 
this study, it was argued that contractors’ agents played an important role in the selection process of 
farmers, a finding that resonates with Sakata’s (2018) observation in Mashonaland East, Zimbabwe. As 
a result, farmers who met contractor specifications were included in schemes, which often excluded the 
poorly resourced farmers and women with no assets. In Chapter 7, it was shown that contracting terms 
favoured the contractor and were favourable to those with resources hence this was telling in allocation 
of resources. 
Farmers had little discretion in the choice to participate in contract farming. This was mainly due to 
credit market failures within the Zimbabwean economy, which resulted in competition for contracts 
offered by the contractors. The influence of the contracting arrangement is evident, as 84 percent of 
farmers now market their produce under contract, and the number of contractors and contracted 
producers is on the increase (TIMB 2017). For poorly resourced peasants, the need for inputs resulted 
in farmer-dependence, indebtedness and stay in exploitative contract farming arrangements.  
10.2 Discussion 
This section provides a discussion and interpretation of findings of this thesis. The mixed methods 
approach produced results that converged to the importance of initial asset endowments in farmer 
participation and contract farming outcomes. Isolated divergent findings are discussed in the relevant 
sections. Using the access theory framework (Ribot and Peluso 2003) together with realist techniques 
(Maxwell 2013; Patton 2015; Emmel 2013) like life history and observations (Prowse and Camfield 
2009); the study tracked processes and mechanisms of which the observed outcomes were attributed. 
The study confirms the importance of social relationships in accessing production resources, contract 
farming, and farmers responses to exploitative exchange relations as suggested by access theory (Ribot 
and Peluso 2003). Social relationships are a form of social capital as described by Sutherland and Burton 
(2011). It involves knowledge, identities and status which are said to form cultural capital and is 
important in accessing resources like labour, finance and technology through interations within a 
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community. This is important for facilitating economic transaction as observed in Mazowe.  Further, 
the results show that farmers resorted to social relationships to fight back unfair pricing by contractors, 
gain entry and maintain status in contracting arrangements. As argued by Berry (1993) farmers relied 
on social relationships, networks and identity to access labour and other opportunities in tobacco 
marketing. The results show that those who accessed land during the FTLRP benefited the most from 
contract farming, were more likely to acquire productive assets and fruitfully participate in contract 
farming arrangements. All this constituted ‘a  bundle of powers’ held by farmers which was important 
for their participation in contract farming. The interdependence of contract farming and FTLRP was 
evident throughout this study. The high number of FTLRP beneficiaries engaged in tobacco production 
employed more people and demanded more services (Moyo 2004), all which benefited the community. 
However, this depended on their ability to negotiate various mechanisms and strands of access (Ribot 
and Peluso 2003).  
According to (Moyo 2004: 4), “lack of access to land and, inadequate strategies to mobilize financial 
and human resources to effectively develop the land economy are a fundamental constraint” to 
smallholders’ quest for a better livelihood and fight against poverty. This study shows that the FTLRP 
and contract farming helped provide a platform to a possible resolution of this concern, though with 
differential effects, influenced by political and socio-economic factors affecting access to resources 
(Ribot and Peluso 2003; Berry 1993). Results of this study confirm the interdependence of capital and 
land reform discussed in chapter 3, 4 and 5. 
The FTLRP was the major determinant in farmers’ participation in contract farming. As observed by 
Zikhali (2010), A1 farmers were more productive than their communal counterparts. It provided the 
land to farm and build assets, all of which were a requirement to join contract farming. Further, it was 
the main factor in the ‘bundle of powers’ that attracted contractors to Mazowe, and hence, the growth 
in grower numbers (45.88%) was well above the national average (32%). This showed that quality of 
land was a pull factor for contractors, which could also explain the increase in uptake of tobacco crop 
by beneficiaries of the FTLRP. It also explains the re-entry of capital and its incorporation of 
smallholder farmers who were now controlling the land. To make profit capital had to mutates to the 
dictates of the new land holding structure.  
As shown in this study, land was central to the performance of the elite farmers, which underlines the 
importance of land reform complemented by adequate building of farmers’ productive assets. Access 
to land is important for smallholder integration in agricultural markets, as shown by Sikor and Tuong 
VI (2005) in the case of Vietnamese farmers. The downside to lucrative tobacco contract farming could 
be land concentration and exclusion of the poor from tobacco contracts (Carter and Mesbah 1993, Singh 
and Prowse 2013). The development of a land market observed in this study could result in land 
concentration as elite farmers rent-in more land. This study showed that FTLRP beneficiaries were able 
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to practice crop rotation, which helped maintain soil structure and fertility and expand production, 
which helped farmers increase income. FTLRP distributed land among many small scale farmers, 
leading to increased uptake of tobacco production under contract, and employment of more labour thus 
benefiting the community members (Moyo 2004). 
Contract farming participation and outcomes are driven by initial resource endowments of the farmer, 
of which most are derived from the land.  As per access theory, the elites who controlled these resources 
captured most of the contracts and benefits, while most of the peasant contract farmers were just 
breaking even, and the poor were excluded. This is not surprising given Mafeje’s (2003) 
characterisation of rural communities with ‘middle’ and ‘poor’ peasants, with the former accessing and 
controlling more productive resources. Mafeje argues that the poor have poor agricultural outcomes 
only because they lack productive resources, a scenario observed in Mazowe. This differential asset-
base was observed by Moyo (2011) in Zimbabwe after the FTLRP. The FTLRP provided a critical asset 
for smallholder integration into markets resulting in “…enormous expansion in contract farming 
arrangements” (Sachikonye 2016: 87) and enormous transformation of  the labour market as more than 
ten fold smallholder capitalist tobacco producers hired more labour (Moyo 2004).  
Some of those who accessed land during the FTLRP and acquired productive assets, attracted 
contractors who offered lucrative contracts which included tobacco and staple food inputs. These 
farmers hired labour thus creating employment for the community. For instance, as discussed in section 
8.1.1, those with land were able to expand plots under tobacco production without compromising their 
food production. These farmers were also able to control community labour using maize as a mechanism 
of access. Some were forced to negotiate land rentals or sharecropping in exchange for labour or food 
in a virtuous circle that favoured the landed. Further, informal land deals (Mkodzongi 2018) provided 
access to land. Therefore, land became a multidimensional mechanism of access to resources, such as 
contracts, labour and staple food, reflecting Berry (1993)’s proposition on elites commanding a 
following and, more important, it generated spillover effects for the community.  
In this study, there is evidence that initial peasant capitals (derived from the FTLRP) affects contract 
farming participation and outcomes, which affects choice of livelihood strategies adopted by farmers’ 
post-contract farming. Providing inputs on credit, contract farming allows resource-rich farmers to 
invest their lump sum earnings in diverse income-generating portfolios. However, resource-poor 
‘middle-farmers’ discussed in Chapter 8 could end up in a debt trap and dependent on the contractor 
(Yeros 2018) to continue in tobacco production because they have no viable livelihood alternatives. 
However, despite struggling under contract, these farmers contributed to community through 
employment generation. Literature shows the importance of asset endowments (Benfica, Tschirley, and 
Boughton 2006; Boughton et al. 2007; Scoones et al. 2018) and elite capture of rural development 
initiatives (Bernstein and Oya 2014; Sulle 2017; Swain 2012), which explains the differential benefits 
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accruing to contracted farmers. While this explains the differentials observed among contract farmers, 
elements of conspicuous consumption could also explain why poor farmers fail to build capital (Prowse 
2009). This points to the importance of the five capitals (Bebbington 1999; Chambers and Conway 
1992; Scoones 1998) which Vicol (2015) interrogated in a thesis based on potato farmers in India. 
Results from this study show that land reform as described in Chapter 3 provides a platform for 
smallholder accumulation.  
10.2.1 Community Spillover Effects of Contract Farming  
As discussed above FTLRP resulted in large numbers of farmers producing for the market and with 
resources provided by contractors, they provided jobs and services that benefited the community.  
Contract farming affects communities through spillover effects that emanate from efficiency and equity 
effects resulting from resource provisions by the contractor (Swinnen and Maertens 2007). Contract 
farming is central to farmers’ accumulation patterns, as it releases complementary finances to diversify 
their portfolios and fills in a gap in their ‘bundle of powers’. Financial additionality was central to this 
accumulation pattern (Moyo 2014) and changing livelihood strategies within the Mazowe community. 
It was observed that this expenditure pattern resulted in changes in labour markets, access to services 
and developing microenterprises, all riding on the success of tobacco contract farming in the 
community.  
Evidence from interviews showed that contract farmers produced surplus food, which was traded in 
exchange for labour or outright cash transactions thus guaranteeing food security for the community. 
This was a result of technology and staple-food input supplies by the contractor, with spillover effects 
to food crop production (Swinnen and Maertens 2007). Yield of maize increased due to fertilizer 
retained in the soil after crop rotation. Contract and non-contract farmers attended field days together, 
thus benefiting from teachings arranged for by the contractor. This shows the importance of social 
relationships that generated positive cognitive effects, and access to capital in the form of contracts. 
Inasmuch as there was competition for contracts in Mazowe, contractors also competed for the best 
farmers, thus creating further spillover effects in the form of inputs and services accruing to farmers 
(Swinnen and Vendaplas 2006) and subsequently to the community through social learning effects 
(Krishnan and Patnam 2013).  
The scenario in Mazowe fits the four criteria pathways through which export crops, such as tobacco, 
affect nutrition. They are “…(i) food availability; (ii) ability of the household to obtain food; (iii) desire 
to obtain food; and (iv) intra-household food distribution” (Pinstrup-Anderson 1983:3); all of which 
were met in Mazowe. While there is no counterfactual data to the contrary, contract farming, as reported 
by Scoones et al. (2018), played a major role in this situation.  
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Food first proponents argue that food security is compromised by “…contracting rich, fertile land” to 
produce food that is not consumed locally (Collins and Lappe 1977:4,7), which could be accompanied 
by reduction in area under food production. Unlike the Lappe and Collins’ concern, however, the 
provision of inputs and crop rotation of tobacco ensured stable maize production. Further, farmers had 
access to more fertile and larger size plots, which allowed them to maintain or even surpass staple food 
production before the FTLRP. However, as noted by Mafeje (2003), only 20 percent of African land is 
fertile and suitable for agricultural production, which could mean continued that expansion of tobacco 
contract farming could impact national food production in the long-term. Weak land tenure systems 
could also contribute to food security concerns (Cotula, Dyer, and Vermuelen 2008) as demand and 
competition for productive farm land increases. Research still need to inform this. 
Increased income had a positive effect on the consumption of manufactured products (Nieuwoudt and 
Vink 1989; van Zyl et al. 1991), which allowed even the poor to access food either through exchange 
of their labour for commodities or earned income. Access to food was assured through improved 
productivity, income and employment opportunities offered to the poor, albeit through self-exploitation 
by the latter. As shown by van Zyl et al. (1991) and Nieuwoudt and Vink (1989) for South Africa, 
increased agricultural income has a positive effect on consumption and, by extension, investment in the 
supply of consumer goods. This was the case in Mazowe as locals, both tobacco and non-tobacco 
farmers, responded to the increased tobacco income investing in different activities to service the 
community, a process that led to spillover effects discussed below.  
Elite contract farmers diversified their agricultural and non-farm activities, intensifying their 
commercialisation efforts and, in the process, hiring more labour and providing services to the 
community. Farmers’ expenditure contributes to community development, absorbing the poor as labour, 
and through networks providing farming inputs to workers in exchange for their labour. The contractor 
provided staple food inputs, which also supported food security within the community. 
The superior income received by contract farmers was invested in agricultural development and non-
farm microenterprises, which influenced the household’s reproductive and accumulation capacity 
(Scoones, Mavedzenge, and Murimbarimba 2017; Bebbington 1999). Nieuwoudt and Vink (1989) 
argued that such households (surplus producing) invest in agriculture-enhancing activities further 
employing more labour. This study showed that contract farmers with more income invested in diverse 
cash crops, which found a market at the auction floors in Harare. Some of these investments had 
spillover effects to the community due to their service- and employment-generating capacity. Heald 
(1991), in a study of tobacco farmers in Kuria, Kenya, observed that levels of investment were class-
related and are related to the level of surplus generated, as the Mazowe case. Similar class-related 
investment was observed by Scoones et al. (2018) in Mvurwi, Zimbabwe, and they showed that different 
social groups benefited differently from tobacco at the back of their resource holding and access to 
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contract farming. Mutenje et al. (2010), in a Zimbabwean study found that household resource 
endowments influenced their investment in non-farm activities, a result confirmed by this study for 
farmers diversifying their livelihoods. 
Daniels (2003), in a study in Zimbabwe, observed that participation in small-scale industries depended 
on farm income and those with higher incomes tended to invest in capital-intensive enterprises, just like 
the Mazowe top earners. However, certain activities depend on labour held by the household who 
invested in low-value microenterprises, such as vegetable sales and roadside vending. In Mazowe, 
investments by farmers were in line with farmers’ income levels, and contract farmers tended to invest 
in capital-intensive activities compared to their counterparts in the sample. 
Investment patterns among elite farmers showed traits of accumulating from below (Sachikonye 2016) 
and the formation of a rural capitalist class (Kennedy and Cogill 1987). However, the majority were 
breaking even and hung on to contract farming for the inputs to ensure household reproduction. The 
communal farmers performed the worst, presumably due to low land holdings, though a TIMB (2017) 
report shows an upward trajectory in the share of production by communal farmers. This shows that, 
through experience, technology adoption affects accumulation from below, which is gaining 
momentum courtesy of contract farming, which has also had positive effects on food security. Over 
time there is possibility of the ‘middle’ farmers catching up considering that they managed to build 
enough capital to enter contract farming. 
This study showed that transport businesses, market stalls and roadside activities created wage-based 
livelihoods for the community. These are examples of spillover effects. On-farm activities, such as barn 
servicing and construction of rocket barns, were also a source of artisanal jobs, which complement jobs 
in service industries, such as vehicle maintenance. All this was made possible because of the 72 percent 
cash injection by contractors in the Mazowe economy. Discussion on access theory (Ribot and Peluso 
2003) showed that actors in contract farming were able to extract benefits from the value chain, as 
farmers transfer/pay to access services. 
Investment in businesses improved mobility within the community allowing for the ease of movement 
of goods to markets. This thesis showed that tobacco farmers sold other agricultural products to markets 
in Harare and that contract farming was an enabler as it provided the extra financial resources that 
allowed farmers to expand into these operations. However, livelihood activities were class related with 
the elite involved in high value commerce activities while the poor engaged in natural resource-based 
trading. This exacerbated social differentiation, though food security was assured. 
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10.2.2 The Fast Track Land Reform Programme Determined Initial Asset 
Endowments of Farmers 
Initial asset holdings were important for farmer selection, participation, stay and performance in tobacco 
contract farming in Mazowe. Evidence presented in Chapter 9 shows the complementarity of farmers’ 
initial livelihood conditions and contract farming participation, which, ANOVA and logit results 
showed, were significantly different, and those with assets were more likely to be in contract farming. 
This is in line with Benfica, Tschirley, and Boughton’s (2006) and Boughton et al.’s (2007) studies in 
Mozambique, which showed that asset endowments were important for farmers’ participation in 
agricultural markets. Adjognon Adjognon (2012:15) summed it up when observing: “…higher income 
per capita in contract farming may merely reflect the fact that more industrious or more skilled 
farmers have a greater likelihood of becoming contract farmers.” Land is an important initial asset 
and, in Zimbabwe, access to land through the FTLRP resulted in increased participation of peasant 
farmers in contract farming (Moyo 2009; Sachikonye 2016; Scoones et al. 2011).  
Farmers in A1 resettlements built-up agricultural productive assets from land acquired from the 
FTLRP prior to joining contract farming (Scoones et al. 2011; Scoones et al. 2018; Moyo 2011a). 
Zikhali (2010), using descriptive statistics and econometric models, showed that A1-resettled 
farmers were more productive and were accumulating assets at a faster rate than their communal 
counterparts within a similar agroecological zone. She attributed this to differential use of 
fertilisers, labour productivity and some unobservable factors. Mkodzongi (2013) attributed 
differential farmer-performance to patronage and initial wealth at the time of farm invasions. This 
study compared like with like, for instance, contract farmers with similar input packages from the 
contractor, and still found A1 to be more productive, suggesting that one of the unobservable 
factors in Zikhali (2010)’s study could be access to better quality, bigger plots of land provided 
under the FTLRP, and initial assets (Mkodzongi 2018). Consequently, FTLRP beneficiaries used 
their control of land and assets to access productive resources that allowed them to benefit from 
land and generate benefits for the community as discussed in Chapter 2. 
Evidence from Chapter 9 showed that farmers with good social standing and access to assets and 
networks were more likely to join and benefit from contract farming in Mazowe leading to better 
incomes. This finding contradicts findings by Shonhe (2017) and Vicol (2015) in Wedza and India, 
respectively. However, the finding in this study is consistent with the middle farmer 
characterisation (Heald 1991; Mafeje 2003; Mkodzongi 2018) and Moyo (2011a)’s observation of 
the uneven access and competition for inputs among elite and poor farmers after the FTLRP in 
Zimbabwe. This is also consistent with access theory wherein the control of access mechanisms by 
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the elite allowed them to benefit from contract farming. Further, the FTLRP’s disruptive tendencies 
left farmers with no alternative finance capital.  
Income from other sources show the same pattern where A1 contract farmers dominate. In addition 
to the FTLRP, remittances and other non-farm activities facilitated accumulation of initial capital 
by elite farmers (Mafeje 2003), who participated in contract farming. In Mvurwi, (Scoones et al. 
2018:9) noted that “…those able to afford inputs, gain access to contracts, and grow sufficient maize 
to cover food needs can profit significantly from tobacco”, a trend observed in Mazowe. This shows 
that family labour efficiency alone propounded under the inverse-farm relationship (Chapter 3), is not 
enough; farmers need resources to access labour, for instance. Further, Zikhali (2010) indicated that A1 
farmers got preference in government input schemes, which could have set them on a good trajectory 
to acquire assets at a faster rate than the communal farmers. As observed by Ribot and Peluso (2003), 
access to such resources is a negotiated process between those who control and users, which is normally 
contested, as observed by Moyo (2011) after the FTLRP. This also accounted for the differentiation of 
farmers and the community at large. In Zimbabwe, Scoones et al. (2018) observed that FTLRP 
beneficiaries improved and diversified their livelihoods due to their increased land holdings, an 
important asset in cash crop production. More important was that the FTLRP allowed farmers to acquire 
complementary assets before entering contracts. TIMB (2017) records show that, despite 83 196 
smallholder farmers producing on 66.45 percent (75 836 hectares) of land under tobacco, they get 55 
percent of income, and 13 870 FTLRP-commercial farmers producing on 33.55 percent (34 977 
hectares) take 44.99 percent of the income. Access to contract farming by smallholders improved the 
share of income as the reverse was true in prior years (TIMB 2016b).  
Land is important for crops such as tobacco, which thrive on crop rotation, and the size of land holdings 
becomes an important variable both for participation decisions and performance of the farmer. It was 
then not surprising that, among the contracted farmers’, higher performers were in FTLRP settlements 
areas, where plots are bigger than in communal areas. Some came from urban areas, while some of 
these farmers were local, emerging ‘middle farmers’ keen on investing and diversifying their economic 
portfolios (Jayne et al. 2016). However, it was evident that land reform with no complementary resource 
provisioning (discussed in Chapter 3) will not result in instant success for the poor peasants; it can only 
benefit the rich peasant. Hence Mamdani (2009:8) observed that success of land reform “… depends 
on providing subsidise to small farmers”. Through time, the FTLRP allowed farmers to build assets, 
though at differential rates. The differential rate of accumulation could be explained by tenure security 
concerns of farmers during the initial stages of the reform (Zikhali 2010), and differential access to 
government resources as reported in Chapter 5. 
Contractors provided working capital to farmers in the form of inputs and cash advances for labour, 
which augmented farmers’ resources, leading to better performance. For a crop such as tobacco, which 
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requires specific assets such as barns, initial investments from the farmer’s own resources become 
critical and the very poor, who could not invest in these assets, opted out or hung on after poor 
performance. According to transaction cost economics, asset specificity could tie producers to contracts 
or the production of a crop. In this study, it created a dependence relationship. Mazwi, Chambati, and 
Mutodi (2018) made a similar observation in a study of tobacco farmers in Zvimba and Goromonzi, 
citing problems of power imbalance. In Latin America, Yeros (2018) observed that it creates 
dependence on the contractor. In communal areas, assets acquired through generations, for instance, 
during colonial times in the master farmer programme in Chiweshe (Bessant and Muringai 1993), put 
farmers in a good position to negotiate and access more assets using historical ties (Berry 1993; Ribot 
and Peluso 2003). 
Social capital through networks were critical in accessing contracts. This is in line with observations in 
Tanzania and in Zimbabwe, where Sulle (2017) and Scoones, Mavedzenge, and Murimbarimba (2017), 
respectively, chronicle how elites with more resources dominated sugar contracts, a position Swain 
(2012) noticed in India. This confirms Ribot and Peluso (2003)’s assertion that those who control 
resources benefit the most, as observed in Mazowe. This study argued that even though the elites were 
the major beneficiaries from contracting activities, all contracted farmers employed more labour, which 
benefited the poor. The community enjoyed direct farm benefits, such as employment, which were 
based on the social networks within the community. Neighbours learned from each other and through 
experience (Foster and Rosenzweig 1995) as they nursed, planted, harvested and cured their tobacco. 
Glover (1984) noted that contract farming transferred technology through input provisioning schemes. 
Kuijpers and Swinnen (2016) emphasise market failure as a condition that allows for technology 
transfer, a push factor for farmers who wanted inputs or premium prices from the contractor. As noted 
by Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson (2007), farmers need some ‘nudging’ for them to use technology, such 
as fertilisers, payable at harvest time, which contract farming did. While this is an apparent case of 
community spillover effects brought about by contract farming, which Govereh, Jayne, and Nyoro 
(1999) and Govereh and Jayne (2003) say are fruits of commercialisation in agriculture, its uptake was 
limited by lack of supplementary sources from interlinked credit. Studies by Maertens and Swinnen 
(2009) in Senegal show that resource endowments and technology were not a critical aspect of contract 
farming participation and outcomes. The groundnut crop required traditional technologies and farm 
implements, a sign that benefits from contract farming are crop-specific. 
High initial asset endowments also meant that those who had this privilege had better access to labour, 
which further enhanced their productive capacity. As Moyo (2011a:945) noted, “…those who were 
educated and employed were better placed to negotiate political power and mobilise resources”, a 
privilege that could be utilised by landowners under the FTLRP. Survey data showed the poor peasant-
workers preferred to work for such elites, and hence, poorly resourced farmers had difficulties in 
competing for labour and other resources.  
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10.2.3 Community Effects of Contract Farming: Inequity and Uneven 
Distribution of Resources 
Results from this study show that equity and distribution of value were affected by the location of the 
farmer, that is, whether on communal or FTLRP land, and the contracting terms offered to farmers that 
were differentiated according to performance. For instance, Scoones et al. (2018) observed that FTLRP 
beneficiaries were acquiring assets, which explains the differences with their communal peers, while 
within-group differences arise due to types of inputs used, assets and farm investment. Between the 
farmers and contractors, evidence showed that power imbalance resulted in contractors benefiting 
through price and grading manipulation. This, Warning and Key (2002) argue, is due to unequal power 
relations between the actors. 
In this study, resourced farmers with experience had a higher probability of participating in contract 
farming compared to the poor, considering the selection process followed by the contractor. The 
contract terms and selection process favoured the elite in a rural community, which Cousins, Weiner, 
and Amin (1992) described as exhibiting land social differentiation. In Chapter 8, three community 
groups were identified, differentiated by land ownership, productive assets and income, which affected 
participation in contract farming and livelihood activities. The poor were concentrated in the communal 
areas, where land quality and size were not enough for profitable tobacco production. For contract 
farming to have broader effects in communities, there should be equitable and inclusive access to 
contracts (Fréguin-Gresh and Anseeuw 2013; Baumann 2000; Warning and Key 2002), and conditions 
of farmer participation and attrition should receive due attention (Narayanan 2013), putting the focus 
on the selection and maintenance of farmers once under contract. For instance, the poor peasants could 
not access contract farming due to their lack of assets and financial resources needed to make initial 
investments (Swinnen and Maertens 2007), for instance, tobacco barns. This increased social 
differentiation in the community. Social differentiation, as exemplified by access to land, inputs and 
labour resulted in the poor being excluded from contracts and those that participated performed badly 
under contract, like the tea outgrowers reported by Sachikonye (1989). While quantitative data paint a 
gloss picture of high-performing contract farmers, qualitative data showed deep underlying social 
differentiation problems driven by differential asset holdings. All this was underpinned by poor resource 
access capabilities of poor farmers, who could not transfer benefits, as shown in Chapter 2. This shows 
the problems of singular methods as laws of averages and perceptions tend to conceal such issues.  
Equitable access and retention in contracts could be achieved through agricultural-association-led 
contract negotiation (Korovkin 1992). This could narrow the divide between big-farmer versus small-
farmer (da Silva and Shepherd 2013) or resourced farmer vs poorly resourced (Boughton et al. 2007), 
which could be handled through asset sharing within the community negotiated by associations and 
facilitated by the contractor. For contract farming to bring equity in land reform communities, equitable 
land distribution (discussed in Chapter 3) is needed to address resource access concerns of the 
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community. Labour, an important creator of value, could increase their negotiating power if they had 
land to produce for subsistence, hence Moyo, Rutherford, and Amanor‐ Wilks (2000) proposed that 
farm workers be allocated subsistence plots. 
Though contractors influenced production protocols nudging farmers to use modern inputs (Duflo, 
Kremer, and Robinson 2007), farmers had the freedom to hire and determine the remuneration of 
workers, which took various forms ranging through commodity barter exchanges, cash or short-term 
land leases. As in the sugar and tea outgrower schemes, these workers were poorly remunerated (Moyo 
2004; Sachikonye 1989), which negatively affected the distribution of income within the community. 
However, farmworker conditions could be improved through farmer-worker association-level 
negotiations. In this study, it was argued that elite farmers provided employment, which helped the poor 
access resources and livelihoods, though it was highly differentiated. Workers and farmers that self-
exploited through long hours of work, earned income that reproduced their households. Those in 
contract farming were trapped in debt and the lump sum payments from their tobacco sales were spent 
on debt repayment and little on new productivity enhancing technologies. Further, while the farmers 
were exposed to asset-based technology, they could not adopt it due to debt-trap and unfavourable 
contract conditions. This technology is complementary to modern inputs. The contractors indirectly 
benefited from this exploitation of labour and the poor members of the community who comprised the 
labour pool. 
10.2.4 Farmers’ Performance under Contract Farming  
In this study, evidence shows that credit provision resulted in financial additionality, which led to elite 
farmers expanding plots under production, improving quality and doubling their income. Various 
scholars on contract farming report on this benefit (De Vaus 2002; Minot and Sawyer 2016; Miyata, 
Minot, and Hu 2009), which results in farmers investing in their farm/non-farm activities, which are 
examples of spillover effects. In Mazowe, the benefits were tilted towards those with better initial 
resources, remittances and alternative sources of income, whom we can call the rural elite (Sulle 2017). 
As observed by Moyo (2011), the elites were able to capture the benefits of the FTLRP because of their 
strong negotiating power, a trait emphasised by both Berry (1993) and Ribot and Peluso (2003). In 
Chapter 8, evidence was presented that showed that most farmers were just breaking even, and their 
lump sum cash earnings were spent on loan repayment. For capital-intensive crops, such as tobacco, 
poor farmers find it difficult to raise the necessary resources to construct barns and acquire other assets 
needed to produce a quality crop. Sachikonye (1989)’s categorisation of farmers in accordance to 
education, position in community and resource is informative in understanding production and income 
outcomes of farmers in Mazowe. As in Sachikonye’s tea study, those in the upper echelons of these 
social structures performed well in contract farming and participated as part of the investment 
diversification process. A similar categorisation was made by Mkodzongi (2013) in the case of A1 
193 
farmers in Mhondoro Ngezi. Interviews with these farmers revealed that this was made possible by the 
bundle of powers that came with their position, which made it easier for them to negotiate access to 
resources (Ribot and Peluso 2003) 
National data from TIMB show an exponential increase in tobacco sold under contract. This study 
argued that this could be a result of side-marketing and increased contracted production. Sakata (2018) 
reports similar observations in Mashonaland East, which confirms the importance of global capital in 
the integration of farmers in markets though under unfavourable exchange conditions. Side marketing, 
as observed by Sakata (2018), was also prevalent in Mazowe, showing the risk-coping mechanism of 
farmers faced with the adversities of contractors. Side marketing was also a response to the 
unfavourable exchange relations with the contractor, which Sen (1982) refers to as exchange 
entitlements derived from ownership bundles. The major beneficiaries of such a system are the elite 
farmers, showing the importance of resources in marketing outcomes. This calls for interlinked financial 
arrangements to empower the poor farmers, which were lacking in Mazowe, possibly because of the 
prevailing credit-constrained macroeconomic environment. As a result, most farmers in the ‘middle’ 
were dependent on the contractor for continued tobacco production. 
This study found that contracted farmers, particularly the elite, improved quality and income due to 
their use of better technologies, which lowered their costs and thus increased their profits in a pattern 
suggested by Goodhue and Simon (2016). National production and income data are supportive of the 
thesis that initial resource endowments matter, as commercial farmers had yields almost double (2 392 
kg per hectare) compared to smallholders (1 353 kg per hectare) and better prices (TIMB 2017). This 
was due to differential access to inputs (see also Mukwereza, 2013 on credit terms offered by Chinese 
contractors), a scenario reflected within the smallholder group, where the rich peasant received 
favourable terms and outperformed the poorly resourced farmers.   
Production outcomes were skewed against poor farmers and workers, a group of the community 
associated with poor resource endowments. Elite farmers had access to alternative financial resources 
from employment and other non-farm activities, which differentiated them from the rest of the farmers 
in terms of production and income. Sachikonye (2016) argues that contestations in contract farming 
arrangements remain a thorny issue and, in this thesis, grading and input pricing were cited as examples. 
Though Sachikonye (2016) does not refer to class of producers, it was evident in this that the poorly 
resourced farmers were the main victims, as they had no alternative financial fall-back, which tended 
to affect cost-reducing and quality-enhancing technology. For the poor workers, contract farming 
provides a source of employment though wages, and working conditions have remained poor 
(Sachikonye 1989). Sachikonye (2016:96) asserts that the process of “accumulation from below” has 
started due to increased tracts of land that allow farmers to expand production; this thesis found that 
this process is surely underway for the elite rural farmers. 
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10.2.5  Unfavourable Contracting Terms: a Case of Power Imbalance 
Chapter 2 discussed farmers’ dependence on the contractor, driven by opportunity cost in accessing 
credit and markets for their production, which creates an asymmetrical relation in contracting. Survey 
data show that no respondents participated in the drafting of the contract, price negotiation and all other 
terms of the contract and as a result the contracts lacked basic details needed for a good contract (Prowse 
2012). Interviews showed that, given the limited contract offers, farmers competed to enter contracting 
activities. All of this played out behind the different “bundle of powers” held by each actor, which either 
diminished or enhanced their negotiation capacity (Ribot and Peluso 2003). Swanepoel ZTA, (2017:4) 
aptly showed the power imbalance when commenting: “The contractor is the financier, input provider, 
jury, judge and executioner.” The skewed ‘power bundles’ and competition affected the distribution of 
contractor resources among farmers, and the profit margins added to the supplied inputs; for instance, 
farmers were charged over 30 percent above the prevailing market price of inputs [see also Mazwi, 
Chambati, and Mutodi (2018)]. Further, determination of grades, prices and costing of services offered 
were at the discretion of the contractor. This brings into question the fairness of the input supply system 
and results in contestations (Sachikonye 1989). Scholars from a political economy school of thought 
are critical about such an asymmetrical balance of power, which arises from differential “bundle of 
powers” held by the parties, which they deem exploitative of farmers (Little and Watts 1994; 
Sachikonye 1989). Despite the exploitative nature of contracts, farmers remained under contract due to 
their dependence on the contractor for resources (Yeros 2018). 
At the core of the power balance problems are the skewed resource endowments of the parties, a 
scenario Mafeje (2003) argues might be resolved through an increased government facilitator role. 
Further government facilitation of farmer organisation could also lead to farmers self-provisioning 
resources and services (Sivramkrishna and Jyotishi 2008). The contractor tables a give-and-take 
contract; however, terms of a standard contract farming arrangement are missing. For instance, da Silva 
and Shepherd (2013:127) speak of “…pre-set specifications that can include mutually agreed conditions 
on prices, production technologies, quality characteristics, and production delivery dates”. This was 
made possible by the individually negotiated contracts and the absence of a farmer’s organisation. 
Farmer associations are regarded as important in negotiating contracts and improving services to 
farmers (Korovkin 1992; Sivramkrishna and Jyotishi 2008), yet farmers in Mazowe preferred arms-
length transactions because of this lack of trust, despite well-documented welfare-enhancing evidence 
(Fischer and Qaim 2012; Key and Runsten 1999). Shaba et al. (2017:2) in a study in Malawi noted: 
…contract farming contributes to reduced monitoring costs, as farmers work in groups and 
monitor each other’s activities, such as baling of the tobacco leaf, which ensures better quality 
tobacco being offered under contract. 
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In Mazowe, such benefits were disregarded due to a lack of trust. As was discussed in Chapter 7, the 
political arm in a farmer organisation could have further destroyed trust. Another issue explaining the 
dearth of farmer organisation in the tobacco industry is the lack of support from non-governmental 
organisations (Baumann 2000), which consider tobacco a health hazard. Where tobacco farmers have 
been organised, as in Tanzania and Malawi, the government has lent an organising hand (Sambuo 2013; 
Shaba et al. 2017), which is lacking in Zimbabwe, where there are direct contracting arrangements, as 
in Mozambique (Pérez Niño 2016). Unlike in colonial times (discussed in Chapter 4) farmers did not 
form associations to lobby contractors or TIMB, purportedly because these were not viewed in the same 
light as colonial oppressors. In Mazowe, institutions that emerged were ad hoc in nature and more suited 
to contractors’ modus operandi, for instance, demonstration plots, field days for training, and input and 
output distribution. According to Bingen, Serrano, and Howard (2003), agribusiness forms such 
institutions to enhance their profit agenda and ensure that they are in control of participating farmers 
thus stifling farmers’ ability to organise, political power and voice for collective action. While Murisa 
(2014) and Mkodzongi (2013) report on FTLRP-initiated institutions in A1 settlements, these did not 
transform themselves enough to negotiate with contractors. Instead, it was clear that farmers within 
these institutions were in dysfunctional competition for contracts with agribusinesses. However the 
farmers extensively used social relations to extract the best price from the contractor once under 
contract. As a result, because of power imbalances and competition, grading, pricing and input prices 
remain contested issues, yet they are central to the success of contract farming arrangements and the 
accumulation of assets by farmers. According to critics of contract farming, this is the source of an 
exploitative relationship (Sachikonye 1989; Little and Watts 1994). 
Central to solving the power imbalance and an exploitative relation is rectifying an asymmetrical bundle 
of powers, which include control of credit, input-output markets, and technology. The control of these 
entails the control of productive assets such as farm implements, land and labour. According access 
theory, Ribot and Peluso (2003) control either legal or illegal is a determining factor in value 
distribution, and those who control accrue more benefits as discussed in chapter 2. Farmer associations 
could open opportunities to access credit, input and new technologies through farmer-led access 
mechanisms, which strengthen their bargaining power. At farmer level, the rich used their networks to 
elbow the less resourced out of contracts. FTLRP-induced competition for finance capital favoured the 
rich peasants. Further barter exchanges with workers were often not favourable to the worker, who got 
left-over inputs. In most cases, the elite farmers used their influence to access resources, such as 
fuelwood, at a cheaper price. The payment of benefits to those controlling resources favoured elite 
farmers, as shown in figure 2-1.  
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10.3 Contribution of the Study 
This study shows the uneven development and exploitative effects of the re-entry of the capitalist system 
into smallholder agriculture after a controversial land reform exercise. The subsequent response by the 
peasantry through social relationships shaped the flow and access to benefits of contract farming.First 
the study shows that contract farming is beneficial under conditions of asset availability, hence most 
accumulators were farmers who accessed land under FTLRP and used it to build more assets. These 
farmers who were favoured by the capitalist system, thrived when additional finance was provided by 
the contractor. The majority of farmers who did not have adequate assets were dependent on the 
contractor in an exploitative relationship for continued production and rarely invested beyond their 
subsistence needs. Access to land and contractor-finance increased the farmer’s ability to benefit from 
tobacco production, diversify into other cash crops and non-farm activities; all of which benefited the 
community through employment and service provision. 
Secondly, farmers responded to the re-entry of capitalist system through use of networks and social 
relationships to either gain entry into contracting arrangements or side marketing networks to access 
better prices from the contractor. The study showed the importance of access theory as an analytic tool, 
in unpacking capitalist-peasant relations in underdeveloped capitalist systems, yet, the theory is rarely 
applied in the study of contract farming arrangements. Most studies focus on the welfare and power 
dynamics of the contractor and farmer, neglecting farmers’ community social relationships that shape 
production and welfares outcomes for the household and commmunity. Using access theory, benefits 
arising from contract farming were unpacked from the household to the community level. The study 
showed that social relationships manifested through ‘side-marketing,’, barter labour-land exchanges 
and resource pooling were an important component of the successful farmers’ ‘bundle of powers’ More 
important, the study showed that even those farmers who were dependent on the contractor and were 
struggling, generated positive community effects through employment creation, derived from social 
relations in the community. Farmers benefited from innovative marketing strategies based on social 
relationships. This is important for policy, as it shows the need to capacitate and or subsidise 
smallholder agricultural production for the good of the community. Further, resettlement areas need 
programmes that build social relationship.  
Thirdly, lack of farmer organisations weakens the bargaining power of farmers. Dependence on the 
regulator only favours the contractor especially in an environment where farmers lack alternative 
resources. 
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10.4 Conclusion 
Using insights from access theory, this case study revealed that contract farming benefited the Mazowe 
community. Through the access theory lens this study was able to explain the interdependence and 
subsequent effects of contract farming and FTLRP, how this interplay generated and distributed benefits 
within households and community. For participating farmers it was shown that those with resources 
benefited from contract farming and these benefits had spillover effects to the community. The majority 
who could not expend resources to generate more income were dependent on the contractor in an 
exploitative relationship for continued tobacco production; however, they also hired labour which 
benefited the community. This study brought to the fore the importance of initial resource endowments  
and social relationships in participation and performance under contract farming. Central to this was 
land; some FTLRP-beneficiaries built assets from the land, which they used as a launch pad for further 
accumulation under contract farming. The study shows the importance of redistributive land reform as 
a major access route in building initial assets and integrating smallholder farmers in contract farming 
arrangement. Peasant farmers, beneficiaries from the land reform often lack capital which is provided 
through contract farming. Access to resources is a contested issue, with stark competition between the 
elites and the poor, a battle which always favours the elite. It is therefore apparent that the government 
needs to intervene in building the assets of the poor through farmer associations and other resources, 
providing activities to allow the poor to engage in market activities. Farmers used social relationships 
to fight back on unfair exchange relations with the contractor through side marketing to avoid debt 
repayments and access better prices.  
The study showed the robustness of access theory as an analytic tool which was able to trace the flow 
of benefits from farmers through to the community. The study showed that apart from using partial 
resources provided by contractors, contracted farmers expend resources. This ultimately benefits the 
community through employment and diversification spillover effects, as farmers invest in other 
activities to maintain their benefit from contract farming. However, while the community benefited, 
poorly resourced farmers struggled, as they had few resources to expend when negotiating for resources, 
and hence, their product quality suffered. Again, farmers relied on social relationships to sustain their 
tobacco production through pooling and sharing of resources. 
Overall, the study showed that participation in contract farming generates positive community effects 
through spillover effects as farmers expend resources and diversify farm and non-farm activities, create 
employment, and provide services that benefit the community. Most of the spillover effects were 
generated by resourced-farmers, mostly those who benefited from FTLRP and improved their asset-
portfolios. The successful farmers invested in transport, retail and service businesses that provided 
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employment and commodities This shows the importance of initial resource endowments if contract 
farming interventions are to benefit farmers and communities. 
10.5 Recommendations and Areas of Future Research  
In communal land tenure systems contract farming provides farmers with credit they would otherwise 
not access due to lack of collateral. In this thesis, it was shown that the efficiency of contract farming 
is based on access to resources or resource endowment by farmers, which suggests that government and 
development agents should support resource/asset augmenting strategies for the poor to improve their 
participation and outcomes from contracting arrangements. Policies should address resource 
endowments challenges that complement contract farming in segments not covered, such as capital 
expenditure. To build on the assets of the poor, the government and development partners should 
provide credit for capital investments, such as barns, cattle and grading sheds, which would be 
interlinked to the contract farming marketing system. Further, programmes, such as asset sharing, for 
small groups could be promoted in conjunction with contracting firms, who can provide institutional 
back-up and coordination. This will help increase the farmrs’ ‘bundle of powers’ and hence their ability 
to benefit from the land and integration into agricultural markets. Farmers willing, and with the 
incentives, to take-up cash crop production would use such a scheme. In turn, this would increase 
farmers’ capacity to save as they become certain of the available channels of accessing resources. Such 
areas need further research to determine how they can be implemented. 
The promotion of crop-based farmers associations, which are empowered through training, could 
improve participation of their members and contracting outcomes through efficient organising of inputs 
and other services, such as the case in Chile reported by Korovkin (1992). This will address challenges, 
such as input price distortions and poor market transmission mechanism of the tobacco markets, leading 
to profitability and farmers staying longer in contract farming. Farmer associations deal with selection 
bias within communities thus making contracting more inclusive for the poor, who are selected to the 
contract through their associations, rather than being discriminated against on asset holdings. Farmer 
organisations can also help enforce quality standards, making the whole contracting practice more 
viable. For instance, farmers’ planting, harvesting and curing practices could be coordinated through 
the farmer organisation and grading and classification supervised. Farmer organisations could also help 
standardise employment practices among members thus benefiting the community at large and 
contracting become welfare-enhancing for the whole community. Broadly, farmer associations allow 
for effective access to productive resources and markets. Where they are absent, there is a tendency for 
uneven access to resources by farmers, depending on their initial conditions. However, the functioning 
of farmer associations in private firm-led contracting arrangements still needs to be researched to build 
on previous work where government was central to contracting activities. Research is needed to inform 
these asset-augmenting mechanisms.  
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 Appendix 1: Tobacco Value Chain in Zimbabwe 
Actors Operating 
Environment 
Role and Linkages 
Distribution 
and Retailing 
Global Marketing of final product 
Multinationals Global Political lobbying of national governments and big 
donor organisations, such as the World Health 
Organisation; marketing; research and development 
Processors National 
subsidiaries 
Two levels: manfacturing of final product consumed 
such as cigarettes, snuff; processing of leaf in leaf-
producing countries 
Buyers National 
Subsidiaries 
Buying at auction floors; contracting firms representing 
multinationals 
Farmers/farmer 
organisations 
Local Consists of small- and large-scale engaged in the actual 
farming of tobacco under contract or independently 
Input suppliers Global and 
National 
Suppliers of seedlings, fertilisers, agrochemicals, paper 
and other resources 
Tobacco 
Industry 
Marketing 
Board 
Global and 
National 
Regulator 
Tobacco 
Research Board 
Global and 
National 
Research and provision of seedlings 
Source: Author from Qualitative data  
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Appendix 2:  Income from Tobacco Correlates 
 Correlations 
 Income from tobacco 
 Pearson correlation Sig. (2-tailed) Number of farmers 
Income from tobacco 1  108 
Agriculural assets .430** 0.000 103 
Livestock .287** 0.003 103 
Household assets .316** 0.001 103 
Extension services 
provider 
.297** 0.005 88 
Education of houehold 
head 
.394** 0.000 108 
Occupation of 
household head 
.327** 0.001 108 
Farmer status -.379** 0.000 108 
Barns 0.138 0.162 104 
Communal or A1 area .304** .304** 108 
Number of casual 
labour 
.383** 0.000 108 
Size of plot under 
tobacco 
.552** 0.000 93 
Where farmer sold 
tobacco 
-0.176 0.187 58 
** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Source: Author compiled from survey data 
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Appendix 3:Monthly Flue-Cured Tobacco Revenue Cash-Inflow 
intoMazowe District – 2013 Season  
Month Contract 
farmers 
(US$) 
Non-
contract 
farmers 
(US$) 
Total 
Inflow 
% of 
total  
inflo
w 
February 4 420 
100.00  
1 152 
197.00  
5 572 
297.00  
11.3
9 
March 9 032 
443.00  
4 558 
144.00  
13 590 
587.00  
27.7
7 
April 10 746 
297.00  
 4 948 
072.00  
15 694 
368.00  
32.0
7 
May 6 600 
188.00  
2 668 
723.00  
9 268 
910.00  
18.9
4 
June 2 598 
982.00  
329 376.00  2 928 
358.00  
5.98 
July 1 555 
733.00  
103 212.00  1 658 
945.00  
3.39 
August 173 062.00  16 320.00  189 382.00  0.39 
Septemb
er 
34 225.00  0 34 225.00  0.07 
     
Season 
total 
35 161 
030.00  
13 776 
044.00  
48 937 
072.00  
100 
 
Source: Sukume et al, 2015 
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Appendix 4:Tobacco Contract/Non=contract Farming Questionnaire 
Date of interview_____________________________________________ 
Hello, am Moses Moyo, a PhD student at the Centre for African Studies at University of Cape Town. I 
am here to conduct a survey on tobacco contract farming, may I please ask you questions related to your 
tobacco farming operations and how you earn a living particularly from tobacco. We will also talk about 
changes tobacco contract farming has brought to your community. By answering questions in this 
questionnaire you will provide me with information I will use to write my thesis titled “Effects of 
contract farming on rural institutions and livelihoods: A case study of Mazowe”. The results of the 
interview will be used for academic purposes and will be confidential, you are free to ask or withdraw 
from this interview at any stage during our interview. Should you have any questions at any given time 
you are free to contact me at myxmos003@uct.ac.za or telephone 0026 3 77241 6529 or Assoc Prof H. 
Chitonge, Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town, +27 (0) 21 650 4056 or 
horman.chitonge@uct.ac.za.  The interview will take approximately 1 hour. With your consent we can 
start the interview. 
Section A: Demographics/Household Roaster 
Instructions: Circle the appropriate code or write the response in the spaces provided 
A1:  Farmer status:   1=Contract farmer  2=Non-contract farmer  3 =contract Drop-out  
A2.  Respondent status in the Household   _____________________________________ 
A3. Household Roaster: Household members are the people who live at same homestead, eat from 
same pot and share expenditure for more than nine months in a year. 
Codes to Questions 
A3.3 Relation to Household head    
Resident Head ……………1;   absent head …………16;   Wife/Husband …….2;  
Child/adopted child.. 3  Parent of head..……......4        Grand Child………………..5  
Grand Parent....……….......6 Sister/brother…………7 Son-/Daughter-in-law……..8 
Mother-Father-in-law…......9 Brother-/sister-in-law…….10 Nice/Nephew……………..11 
Great-grand Child…….....12 Other Relatives…………..13 Workers/Relative…………14
 Other (specify)………………………………………………15 
A3.6. What does […………………………………..] do for a living?   Formal job……..1;
 Casual Work…..2; Self-employed…3; Unemployed…...4; Own Farm……...5
 Farmworker……6       Studying………..7 Government……8
 Retired………….9               Housewife….......10  other (specify) ………….. 
11   
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A3.7  What is [……………...]’s marital status?  Married………….1
 Divorced..……….2  Separated…........3 Widow(wer)…….4 (>> Q10)
 Never married…..5 (>>Q10) 
 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 
 
PERS
ON  ID 
CODE             
  
 Ask  Qs 
2-9 for 
each listed 
household 
member 
before 
going to 
Q10 
 
 Sex 
Male...1 
Female
…2 
Relation 
to HH 
head 
How 
old is 
[…..] 
Today? 
Years 
Date of 
Birth: 
What 
does 
[….] 
do for 
a 
living
? 
Wh
at is 
[….
]’s 
mari
tal 
stat
us? 
Doe
s the 
wife
/hus
ban
d of 
[….
] 
live 
in 
this 
hou
seho
ld 
Yes…
………
1 
No……
…..2 
(>> 
Q10)  
  
 Does 
[…]’s 
spouse 
live in 
this 
househo
ld? 
 COPY 
THE ID 
OF 
WIFE/
HUSBA
ND. IF 
MORE 
START 
WITH 
FIRST 
WIFE 
Has […] 
lived in 
this 
household 
for more 
than 30 
days  in the 
last 12 
months? 
 yes…….1 
No……2 
Person 
code 
name  Gender  Rel. to 
HH 
 age  DOB Occupat
ion 
 Marital 
sta. 
 Live  
Spouse(
s) 
 HH 
member 
1                     
2                     
3                     
4                     
A3.14 What was his highest education attainment?  1=No formal 2=No formal can read and 
write;  3=Pre-school   4=Primary; 5=O-level;  6=A-level   7=College;  8=Degree   
 A3.11 A3.12 A3.13 A3.14 A3.15 A3.16 A3.17 A3.18 A3.19 
232 
 
PERSO
N  ID 
CODE                  
 
Is the natural father 
of […..] living in 
this household? 
COPY ID CODE 
FOR FATHER  
FROM PART A  
Yes……1 
No……..2 
(>> Q15 
 
Is the father 
of [….] still 
alive? 
 
Yes…..…1 
No……....2 
(>>15 
 
Did the 
father of 
[……] 
attend 
school? 
 
Yes……1 
No……..2 
(>> Q15) 
 
What was 
his highest 
education 
attainment?  
 
SEE 
SCHOOLIN
G CODES 
 Is the 
natural 
mother of 
[…] living in 
this 
household? 
(copy id 
code for 
father  from 
part a)  
Yes………1 
No………..
2 (>>18) 
Is the 
mother of 
[….] still 
alive? 
yes…..…1 
No………
2 
(>>Q18) 
 
Did the 
mother 
of 
[……] 
attend 
school? 
Yes…
…1 
No……
..2 
What is 
[….]’s 
populati
on 
group? 
African
……1 
Coloure
d..2 
Indian..
3 
White……...
4  
 
Which 
household 
members make 
decisions about 
various things?  
 
 E.G, BUY 
FOOD, 
SENDING 
CHILDREN TO 
SCHOOL, 
 BUY 
FURNITURE  
etc 
                   
Person 
code 
father  Father live Father edu.  mother Mother 
edu. 
Mother 
live 
 Mother 
edu. 
 race Decision 
maker 
1                  
2                  
3                  
4                  
5                  
A5. Number of employees working in your tobacco who are not part of the household: _______ 
A6. Dwellings: How many bedrooms ______Dining room _____Lounge_____Kitchen_________ 
Toilets/Bath room ____________Other___________ 
A7. Type of roofing ________________Type of building (e.g brick cement mortar; earth) ______ 
A8. Type of cooking energy ________Lighting source ___________ General power_________ 
A9. Source of Water:  1=own borehole; 2=community borehole; 3=tape water; 4=River/Dam; 
5=Well 
A10. Other structures: Kraal_________ Fowl run ____________ Other 
A11. Is the property fenced/enclosed 1=Yes   2=No 
A12. Do you have another home in the communal or resettlement areas? 1=Yes   2=No 
A13. If yes, who stays in that home? _________________________________________ 
A14. Do you own a property in town? 1=Yes   2=No 
A15. If in a resettlement area from which district did you come from? 
A16. When did you settle at this homestead? __________________________ 
Section B  Expenditure and wellbeing 
B1 Does the income your household receives from tobacco meet your family’s needs? 
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B2 Are there days when you go without food in your house? 1=yes;   2=no 
B3 If yes to D2; how did you cope? _________________________________________________ 
B4 What other farming activities are you involved in? List  1=Market gardening 2=other 
cash crop  3=staple crop 4=other   ______________________________ 
B5 Do you produce your own staple food crops?  1=yes;     2=no 
56 Do you have enough land to produce your staple crops?      1-yes      2=no 
B7 Who provides you with inputs for these activities? 1=self-financed 
 2=Presidential input scheme 3=command agriculture  4=agribusiness 
 5=family 6=other   __________________________________ 
B8 If you produce your own staple crops, do there last you until the next harvest?  1=yes    2=no 
B9 If you don’t produce your food, where do you buy from?  1=supermarket 2=from 
community 3=Both_____________________________ 
B10 Have you ever been diagnosed of any sickness related to your work in tobacco production?  
1=yes        2=no 
B11 What would you say caused this illness?  1=handling of chemicals    2=handling green leaf
 3=other __________________________________________ 
B12 Do you have safety clothes needed in the production of tobacco? 1=yes     2=no 
B13 Do you smoke?   1=yes     2=No 
B14 Is it because you produce tobacco?  1=yes   2=no 
B15 Are there any people or organisations that try to discourage you from producing tobacco?  
1=yes      2=no. What do you think about these organisations? ______________________ 
B16  What is your view about B15? _______________________________________________ 
B17 List any income generating projects you are involved in if any 1=run passenger transport
 2=haulage  3=manufacturing 4=retail  5=services 6=other ________ 
B18 Tell us about any social or leisure activities you are involved in within your community_____ 
B19  On average what is your income and expenditure per month on the items listed on the table 
below: 
Income:         Tobacco Sales  
                        Wages  
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                        Remittances  
                        From business  
                       Other specify  
Food  
Water, electricity and rates  
Rent  
Transport  
Education  
Clothing  
Telephone/cellular phone  
TV/DSTV  
Entertainment  
Insurance  
Wages  
Loan repayment  
Health  
Donations  
Other specify  
B20  Do you have a bank account?  1=Yes   2=No 
Section C Community Module  
C1. Is this a:     1=communal area      2=A1 resettlement (fast track)     3= old resettlement   
C2. Distance from tarred road in kilometres (estimate using google maps) ______________ 
C3. Comment on the state of roads: 1=very good tarred      2=good tarred  3=tarred with 
potholes 4=gravel 5=bad gravel 
C4. Is there a community clinic within your community? 1=yes; 2=no 
C6. Do you always get medication and medical care you and your household needs from the 
clinic? 1=yes 2=no 
C7. Are there transporters within your community who can transport your tobacco and inputs?
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 1=yes 2=no 
C8. Are there stores, organisations and institutions that provide you with: 
agricultural inputs  1=yes    2=no; finance  1=yes     2=no 
extension         1=yes  2=no   services within your community? 
C9. Are there any taboos that you must observe when working on your tobacco? 1=yes  2=no 
C10. How does this affect your work on the tobacco crop? 1=cannot work in the field
 2=other ___________________________________________________________ 
C11. How many kilometers is the nearest school from your homestead? __________________ 
C12 How many kilometers is the service center from your homestead? ___________________ 
C13 Do you have access to any of the services? 
 Conflict 
resolution 
Police 
services 
Credit/finan
ce 
training Water for 
Irrigation  
Entertainme
nt 
Shopping 
services 
1=yes        
2=no        
C14 List any businesses that were set up by locals since the start of contract farming in your area 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
C15 Who set-up business 1=local tobacco farmers   2=investors from other regions 
 3=big agribusiness 4=supermarkets 5=other _________________________ 
C16 Are there any investors who came to invest in your area because of contract farming 1=yes
 2=no 
C17  Are there any changes in your community you would say happened because of contract 
farming? 1=yes  2=no give examples (eg social life, education etc) _________ 
C18 Has the contracting firm contributed anything for community development?  1=yes
 2=no Give examples? _______________________________________________________ 
Section D. Livestock and Assets 
C1. How many of these assets and livestock do you own? (Write 0 if none) 
Assets Quantity 
Source of asset: 
Given=1 
Bought=2 
Inherited=3 
Date 
purchase
d 
How many in 2004 
 
Comment if any 
Cattle    2004 2009  2017  
Sheep        
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Goats        
Donkeys        
Scotch cart        
Ox drawn 
plough 
       
Tractor        
Motor 
vehicle 
       
Motor bike        
Bicycle        
Generator        
Water 
pump 
       
Barns        
Cellphones        
television        
Sprays        
State other        
D2. List any home improvement you undertook since 2009. _______________________ 
D3. List the sources of funds you used to improve your home.  1=income from tobacco 
2=part-time work 3=full-time work 4=remittances 5=other cash crops 
6=other__________________________________________________________ 
D4 Do you have irrigation facilities for your tobacco? 1=yes    2=no 
D5. How many acres can you irrigate at a given time using this system?  ____________________ 
D6. How did you pay for your irrigation system if any?  1=tobacco income 2=loan from 
agribusiness 3=income from employment 4=remittances 5=income from other cash 
crops 6=other ______________________________________________________ 
Section E: Selection of participants 
E1.  How did you join contract farming?      1=Was invited by the firm    2=Was invited by local 
leader   3=Made personal application    4= Offered to us as community   5=Other 
specify ____________________________________________________________________ 
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E2. Were there any requirements you needed to fulfil to qualify to join contract farming?  1=yes   
2=no 
E3. If yes to C2, what were the conditions? List 1=Assets    2=experience 3=Education
 4=land size 5=other______________________________________________________ 
E4. When did you join contract farming? 
2004 
 
2005 2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
2016 
 
2017 
 
 
 
  
       
  
 
 
 
  
       
  
1=was member  2=Dropped out  3= Stopped tobacco farming   4= Joined another firm 5=Re-joined contract farming 
E5.    What made you join contract farming? 1=access inputs  2=Better prices 
 3=Access market 4=extension services  5=better farming methods
 6=other___________________________________________ 
E6. If you dropped out, stopped farming, or joined another firm explain why?  1=poor prices
 2=exploitative contractual exploit 3=Built enough capital to go it alone 
 4=my contract was not renewed 5=shortage of labour       
 6=other____________________________ 
E7 If you are not a contract farmer, do you wish to join contract farming?  1=yes 2=no 
E8. Are there any requirements for you to join contract farming 1=yes      2=no 
E9. If yes to C6, what are the requirements?  1=farm implements 2=draught power
 3=experience in tobacco farming 4=established source of income 
 5=other___________________________________________________________________ 
 E10. Do you meet these requirements? 1=yes 2=no 
E11. Do you think some people are excluded from contract farming? 1=yes 2=no 
E12 If yes to E11 Explain. 1=lack of farm implements  2=lack of draught power
 3=lack of experience to produce tobacco  4=no established source of income
 5=bad reputation 6=other_________________________________________________ 
C12.  Since you joined contract farming have the price per kilogram of tobacco been: 1=increasing; 
2=decreasing.  3=remained the same  
E13 Explain why this might have been happening? 1=Quality of my crop changed 2=World 
market prices changed  3=quantity of tobacco is increasing/decreasing 4=we are 
ripped-off 5=other ______________________________________________________ 
SECTION F: Tobacco farming 
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F1 Size of plot ________________area under tobacco ______________ Food crops ________ 
F2 Do you practice crop rotation?  1=yes 2=no 
F3 If yes, why? 1=disease management  2=soil fertility management 3=required 
by contract 4=other ___________________________________________________ ___ 
F4 If no, why? 1=no enough land 2=not allowed by contract 3=no resources to 
prepare new land 4=other _________________________________________________ 
F5 How do you rid your tobacco plot of disease? 1=burning plot  2=apply chemicals 
3=leave fallow 3=crop rotation  4=other ____________________________ 
F6 Which year did you start growing tobacco? _______________ 
F7 Have you been growing tobacco since then 1=yes; 2=no 
F8 If no, Give reasons?  1=poor prices 2=exploitative contractual exploit 3=Built 
enough capital to go it alone 4=my contract was not renewed 5=shortage of labour       
 6=other____________________________________________________ 
F9 Do you produce other cash crops?  1=yes; 2=no   Why?  1=supplement income 2=risk 
management 3=abundant land 4=other_____________________________________ 
F10. How many people worked in your tobacco growing/production fields in the years below?  
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
HH member              
Casual              
permanent              
1= HH members 2= casual from community 3=Permanent workers  4= casual from other communities 
F11 How did you pay for the service in C1?  
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
HH member              
Casual              
permanent              
1. Cash         2.  Did not pay      3.  In kind  4. Will work in their field in return 
F12 If you paid cash, what was the source of funds? Pick from below and write the number in the 
box 
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 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
HH member              
Casual              
Permanent              
1. Bank loan   2.  Savings   3.  Borrowed from friends or family   4. Contracting firm  5.
  Donor     
6. Government  7.   Local money lender 8=other 
F13. Rank the sources of finance for your tobacco farming activities for these seasons. Rank 1 is 
the source which provides most. 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
1              
2              
3              
4              
1=Government grant  2=Government loan 3=Bank loan  4=Contractor 5=Personal savings  
6=Remittances  7=Local money lender  8 = other, specify 
F14. Have you ever taken credit or loan to pay for your tobacco growing?  
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Yes              
No              
 1= Bank 2=Government 3= Contracting firm 4= Friends/family 5=Local money lender 6=Donor 
7=Other  
F15. Who provides you with extension services during the years indicated below? 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
             
             
             
 1=Government extension workers  2= Contractor extension workers  3=Both       4=None 
F16. Did you pay for the services?  1=Yes         2= No 
F17 Will you be prepared to pay for extension services in future?  1=Yes      2=No       3=Not Sure 
F18.  What were your sources of inputs (seeds/seedlings, pesticides/herbicides, fertilisers) for the      
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tobacco farming seasons below? 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
             
             
             
 1=Government    2=Contractor    3=Self    4=Friends/family 
F19.  Have you attended any tobacco production training courses?  1=Yes        2=No 
Training type: ________________________________________________________________ 
Trainer: _____________________________________________________________________ 
F20: How many acres of tobacco did you plant for each of the seasons below? 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
             
F21: Indicate the quantity of inputs you received from the contracting firm for the past three 
farming season: 
Name of 
input 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Were all inputs used on 
tobacco  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes No 
        
        
        
F21 If no, how did you use the other inputs?  1=on other crops 2=sold them to meet 
operational cost  3=gave to family/friend  4=other _____________ 
F22: How many kilograms of tobacco did you produce and sale in each year indicated below? 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Kgs 
produced 
             
Kgs sold              
Income 
received 
             
F23 Do you hire an equipment/draft power like tractors for your farm operations?  1=Yes   2=no.  
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F24 If yes List: 1=tobacco barns 2=tilling  3=sheds 4=scorch-cart 
 5=draft power  6=other _____________________________________ 
Section G: Reasons for Participating in Contract farming  
G1.  What are the advantages of contract farming?  1=Source of finance 2=Access to 
markets 3=Extension services        4=New technology 5=Other________________ 
G2.  Are you going to/would you consider producing tobacco under contract next season? 
1=No   2=Yes   3=Not decided yet 
G3.  What are the disadvantages of contract farming?  1=new technology and skills; 2=ready 
market 3=inputs  4= extension services 5=reduces some of the risks I face as 
farmer6=offer credit 7=all these  8=other___________________________ 
G4.  Where do you sell your tobacco? 
1=Contractor   2=Auction     3=Both  
G5.  Do you insure your tobacco?   0=No    1=Yes 
G6. Are there insurance companies in your area? 1=yes 2=no 
G7. Does the contracting firm require you to take insurance? 1=yes 2=no 
G8. How do you protect yourself against floods, drought and other risks that affect your tobacco? 
1=have insurance 2=invest in other assets  3=social networks   4=works programmes 
and government assistance   5=other _________________________________ 
G9. If your sales can not cover your credit and input costs from the contracting firm how you do 
pay your debt? 1=sell assets 2=reschedule debt 3=borrow to pay debt 4=other___ 
G10. Are there any risks you face in your tobacco operations?  1=yes 2=no 
G11  Explain how you mitigate the risks mentioned in E10. 1=have insurance 2=rely on 
social network 3=negotiate with contractor 4=other ___________________________ 
Section H:  Tobacco Curing, Grading and Marketing 
H1 What is do you use to cure your tobacco?  1=coal    2=firewood 3=other ________________ 
H2 Where do you get your firewood/coal? _______________________________________ 
H3 What do you do to ensure that the firewood/coal you use will always be there to help you cure 
your tobacco? 1=plant trees 2=buy coal 3=not sure 4=other _________ 
H4. Who grades your tobacco? 1=myself   2=hire specialist graders   3=my workers  
H5 Were you trained to grade tobacco?  1=yes   2=no 
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H6 At the selling point do you understand how the buyers grade/classify your tobacco? 
H7 Where do you sell your tobacco?  1=auction floor    2=contractor   3=where I can get best 
price 
H8 Why do you think your tobacco from same field and crop gets paid different prices? _____ 
H9 Are there any other issues you think affects the price of tobacco at the auction floor? __ 
H10 How do you transport your tobacco to the auction/selling point?   1=use own truck 2=hire 
transport 3=contractor collects 4=other_____________________ 
Section I: Contract farming: terms and enforcement 
I1. Did you sign a contract with the agribusiness firm? 1=yes  2=no 
I2 Did you or anybody representing your interest participates in the drafting of the contract?        
1=yes  2=no 
I3. Was the contract explained to you or you understood it by yourself? 1=yes 2=no 
I4. What is the duration of your contract? _________________________________________ 
I5 Does your contract specify the quantity of tobacco or acreage to be cultivated?  
I6. Under what conditions can your contract be terminated?  1=bad reputation 2=poor 
performance 3=repeated delivery of low quality tobacco 4=other___ 
I7. How do you resolve contractual disputes? 1=never had disputes  2=mediation 
3=arbitration 4=litigation 5=negotiation 5=government intervenes  6=other ___ 
I8. Do you feel that the contract clearly specifies and cover all your requirements? 1=yes    2=no 
I9 If no which issues are not clear? 1=duties of the contractor 2=my duties 3=contract 
enforcement mechanism 4=grading, quality and pricing of tobacco 5=production process 
 6=monitoring of farming  6=risk sharing 7=other ________________ 
I9 In case of unforeseen events, like drought, hailstorm what are the provisions in your contract 
that protect you?  1=none  2=insurance 3=renegotiate contract4=debt write-
off 5=share expenses 6=other_______________________ 
I10 In case of prices falling below production cost what does your contract say? 1=not 
included in contract 2=there is a base-price set in contract for each grade of tobacco 
3=carry the risk   4=share the risk 
I11 Does your contract provide details of inputs, delivery times, quantity and quality required to 
match the quantity and quality of tobacco to be delivered?   1=yes   2=no 
I12 In your contract, are results of soil tests included to determine the inputs or quality of tobacco 
likes to come from the plot.  1=yes  2=no 
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I13 Does the contract specify the method of determining the price of tobacco you deliver to the 
contracting firm?  1=yes  2=no 
I14 What remedy do you have if the contractor delays delivery of inputs or payment of advanced 
loans needed for growing tobacco?  1=none  2= contractor compensate for 
possible effects  3=contract is silent 4=have recourse to contract enforcement mechanism
 5=other____________________________________________________ 
Section J:  Membership to organisations 
J1. Do you belong to any farmer or community organisation? 1=yes  2=no 
J2. If yes what is the purpose of your organisation?  1=negotiate contract terms 2=assist 
with sourcing input/delivery of tobacco  3=lobbying other stakeholders 
4=other______________________________________________ 
J3 Is your organisation registered with any government department?  1=yes; 2=no 
J4  Which one?  ____________________________________________________________ 
J5  Do you pool your resources for tobacco farming purposes? 1=yes; 2=no  
J6 If yes explain. _______________________________________________________________ 
J7 Does your organisation have any relationship with the department of agriculture? 1=yes; 
2=no.   
J8 Explain. _______________________________________________________________ 
J9. How do you think the government can help you and your community improve tobacco 
production? _____________________________________________________________ 
J10 Do you think an organisation is necessary when you are dealing with contracting firm? What 
should be its role? ___________________________________________________________ 
Section K: Multiplier Effects  
K1. What benefits would you say contract farming brought to your community?  ____________ 
K2. Do you share tobacco farming methods you learn from the agribusiness with friends 1=yes 
2=no 
K3. Do you offer any help to community members as a contract farmer? 1=yes 2=no 
K4 Give us examples? __________________________________________________________ 
K5. Do you help community members with the marketing of their tobacco? How do you help? __ 
K6. Which services in your community would you say were brought about because of contract 
farming? ___________________________________________________________________ 
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K7. Has the government done anything (like roads, dams) because the agribusiness lobbied for it?   
 1=yes 2=no 
K8. Are there organisations or government departments that have set-up offices or shops to help 
you as contract farmers or the community at large? 1=yes     2=no. 
K9 If yes to K8, name them 
________________________________________________________ 
K10 Has any of the farmers in your area established agriculture retail outlet to service tobacco and 
other farmers? __________________________________________________________ 
K11 What other agroindustries would you say developed because of tobacco contract farming in 
your area?  _________________________________________________________________ 
Section L: General 
L1.  List services you wish to receive from TIMB, Government and contractor. 
TIMB    Government    Contractor 
L2. Which organisations or companies were established in your community since the start of 
contract farming? __________________________________________________________ 
L3. Does the contracting firm contribute to school, health or other social activities in your 
community? _________________________________________________________________ 
L4. Do you or your organisation participate or contribute to the development of school, health 
or social activities in your community? ____________________________________________ 
L5. Are there any infrastructure projects that were done in your area to support contract 
farming activities? ___________________________________________________________ 
L6. Do you have any comments you have about tobacco production? _____________________ 
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Appendix 5: A case of successful farmer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr Rancher, is a 32 year son of a rich-peasant. His father accumulated wealth through 
trading and farming. He said his father produced cash crops, and acquired cattle some of 
which was farmed out to poor peasants in the region to enable easy access to grazing 
land. Mr Rancher has a herd of 52 cattle. His father gave him a gift of 5 cattle soon after 
he had completed his o-levels in 2003, he decided to move to A1 scheme in search of new 
pastures, through his father’s influence and assistance he bought more cattle from 
displaced white farmers. In 2009, he joined contract farming and now farms two hectares 
of tobacco, which gives him an average of US$21 000 per annum. He trades his steers at 
local cattle market and claims each beast fetches upwards of US$1000 and in a good year 
he can sell up to 20 beast. 
Mr Rancher said he was approached by the contractor to to produce tobacco for the 
company. He said he is provided with all the inputs, cash for labour and credit when he 
needs it. He claimed this has made his farming activities easier. The contractor proposed 
that Mr Rancher increased his acreage, an offer he said he would take in the next 
marketing season. Mr Rancher said he has good access to labour because he assists a lot 
of people in the area when ever there are problems like illnesses, deaths. He said, “in 
rural areas we live for each other, thus the only way you can make it. 
Mr Rancher’s success is visible for all to see, he owns two cars, has a furnished three 
bedroomed house, a tractor among other farm implements. He also bought a house in  
Harare, and goes on holiday around Zimbabwe after every tobacco marketing season. He 
is currently constructing a feeding lot for cattle fattening and looks forward to be buying 
maize and soya beans from other local farmers for the fattening of his cattle. 
The expansion of his farming enterprise resulted in the employment of a tractor driver 
and five permanent farm workers, and a maid. The tractor is hired out within the 
community. The cattle feeding programme will generate three more jobs and around five 
for the people who would mix the feed in the milling machine. A truck driver and assistant 
who would go round the farms buying produce. He believes, just like his father before 
him, all this benefits the community and more importantly his business.  
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Appendix 6: Use of social relationships to access resources 
 
Mr Tindo is a 43-year old farmer, married with six children. Mr Tindo was born out of wedlock and had 
to stay with his martenal grand parents when his mother married. He grew up in the Chiweshe 
community, but never went to school because he was not considered part of the family, since he was 
not a member of the patriarchy. His early years in life were therefore spent herding his grand father’s 
cattle, doing household chores. He also felt discriminated as he saw his age mates go to school. The 
excuse given by his uncles was always that there was no money for school fees.  
In 1997, Tindo lost his grand father. This was unbearable for him as the remaining uncles illtreated him. 
Under these harsh conditions Tindo confronted his mother and demanded to know his father. His 
mother was not forthcoming, however in search of his father Tindo managed to get leads to a hotel in 
Harare where his father once worked and met his mother. Unfortunately he only found out that his 
father had died five years back. Sensing that he would have a change of fortune among his father’s 
people, Tindo moved to his patriachical family in 1998. He married, from his new homeland, however 
things turned for the worst as conflicts over farm land with his father’s cousins took their toll. 
In 2006, he went back to Chiweshe where his grand mother allocated him a quarter of a hectare of 
land to build his homestead. Tindo had missed out on land invasions and subsequent land reform. He 
continued with his old profession working for farmers in both the communal areas and A1 settlements. 
He also moulded bricks for A1 farmers, learnt how to build tobacco barns. Together with his wife they 
had a small market garden by the river to supplement food needs and raise income.  In 2009, he worked 
for a tobacco farmer who paid him in kind with two turkeys (birds), in 2018 at the time of the study the 
turkeys had multiplied to fifty. Tindo sold his turkeys to buy fertilisers for his newly rented tobacco 
plot, pay school fees and build a third hut. He also bought three goats. He sold his tobacco through the 
farmer whom he worked for in a labour-land rent exchange. He also had access to the farmer’s cattle 
for draught power, barns for curing. His only complaint was that all his tasks were done after his 
landlord’s tobacco has been worked on. This affected the quality of his crop and retains from sales 
floor.  In the 2018, tobacco marketing season, Tindo was planning to buy a cow and possibly a plough. 
He was hoping to pool resources with his cousin, who also had a cow. Tindo was excited about the 
opportunities brought about by tobacco. He was only concerned that land was going to limit his 
progression, he summed it up, ‘…with land everything is possible, I only wish I can get my on and farm 
my way out of poverty”. Tindo offered the researcher accommodation, and this exposed the researcher 
to dailstruggle poor peasants go through. 
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Appendix 7: Struggling for survival after FTLRP 
 
 
 
 
Mr Banda (70-years old) migrated from Malawi in 1972, first settling in Karoi working as a 
farmer worker, five years (1976) latter he moved to Mazowe where he has lived the rest of his 
working life as a farm worker. Just before the land reform Mr Banda said he had been promoted 
to work in the horticultural division. He was rewarded with a three bedroomed house at Ardura 
roofed with asbestos where he stays to this day. He recalls how badly there were treated before 
Zimbabwe gained independence at times going without pay, because they failed to meet 
required targets. However he is quick to mention that things improved after independence 
when he started working for a new farmer who eventual gave him this house. Since FTLRP, life 
has become unbearable, he lost his small piece of land which he says was incorporated in an 
A1 farm, lost his job and now depends on working part time for the small scale farmers in the 
area, however the problem is that they don’t pay after the job is completed. At the time of the 
study Mr banda was employed in a wheat farm, to frighten birds which were preying on the 
farm’s wheat. He used a bell and drum to chase away birds He believes has has become poorer 
by the day but has nowhere to go except wait for his death at the farm compound.  Unlike his 
compatriots who are involved in trading of vegetables and other food stuffs, he says he no 
longer has the energy, in fact he says he has become immobile because of an injury he sustained 
on his left leg, and can only do light tasks. He claimed the local clinic has no medicine and is not 
thinking of going to Harare because he doesn’t have the money. 
Mr Banda’s children are now scattered in the neighbouring farms. He says they are also 
struggling as the only job they knew was farm work, and the new farmers were not paying 
enough for their survival. Mr Banda rents out his two bedrooms for  twenty-dollars. He uses 
this money to buy staple food and his small garden at the back of the house provides 
vegetables. His pension from National Social Security Authority (NSSA) has also been processed, 
because he did not know how to access it. His former employer deducted employee 
contributions. Mr Banda was excited that he had learnt about how to access his pension and 
said he was going to camp at the NSSA offices waiting for his pension. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 Livelihoods: activities and resources the community engage with to earn a living 
2 Fast Track Land Reform Programme: a radical redistributive land reform process which Moyo and 
Chambati (2013) argue was the only one of its kind since the end of the Cold War. Elsewhere in 
Africa there was one in Ethiopia (Pausewang, 1983). 
3 Community: This study adopts Oxford online definition: A group of people living in the same place 
or having a particular characteristic in common 
4 Partial resources: Most contract farming studies report on agribusiness supplying inputs and 
extension services and rarely are production assets provided though there might be a necessary 
condition for one to produce cash crops.  
5 Cognitiveeffects: In this study refers to processes involved in transfering knowledge, skills, 
technology, learning, and understanding of agricultural practices and adoption of new livelihood 
strategies. In poor communities this often happens through social relationships, interactions and 
common  tasks the community undertake, be it religious or other rituals 
6 Realist Approach: a research approach where qualitative data is used to establish causality based on 
the tracking of processes and mechanisms to explain observed outcomes. For example using life 
history interviews and observations respondents can explain the processes that they followed to get to 
whatever outcomes. This approach ‘values’ context which could be important in understanding 
outcomes.  
7 Moral economy Understood “…as obligations and responsibilities among and within families” ( 
Bessant and Muringai 1993: 552). These obligations and responsibilities are based on social 
relationships within the community. The social relationships allow people to transact economic 
activities 
8 Ward: The smallest governance structure in local government structures, covering villages or 
particular suburbs in urban areas. In this study the size of a ward was 1600 households 
9 Realist sampling techniques Sampling techniques popularised by Realist researchers, who seek to 
establish “causality” based on connectivity of events, selecting cases that speak to the theory and 
objectives under study. See Emmel, N. (2013). Sampling and choosing cases in qualitative research: 
A realist approach. Sage. 
10 Purposive sampling is a non-probability sample selected on the basis of the research question or 
objectives to pick the desired population characteristics 
11 Probability sampling is a method of picking a sample where every member in the population has an 
equal chance of being picked. The sample is picked randomly using statistical theory. 
12 Snowballing technique is a sampling technique based on referrals  
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13 Agribusinesses firms that produce, exchange and/or process agricultural commodities and/or 
services. 
14 Studying real markets, according to Bernstein and Oya (2014), investigates market exchange 
relations from a perspective of different power relations among actors. In this study, actors refer to 
farmers, contractors and other industry players 
15 De jure used here to mean a claim “based on laws or actions of the state” (Merriam-Webster online 
dictionary) 
16 De facto is understood here to mean: “resulting from economic or social factor:s rather than from 
laws or actions of the state” (Merriam-Webster online dictionary). 
17 Insertion of international capital in agriculture: Sachikonye (1989, 1991) provides details of how 
this process leads to exploitation and marginalisation of labour due to power imbalances in 
negotiating contracts 
18 Oligopsony: Oxford online dictionary defines it as “a state of the market in which only a small 
number of buyers exists for a product.” this is the meaning used in this study. While there are 20 
contractors operating, these are controlled by five big processors, and in most cases are subsidiaries, 
19 Land Reform and Resettlement Programme-2 (LRRP-2), a land redistribution plan presented to the 
donor conference in 1998 as a successor to the Lancaster house agreement on land. Donors were 
expected to avail funding for the resettlement programme. 
20 Jambabja: A Shona word for violent, chaotic encounter which is resolved through extreme force. 
21 Committee of Seven, a war veteran dominated committee that oversaw land settlement issues at the 
invaded farm. The issues included negotiating with the farm owner, vetting of beneficiaries 
22 Community-based livelihoods: Livelihoods that are derived from the common pool of shared 
resources in a community for example, forests, rivers and wide fruits. This concept is popular in 
Natural Resource management programmes 
23 Banding according to Mariam-Wbster online dictionary is “to form a group in order to do or 
achieve somethings”. This is common in moral economies like the one described by Bessant and 
Muringai (1993) in Chiweshe where households come together to perform particular tasks (see note 7) 
24 ICAs are voluntary local groupings of farmers within an ecological setup, which were 
operationalised in the 1940s after the Zimbabwe Natural Resources Act of 1941. Child &Child (2015) 
describe how, through persuasion and peer pressure, ICAs were critical in the preservation of the soil, 
vegetation and animal population through enforcement of good farming practices. 
25 According to ILO: “Own-account workers are those workers who, working on their own account or 
with one or more partners, hold the type of job defined as a self-employed job, and have not engaged 
on a continuous basis any employees to work for them during the reference period.” International 
Labour Organisation 1993). In Mazowe these workers employed part-time workers to execute specific 
tasks as piece workers. 
26 GAP also known as best agricultural practice in that is meant to protect the environment and is 
sustainable 
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